A New Party? Opportunists wait in the wings to seize upon a Lab-Con governing impasse

This weekend revealed that a number of rich donors are working on putting the pieces in place for a new political party. The revelation did not go over well, with a lot of criticism aimed at a party based on money first, and supporters second.

There is a strong impression among commentators that the plan is for a new party of neoliberalism and vague bureaucratic centrism, to unite the Blairite trend of New Labour with the Cameron and Osborne wing of the Conservative Party.

Is that really where the future of British politics lies?

Well the certainly times haven't been favourable to the Liberal Democrats, for instance, whose Orange Book wing that led them into The Coalition represents this same kind of neoliberal platform. They have largely been forgotten by the electorate - though there are more complex reasons for that.

Is a new neoliberal party the catalyst that will 'remoderate' an electorate that the 'centrists' perceive as being torn apart by the militant division between the Tories turning rightward and Labour turning leftward into Corbynist socialism?

Who would even lead such a party? Are Tony Blair and George Osborne hoping to make a dramatic political comeback? Maybe the plan is to push forward Yvette Cooper, the Labour leadership contender and figurehead of 'moderate' Labour?

This kind of party certainly seems to be a long term aim of Tony Blair, as we previously wrote about the direction he took at the helm of New Labour, steering Labour towards being a sort of big tent, middle ground, Democratic Party.

Blair and New Labour did not, however, complete their 'modernising' project. He and others tried to have things both ways - clinging to left-wing pretensions, and trade union backing and funding, even as they embraced right-wing economics - when an irreversible transformation of British politics was in their hands.

But that moment has passed. How would such a party even launch in the present climate and who could stand for them as a candidate?

The only practical route to such a party would be to rip the Labour Party in two, perhaps with some sort of agreement in place, at least in the short term, to not stand against each other - a possibility even Owen Jones has acknowledged.

The time when this might be a realistic possibility is not now, but in the aftermath of the next election if Labour do not beat the Conservatives. Would those who are anti-Corbyn leave or use the opportunity to topple him?

Whether to stand or walk is a dilemma the so-called centrists have been wrestling with. So far they have favoured staying and fighting. But with the strength of Labour's left-wing - pushing Corbyn to two leadership elections and gaining control of the party - if power isn't a prospect, then maybe the so-called centrists will see exiting as their only way to pursue their electoral agenda.

It has to be noted that new parties have little luck on the British political scene. The anti-EU movement had more success out of Parliament than breaking into it. Ripping current MPs and their seats from current parties, en masse, would increase the chance of success.

So another possibility, that might have more pull with 'moderate' Conservatives, would be for a party to launch in the aftermath of the election if Labour win only a minority government - but with more seats and votes than the Tories.

In that scenario, a new party would be able to prey on the opportunism of MPs on all sides of the House amid what would be seen as a very unstable impasse, with the Conservative Party humbled but Corbynism unable to deliver a majority.

However, there would seem to be little inspiring about a party of opportunists assembling to break an impasse. Would voters be grateful to them or see them as responsible leaders? And does such a 'party of the centre', a big tent Democratic Party, even have much of a vision to offer?

There is nothing convincing in any of this. It is still the view of The Alternative that - far more than a new party - we need political plurality and a Progressive Alliance fighting for a proportionally representative electoral system.

There's no such thing as politics without ideology - only policy made in the context of hidden or unexamined assumptions

George Osborne and Tony Blair took some time out of their busy, and well-paid, post-government lives to talk to a conference in Dubai about the "moderate, pro-business, socially liberal, internationalist" gap at the 'centre of politics'.

The centre that both have in the past claimed and which both have claimed to be a non-ideological space. It's a common claim, mostly levelled at Labour and it's Bennite left-wing, which Theresa May has used against both them and the EU.

But the use of 'ideology' as a pejorative misses one crucial thing: there's no such thing as politics without ideology - just policy made within the context of hidden or unexamined assumptions.

So what is an ideology? In short, it it comprised of: a philosophy of what the world is, an ethics of how people should behave in that world, an ideal of how society should function, and a politics laying out how to get there.

Politics is active element of ideology. It represents the structures, or absence of them, intended to shape society in a particular way, towards particular outcomes.

Comprehending this is crucial to understanding the Tories' time in government. While accusing their opponents of abandoning the centre for polarisation they oversee policies that, from a progressive perspective, have impoverished working people amid widening inequality.

When the evidence appears to be staring us in the face, when it seems so obvious to progressives, and yet conservatives do not see it, there has to be a bigger picture. That is ideology.

Consider the government's housing policy, born during the Coalition. The plan was to convert social housing into affordable housing, to support private sector house building with a higher rent threshold, thereby saving taxpayers money by reducing government housing spending.

This came with the acknowledged cost of a rise in housing benefit payouts, but it was believed that it would balance out in the public favour. It was, in basic, an attempt to shift an expenditure off the public books.

Yet the move in favour of privatised house building has not delivered for ordinary people. If there are benefits to tax payers, they are not balancing out the rise in average rents that has come with the collapse in social housing construction.

The government pursued a similar course with tuition fees. The cost of higher education was shifted onto the shoulders of students. This private, regulated, debt burden was deemed manageable by the Treasury and preferable to it contributing to the the national debt.

That demonstrates a rather cavalier attitude to private debt and Theresa May recently promising a review shows the government is feeling the need to moderate it's position against pushback from opposition.

So why continue with such policies - on housing, on tuition, on healthcare, on welfare, on so many core parts of society - even after it seems so clear, to progressives at least, that it isn't working and people are suffering?

The only sensible answer is ideology - the belief that the pain is a transitional phase, in a journey towards an ultimately more beneficial light at the end of the tunnel. Or, more darkly, that the pain is the point.

Macron and Popularity: The President of France has yet to win a sceptical public back over to the political process

Photograph: LEWEB 2014 Conference - in conversation with Emmanuel Macron by LE WEB (License) (Cropped)

The victory of Emmanuel Macron attracted the attention and plaudits of centrists across Europe, desperate for a way out of the slump that has undermined social and liberal democratic parties. But the talk in many countries of needing their own Macron and En Marche is all just buying into a myth, because the rise of Macron was an illusion.

Reports this last month talked of Macron and his government already facing a decline in public support. But what those reports ignore is that support was never that high in the first place - the election landslide was more due to the electoral system than a swell of support.

Macron's movement was perhaps well organised or made a particularly well tailored pitch, but En Marche mostly benefited from a system that favours voters' picking their least worst option - which served En Marche who were the heirs of the collapse in the credibility of the centre-left and centre-right.

Macron took just 24% in the full field first round of the Presidential vote, and La Republic En Marche took 32% on a first round legislative election turnout of just 49%. These numbers delivered political power, but not broad public support or high approval. There was no rising wave, just a window of opportunity.

The problem for Macron is not that he has been discredited, but that he has yet to win voters back to the political process. Taking power on the support of a quarter and a fifth, his approval ratings will begin low, with scepticism high and everything to prove.

Turning political power in decent approval ratings was never something that was going to happen overnight. The pledges of Macron were built around big promises with no easy solution, like cleaning up politics.

The difficulties faced by Macron and En Marche were underlined when, within the opening weeks of his new office, his MoDem political allies and their leader Francois Bayrou were hit by corruption investigations.

The other big promise Macron made was to reform France's labour laws, famous for their scale and complexity. It is an issue on which there is a clear public support for action, but no real consensus on what action.

Macron has his own ideas, but has set about a negotiating strategy, rather than trying to force it through. Even trade unions have gotten around the table for talks - with the two of the largest unions even declining to take part in protests against any watering down of labour protections.

While the left under Jean-Luc Melenchon and the union CGT push for protests and strikes, Macron's consensus approach with no legislative surprise has got enough of the key players involved to reduce action to the harder left organisations that media find it easier to discredit.

But the dissatisfaction with politics in France is too broad to be convincingly reduced to the bellyaching of the radical left. And despite the lean times and discrediting of the centre, neither the radical left nor the far right have taken a decisive advantage.

The people of France are not itching to rise up for either extreme, but nor have they fallen back in love with the Republican centre. Macron was never the unquestioned messiah and he has yet to win the public over.

The election results showed all of this. The approval ratings just confirm it. The task ahead of Macron is to rebuild the Republic and he has no gordian solution. A facsimile of Macron in another country would face the same problems.

Macron's ascendency is not the revival that liberals crave, nor are his low approval ratings the death knell of moderate-led reformist capitalism for which socialists are straining their ears. Macron got enough support to get through the door.

But to stay there, Macron and En Marche must win people back to the political process. Sure, his failure to reengage people would be a blow to neoliberals trying to cling to power. But it would be just as bad for progressives of all stripes, for whom public faith in democracy and a politically active and interested people are a cornerstone.

The Yellow Tide isn't what it seems: The neoliberal centre has depended upon abstention and prevails amid disinterest

Macron's landslide was not quite what it appeared, exposing how neoliberal Centrism depends upon disinterest and abstention. Photograph: Emmanuel Macron campaign poster 'Macron President' in Paris by Lorie Shaull (License) (Cropped)

The rise of Macron was met with a chorus of celebration from some corners for the resurgence of the 'Centre'. In France, we are to believe, the neoliberal Centre has recovered. But has the centre really found a new revitalising note?

In the presidential election, Macron prevailed as the neoliberal Centrist candidate thanks to a number of factors: the collapse of social democracy, repeated Centre-Right scandals, and because the Far-Right was sufficiently repulsive.

Now, even with the Left non-committal, Macron did secure the support of around 45% of registered voters in the head-to-head with the Far Right. But was the high water mark.

At the legislative elections Macron's party, La Republic En Marche, took a landslide majority. Yet it came amid a low turnout. While his party took 49% of second round votes, just 43% of voters turned out - giving them the support of only about 20% of eligible voters.

The neoliberal Centre is holding on to power, but it doesn't seem to be the result of its own arguments. If anything, it seems as if the Centrists are standing still as the turbulent waters wash around them. As protest votes and popular dissensions of the Left and the Right ebb and flow, the stagnant Centre appears to rise or fall.

Just look at Italy. Despite losing a crucial referendum in December and resigning as Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi won back the leadership of the Partito Democratico in a landslide. And judging from the polls, he will likely return as Premier at the next election.

If he does, it would be explicitly at the head of a party of Renziani Centrists and neoliberals, looking to replicate Macron's success. That comes thanks to the Left-wing of the party going through with its threat to leave if Renzi won back the leadership.

Under former party leaders Pierluigi Bersani and Massimo D'Alema, the Centre-Left walked away to work towards concentrating all of the many Left factions - including their own Democratici e Progressisti vehicle - under a single progressive banner.

This move leaves Renzi as the undisputed leader of a definitively Centrist party. Matteo Renzi again proves himself to be - in the years of turmoil created by Berlusconi finally, if only partially, falling from grace - pretty much the last man standing.

But what else does Renzi have? Other that his political skill that earned him the nickname 'il Rottamore' - the scrapper. He lost the constitutional referendum on which he staked his Premiership and the Renziani approach has alienated the Centre-Left and driven them out of the party - much as the Hollande governments did and Macron risks doing with his programme.

Furthermore, it was his political skill - not electoral success - that saw him rise to the position of Premier, after a succession of resignations when the Democrats under Bersani failed to gain enough support to govern with it's Centre-Left platform in 2013.

While the Democrats had consistently polled well under Renzi, up on 2013, their lead has slipped and the recent turmoil has seen them fall into a neck and neck race with the populist anti-establishment party Movimento 5 Stella (M5S).

The sum of this is that in Italy, the 'third way' Centrism - blending social democracy and neoliberalism - may return to power with Renzi, but it's unlikely to do so with sweeping triumph. Again, the waters are moving and the Centrists are not the ones moving them.

In the Netherlands, Prime Minister Mark Rutte celebrated his party remaining the largest and the halting of the Far-Right advance. But the figures tell a different story. Between the coalition partners - the Centre-Right liberal-conservative VVD and the Dutch Labour Party PdvA - they lost 37 seats and 24% of the vote.

For Rutte's VVD, it was the failure of an alternative to muster sufficient support from a fractured and plural political landscape that has kept him in power: they remained the largest party with just 21% of the vote.

It will take an across the spectrum alliance of at least four parties to keep Rutte's VVD in office. While that kind of pluralism is a positive thing, it's not exactly evidence of a great Centre revival.

In Britain, the failure of the Liberal Democrats to increase their share of the vote reinforced the point.

By succeeding in getting people to engage with politics, to turnout and vote, Jeremy Corbyn shut down what appears to be the main avenue along which the neoliberal Centre has travelled: abstention.

If this is the case, it makes the pitch made by the Lib Dems over the last few elections and the New Labourite obsession misguided. Pitching to be the party of faceless bureaucrats, the party of government, the party of business, only seems to work if people have lost interest.

Could a new British party of the centre have done better than the Lib Dems? A party of economically neoliberal social democrats, uniting Labour MPs with some liberals and even some Tories, and pitching to as broad a base as possible, under a leader like Yvette Cooper?

The numbers don't really support it. Even with the Tories and Labour getting their largest vote share for some time, abstention was still the largest block. The reality is that Centrism doesn't seem to have a convincing story to tell and so stands still as events move around it.

Macron was the rallying point to see off a threat. And while Justin Trudeau did indeed lead the Liberals to a huge comeback and landslide majority in Canada in 2015, he did so with the support of just a quarter of eligible voters - the gift of an electoral system - against the waning power of an ever more rightward leaning government.

If Renzi wins back to the Premiership in Italy with effective power, it will also be likely thanks to an electoral system. And, in the Netherlands, Rutte held on thanks to support being fractured across the plural options.

While the Right rallies an angry minority around a crude nationalism that makes wild promises and the Left assembles behind a hopeful interventionism, the Centre mostly benefits from disengagement. The the relative recovery of the Centre comes to look more like a holding pattern.

This isn't the sign of a recovery - it's the absence of one.

The Centre remains with a hand on power because disengagement remains a real issue and neither a Left Alternative nor the angry Far Right have, so far, won over enough support with the broader public.

While this does seem to toll the bell for neoliberalism, Centrism need not necessarily follow it. There is a place for Centrism, but right now it seems like the Centre is struggling to understand itself.

The Centre is supposed to be about balance. About inclusion. That is not the same thing as 'equidistance'. And the occupation of the centre ground by neoliberalism is more about 'received wisdom', the present consensus, than the ideals of the Centre.

In a pluralist society, Centrism has an important role to play. It pursues a stake in society for people on all sides and tries to maximise the utility of the society - to ensure the maximum number of people enjoy the benefits.

What that can't mean is accepting conservative narratives on the economy, the trap that the heirs of New Labour have frequently fallen into. That centrism, of neoliberalism, has become like a technical government, a bureaucratic caretaker while we await something better.

Those that values the ideal of the Centre - inclusion - need to wake up. The revival of the Centre is not what it appears. The politics of management is offering nothing and standing still. People are ready to move. Centrists need an answer as to where.

France 2017: Elections will be a stern test for the French political mainstream

The relationship between France and Europe will need to change regardless of who comes out on top in the 2017 presidential and legislative elections. Photograph: France and EU-flag, somewhere in Dunkerque by Sebastian Fuss (License) (Cropped & Flipped)

This year's French elections, both presidential in April and the legislative in June, represent the next important watershed in the struggle against the Far-Right. For progressives, they represent the next big hope for pushback against the extreme political trend represented by Brexit and Trump.

In the Netherlands, the failure of Wilders' Far-Right PPV to become the biggest party was celebrated by the mainstream - even by VVD's, despite their own loss of seats which makes their position as the largest and governing party more tenuous. Progressives have to start thinking bigger.

That won't be easy in France, where the political climate is fractious - which has been a consistent factor in the Far-Right's success wherever around the world it has reared its head. The governing Parti Socialiste and its President Francois Hollande and suffered a severe decline in its popularity and the fall in its credibility seems to have weakened the entire political mainstream.

As the Far-Right - the Front National under Marine Le Pen - threaten to gobble up a fifth or more of the votes, the parties from the Right through the Centre and Left are tangled in a close multi-party fight for the rest of the votes. The Far-Right is thriving on a mainstream in turmoil.

If the social conservatism, nationalism and hostile extremism of the Far-Right is going to be defeated, progressives in France need to find a way to work together despite their fractious splits. That will likely mean crudely rallying behind a single candidate in the presidential election. But for the legislative elections, it can mean a more practical alliance between separate parties or a simple willingness to engage and work together to freeze out extremists.

Electoral System

The presidential election, the first to happen on 23rd April, is a two-round contest. The election is completed in the first round if any candidate gets an outright majority. If not, the top two candidates face one another in a second round run-off.

The legislative election is contested in 577 single member constituencies, also over two rounds of voting - said to treated as the first vote cast with the heart and then the second with the head. The first round takes place on 11th June and the run-off is on 18th June (Henley, 2017).

Socialists and the Left - Hamon and Melenchon

Photograph: Benoit Hamon painted portrait by Thierry Ehrmann (License) (Cropped)

Under the Hollande Presidency, the Socialist government has faced painfully low approval ratings (Fouquet, 2016). Prime Minister Manuel Valls tried to bring about unpopular labour reforms and it has cost himself and his President dearly in political capital (BBC, 2016).

The result of the party leadership's unpopularity is that the chances of the party retaining power, either the presidency or in parliament, are low. Last year's regional election saw them drop to just 23% and 3rd in the first round - though they recovered a little to 28% and 2nd on second preferences.

In the face of a polling decline that was discrediting the mainstream of the party, the party's primary to nominate a presidential candidate saw an upset. Benoit Hamon, a centre-left critic of Hollande and a supporter of the basic income, became their official candidate for the 2017 election (Chrisafis, 2017).

But things are rarely simple for the Centre-Left these days. The Socialist situation is made much more difficult by the surge of support for an alternative candidacy. Emmanuel Macron, a former Socialist economy minister has launched an outside run - that is avowedly pro-European, liberal and centrist - for the presidency.

Macron's campaign, hoping to be a unifying candidate for the mainstream against Le Pen, even has the support of Socialist Premier Valls (BBC, 2017) - breaking a commitment Valls made to honour the outcome of the party primary, in order to back a candidate closer to his own position.

The socialist difficulties don't end there. They also face more opposition from further to the Left, in the form of Jean-Luc Melenchon's party Unsubmissive France. Melenchon received a positive public reception for a 'convincing' performance in the debate at the start of April (Willsher, 2017), thrusting him in amongst the leaders in the polls.

The nature of problems facing the progressive centre and left in France is demonstrated well by the Parti Radical du Gauche (PRG). The backing of the Radical Party of the Left is one of the few notes of consistency for the Socialists.

They have been a long time ally of the Socialists and, even entered their own candidate, party leader Sylvia Pinel, into the Socialist Party Presidential Primary. The Socialists had some relief when Sylvia Pinel announced last month that her party would honour the commitment to back the primary winning candidate (Le Monde, 2017).

And despite despite talk of discussions between the PRG and Emmanuel Macron, she acknowledged the need to unite and fight against the threat posed by the Front National. However, the Radicals are far from united behind the official stance, and some of its parliamentarians have announced their support for the outside candidacy Macron.

As for policy, there seems to be little on display in the campaign on any side - all of the focus is the notion of who best represents France. For Benoit Hamon's part, he has presented a more fleshed out set of policies than others.

Hamon has been vocal on wanting to further democratise Europe and to subject more of its policy convergence to be subject to the scrutiny and control of a democratic assembly (Flausch, 2017) - striking a compromises between a pro-EU position and the rising demand for change in the way the EU works.

At home he has made a pitch to recover working class support with policies like a robot tax, to tax automation that takes away jobs and cutting the working week to 32 hours (Serhan, 2017). He is also an advocate of the universal basic income.

However, without even the full support his party, it's unlikely that Hamon will even be amongst the chief contenders in the first round of the presidential election. The damage to the image of the Socialists seems just too much to overcome.

The Centre - Macron and Bayrou

Photograph: LEWEB 2014 Conference - in conversation with Emmanuel Macron by LE WEB (License) (Cropped)

In light of the negative perception that is hampering the Socialists and their nomination of a candidate some way to the left of the party mainstream, the party's former economy minister Emmanuel Macron launched a hastily arranged campaign for the presidency called 'En Marche!' (Lorimer, 2017).

From being dismissed as a bubble bound to burst, Emmanuel Macron has become the favourite, leading in all of the polls for both the first and second round votes. He has held rallies that, even in Britain (DW, 2017), received the attendance of crowds in their thousands (Gendron, 2017) - numbers comparable to those who flocked to see Bernie Sanders in the US election.

Liberals and pro-Europeans from across Europe have flocked to his side and offered endorsements - including Nick Clegg and EU liberal leader Guy Verhofstadt, with others taking a close interest.

But beyond his promise to run a hard campaign against the Far-Right and to stand up for the European mainstream, his policy positions seem somewhat thin - one French commenter described his campaign as like a movie, a canvas for a beautiful image without much depth (Gendron, 2017).

That may change when En Marche! has its list of candidates up and running for the legislative election, as appears to be the plan - and it would be hard to see them running without some sort of platform.

But that isn't so critical for a Presidential race where the aim is broad unity. It is notable that he has invoked a legacy of France governed from the centre in which he includes Jacques Chirac - in 2002, Chirac was elected overwhelmingly as the mainstream candidate versus Jean-Marie Le Pen, father of Marine, and his more openly extreme version of Front National.

Like with the Socialists, Macron is not the sole candidate of the Centre. But his chances are more clear cut. In theory, the 'official' centrists candidate would come from Francois Bayrou's Democratic Movement (Mouvement Democrate, MoDem).

In fact Bayrou only ruled out running again himself when he was sure Nicolas Sarkozy would not be running. As it stood, the centre was represented only by Jean Lassalle, a former MoDem Member of the National Assembly, on a 'Résistons!' ticket.

However Bayrou, having ruled out his own candidacy, proposed support for Macron (Willsher, 2017{2}) - an unsurprising move considering Macron's centrist campaign and rapid rise in popularity. The deal for Bayrou's support came a demand for a law to clean up French politics.

The tougher question is, how will Macron's En Marche! and Bayrou's MoDem mesh when it comes time for the legislative election? With plans in any definite form, it is hard to say what logo to expect candidates from the centre to be standing under come June.

The Right and the Far Right - Fillon and Le Pen

Photograph: EPP Summit Brussels December 2016 by the European People's Party (License) (Cropped)

The Republicans (Les Républicains, LR) started this campaign looking to have the presidency all sewn up. Former presidents and prime ministers were queueing up for a shot at being the party candidate (Vinocur, 2016) - including Nicolas Sarkozy, attempting a political comeback.

Yet their hopes have sunk low since then. Nearly every candidate was plagued with some sort of controversy or historical accusations of corruption in office. From Sarkozy to Alain Juppe, to Jean-Francois Cope, the leading candidates had track records they needed to overcome.

While it seemed for a brief moment that they had settled on a nominee free from such troubles in Francois Fillon, a social traditionalist and Thatcherite free marketeer, he also quickly found himself embroiled in controversy.

Fillon has been accused of creating, in essence phony, jobs for family members and using public funds to pay them. At a time when there is dissatisfaction with the political class in every country, it is the kind of story that won't go away.

If he had steered clear of trouble, he would still have found himself undercut - in efforts to be the mainstream candidate to face the Front National - by Macron, thanks to his platform that leans deeply into the territory of the Right.

On top of wanting tough measures against trade unions and ending the 35 hour working week, with restrictions on immigration, he wants cuts to public spending and an end to the wealth tax (McKenzie & Dewan, 2016). Hardly a broad platform.

The Right's ever further drift rightwards was to try and cover off the threat of the Far Right. After their performance in the regional elections last year, Marine Le Pen's Front National was seen as being in the strongest position amongst Europe's Far Right parties to rock the establishment.

Brexit only reinforced that idea. The fearful mainstream and grinning extremists alike presaged the EU's death in her victory. The trouble is, the 'surge' for Marine Le Pen and her party was never really what it seemed.

While passing 20% in the polls was a troubling landmark, her party has not been able to advance. The key is that it hasn't been able to convince a wider audience, despite efforts to make the Front National the respectable face of Far Right nativist nationalism.

In a departure from the more outspoken racism of her father, she co-opted mainstream values of French republicanism and sought to equate them with nationalism - as that which is native and needs protection. It hasn't worked. The most ambitious projections see her reaching the second round presidential run-off, only to lose profoundly.

Under the respectable surface are disturbing movements. There are dark and extremist rumblings. The face might be respectable but it is façade covering and benefiting from the rise of a cancerous extremism (The Guardian, 2017).

Implications

One thing is clear: the fallout from the French election will come with demands for things to change in Europe. Amongst the agreements that have kept the PS and PRG together is a commitment to overhaul the economic governance of the Eurozone and a call to harmonise Corporation Tax across the continent (Le Monde, 2017).

These would be gigantic, and necessary, steps and be a positive direction for the European Union, particularly in the fight against corporate tax evasion. From Far Left to Far Right, there will be pressure for some kind of action.

The presidential race is only the first and symbolic step. The second step will be taken in the legislative election, where some sort of consensus will need to be found among the progressive parties if they are to set the agenda.

Neither the Right, nor the Far Right, yet hold the balance. So what stands in the way of a progressive next step for France is whether or not the parties of the Left and Centre can find common ground.

In 2002, voters rallied around conservative Jacques Chirac in the presidential against Le Pen's father. It seems likely that the same will to unite behind anyone to 'beat the fascists' will stymie Marine in 2017.

But the various parties - the different streams of the Parti Socialiste, the Parti Radical de Gauche, Macron's En Marche!, Bayrou's centrist MoDems, Melenchon's Left groups and others - will need to pull together to ensure a positive progressive government emerges from the legislative election.

In Argentina, Macri's broad Centre coalition secured the Presidency. Yet the question remains: when can the Left cut ties with neoliberals to pursue truly radical reforms?

Mauricio Macri, pictured casting his vote in the August primaries, united the Centre-Right and Centre-Left opposition to defeat the Kirchner candidate and become the first non-Peronist, non-UCR President. Photograph: Mauricio Macri vota by Mauricio Macri (License) (Cropped)

After twelve years in power, the Kirchnerist faction of the Peronist movement, in the form of the Partido Justicialista, lost their grip on the Presidency of Argentina (Watts & Goni, 2015). In the second round of voting Mauricio Macri, leading the broad centre coalition Cambiemos, defeated the Justicialista, and former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, backed Frente para la Victoria candidate Daniel Scioli (BBC, 2015).

Macri's victory has been received positively as, possibly, the beginning for a new moderate Argentina (Cottle, 2015). And yet, while neoliberals, in particular, rejoice in a pro-market victory, Macri's Presidency has only come with the complicity of the centre-left, specifically the Union Civica Radicale (UCR, Radical Civic Union).

That tentative alliance raises the question of whether, sooner or later, those with Left-wing tendencies, particularly within UCR, will feel the need to go their own way - though there is a lot of work ahead before a progressive slate could win without some sort of agreement with, or against, the Peronist movement.

Not the least consideration is that the election of the conservative liberal Mauricio Macri will not, alone, be enough to change the direction of Argentina. Although, the defeat of Kirchner's populist Peronist candidate - which has brought a positive response from neoliberal pro-market voices - has been regarded as a new turn for Argentina and, possibly a little optimistically, the overthrow of populism (Rodriguez-Brizuela, 2015).

While the Peronists are still the largest group in the Congress, that may shift over the course of Macri's term as half of the Chamber of Deputies is elected every two years in legislative elections. And the efforts already launched by Macri at tackling Argentina's immense economic challenges have received praise (The Economist, 2016). So, for the moment, the momentum is with Macri.

However, Macri's support came from a coalition primarily divided between the Centre-Right party Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal, PRO) and the Centre-Left party Union Civica Radical - backed by a mix of supporters from across the centre (The Argentina Independent, 2015). So what of Macri's Radical partners?

Despite the party's name, the UCR is a moderate centre-left party, seen by the harder Left as bourgeois, that has for decades been caught between other factions. The traditional opponents of the Peronists, some internal and breakaway factions such as the Radicales K have nonetheless found themselves sometimes allies with Peronist factions, in pursuit of reforms that promise social justice and improvements to the lives of citizens (La Nacion, 2006).

Yet the authoritarian character of the Justicialista - with fears ranging from electoral fraud to intimidation and suppression of the press, along with policies like the confiscation of pension funds to plug financial holes (Marty, 2015; Crandall, 2012) - seems to have helped align the UCR with the opposition. That has led the UCR on the path joining Cambiemos, despite its mainstream, globalising, neoliberal approach (Rodriguez, 2015).

Now, it would not be a surprise to see the election of 2015 presented as a contest between the market and the state. Yet in reality, it was more after the fashion of the statist, populist and nationalist Peronists, holding a long-term authoritarian grip on power, versus a broad opposition, that Macri has succeeded in rallying around his open and 'neoliberal' way - that embraces the global system.

That is a story replicated across Europe in different shades - liberals and social democrats shackled to the neoliberal mainstream, in the face of rising fear and nationalism, rallying to protect positive gains embodied in the the establishment institutions. So why, the question might well be asked, would or should the Centre-Left consider breaking away from the Centre-Right? It is certainly clear that the global economic crisis is not over and that populist nationalism has not retreated - even in Argentina after its defeat.

The answer is because, ultimately, neoliberalism is no friend to social progress.

For all his moderate liberal credentials, as Mayor of Buenos Aires Mauricio Macri behaved in a typically neoliberal way - defunding social programs in search of competition at the expense of social security (Esperanza Casullo, 2015). And Argentina's Macrinomic path out of its present crisis will likely follow the same austerian path as many countries in Europe - particularly the UK under George Osborne Chancellorship.

But that doesn't mean that some overnight, clean break is imminent. Progressives in Argentina must build gradually towards an unshackling, because the election demonstrated that there is not yet much of a political space for a radical alternative to Peronist statism or the neoliberal market. Yet Macri's election has levered open the door and progressives must step into that new space to develop a fresh consensus around a just, sustainable and liberating alternative, amenable to the building of broad Left movement.

In the aftermath of the Syria Vote and the Oldham By-election, New Labour has scored itself some marginal points in its struggle with Corbyn - yet Labour remains divided

Hilary Benn's speech in support of expanding military action into Syria has left the rifts between the Left and Right of the Labour Party as deep as ever. Photograph: Hilary Benn by Jodie C (License) (Cropped)

After a number of important events in the week leading up, from the Chancellor's Autumn Statement to the vote on intervention in Syria, it would not have been outrageous to expect some sort of fallout in the Oldham West and Royton by-election.

In the end, however, it was ultimately uneventful. The incumbent Labour Party won, even increasing its percentage of the vote (Pidd, 2015). There was no drama in the end for Labour, no dramatic surge of support away from the party by voters fleeing its Left-wing leader (Harris et al, 2015; Warren, 2015).

Yet the past week's events, Oldham included, have shifted the political field ever so slightly. In the aftermath of the Syria vote and the Oldham by-election, it is the Right-leaning Labour faction who find themselves the marginal beneficiaries in their struggle with Jeremy Corbyn's leadership.

George Osborne's spending review, courtesy of the Office of Budget Responsibility's generosity in predicting a stronger economy, was as much a political play as economic. By performing a U-turn and not cutting tax credits, for now at least, and not cutting police budgets, Osborne was able to make his policies appear much more moderate (Kirkup, 2015).

From a Labour Right perspective, this was a master stroke by the Chancellor. In their view, Osborne will have countered and undermined criticisms levelled by Corbyn's shadow cabinet by removing its main threads and moved the Conservatives to occupy a centre ground they believed was being abandoned by their own leadership. With the Right of Labour feeling that the middle ground was slipping away from them, the Syria debate came at a politically crucial moment.

The vote on intervention in Syria saw a rebellion of 66 Labour MPs against the position of the party leadership (Sparrow & Perraudin, 2015), after - under a barrage of Conservative heckling - Corbyn had stumbled through his speech (Wallace, 2015). It also saw allegations from Labour MPs of abuse by angry constituents - the responsibility for which they were quick to pin to Corbyn (Dathan, 2015).

The biggest moment of the debate was clearly Hilary Benn's speech, which - while much applauded by Conservatives - in truth had little substance. There were no compelling facts, of which the debate as a whole suffered a disgraceful shortage, only emotional appeals. Described as a piece of political theatre (Shabi, 2015), it served both to stake out a distinct position for the Labour Right and to undermine Corbyn.

After so contentious a week, in was not unreasonable to think that sparks might fly at the Oldham by-election. Yet the result was a comfortable, status quo recovering, victory for Labour. Yet the Labour Right was again able to salvage something for themselves.

In Oldham, some on the Labour Right claimed the victory as a win in despite of Corbyn, amongst a population that had little warmth for pacifist republicanism (Pidd, 2015; Warren, 2015). The late Michael Meacher, a strong supporter of Corbyn and the Labour Left, was even replaced by a new MP, Jim McMahon, who is no follower of Corbyn.

This week has been a stern test for Labour. As a whole it has largely scraped through. However, while there were no decisive moments, the Labour Right will feel it has scored some marginal points in its struggle against Corbyn and his new direction. Yet for progressives more broadly, it was just another week of squabbling and division across the Left.

If Labour is going to compete with the SNP in Scotland, it needs to address its own complicated and confusing politics

Labour have a lot of work to do in Scotland if they are to recover from the landslide defeat that cost Jim Murphy his job. Photograph: Jim Murphy and Eddie Izzard meeting retailers in East Renfrewshire by Scottish Labour (License) (Cropped)

In his speech to the Scottish Labour Party conference, Jeremy Corbyn made clear his intention of facing the SNP head on in Scottish Parliamentary Elections in May (BBC, 2015). Corbyn pulled no punches in the speech, which contained barely veiled criticism of SNP. He referred to Labour as the true democratic socialist party, in both "words and in deeds".

Along with new Scottish Labour leader Kezia Dugdale, the Labour leadership face an undoubtedly uphill task. Even accounting for the 'Corbyn Effect' and 'Corbynmania', the general election in May was only the culmination of years of alienation - during which time the popularity of the SNP soared.

If Corbyn wants to outright defeat the SNP, he has to get to grips with Labour's long term Problems. At the last election, Labour lost support in every direction: they lost their base on the Left and amongst the working class by making those supporters feel abandoned; and they lost amongst their targets on the Right because the Tories convinced voters that their abandonment of the Left was not genuine.

Their unclear, inconsistent, positions - that sought to string the Left along without having to pursue Left policies - only led to alienation.

Ahead of Corbyn and Dugdale is the task of making Labour credible again. But rather than how this is usually interpreted - vis a vis embracing mainstream neoliberalism - the renewed credibility requires consistency: clear beliefs, backed by clear motivations, that support clearly communicated stances and policies.

That means Labour has to be very careful of U-turns and wavering - the choice to delay tax credits cuts rather than to kill them outright (BBC, 2015{2}), or Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell's shifting position on George Osborne's fiscal responsibility charter (Perraudin & Wintour, 2015), both being prime examples.

Along with establishing their own position, they also seem determined - if the thinly veiled criticisms from Corbyn's speech tells us anything - to shake the impression people have of the SNP as a true party of the Left.

There certainly are, undoubtedly, some legitimate criticisms to be made with regards to SNP governance (Macwhirter, 2015). And it isn't a departure from reality to suggest that the SNP could be more comfortably described as a broad tent party of the Centre. But the SNP under Nicola Sturgeon is no flash in the pan protest vote, to be undone by the simple bursting of a bubble.

The SNP used disaffection on the Left with Blair and Brown's long rule of Labour to first establish themselves, through Alex Salmond's Scottish minority administration, as a credible party of government. As Labour's credibility sank, the SNP converted that position into a majority in Scotland in 2011 and then a virtual sweep of Scottish seats at Westminster in 2015 under Nicola Sturgeon.

The position of the SNP has been at least a decade in the making. It is a well organised, with visible support that wields distinctive branding and a clear sense of themselves as the opponents of conservatives. Theirs is a formidable position.

If they're to compete, Labour need consistency, clarity and clear communication. Without addressing the complicated and confusing politics with which they alienated supporters as New Labour, they stand little chance of being seen as a credible alternative to the SNP.

George Osborne's appeal for progressives to back his 'reforms' cover an attempt to dismantle compassionate social security

An old branch of the Job Centre in London. Photograph: DSC_0107.JPG via photopin (license) (cropped)

In The Guardian on Sunday, George Osborne made an appeal to progressives and Labour Party MPs to get behind his welfare 'reforms' (Osborne, 2015).

"We are saying to working people: our new national living wage will ensure you get a decent day’s pay, but there are going to be fewer taxpayer-funded benefits.... I believe this settlement represents the new centre of British politics, and appeal to progressive MPs on all sides to support us."

Yet even as Osborne attempted this appeal to 'moderates' with his new 'Centre', Conservative ministers were floating policy ideas that made it clear the party is not content to settle for just the latest round of austerity cutbacks.

While it has become abundantly clear that austerity is the long term economic plan that the Conservative leadership has taken pains to remind us of, ad nauseum, the ambitious extent to which that plan would be extended was not.

As far back as 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron was telling guests at the Lord Mayor's dinner that austerity measures would, in the end, produce a 'leaner' state permanently (Watt, 2013). The first Conservative budget, divorced from the Liberal Democrat obstructions, then arrived with a prelude from Cameron, announcing his wish for a 'higher wage, lower welfare, lower tax' society (BBC, 2015).

But even the budget, with its cuts to welfare - which have been variously criticised as driving divisions between the old and the young (McVeigh & Helm, 2015), between men and women (Watt & Perraudin, 2015), and between the rich and poor (May, 2015) - only mask a more fundamental change being pursued.

There is a project under way to comprehensively deconstruct the welfare state and the principles upon which it was founded. From the NHS (Campbell, 2015), to welfare (Mason, 2015), to even the post office (Macalister, 2015) and public broadcasting (Perraudin, 2015), the public sector is faced with being stripped back and undone - with tax funding for services being replaced with fees charged to the 'consuming' individuals.

The big question is why? Looking beyond the temptation to suggest a colourful variety of reasons involving detached selfishness and collusion with vested interests, what ideological and theoretical motivations are there to dismantle the systems of social security?

The word that comes up, again and again, is dependency.

From around the 1970s, modern conservatism began to form itself around the long abandoned ideas of classical liberalism, absorbing its priorities of laissez-faire, that is non-intervention, and meritocracy. Those principles are used as the theoretical underpinning of a low tax, low regulation and low equality modern conservative economic system, that acts as the social framework for advancing certain deeply ideological values.

The stated aim is to encourage self-interest, or greed as Boris Johnson championed it (Watt, 2013{2}), while discouraging dependence. It is in particular dependence which these modern conservatives see as the danger inherent to systems of welfare and social security.

The practical application means divorcing the state, acting on behalf of society and particularly of its richest members, from the responsibility of securing the wellbeing of the individual members of society - passing that duty off onto the individuals themselves. Through this means, neoliberal conservatives aim to drive individuals to self-interested action, where their productive work directly links to their social security and makes them wholly dependent upon themselves.

What they do not seem to grasp is that the idea of paid work, in the form of productive labour - with success and wealth marked as the result individual character, and failure and poverty as likewise the result of a personal fecklessness - is a deeply moralistic and ideological viewpoint of how society should function.

The facts do not bear out these moral and ideological beliefs. If you are born poor, the statistics say you will likely remain poor (Harrison, 2013). Whatever merit based rewards that the market might offer are suppressed or distorted by very real social conditions. Liberties and rights become privileges far out of reach for most individuals, who are reduced to factors of production competing with each other for survival.

So busy are neoliberal modern conservatives in trying to avoid dependency (George & Wilding, 1994) - and an escalating collectivism that they fear it would lead to - they ignore, are blind to, or outright disavow, the necessity of facilitating opportunity, for competition to actually be fair and so produce meaningful outcomes, or facilitating justice, where members of community are fairly supported and rewarded for the competitive exploitation of what ultimately belongs to the community.

Neoliberalism also undermines two important factors in any progressive state: social cohesion and the principle of universality. Through progressive tax contributions that pay for general use public services, society is bound in a common obligation (Peston, 2015). A portion of what is made by the individual through the exploitation of other individuals and of community resources, is used to fund care and support for the whole community.

The public sector, from healthcare to education, represents the individual members of society pooling their funds to provide a universal service. Everyone, who can, pays in and everyone benefits, regardless of their bank account, from freely accessible services. Communities, and society at large, are brought together on the basis of compassion, acknowledging the inherent value of one member of a society to another - with each member benefiting from the education of another and from their wellbeing, healthy and free from poverty.

Neoliberalism is neither post-ideological nor centrist. It carries very definite social aims that are focussed squarely upon the destruction of this consensus. In its place is put a highly moralised version of earning a living, where working for pay - however degrading and insufficient - is no longer a necessary sufferance, which radical reforming governments attempt to alleviate, but the focal point of an individual's life and a  marker of their worth (O'Hagan, 2012).

At a time when people are talking seriously of abolishing poverty (Ban Ki-moon, 2015), are rolling out trials of the basic income (Perry, 2015) and discussing the possibilities of a post-capitalist society based on abundance (Mason, 2015), George Osborne is trying to implement a system designed to entrench the old world - and he wants the help of progressives in rewriting that script.

But whatever iniquities the welfare state may have, including its cost, what is there to consider progressive about coercing people into paid employment, however degrading, with the threat of impoverishment? The classical liberals of old were left behind by the modern liberals (1928), who moved on to say:

"We believe with a passionate faith that the end of all political and economic action is not the perfecting or the perpetuation of this or that piece of mechanism or organisation, but that individual men and women may have life, and that they might have it more abundantly."

Dignity and self-esteem come from autonomy - which is a far throw from a life lived supported by the ever insecure low pay scraped together from working in poor conditions for exploitative employers. The austerity agenda will not achieve them for any but the very few.

Liberal Democrat Leadership Election: Who's who and what do they stand for?

The Liberal Democrat leadership election is the first step to recovery for a party whose voice is being missed in the campaign to protect human rights in Britain.

After the party's electoral collapse in May, the Liberal Democrats have run an accelerated campaign to elect a new leader to replace Nick Clegg. Voting will come to an end on 15th July and the results will be announced the following day.

Clegg's resignation has, dramatic as it was following the party's disastrous election night, been seen as a long delayed inevitability (Wintour & Watt, 2015). Ultimately, the decision to go into coalition with the Conservatives seems to have been something from which the party could not recover.

And yet, early indications suggest that the party nonetheless possesses an enduring appeal. Their presence is already being missed in the defence of civil rights and liberties (The Guardian, 2015), and council bye-elections are already being won (Steerpike, 2015).

However, their collapse has raised a question within the party, one that has importance for all of the parties across the Centre-Left (Kettle, 2015). Is the response to the election loss to move Left and embrace more idealistic positions, or to move Right and try to win voters away from the Conservatives directly?

For the Liberal Democrats this has been distilled into the nominated candidates. The candidate representing continuity with Clegg, seen as the Centrist and Centre-Right wing of the party which is concerned with being a practical party of government, is Norman Lamb. The more Left-leaning candidate, which in the case of the Lib Dems means embracing its campaigning and grassroots tendencies, is Tim Farron.

Norman Lamb

Norman Lamb served in the last government as a Minister of State for Care and Support, a position he pursued with a personal passion. He has made a point of vociferous campaigning on issues of mental health, and was deeply involved in the party's aims of putting mental health onto an equal footing with physical health (Lamb, 2015).

Lamb is very much the designated heir of the Centrist liberal faction that took the party into the Coalition - something reflected in the endorsements he has received, which include Clegg's closest supporter and former party leader Paddy Ashdown (Lindsay, 2015). Little can symbolise that more distinctly in the minds of voters than the fact that Lamb voted for the Coalition reforms to tuition fees (BBC, 2010).

So far Lamb has argued that the party should not retreat to its comfort zone (Lamb, 2015{2}), a sentiment likely reflected by those in the liberal centre. Yet, at the same time he argued for new ways to tackle economic inequality that are not based on old models of redistribution - singling out mutuals and social enterprises as things that liberals 'instinctively' support.

Tim Farron

Tim Farron remained aloof of the government during the last parliament, during which he served as the party president - a position from which he was often a voice critical towards the coalition (Greenwood, 2015). As might be expected, he voted against the coalition tuition fee changes (BBC, 2010).

The MP for Westmoreland and Lonsdale has received the endorsement of the party's more radical, campaigning, Left - including former leader David Steel, who was very critical of how the Coalition was handled (Steel, 2015) - and the leaders of the Welsh and Scottish Lib Dems (Perraudin, 2015). He also, notably, has the endorsement of both The Guardian and the New Statesman (The Guardian, 2015{2}; New Statesman, 2015).

Farron's main distinctive positions came up in the debate between the candidates at 2015 Conference of the Social Liberal Forum group (Lindsay, 2015{2}). He displayed his openness to liberals increasing taxes to fund public services and expressed a willingness, should he become leader, to not get into conflicts with the party conference policy making processes. Farron has also stressed his intention of rebuilding the parties grassroots and so increasing party membership 100,000 by 2020 (Farron, 2015).

Quiet establishment man or the problematic firebrand?

Voices in the social liberal and liberal centre wings of the party have their own reasons for leaning either way. Those in the liberal centre argue that there is value in the consistency of remaining in the Centre, from which the party's only opportunities to make its policies a reality will come through coalition with the Conservatives or with Labour (Tall, 2015).

For social liberals, however, there were important things ignored by the party leadership from 2010 onwards (Howarth, 2015; Smith, 2015). They argue that the leadership abandoned the radical Left-of-Centre causes and ideals, upon which they had been elected, in favour of a Centrist coalitionism - built around stability, unity and the embrace of a Toryism-lite - for which they had no mandate and were duly punished.

The Guardian has argued that there is a need for a figure who can lead a 'charismatic insurgency' (The Guardian, 2015{2}). But there are also warnings against the danger of traumatised parties electing 'feel good', comfort zone, candidates (Kettle, 2015). That need for a comfort zone candidate may factor in if there is felt to be a strong need to distance the party from the previous leadership and its direction.

One way of ensuring that distance could be embracing the rebranding of the party, with talk going around of a possible name change. Changing the name of the party could be a powerful moment upon which to hang the interviews and coverage that would make clear how the Lib Dems have heard their critics and responded (Withnall, 2015). In that case, Tim Farron's detachment from the Coalition would seem to make him the more ideal candidate - and he has certainly floated the idea of a fresh start (Farron, 2015{2}).

Yet there remain lingering reservations about Farron, in regards to his seemingly anti-liberal personal stances on a number of pressing social issues from abortion to gay rights (Birrell, 2015). With the party desperately needing to regain trust and a consistent identity, his own inconsistency could well factor against him and the party.

Though Farron might suggest that these personal standings should have no bearing, it is hard to escape an overriding feeling that there is also a decision to be made between the candidates' different characters: the quiet and practical, though establishment, man or the problematic firebrand. It's as if liberals are once more being faced with the spectre of siding with Asquith or Lloyd George. A more easily unifying figure would have been preferable, such as Jo Swinson - who would surely have been a leading candidate had she retained her East Dunbartonshire seat.

Rebuilding trust

In The Guardian, back in 2006, the late Charles Kennedy argued that:

"Fewer people are joining political parties, yet single-issue pressure groups continue to flourish. Mass international movements - from opposition to the war in Iraq to last year's Live 8 - demonstrate how great issues and principles can still motivate on a huge scale. But somehow our current political culture seems unable to accommodate and address such concerns...

...The danger in all of this is that if sufficient people conclude that there is nothing in the conventional political process for them then they may opt for more simplistic and extreme options on offer. I remain an optimist. But across the mainstream political spectrum there is a candid recognition of the danger."

For Liberal Democrats, and liberals generally, this has become a matter of great importance. Regardless of who becomes party leader, their first task must be to regain political trust. That means carving out a distinctive position that the whole party can comfortably adhere to and, importantly, campaign on. It means opening the party to working with others for electoral and political reform and encouraging a progressive alliance, even if only informally.

From a pragmatic point of view, those will likely remain the priorities - for the moment at least. Anything else might simply lead to a division that would strip the party of any credibility it has left, which means that neither candidate is likely to pick a fight with the supporters of the other. As a result, the issues that arise between the Centre and Left strands of liberalism are likely to go unresolved in the present. This election will instead be about who leads, rather more than to what they lead the party.

The Labour leadership election begins in earnest. But what will the candidates stand for?

With the nominations counted and the candidates confirmed, the 2015 Labour leadership election campaign has begun in earnest. The day was marked with the first televised debate last night in Nuneaton, which had been a prime Labour election target seat where the party had failed spectacularly (BBC, 2015).

For the position of party leader the candidates are Andy Burnham, Yvette Cooper, Jeremy Corbyn and Liz Kendall (BBC, 2015{2}). At the same time, there will also be an election for the deputy leadership. Standing for the position of deputy leader are Ben Bradshaw, Stella Creasy, Angela Eagle, Caroline Flint and Tom Watson (New Statesman, 2015).

The most pressing issues for the leadership candidates will be to address what they believe went wrong in 2015 (Wintour, 2015), and to find answer to those beginning to ask what the point is of the Labour Party (Jones, 2015; Todd, 2015).

Amongst the prospective leaders, Andy Burnham and Yvette Cooper most represent continuity with the New Labour project, having both been deeply involved with Blair and Brown governments and regular frontbenchers over the last Eighteen years. Both Burnham and Cooper announced their candidacy with an appeal to the party not to move Left or Right, but to make a broad appeal with an emotional connection to everyday lives (Wintour, 2015{2}; Gayle, 2015).

Liz Kendall was the first, and is both the youngest and most right-wing, candidate on the list, having made it clear that she believes the Labour Party did not 'do enough to appeal to Conservative supporters' (Chakelian, 2015).

The final candidate, who just scraped onto the list, is Jeremy Corbyn, representing the old Socialist Left-wing of the party. His candidature has been commended for opening up the leadership contest, turning it into an open, public debate between the Left and Right on the future of the Labour Party (Kelner, 2015). Corbyn declared his candidacy by mocking the other candidates' obsession with 'aspiration', by declaring his aspiration the close the inequality gap (Corbyn, 2015).

At last night's debate in Nuneaton, all four had their first chance to connect with an audience (Wintour, Watt & Mason, 2015; Watt, 2015). What was most starkly remarkable about three of the four candidates was how very little seems to have changed from the 2015 general election campaign message. The leaders in waiting are still talking about immigration, work as a responsibility to work, of leaving Labour's past behind and embracing business.

There is a growing consensus that Labour is going to need something more from its next leader if it is going to get into government after the next election. A big idea (Robinson, 2015). Conviction (Behr, 2015). The Green Party MP Caroline Lucas even offered her thoughts, proposing that Labour finally embrace multi-party politics (Lucas, 2015). All of these things will factor as decision time approaches for Labour. It awaits to be seen whether the party will the party stay in the Centre-Right, hoping to beat the Tories at their own game, or if they will try to come up with a real, progressive, alternative message?

Labour and the Lib Dems talk of reclaiming the 'Centre' - but what do they mean?

The UK general election made it abundantly clear that the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats did not have the confidence of voters. In the face of that defeat, the respective parties have begun their own internal debates over their future. One of the questions that both parties will be asking is whether either of them need to claim the political centre ground to recover their electoral fortunes.

Labour leadership candidate Yvette Cooper has already made it clear that she won't back a 'lurch' to the Left or Right (Gayle, 2015), and the Lib Dems are also being cautioned against straying from the 'liberal centre' in search of the more radical liberalism for which they built their pre-Clegg reputation in opposition (Tall, 2015).

What isn't necessarily clear for many observers is what exactly is meant by the 'centre'.

There are, in essence, two of them. The first is the position of compromise between the grand historic ideological positions of liberalism, democracy and conservatism. The other represents a shifting point which acts as the 'centre' of a space shaped by the dominant voices of the day on the main issues - usually the media outlets with the broadest audience and the main political parties.

The Historic Centre

The historic centre represents a kind of Roman ideal, holding the space where the interests and sections of society are brought together - where the Romans were seen to have built a polity that incorporates elements from all of them. It is the place of mixed government, mixed economy and compromise between the grand polemic ideological positions - which represent ideals like individualism and communitarianism, progressivism and conservatism, libertarianism and authoritarianism.

While the shifting centre depends upon parties each appealing to a perceived majority opinion, the historic centre is the both the result of the development of distinct ideological positions and a place of compromise between the sections of society these ideologies have been seen to represent.

In Nineteenth Century Europe, the stranglehold of monarchist conservatism found itself challenged by radical new ideas. The enlightenment ideas of reason and progress - that had played a significant role in the American and French revolutions - had led to the formation of political groups and associations of radicals, republicans and reformers.

That new republican Left-wing of politics was broadly composed of two separate ideological groups: the liberals and the democrats. During the revolutionary struggles of 1848 the dividing lines between the two became apparent. While the liberals had been content to reform the old system slowly - accepting limited concessions in the form of a constitution, small extensions of suffrage and more freedom for merchants and burgeoning industry to open up a free trading free market - the democrats had wanted more.

The democrats wanted control placed in the hands of the people. During the strife of 1848, the democrats decisively split from the liberals and from amongst them came the early developments of socialism - including the works of Karl Marx. That division between the liberals and democrats, on the road to their own versions of progress, allowed the conservative establishment to survive. A counter-revolution followed, but what that reaction could not suppress was the emergence of these three broad positions, two upon the Left and one upon the Right, which were seen as each representing broad progressive sections of society.

Between these positions - each with their own distinct, historical priorities: the democrats for equality, community and the workers; the liberals for opportunity, the individual and the professional and merchant classes; and the conservatives for tradition, security and the traditional hierarchy - there lies a centre ground balanced in a compromise between these positions and sections.

The use of that place has been ascribed to the Roman system of mixed government, referred to and interpreted by renaissance thinkers as civic humanism. The primary concern at this centre was to avoid tyranny of all kinds, of any ideological or sectional type, by creating a society that balanced the various parts of society within the establishment's institutions. In Roman terms that meant singular monarchical figures in the form of term-limited Consuls, the aristocratic wealthy interests in the form of the Senate, and democratic participation in the form of direct democracy and civic assemblies.

The Shifting Centre

Though it may not feel like it, what with all of their similarities, Britain does still have three main parties representing these three grand historic ideologies - Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. Their connection to these distinct historic positions has however been weakened by their competition over the Centre ground - in the name of chasing the power to govern.

The Centre the parties compete over today is not, however, a true compromise between each ideological viewpoint and sectional interest of society. The contemporary Centre has been shaped by the times. Tony Blair's Third Way social democracy, David Cameron's attempt at a warm and fuzzy conservatism, and David Laws' Orange Book liberalism all represent responses to a Centre that shifted to the Right, deep into Conservative territory, due to the drastic changes to the balance of power between sections of society that took place in the 1980s and 1990s.

All three accepted the possibilities created by the flimsily founded wealth generated by the aggressive speculative capitalism of the 1990s and 2000s. All three accepted deregulation and light touch management, only interfering as much as was needed to ensure a small amount of wealth redistribution to serve those social purposes prioritised by the party ideology - broadly speaking equality, opportunity and security, for Labour, the Lib Dems and the Tories, respectively. All three accepted that the balance of power had shifted significantly into the hands of wealthy vested interests and so adjusted their approach accordingly.

That has, however, proved a dangerous game. The question that many will have asked over the last twenty years is: what is the point of having power if you have lost what makes your use of it distinct?

Disillusionment with the tripartite status quo, where the big three parties appear to have become indistinguishable, has fragmented the old system. Even though the Conservative Party managed to just about squeeze out a majority, it is a narrow lead on a poor mandate - less than 25% of eligible voters - which, by prizing a majority to the Conservatives, has done little to re-establish the legitimacy of the old system. If anything, it may simply accelerate its collapse.

A Decision to Make

The trouble for Labour and the Lib Dems is that to 'win' an election, under the present system, means receiving votes from the broadest groups of voters, not simply representing a section of society. That has led both parties to make compromises with the dominant social attitudes of the day in order to appeal, not to the historic centre, but to the shifting centre - first in the 1990s and 2000s with the wealth created by an economic boom, however shaky its foundation, and then in the 2010s with the growing cynicism towards welfare, free movement and immigration.

The big decision now ahead of both parties is whether to return to a purer form of the party ideology, with the risk of becoming little more than a sectional voice for a particular interest, or to embrace the chase for the votes at the shifting centre, with the risk of alienating more idealistic supporters in order to gain the support of those whose views have been formed from the dominant attitudes of the times. That decision comes with a lot of questions to answer.

Should the parties give up their distinct arguments to appeal to as large an audience as possible, in order to gain the power to implement their vision? What would then make any party distinct from another? Would there be something dishonest in that approach?

Or, should the parties be up on a platform, making their distinct arguments heard and trying to convince people of the merits of their ideals, each representing a small portion of voters? And where society remains divided in the aftermath of an election, place trust in coalition government?.

There are no simple answers. It is, however, worth considering a few things: whether we believe or not that people are fixed entities, with definite and fully formed views, bound to the narrow interests of their section of society; whether we believe or not that ideologies can offer a broader civic vision, in which people from all parts of society can find merit, without a party having to give up its distinct ideals; whether we believe that it is the justly democratic act to attend to the dominant social attitudes of the day, regardless of the evidence, or if we can or should challenge that popular consensus with idealism and evidence.

The popular consensus of today has pulled the shifting centre far into conservative territory. The voices advocating for business, for low taxes and for nationalist priorities like restricting immigration are writing the contemporary political narrative. To deviate too much means risking being seen as an idealistic extremist. To play for votes from the midst of that consensus means progressive parties straying a long way from their idealistic alternatives.

What stands before those who have to make the decision is a choice between a pragmatic path to the power to govern and a, potentially, politically impractical pursuit of idealism. The path each party has chosen won't be known until their newly elected leader begins to shape new policy ideas. But it is to be hoped that a decision to tread a practical path can still find space for presenting visions of alternative societies outside of the present limitations and boundaries. That there might be included the aim of changing minds and reconstructing social norms, values and structures so that in the future we might see our ideals represented rather than sacrificed on the road to political office.