The Alternative General Election 2019: Progressive parties need to settle their differences

This is another election that will come down to a simple arithmetic: how can progressives prevent another Tory government, led by Boris Johnson as Prime Minister. That simple arithmetic is given a crudity by the fact that most of the progressive parties do not get along.

It's a particularly extraordinary factor in British politics, when you consider how close our progressive political parties are to one another - in their concerns, in their approach, in their policies. Those crossovers continue into this election.

Progressive Goals

All of the progressive parties share a commitment to tackling the climate crisis, with emissions goals set for the 2030s. The features vary, but include tackling energy costs for households and funding the reorganisation of the energy sector and industry to reduce pollution.

Lifelong learning is also a common feature, committing progressives to spending more to enable people to retrain during their working life, and adapt better as the economy changes.

Across the progressive parties is also an instinct to ease the burden that comes with welfare, including, in some form or another, a trial scheme for a basic income.

And of course, tackling the housing crisis is a key priority for all of them, with each making their pitch for how many and what kind of homes they will build.

As ever though, the parties have their differences. What primarily divides the progressive parties are their jealous priorities - and also their deep seated dislike for one another's approach to politics.

Priorities

For Labour, it is what they call real change - the role that public ownership could and should play in giving people a fair chance at a good life. A possibly expensive policy objective that has riled up a lot of people within and without the party.

For the Greens, it's the climate emergency. The centrepiece to a manifesto with some big commitments is £100bn to reach emissions targets by 2030 - much more ambitious than those of the other parties.

And for the Liberal Democrats, they have made "Stop Brexit" their slogan, and to the annoyance even of some of their own supporters, almost the single issue for which the party now stands - even when they might make meaningful pitches on welfare or education reform.

None of these priorities ought to rule out cooperation, but the mutual antipathy between the parties and their memberships always makes things difficult. But imagine if they could cooperate?

For now, see for yourself how close the two biggest progressive parties get in their manifestos, which we breakdown in these articles below:

Labour manifesto review, 'Real Change';

Liberal Democrats manifesto review, 'Stop Brexit';

and then contrast those with the manifesto, and the record in government, of the Conservatives, 'Status Quo';

How badly do you want the Tories out?

This election has all the makings of another two horse race - however much Jo Swinson may be hoping for a Canadian Liberal scale landslide shift. This country's two-party system is just too hard to crack without extenuating circumstances, and the Lib Dems have made too many people mistrustful.

Which makes Labour's determination to stick to it's majoritarian big tent attitude - even in the Corbyn/Momentum era - all the more absurd. Yes, Britain has a two party system. But it has many more parties, that all gain votes and all have devoted supporters who at times are openly hostile to the big two.

Not working in alliance with the third parties, and not working to break up this inequitable electoral and parliamentary system, is a ludicrous act of self harm by the Labour Party - which clings to the remnants of power, mostly expressed these days in the one-party-state level of control it holds over some communities.

Not that other parties have been displaying much of an appetite for unconditional cooperation. The Lib Dems have been trying to oust Corbyn, or deny him the Premiership, as their price for working with Labour. Meanwhile, the SNP want a second referendum on Scottish Independence as their price - one that is too high for most English parties.

That's not to say there has been no cooperation. Working in a small progressive alliance, the Lib Dems, the Greens and Plaid Cymru will probably be able to pick up some crucial seats among the sixty where they are working together. Taking seats away from the Tories, but perhaps also taking seats from Labour.

Labour need to be on the right side of these political alliances if it wants to get into government. The balance of support, in England in particular, means that Labour depend upon tactical voting for them against the Tories, and voters elsewhere leaving the Tories for parties who have a chance to oust them where Labour are outsiders.

Like at the last election, it may be left for ordinary voters, campaign groups and local party associations to work out the cooperation that the national level party leaderships can't if progressives are to oust the Conservatives and their damaging era of austerity and government-by-press-release.

And the damaging era of Tory rule must end. It's been a disaster for the most vulnerable, with the return of Dickensian poverty. Austerity is bad and there is no end in sight under the Tories.

The Alternative Debunk: Populism, democracy and where it ends

In refusing to rule out further votes on her Brexit Deal - should it be defeated in the Commons - Prime Minister Theresa May has doubled down on a stubborn stance. Adamant that she has a Brexit mandate, May won't countenance a challenge to it.

Whether she likes it or not, that puts the Prime Minister in the same camp has the hardcore Brexiters, who argue that the first referendum was the final say - however flatly untrue that stance may be when it comes to UK constitutional conventions.

In a time when interest and participation in democracy has been slipping, when democracy has been increasingly under assault from fake news and far right populism, it is unhelpful when the Prime Minister coopts their arguments.

Populism and democracy

Populism is a word that gets thrown around in the media, being used to refer to popular movements of left as well as right. But it's not accurate to equate the two.

On the left, popular movements are increasingly horizontal, cooperative and reflective of a belief not in a single struggle, but in the commonality between different struggles to shake off inequalities that affect people based on their identities - ethnicity, sexuality, gender - and stand together in solidarity.

On the right, popular movements are emotional, exclusionary and 'competitive' - highlighting difference between groups of people and pitting them against each other, even against good sense. These are the so-called 'populist' movements. It is a populist idea that one vote is enough to settle something in a democracy.

Like he idea that the referendum ended the conversation, that the will of the people was crystalised in one popular vote - which is clearly undermined by the fact that any political party could stand at a future election on a manifesto to stop Brexit, and upon winning a majority have the right to implement it.

The populist sentiment is a trap that Theresa May fell into the moment she tried to claim the referendum mandate for her own government. It was aggravated by the fact that she hasn't been able to covert the referendum result into a Parliamentary majority - functionally necessary to delivering any change.

With the referendum vote in her pocket, Theresa May triggered a snap election and stood on a party manifesto that promised to deliver Brexit. But she failed to win a majority. And in that failure was exposed the problem with the referendum in the first place: there wasn't, and still isn't, a party of Brexit with a Parliamentry mandate to deliver it.

Lincoln and the Union

In a democracy, the ideal is that even those who lose out most in the result of a poll will be able to appreciate the importance of respecting the will of the majority - it's a key aspect of democracy. Populists have been quick to label their Remainer opponents as undemocratic sore losers.

However, with the Brexit referendum, the populist Brexiter side has exploited their temporary majority and failed to respect the fact that majoritarianism is two sided: yes, the will of the majority needs to be respected. But democracy also means that the will of the majority can change. There is no final say.

The trouble with that fact is that it doesn't quite have the emotional reasonance of 'one vote and done' - it doesn't feel as good. It doesn't feel as cathartic. Yet it's at the core of why a minority should respect the will of the majority. Some day, you may change their minds. You may be the majority.

In an old biography of Abraham Lincoln, there is a discussion of his view of the importance of the political union and disavowal of secession. He had questioned the right to secession, asking, "Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain itself?"

Following Lincoln's stance against secession as undermining a democratic political union, his biographer asks:

"...if by democratic government is meant the rule of the majority, may there not be occasions when the majority is tyrannical or where the division of opinion between majority and minority is so acute, that the minority is entitled to leave?"

Lincoln had argued that adhering to majority rule, properly held in restraint by constitutional checks and balances, was not only a good, but a safeguard against the severed consequences of undermining majority rule - chaos, disorder, the threat of war.

As Lincoln said, "that ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors of bullets." To Lincoln, elections and majority rule held out always the possibility that the majority might be persuaded and would change it's mind at a subsequent election.

That while a minority must adapt and integrate to the majority conditions - and could, perhaps should, be helped along to do so - it would still be able to seek to peacefully win over the majority. Laid plain, that democracy, that majority rule, was never to be seen as final.

May and the Union

Theresa May has her own Unionism. For her part, it has driven her to pursue a particularly single-minded path. One that does not really account for, especially, the divergent path upon which Scotland is travelling compared to the rest of the UK.

Theresa May has caught herself in a difficult position, of jealously holding one union while dissolving another - in opposing one secession while enacting another, a confusing circumstance of competing sovereignties.

Arguing against dissolving the British Union, while also arguing for the permanence of the referendum vote, May finds herself caught in an inconsistent position - that the Union cannot be dissolved, but it also will not allow for the changing of minds.

That position undermines the point of democratic majority rule. As Lincoln argued, the preservation of the Union is in large part achieved by acknowledging that there is no end point to a debate - that there is no definitive, inalienable vote.

Theresa May has pulled out all stops to protect her position, the mandate she claims and the policies she pursues, especially Brexit. The result has been that she has turned to the arguments populist right for justification of her actions - the Brexit was a final vote, there can be no change of position.

Legitimising the positions of the populist right is a very dangerous game to play, but as Conservative leader Theresa May inherited a legacy of taking advantage of the over loud and amplified grumbling and scapegoating of the far right.

The Conservatives have spent a long time courting the rise of the far right, feeding off the populist energy to attack Labour and the Liberals. But it's a source of energy that comes with a high cost, giving light and air to emotive scapegoating.

From the beginning, the Conservative plan for a referendum - spawned of a need to satisfy the right-wing energy it was exploiting - didn't really factor in the possibility that the Leave campaign would win the public vote.

Conservative leader David Cameron resigned, having backed Remain as the Prime Minister in a deeply pro-Remain Parliament. With no Parliamentary majority for Brexit, the country was thrown into political turmoil - which May has tried to navigate.

Her failing was to try and do so without a proper constitutional mandate, gained in the form of a Parliamentary majority from an election with an explicit Brexit manifesto commitmnt. She waited too long to pursue that, trusting instead to exluding Parliament in favour of using executive power to forge ahead.

Democracy never ends

When the question is settled, the post-Brexit Union will be defined by this period in time. Disrespect for democratic process, political division, ignoring or exploiting well-established constitutional conventions - all of these things will feed into the new shape of the British Union, whether it remains European for the long haul or ultimately pulls away.

Theresa May has allowed the far-right populist view of democracy - as a competition not a compromise, pitting ideas against each other for mastery - to infect the mainstream and take route in the public consciousness. These represent lasting damages inflicted in pursuit of short term political goals. May will have to reflect on that.

The reality is that the referendum vote could never have been binding, but the view it expressed needed to be respected. That has never really happened. Theresa May and the Conservatives didn't go to the electorate for a Brexit mandate until a long time after the fact. By then, moods had begun to shift.

Brexit was always undermined by the absense of a mandate to deliver it - a party, or parties, explicitly elected on a manifesto commitment to deliver it, awarded the power by the electorate to do so in the form of a Parliamentary majority.

Now, with the deal an unsupportable mess, public opinion is polling as even less inclined. And Parliament remains ill-disposed towards Brexit. Saying that there is no justification for further votes undemocratically protects the power of a majority that may now have become the minority.

Is a second referendum, the People's Vote, the answer?

The first referendum resolved little, as it didn't produce the political conditions within the constitutional framework to deliver on the 'Brexit mandate'. Can another referendum do anything more than simply affirm one of the positions?

Another referendum will still need the explicit mandate from an election to deliver on the public will, if it is to have the legitimate power to implement the decision. In the end, the only way out of this mess is to return to democracy.

Populism sees an end to democracy in the satisfaction of it's own will - the realisation of it's own supremacy. But democracy, to be a valid basis for political union, has no end point. There is no definitive say. Only limited mandates that expire.

The Brexit mandate is close to expiration - largely thanks to the failures of the Conservative party, who brought forward the first referendum and failed to empower it. What comes next must be instructed and empowered by the people.

US Midterms 2018: How will voters respond to sorry state of disunion at the midterm congressional elections?

It's a crucial time in the first term of the self-declared nationalist 45th President of the United States. His administration has done nothing but divide America. He goads and baits his progressive and even moderate opponents, while egging on the worst of his own supporters.

In Congress, the Republic Party (GOP) is in control, but still somehow presides over stagnation. So far, the most active use of their dominance in Congress has been to use it to back the President and his decisions - against even reasonable criticism - largely by inaction.

While the GOP is held in destructive unity, the Democrats are busily undergoing an internal struggle. The progressive wing of the party - symbolically represented by the Sanders Presidential campaign - is striving for a bigger part in the wider party, still controlled by pro-business moderates.

Midterm Congressional Elections

The midterm elections give voters a chance to take stock of this sorry state of disunion.

On 6th November, voters will go to the polls to vote on members of Congress - one third of seats in the Senate are up for grabs and all of the House of Representatives. In the Senate, there are two seats per state. In the House of Representatives, seats represent districts on the basis of state population.

This won't be a vote on the President directly, but it will shape the balance of power in Congress - through which any new bill he wishes to pass must navigate. Right now it is run by Republicans, but as things are at present that could well change tomorrow with a strong result for the Democrats.

So the Democrats will be pleased that so far news seems to be positive for them. It's good news for them that turnouts for early voting have been high. Low turnout tends to favour the GOP, because it is older, whiter, more affluent voters - conservative bread and butter - that are a reliable turnout.

On other fronts, there's good news for the Democrats too. Small donations tot he Democrats have come in at double of those to the GOP. Presidential approval, sitting at a twelve year midterms low of 40% - the lowest since, and second only too, George W Bush who sat on 37% at the 2006 midterms.

Democrats are also polling well. They sit at a 49% to 41% margin, wide enough to tip the election towards a landslide and rebalance Congress towards the Democrats. There are even indications that youth turnout, which as elsewhere leans heavily progressive, may also be high this time around.

But general polling can't tell us all we need to know about the individual races. In the House of Representatives there are plenty of Republcian seats up for grabs. However, in the House of Representatives there are just 35 seats up for re-election, of which just 9 are Republican - limiting how deeply inroads can be made. But taking five of those seats would be enough to tilt the balance towards the Democrats.

High water mark in Texas: Ted Cruz and Beto O'Rourke

So which seats are the ones to watch to see if Congress will swing heavily to the Democrats?

To look at one example: the most high profile Senate seat being defended is that of Republican Presidential candidate Ted Cruz in Texas. A deeply controversial figure who has wielded the backing of the Evangelical Christian movement.

He is facing a surprisingly tough race against the Democrat challenger Beto O'Rourke, who has served three terms in Congress as a Representative for El Paso. In stark contrast to Ted Cruz, O'Rourke is pro-LGBT rights, supports efforts to tackle climate change, women's right to an abortion and a meaningful reform of healthcare in America.

Contrasting the big money PAC support that Ted Cruz enjoys, O'Rourke focused on raising money from small donations from individuals - a stance that makes him stand out against a backdrop of big money lobbying in politics and appears to have served him well with impressive campign funding.

Even with an impressively run campaign and the signs of a strong turnout, it has to be said that it will be a major upset if Beto O'Rourke wins this seat.

But it is an important benchmark for Democrats across the country - in fact, likely to be the high water mark of a Democrat 'wave' (landslide electoral victory). If O'Rourke looks like getting even close to taking this Senate seat for Texas from Cruz, that could herald a strong night for the Democrats.

Restore a little hope

For two years, this President - a self-proclaimed nationalist and obvious narcissist with a hardcore following of white nationalists - has had nearly free rein in Washington thanks to Republican control of Congress enabling him. It's time to restore some of the checks and balances. It is time that he faced some meaningful opposition - faced some possibility of being held to account.

For that role, the Democrats will do. They're far from the progressive ideal, but right now they represent a better, more inclusive vision of America - and they are engaged in internal reform that is pushing them to be something more. In that, there is hope. America could do with a little of that right now. All progressives, everywhere, could do with a little of that right now.

Election 2018? May government has backed itself into a corner again and again, only to slip away to fight another day

Will there be an election this year? That's the big question on the tongues of everyone interested in British politics right now.

Theresa May's big effort to bring together her party - to bring it into line with the 'Brexit mandate' she claimed and coopted for herself - with a plan for Brexit backfired spectacularly. There have been big profile resignations, rumour of a leadership challenge and a divisions are now as wide as they have ever been.

For their part, Labour are raring to go. They're ahead in the polls and full of the belief that their poll lead will only be the starting position for another election campaign that will gather steam and see another surge.

However. Theresa May has so far managed to steer her government through one crisis after another - into and out of one corner after another - and cling to power. Even as each time pundits say a leadership challenge is brewing, and perhaps an election is not far away.

In fact, this government has lasted far longer than expected and predicted, considering it's disastrous election campaign, it's weakness, it's divisions, it's lack of a majority. But clinging on in that state surely cannot last.

There have been other minority governments that have limped along like this. John Major's minority government, as Tory seats were whittled away in by-elections and defections, lasted just four months. With a series of pacts with other parties, the Callaghan minority government kept going for two years, but lost heavily when it finally reached an election.

Theresa May again faces divisions that seem insurmountable - her Brexit white paper having exposed, rather than resealed, the cracks. Tory Brexiters are unhappy and so are the Tory Remainers, with one wing preparing to challenge May's leadership and the other starting to call for a second referendum on the final Brexit deal.

But the May govt still has, for the moment, it's deal with the DUP intact. And she has another thing on her side. For a year, May has survived by defusing crises with dsitractions, often simply waiting it out until everyone gets bored and moves on, and with a sheer stubborn refusal to accept the reality of her government's weak position.

Yet it is that weak position itself that may very well be what helps her fend off the threat of an election. The Tories see the polls and know that Labour is so close to taking power - and the one thing the Tories can unite on is not letting Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell into No.10 and No.11 Downing Street. And their internal squabbles are making their dread outcome a realistic prospect.

What weighs in favour of the Tories is that there can be a change of Prime Minister, even of the government, without an election. It is a fact that the Tories will lean upon heavily in the coming months, if a leadership challenge emerges. They will be eager let everyone know that a new leader is to ensure continuity, rather than to change direction, to minimise claims that an election must surely follow.

The reality facing progressives is that, even as weak as the May government is, it's fate is still in the hands of the Conservatives themselves. With a defiant vote by Tory rebels to force an election unlikely, it will take a sustained swell of public pressure to force the Tories into a premature election.

Corbyn and McDonnell are victims of their own success. They have gotten Labour so close, and leading in the polls, that whatever else the government does, it knows it can't risk an election. The weakened government can do nothing but limp on.

Italian Election 2018: Can progressives settle their differences and work together? The heavy right-wing leaning of other possible governments makes cooperation a must

The Palazzo Montecitorio, home to the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Photograph: Palazzo Montecitorio by Nick Kenrick (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, Italy goes to the polls. Considering how turbulent the past few years have been, it is astonishing that the last election was a full five years ago now. In 2013, with help from the electoral system, the Partito Democratico - led by Pier Luigi Bersani - came out on top.

Things did not go to plan for the Democrats. Without enough seats for a majority, the three way division of Italian politics became an insurmountable obstruction. Bersani failed to form a government and stood down. With tentative agreements, successive Democrats have been Prime Minister: Enrico Letta, Matteo Renzi and Paolo Gentiloni.

It was Renzi who had the longest run at the head of the government, but his popularity waned as he kept pushing for reforms and he was toppled by his own constitutional referendum - to change the electoral system - which he staked against his own position and lost.

Since Renzi left office in the December 2016, Paolo Gentiloni has led the government and has proved fairly popular, with good approval ratings, back by most centre and left parties. However, he is not running at the head of the Centre-Left on Sunday.

In his absence, it is instead the centre-right, that look most likely to gain enough seats to form a government. The question for the centre-left, and the leading Democrats, is how to recover to the position they had early in Renzi's tenure, when they topped the European Parliament polls with 40% of the vote.

The Centre-Left

Matteo Renzi speaks at a university in October 2015. Photograph: Matteo Renzi a San Giobbe by the Università Ca' Foscari Venezia (License) (Cropped)

The 'centre-left' is led by Partito Democratico (PD), with Matteo Renzi returned as leader. A dispute over methods led to an ultimatum from left-wing Democrats, including stalwarts like former leader Bersani and former Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema, that if Renzi ran to return as leader of the party, they would leave.

Renzi ran again, and won. So they left - leaving the party largely in the hands of the Renziani faction, as many of their followers went with them. As a result, the party's more left-wing factions departed, and gone with them are a number of small left-wing parties that the Democrats previously counted on for support.

The PD's main allies this time around will be centrists and liberals, such as radical Emma Bonino's +Europa and Beatrice Lorenzin's Civica Popolare list of the centre-right Alternativa Popolare. These allies reflect the reality that the Democrats have found themselves under the consolidated control of the Renziani faction.

For the Renziani, this election is about defending their policies in government. Under his watch, civil administration was reformed, labour laws were relaxed and taxation simplified - it was these policies, a typical neoliberal agenda, that their left-wing critics found intolerable.

However. While economic reforms they oversaw are broadly accepted by the Centre-Right, they were accompanied by social measures, such as same-sex civil unions, which are likely to be targeted by the Centre-Right if it returns to government. It is also possible that Italy's fidelity to European commitments may also suffer - especially where they require unpopular fiscal sacrifices.

In the name of protecting such policies, a small part of the dissenting left has stuck around. As a result, the PD will get a little support from the left through from 'Italia Europa Insieme', or Insieme (Together), which gathers parties including Partito Socialista Italiano (Social Democrats), Federazione dei Verdi (Greens) and others from the recently faltered Campo Progressista.

The Centre-Right

Silvio Berlusconi, through controversies and legal battles, has intermittently held the post of Prime Minister of Italy during nearly a quarter century on the political frontline. Photograph: Silvio Berlusconi by paz.ca (License) (Cropped)

The name 'centre-right' is a bit of a misnomer, as it is composed of parties ranging from right-wing to far-right. Silvio Berlusconi is still there (or back, if you prefer) with Forza Italia, his vehicle of some twenty five years, leading the right.

He is joined once more by his long time, on again off again, allies, though they have expanded their appeal to all of Italy, quietly dropping their call for Northern separatism. Also in tow once more are Fratelli d'Italia, Brothers of Italy - the successors on the far-right to the National Alliance.

Despite everything, the octogenarian Silvio is still in the middle of everything. But he isn't having it all his own way. He faces strife within his own coalition list, with Lega leader Matteo Salvini - the influence behind taking the party national - not happy to play second fiddle. How that power struggle plays out could have a huge impact.

It wouldn't be an election featuring Silvio Berlusconi if there weren't some wild promises. The Forza Italia electoral pitch includes a basic income of E1000 for all Italians, along with free vet treatment for pets. Silvio has also promised tax breaks for adopting pets and to cut VAT on pet food.

It would be unwise for progressives to be seduced by these trinkets. These are pitches to win over any supporters of the populist party M5S who aren't looking too closely at the rest of the centre-right agenda, which - with the influence of FdA and Lega - would be terrible for virtually anyone except white male Italians pleased by tax breaks.

That is reinforced by Berlusconi's commitment to cutting income taxes across the board. Italy has a top rate of tax well above the European average and Silvio's solution is the darling of right-wing libertarians: a flat rate income tax set at 23%. As ever, the question arises as to how any of these promises can be paid for.

The particular driving force behind the campaigns of the right-wing parties is immigration. While tensions of been heightened by murders and revenge killings in recent months, the refugee crisis has been feeding anti-immigrant, nationalist rhetoric for some time.

Matteo Salvini and his party Lega, slogan 'Italy First', have been allowed to set the tone on the immigration debate and their tone has been aggressive. Salvini refers to a 'tide of delinquents', 'drug dealers, rapists, burglars' and says he 'wants to send them home'.

That aggressive, oppressive tone has been softly mimicked by Berlusconi, as you might expect, but also been followed by the Five Star Movement - the populist rival to the two main coalitions. The Democrats have not shied away from appeasing this stance either.

The Populists

Beppe Grillo talks to the crowd at party event in 2015. Luigi Di Maio stands in the group behind him, second from right. Photograph: Italia 5 Stelle at the Autodromo Enzo e Dino Ferrari - Imola by RevolWeb (License) (Cropped)

Movimento 5 Stella were the surprise of the 2013 election, presenting themselves as a true third force in Italian politics - much to the dismay of the centre-left and centre-right. Founded by comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, the party built a following that came for the establishment with a fire for tearing it down.

Or at least, that was the impression they liked to give. Led in the Italian Parliament by the 31 year old Luigi Di Maio, they present themselves as Anti-establishment, almost anti-politics, Eurosceptic and outspoken against administrative corruption. Di Maio has tried to professionalise that outline, in order to steer the party into government.

The M5S quest for respectability included an attempt last year to join the pro-EU liberal group in the European Parliament. The liberals gave them a hearing, but declined their application after members of the group objected (the other groups in the parliament had quietly turned them down, while the Greens overtly stated their mistrust of Grillo).

Yet they are a party filled with contradictions. M5S has found itself mired - from laughable amateurishness, like their programme apparently being copy-pasted from Wikipedia, to being itself caught up in corruption. Virginia Raggi's time in office as Mayor of Rome has been dogged by corruption allegations. And nationally, delegates were forced to resign after it was discovered they had fiddled commitments to donate parts of their salaries and expenses.

The party, or Movement, has also been linked to the spread of fake news, and propaganda from Russian sources. The party leadership has been accused of making money off the back of a fake news aggregator. This shouldn't come as a tremendous surprise.

The party itself is a spawn of Grillo's blog, and the party's branding remains his property. That makes it as much a controversialist media business venture as a political movement - much like that of a certain president in North America, with his penchant for crying fake news of mainstream media journalism included to boot.

But what are the controversialists standing for? They have been described as an anti-representative democracy movement - calling for direct democracy through digital means. But Di Maio has focused on more practical measures in his campaign.

Their policies include a basic income, which Berlusconi has felt the need to copy, but also cutting public debt and simplifying many laws. The left should be concerned with just how much common ground M5S has with the parties of the so-called 'centre-right' grouping.

Dissenting Left

The outspoken Pier Luigi Bersani, pictured during his time as leader of Partito Democratico, was instrumental in the breakway of the Movimento Democratico e Progressista and the formation of it's coalition Liberi e Uguali. Photograph: Floris e Bersani, Non stop Banda Larga PD venerdì 18 giugno 2010 by Bee Free - PGrandicelli (License) (Cropped)

The dissenting left has, after it's recent exodus from the Renziani dominated Partito Democratico, gathered a number of like minded parties in an alliance by the name of Liberi e Uguali (Free and Equal) - under the rather familiar slogan of "For the many, not the few".

It's leader is the former antimafia prosecutor Pietro Grasso, at present the President of the Senate. It's leading figures include former Premier Massimo D'Alema, former PD leader Pier Luigi Bersani, former leader of the left-wing Sinistra Ecologia Liberta party Nichi Vendola, and Laura Boldrini who is currently the President of the Chamber of Deputies and formerly the spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The LeU groups unites the breakaway factions of PD in the form of Movimento Democratico e Progressista, with other left-wing groups gathered into Sinistra Italia (Italian Left) - that acts as a successor to the Sinistra Ecologia Liberta party that has been a significant left-wing block in recent years.

The joint programme for LeU promises that the group will fight to turn the tide of globalisation, to counter the trend towards precarity, to put education and work back at the centre of people's lives. While the reforms under Renzi increased jobs by one million, they haven't arrested the slide of 18 million people into poverty, with most new jobs being on a part time basis.

In practice, the LeU programme comes as a pledge to restore 'good employment' with a Green New Deal, an investment programme to convert and expand the economy across many areas; to undo the 'blackmail' of precarity by restoring restoring Article 18; to undo recent school reforms and boost investment - along with abolishing university fees; to reorganise taxes to be more progressive and close loopholes - with the money being used to fund reformed health and welfare provision; and to shore up inclusion of LGBT people, particularly couples.

It may be that this pitch is more about shifting the position of the Democrats back in their direction than expecting to implement these plans in government. But it is an ambitious programme which has brought together a number of left-wing, democratic socialist parties and factions - not an easy task in Italian politics.

But what unites LeU as much as politics is a deep mistrust of Renzi and his methods. Pier Luigi Bersani - former leader of the Democrats and one of the founders of the breakaway Movimento Democratico e Progressista that formed LeU - has taken particular exception to Renzi's tearing up of the root of what Bersani considers his party.

Bersani has gone as far as expressing the belief that Renzi plans to form a government with Berlusconi - the old enemy as far as the left in Italy is concerned. It is perhaps notable then that the party's main objectives require largely dismantling the changes to job security and pensions that the Renziani faction oversaw.

Polling and Possible Governments

Despite spending since 2013 in government, and even riding high in the polls during that time, the Centre-Left has a lot to do if it wants to end up in government. The Democrats have fallen to around 22% - with their allies +Europa on 3%, and their whole coalition list sitting at just 27%.

Even if the dissenting left could be reconciled, that would at present add just 5% more support. Bersani is optimistic that Free and Equal can take double their poll numbers - perhaps hoping their borrowed slogan brings a little of Corbyn's campaigning fortunes. But even if the party reaches towards 12-15%, they will still need allies. Can they work with Renzi?

Unless there is some serious turn in favour of the Democrats - such as winning well in FPTP constituencies - it may be that forcing a fresh election might be their best outcome. With support for a progressive government struggling to crest 30%, things do not bode well for other options.

While the LeU want nothing to do with Renzi, would it be possible to attract the support of sufficient centrists to cobble together a (very) broad centre-left government under someone like Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni? It seems unlikely at this point.

As a result, the Centre-Right finds itself perhaps best positioned to form a government. But it would be a government of fractious interests and hostility to otherness. However, collectively at 38%, they hold the strongest position - though who will lead such a group after the election is another question - it is too close to call in the polls between Berlusconi's Forza Italia and Salvini's Lega.

For Berlusconi's part, he has ruled out both a grand coalition, or national unity government, and even a limited confidence & supply arrangement between the Centre-Right and Centre-Left. He says there will be a new election if his coalition falls short of a governing majority. Renzi has agreed with this - but such proclamations may be taken with a pinch of salt, as pragmatic dealmaking rules in Italy.

So the renewal of the Centre-Left/Centre-Right grand coalition should be considered very possible. The denials of the leaders of both coalitions have been offset by voices among the allies of both, who note that a grand coalition is the most likely outcome. But will it be a long term option or just a stop-gap until a fresh election?

It could presented as stop-gap but run as long as needed. What is clear is that neither Renzi nor Berlusconi could lead such a government (in Silvio's case, because he is still banned from holding political office). That would mean the appointment of some third figure - such as current Premier Paolo Gentiloni.

The current Prime Minister Gentiloni is, personally, Italy's most popular leader. But people know he isn't the leader of the PD, and so his polling has yet to figure into the election. With his record - at present overseeing Italy's GDP up on 2010, while both deficit and debt are falling, thanks to reforms that have received praise in Europe - he might assemble a stable government, for a time.

But it will likely be seen as another stitch up. Stirring up the pot will be the M5S, and the share of votes and seats they are able to capture this time. Contrary to previous elections, M5S seem keen to get into government this time. But the question is: who with?

The nightmare outcome for the left is M5S throwing it's lot in with the right-wing parties. It does not seem like a big leap for M5S to work with the Centre-Right in a small state, Eurosceptic, socially conservative government.

There is an outside prospect for M5S, in the form of fleeting hints that the dissenting left group 'Free and Equal' might be prepared to work with them in government. It seems unlikely with so much ground between the two - but it would certainly be considered change. It is more likely that M5S will tip the centre-right into government.

Advent of Populist Government?

However, from our perspective, the prospective government for progressives to be most concerned about  is some sort of tie-up between M5S and Lega. It would, of course, require both to have particularly strong elections - though they are currently polling at around 26% and 15% respectively, and Lega particularly may punch above their weight in seats thanks to regional concentration.

Both parties have a history of being aggressively anti-establishment. That is not, in itself a reason for dismay, but it is something they may find common ground on. But what is worrying are their common ground on pushing anti-immigration stances and their criticised ties to the wider populist and nationalist waves that have been backed by Russian interventions in Western democracy.

If these two were able to patch over their differences - and Grillo has shown himself to be very flexible about making friends, allying with Farage and UKIP in Europe, praising a certain US President - they might assemble between them the kind of low tax, protectionist, nationalist and hostile-to-difference socially conservative agenda that will spook every country around them.

More pressing is that this toxic brew - the mix of Grillo's anti-representative democracy, Salvini's 'promotion of the family' at expense of LGBT people, and both party's scapegoating of refugees and immigrants - might do significant damage to the rights and wellbeing of a lot of people.

Salvini has certainly indicated a desire to shake off Berlusconi and assert his own leadership. An alliance with M5S could give him an outlet to pursue a government built on the exploitation of the kind of unrestrained nationalism and disaffection that a certain US President rode into office.

Don't expect a clear result on Monday morning

The complicated electoral system will play a role in which of the possible governments Italy ends up with and a lot will ride on the performance of the smaller parties. The election has two components: a third of seats are first-past-the-post constituencies, while two thirds are proportionally distributed according to the popular vote - above a 3% threshold.

It is important to note that just reaching the popular threshold delivers a substantial number of seats: just 3% would award 11-12 seats. Meanwhile, the FPTP element, just as seen in Britain with the SNP, favours small but regionally concentrated parties and rewards them very heavily.

For instance, the smallest of the parties allied to Berlusconi is Noi con l'Italia, which is standing locally known candidates, against very little opposition, in the poor Southeastern region of Apulia. Standing in just 34 seats, if it were to win even half that would be 17 seats - even if it took less than 3% of the vote.

It will take days to sort through the permutations. But whether Italy has a functioning government will be in the hands of many competing factions, across the spectrum, doing deals long after the distribution of seats is decided.

For progressives, there is no clear route to building a government and everything depends on a big shift come polling day. If voters turn out to give the Centre-Left and the dissenting left sufficient seats, they must sort out their differences and work together, because the other possible governments do not bode well for progressive values.

Macron appears to have consolidated power, but is there anything for 'centrists' to learn from his success? Not really

Macron's landslide was not quite what it appeared, exposing how neoliberal Centrism depends upon disinterest and abstention. Photograph: Emmanuel Macron campaign poster 'Macron President' in Paris by Lorie Shaull (License) (Cropped)

Nearly three-quarters of a year has passed since Emmanuel Macron took up the post of President of France. In that time he has seemingly managed to consolidate power (despite of some rocky moments). So: job done, new centrist model ready to roll out? Not so fast.

Well, let's look beneath the surface. The election landslides for Macron and La Republique En Marche were always going to provoke a response, especially with the near wipeout of the old centre-left Parti Socialiste (PS).

One small, but significant, reaction - an indication of how sizeable a reorganisation of French politics Macron has caused - is the reunification of the old Parti Radical with the breakaway Radical Party of the Left, as the new Mouvement Radical.

For years, the two radical parties - in former times a powerful party of government - were occasionally a crucial coalition partner of the larger parties. But they split from one another down the old left-right lines.

The Radical Party of the Left would partner with the Parti Socialiste and the centre-left, and the Radical Party would partner with the various centre-right parties. It appears that Emmanuel Macron has helped to settle the dispute between the two.

The reunification of the Radicals is a small thing, but also suggests that Macron's victory (and the collapse of PS) was big enough to put into abeyance the question of whether to partner with left or right. The radicals are happy with the centre.

That perhaps also says a lot about where Les Marcheurs lie on a political spectrum: European Federalist, social liberal, and for equality of opportunity (rather than of outcomes) within a free market.

Those were also the bones of Macron's pitch at the election. An election that left Macron with a severely weakened opposition, a a left-wing reduced to around 50-60 social liberals, social democrats and socialists, and a right-wing of around 130-140.

One potential problem Macron faced was if those with divided loyalties between En Marche and the social liberals and social democrats in opposition organise, Macron might face difficulty from a voting-bloc under his own left-wing.

However, the Left is still in disarray - and the Radicals seem set jump ship. The election was a disaster for the Parti Socialiste, it's bastion, who fell from 280 seats to just 30. Even their 2017 Presidential candidate Benoit Hamon has walked away.

Hamon has formed a new party, Generation.s, which has formed a tentative European alliance with Yanis Varoufakis and DiEM25. It had been hoped that Hamon might do for PS what Corbyn did for Labour in Britain, but now he will have to start from scratch.

There are also two separate far-left groups in the National Assembly, that have yet to find a way to work together - France Insoumise with 17 seats and Gauche Democrate et Republicaine with 16 seats.

With the collapse of the Left and, so far, no sign of a new rallying position, Macron has for the moment usurped the place of the Parti Socialiste in two-party system. Does this mean that the centre is saved and the model can be copy and pasted elsewhere?

No.

The hope for a centrist revival is not giving due credit the particular circumstances of Macron's victory - nor that both Macron and Les Marcheurs won, across the board, as the least worst option amidst raging disinterest. Not exactly an inspiring rallying call.

Macron's victory also has shadows of the upswell that took Barack Obama to  the US Presidency in 2008. Macron, undeniably a member of the party establishment, rode on the back of a movement that was then jettisoned when office was achieved.

The leading talents of that movement were absorbed into the government machinery, while the movement itself has been left without it's leading figures and central purpose. Will it survive or find a new role?

That Macron has succeeded in consolidating his position must still be put to the test at the ballot. As Obama learned, when you set high expectations, the movement will want practical changes it can touch. A legacy they can touch.

What Macron has right now is a governing majority. He doesn't even have a campaign machinery for himself or his supporters to sustain their agenda. Nothing has really changed over the past year.

Copy the En Marche model at peril. Macron's was a victory for charismatic leadership, but it's hollow inside. The future, never mind success, will depend on the support existing parties like MoDem and the Radicals, and the creation of some sort of plain, traditional electoral machinery for Les Marcheurs.

Macron's victory was a lesson in how to get into government, not in how to stay there. He made waves, a tidal wave, that upset the system and forced some realignment. But politics is fickle.

Alliances can seem unbreakable, until they aren't. Break ups are forever, until they aren't. Just ask the Radicals.

What next for Merkel and Germany?

Photograph: Bundestag by Hernán Piñera in 2011 (License)

When the exit poll for yesterday's German Federal Election was released, it provided a lot of expected answers. Angela Merkel will be Chancellor for a fourth time and the far-right has managed to be elected to the Bundestag for the first time since the war.

The numbers where not quite as expected though. Merkel's CDU and their traditional opponents, the social democratic SPD, both managed to underperform polls that had already suggested losses were to be expected. The CDU fell nearly 9%, the SPD 5%.

There were gains though for the Left and Centre parties. Die Grune and Die Linke, the Greens and the Left, both gained half a percent, while the market liberal FDP did better than expected to reach around 11% and will return from losing all their seats in 2013.

The far-right also made larger gains than expected, though they failed to breach what seems to be the West European threshold of 13% - in Britain, Netherlands, France and now Germany no far-right party has managed to get beyond that number.

What Next?

Once the calculations of seat numbers are completed, the next step will be to form a government. The most likely combination at the present time will be a Black-Gold-Green combination: CDU-FDP-Grune.

It has been said that the great difficulty there is in pinning down what Markel and the CDU actually stand for has played largely to their benefit. It will help them again in trying to form a government uniting conservatives, liberals and greens.

While the CDU and FDP have previously formed coalition governments with distinctly pro-market, pro-business, centre-right leanings, the presence of Die Grune in government would likely force the parties to at least stick in the Centre ground that the SPD and CDU grand coalition had navigated.

What that opens up if the possibility of progress on social issues. Both the FDP and the Grune care about sustainability, about human rights & civil liberties, and about Europe (though not without some Eurosceptics in the FDP fold).

With the social democrats and the radical democrats of SPD and Die Linke in opposition, socially progressive parties will have strong presence in government and hold a narrow majority in the Bundestag - not counting those numbered among the CDU.

Things will be unlikely to be that simple. The FDP has been somewhat erratic on policy in recent years - likely a result of their collapse after coalition with Merkel's CDU - and have been trying to find a distinct voice.

As far-right success in the UK - in the polls and at the ballot box though not in terms of seats - spooked the harder right of the Conservative Party, the predominantly conservative CDU may have the same struggle ahead of it.

Die Grune will also face a difficult few weeks ahead. Presented with the opportunity to push, a possibly very strong, environmental and sustainability agenda from government will be weighed up against the damage that an alliance with conservatives and pro-business liberals may do to their image in the long term.

Resist the Far-Right

As for the far-right, the narrative of a rising tide has failed to produce the sweeping victories predicted. The return of the far-right in Germany is significant, but it fits better with a broader Western European context than with an historical German context.

And that can be seen in where their support came from. Mirroring patterns elsewhere, three quarters of the far-right's voters came from other parties or where previously non-voters: disaffection, disillusionment and lost trust that follows a broader pattern.

It is also unlikely that the full 24% of those who are not first time voters for the far-right (approximately 1.5m) will be racists, fascists or otherwise broadly intolerant. As elsewhere, the far-right in Germany is visciously, bitterly, internally divided.

In the Bundestag they will be frozen out and they will face protests and public outcry everywhere they go. The far-right remains a long, long way from power and influence.

There is a chance in Germany to make progress in the next four yearsand a chance to repair the hurts born of a decade of crisis. Getting on with salving those wounds will sap the far-right's appeal. Greater exposure and scrutiny may do the rest.

References

'German election: Merkel wins fourth term, AfD nationalists rise'; on the BBC; 25 September 2017.

Alberto Nardelli's 'Germany – #BTW17 election – ARD exit poll'; from Twitter; 24 September 2017.

'German elections 2017: full results - Angela Merkel has secured a fourth term as German chancellor after Sunday’s election for a new Bundestag, the federal parliament. However, her authority has been diminished. Meanwhile, the radical rightwing AfD has entered parliament as the third-largest party. We analyse the official results'; in The Guardian; 24 September 2017.

Jefferson Chase's 'What you need to know about Germany's liberals, the Free Democratic Party: After four years without representation in the Bundestag, the FDP is back. Here's what you need to know about the small party that could hold the keys to power'; from DW; 24 September 2017.

'Also for context: far-right in WEur take votes from most parties & mix it with (usually) non-voters. Disaffection/lost trust factors. #BTW17'; from The Alternative on Twitter; 24 September 2017.

German Elections: Angela Merkel will be the stern, bleak but sturdy breakwater people accept amidst interminable turmoil

Photograph: Angela Merkel in 2012 from the European People's Party (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, Angela Merkel leads her party to the polls looking to secure a fourth term as Chancellor of Germany. The polls suggest that she is on course to do it.

Despite her SPD rivals taking a poll lead for the first time in six years in February, Merkel's CDU now hold a fifteen point lead. But for all the hype, she is a problematic figure for progressives.

This certainly hasn't stopped her ascent. Merkel has arguably reached the apex of her political career, in the eyes of many even taking up the mantle of the leader of the free world (courtesy in part to the abdication of that role by a certain President of the United States).

Yet if Angela Merkel's way is the medicine for instability in Europe, then it is a bitter pill for progressives. Reform has been slow under CDU governments.

Merkel was late, and reluctant, to support a vote on equal marriage. While she conceded in allowing a vote to take place, she still voted against equality - a contest that she did however lose.

And though fiscal rectitude at home has steered away from slashing taxes in pursuit of debt reduction, for pro-European progressives Merkel's way is a doubled-edged sword.

While she is held as a key pillar in keeping the European Union standing, the rise of Merkel has coincided with the decline of Social Europe - in fact wolfgang schauble, her finance minister, has been the arch-enforcer of the austerity agenda that has Greece locked in a debt-spiral and the stern opponent of leniency.

The decline of a Social Europe, with a tendency toward long-termism and cooperation, has run opposite to growing instability, growing disatisfaction with globalisation and a wedge being driven between Northern and Southern Europe - typified in Greece.

Much of that decline and these growing problems have happened under the influence of conservative parties like the CDU hiding behind the symbols and offices of the EU to project their agendas.

Yet Merkel remains above these potential controversies. Caution leads her to an inoffensive and vague centre, where easy platitudes reign and moves are made only gradually - and only when the wind is firmly seen to be blowing in a decisive direction.

That tendency can be seen in the dramatic transition for Merkel in the last few years from a cold response to a frightened young child whose family faced deportation, to the embrace of refugees - opening the doors to relieve the pressure on Southern Europe.

A turn that, with substantial political consequence, has garnered fresh respect among younger voters. Through such means have Merkel and the CDU, conservative Christian Democrats, kept just ahead of the curve.

The Election

After seven years of government by the SPD and Gerhard Schroeder came to an end in 2002, there began a widening of the groups that won representation in the Bundestag, with the share of the vote for the biggest parties falling.

The 2013 election seemed to break that trend. The falling vote share of the big two reversed and party representation dropped from to four. The CDU established for themselves a commanding place - largely at the expense of their former coalition partners, the FDP.

However, 2017 seems likely to render 2013 just a blip in a larger trend. Polling suggests the two main parties will lose ground again and as many as six parties will win seats in the Bundestag for the first time since the 1950s.

The remarkable thing is that the CDU has over time proved itself far more resilient than the SPD to this fragmentation of the vote. More remarkable still is that in this election it will be young people who keep Merkel's conservative party in power. Their support has been critical in several recent regional elections.

The Oppostion

At the head of Merkel's opposition is Sigmar Gabriel and the SPD, the Social Democrats who have for the passed four years been her coalition partners in a grand coalition between the two main parties of German politics.

At times in the last few years, particularly back in February, Gabriel and the SPD would have been forgiven for thinking their opportunity had come to return to office as the senior party. Yet the lull in support for the CDU in February did not last.

Once again, the SPD will instead enter an election looking to stem the flow of support away to third parties - a pattern seen not just in Germany but across Europe where Social Democrats have struggled to find a narrative for the times.

This election will also likely see the return to the Bundestag of Merkel's former coalition partners the FDP - her free market liberal allies whose decline prompted her to warn the Coalition partners in Britain of the likely affect of such an arrangement on the Liberal Democrats' fortunes.

The FDP have slowly recovered across regional elections since they fell below the seat threshold in 2013 and are back up to 9% in the polls. Under Germany's proportional system that could deliver around 60 seats and could mean the return of a CDU-FDP government.

For the Left, influence in the next legislative term will depend on polls translating to seats for Die Linke (The Left) and Die Grune (The Greens), one democratic socialist, the other environmentally conscious and concerned about finding a sustainable future.

The strength of the big two, and especially their grand coalition of the passed four years, tends to freeze them out of federal politics. But both parties put pressure of the SPD to move Leftwards and away from the CDU and the far-right AfD - who threaten the SPD base in much the same way as UKIP have threatened Labour in Britain.

It is perhaps testament to the centrist positioning that Merkel pursues, that there is talk that her administration may even turn to the Greens as a possible coalition partner after Sunday - with her decision to begin a nuclear phase out as a statement of credentials.

A Bitter Pill

Amidst the turmoil - the returned spectre of nuclear war, regional wars and the resultant refugee crisis, fundamentalist terrorism, the slide into authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, the return of Nationalism to the West - Angela Merkel is, understandably, seen as a fixed point.

A stable, constant, and reassuring presence. There will not be many voices that cry out loudly against the result, if she is reelected to office. It will be seen as inevitable. But there is something bitter in the triumph of conservatism amidst neverending crisis.

What the progressive heart cries out for is something, for Germany and for Europe, that can roll back the darkness. What they will accept for now is the stern, bleak but sturdy breakwater.

French Legislative Elections: Macron's ascent asks a tough question of social democrats and social liberals

Macron's ascendancy consumed the parties of social democrats and social liberals, reducing them to a sliver of seats. Will they be represented in his En Marche majority? If Macron doesn't give enough thought to them, the Left opposition will look to build progressive alliances under his left-wing.

Emmanuel Macron has completed what he set out to do. He has won the Presidency and an Assembly majority riding the crest of his new movement 'La Republic En Marche'. However, the poor turnout suggests all is not yet what it appears.

Macron and En Marche won a landslide, yes. But the wave of disaffection was greater still. In the two rounds of voting, just 49% and 43% of the people voted. Macron has a majority in the Assembly, but not yet in the country. Far from it.

That disparity will only make it harder and more desperate, not easier, to win people over. The pressure is now tangible. Macron has to deliver - and not just his own programme. He has to deliver it in a way that meets with public expectation.

People are already disaffected, with turnouts low, and the call for people to rally about the Centrist candidate has not exactly been answered - regardless how it has been portrayed by those excited by a pro-European Centre revival.

Macron's Centrist success also came largely at the expense of the Centre-Left, practically wiping it out save for those who aligned with En Marche.

Leading figures in the social democratic 'Parti Socialiste' lost their seats as the the party was nearly wiped out, reduced from 280 to just 29 seats. The Left-wing Presidential candidate Benoit Hamon and Assembly leader Jean-Christophe Cambadelis were defeated - though former Premier Manuel Valls survived, standing as an independent.

Social democracy also managed to take social liberalism down with it. The 'Parti Radical de Gauche', their social liberal allies, lost all but three of their seats, though their leader Sylvia Pinel survived. It is worthy of note that three more radicals survived under the En Marche banner.

That poses an interesting question. How much of these ideologies was carried over to La Republic En Marche? Progressives will be watching closely for the answer.

In the mean time, there are questions of how to go about forming a progressive opposition. The main opposition will be the Centre-Right 'La Republicains'. They also suffered a defeat, though less damaging, and along with their allies dropped to 131 seats.

In opposition on the Left, Social democrats and social liberals are now present only in small numbers - in terms of their traditional, recognisable forms. Their supporters may be forced to look to En Marche and their MoDem allies in government for representation.

There is now, though, the possibility of a clear democratic socialist caucus in opposition. If the Socialists stick to the agenda that Benoit Hamon presented for the Presidential election, there is a possibility of forming a largely coherent DemocSoc group.

While the Socialists hold more seats, the leading voice of that group would be Jean-Luc Melenchon - who performed well at the Presidential election from the Left as the outsider candidate.

His movement 'France Insoumise' gained seats, and with what remains of the PS, along with the support of the PCF (Communists), there is a core of fifty seats with which to build an opposition group. That is enough, perhaps, to put pressure on Macron - and maybe enough to act as the beginning of a new Left alignment.

Macron's new movement - his new party of government, created just for that purpose out of the ashes of social democracy and social liberalism - has work to do.

That work has been described as Nordic in style, mixing controls on spending and cuts to regulation, with public investment and a strong social safety net - shifting the public role from keeping people in work to supporting them when they're not.

But to do that, he must first pull down the intensive labour institutions and the DemocSoc Left will not take that lightly. Expect protests on the streets and, if they can organise, a Left bloc voting against him. They will also resist plans aiming to cut taxes for the wealthy and corporations.

Caught in the midst of these struggles will be the social democrats and social liberals - both those within Macron's caucus and those in small numbers outside. They will have a difficult choice over their relationship to the Presidential majority.

Macron will likely have some of his greatest difficulties dealing with the threat of social democrats and social liberals pulling to the Left, if he tacks too far to the Republican Right, and threatening to vote with an organised DemocSoc bloc - perhaps giving both groups more influence than their initial numbers might suggest.

However, right now, Macron has the numbers. If he and his Premier move with energy, the most controversial elements of his approach might be completed early enough that En Marche can ride the wave. But the longer he waits, the harder change will get.

One last note. As a reminder that the far-right is far from beaten, Marine Le Pen was among a handful of Front National deputies elected to the National Assembly.

As Macron and his Centre-Right Premier Edouard Philippe lead the Assembly, they should keep Le Pen's deputies in sight. They represent the cost, for France, of failure to deliver on public perception. En Marche must deliver to France a tangible fresh start.