What next for Merkel and Germany?

Photograph: Bundestag by Hernán Piñera in 2011 (License)

When the exit poll for yesterday's German Federal Election was released, it provided a lot of expected answers. Angela Merkel will be Chancellor for a fourth time and the far-right has managed to be elected to the Bundestag for the first time since the war.

The numbers where not quite as expected though. Merkel's CDU and their traditional opponents, the social democratic SPD, both managed to underperform polls that had already suggested losses were to be expected. The CDU fell nearly 9%, the SPD 5%.

There were gains though for the Left and Centre parties. Die Grune and Die Linke, the Greens and the Left, both gained half a percent, while the market liberal FDP did better than expected to reach around 11% and will return from losing all their seats in 2013.

The far-right also made larger gains than expected, though they failed to breach what seems to be the West European threshold of 13% - in Britain, Netherlands, France and now Germany no far-right party has managed to get beyond that number.

What Next?

Once the calculations of seat numbers are completed, the next step will be to form a government. The most likely combination at the present time will be a Black-Gold-Green combination: CDU-FDP-Grune.

It has been said that the great difficulty there is in pinning down what Markel and the CDU actually stand for has played largely to their benefit. It will help them again in trying to form a government uniting conservatives, liberals and greens.

While the CDU and FDP have previously formed coalition governments with distinctly pro-market, pro-business, centre-right leanings, the presence of Die Grune in government would likely force the parties to at least stick in the Centre ground that the SPD and CDU grand coalition had navigated.

What that opens up if the possibility of progress on social issues. Both the FDP and the Grune care about sustainability, about human rights & civil liberties, and about Europe (though not without some Eurosceptics in the FDP fold).

With the social democrats and the radical democrats of SPD and Die Linke in opposition, socially progressive parties will have strong presence in government and hold a narrow majority in the Bundestag - not counting those numbered among the CDU.

Things will be unlikely to be that simple. The FDP has been somewhat erratic on policy in recent years - likely a result of their collapse after coalition with Merkel's CDU - and have been trying to find a distinct voice.

As far-right success in the UK - in the polls and at the ballot box though not in terms of seats - spooked the harder right of the Conservative Party, the predominantly conservative CDU may have the same struggle ahead of it.

Die Grune will also face a difficult few weeks ahead. Presented with the opportunity to push, a possibly very strong, environmental and sustainability agenda from government will be weighed up against the damage that an alliance with conservatives and pro-business liberals may do to their image in the long term.

Resist the Far-Right

As for the far-right, the narrative of a rising tide has failed to produce the sweeping victories predicted. The return of the far-right in Germany is significant, but it fits better with a broader Western European context than with an historical German context.

And that can be seen in where their support came from. Mirroring patterns elsewhere, three quarters of the far-right's voters came from other parties or where previously non-voters: disaffection, disillusionment and lost trust that follows a broader pattern.

It is also unlikely that the full 24% of those who are not first time voters for the far-right (approximately 1.5m) will be racists, fascists or otherwise broadly intolerant. As elsewhere, the far-right in Germany is visciously, bitterly, internally divided.

In the Bundestag they will be frozen out and they will face protests and public outcry everywhere they go. The far-right remains a long, long way from power and influence.

There is a chance in Germany to make progress in the next four yearsand a chance to repair the hurts born of a decade of crisis. Getting on with salving those wounds will sap the far-right's appeal. Greater exposure and scrutiny may do the rest.

References

'German election: Merkel wins fourth term, AfD nationalists rise'; on the BBC; 25 September 2017.

Alberto Nardelli's 'Germany – #BTW17 election – ARD exit poll'; from Twitter; 24 September 2017.

'German elections 2017: full results - Angela Merkel has secured a fourth term as German chancellor after Sunday’s election for a new Bundestag, the federal parliament. However, her authority has been diminished. Meanwhile, the radical rightwing AfD has entered parliament as the third-largest party. We analyse the official results'; in The Guardian; 24 September 2017.

Jefferson Chase's 'What you need to know about Germany's liberals, the Free Democratic Party: After four years without representation in the Bundestag, the FDP is back. Here's what you need to know about the small party that could hold the keys to power'; from DW; 24 September 2017.

'Also for context: far-right in WEur take votes from most parties & mix it with (usually) non-voters. Disaffection/lost trust factors. #BTW17'; from The Alternative on Twitter; 24 September 2017.

German Elections: Angela Merkel will be the stern, bleak but sturdy breakwater people accept amidst interminable turmoil

Photograph: Angela Merkel in 2012 from the European People's Party (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, Angela Merkel leads her party to the polls looking to secure a fourth term as Chancellor of Germany. The polls suggest that she is on course to do it.

Despite her SPD rivals taking a poll lead for the first time in six years in February, Merkel's CDU now hold a fifteen point lead. But for all the hype, she is a problematic figure for progressives.

This certainly hasn't stopped her ascent. Merkel has arguably reached the apex of her political career, in the eyes of many even taking up the mantle of the leader of the free world (courtesy in part to the abdication of that role by a certain President of the United States).

Yet if Angela Merkel's way is the medicine for instability in Europe, then it is a bitter pill for progressives. Reform has been slow under CDU governments.

Merkel was late, and reluctant, to support a vote on equal marriage. While she conceded in allowing a vote to take place, she still voted against equality - a contest that she did however lose.

And though fiscal rectitude at home has steered away from slashing taxes in pursuit of debt reduction, for pro-European progressives Merkel's way is a doubled-edged sword.

While she is held as a key pillar in keeping the European Union standing, the rise of Merkel has coincided with the decline of Social Europe - in fact wolfgang schauble, her finance minister, has been the arch-enforcer of the austerity agenda that has Greece locked in a debt-spiral and the stern opponent of leniency.

The decline of a Social Europe, with a tendency toward long-termism and cooperation, has run opposite to growing instability, growing disatisfaction with globalisation and a wedge being driven between Northern and Southern Europe - typified in Greece.

Much of that decline and these growing problems have happened under the influence of conservative parties like the CDU hiding behind the symbols and offices of the EU to project their agendas.

Yet Merkel remains above these potential controversies. Caution leads her to an inoffensive and vague centre, where easy platitudes reign and moves are made only gradually - and only when the wind is firmly seen to be blowing in a decisive direction.

That tendency can be seen in the dramatic transition for Merkel in the last few years from a cold response to a frightened young child whose family faced deportation, to the embrace of refugees - opening the doors to relieve the pressure on Southern Europe.

A turn that, with substantial political consequence, has garnered fresh respect among younger voters. Through such means have Merkel and the CDU, conservative Christian Democrats, kept just ahead of the curve.

The Election

After seven years of government by the SPD and Gerhard Schroeder came to an end in 2002, there began a widening of the groups that won representation in the Bundestag, with the share of the vote for the biggest parties falling.

The 2013 election seemed to break that trend. The falling vote share of the big two reversed and party representation dropped from to four. The CDU established for themselves a commanding place - largely at the expense of their former coalition partners, the FDP.

However, 2017 seems likely to render 2013 just a blip in a larger trend. Polling suggests the two main parties will lose ground again and as many as six parties will win seats in the Bundestag for the first time since the 1950s.

The remarkable thing is that the CDU has over time proved itself far more resilient than the SPD to this fragmentation of the vote. More remarkable still is that in this election it will be young people who keep Merkel's conservative party in power. Their support has been critical in several recent regional elections.

The Oppostion

At the head of Merkel's opposition is Sigmar Gabriel and the SPD, the Social Democrats who have for the passed four years been her coalition partners in a grand coalition between the two main parties of German politics.

At times in the last few years, particularly back in February, Gabriel and the SPD would have been forgiven for thinking their opportunity had come to return to office as the senior party. Yet the lull in support for the CDU in February did not last.

Once again, the SPD will instead enter an election looking to stem the flow of support away to third parties - a pattern seen not just in Germany but across Europe where Social Democrats have struggled to find a narrative for the times.

This election will also likely see the return to the Bundestag of Merkel's former coalition partners the FDP - her free market liberal allies whose decline prompted her to warn the Coalition partners in Britain of the likely affect of such an arrangement on the Liberal Democrats' fortunes.

The FDP have slowly recovered across regional elections since they fell below the seat threshold in 2013 and are back up to 9% in the polls. Under Germany's proportional system that could deliver around 60 seats and could mean the return of a CDU-FDP government.

For the Left, influence in the next legislative term will depend on polls translating to seats for Die Linke (The Left) and Die Grune (The Greens), one democratic socialist, the other environmentally conscious and concerned about finding a sustainable future.

The strength of the big two, and especially their grand coalition of the passed four years, tends to freeze them out of federal politics. But both parties put pressure of the SPD to move Leftwards and away from the CDU and the far-right AfD - who threaten the SPD base in much the same way as UKIP have threatened Labour in Britain.

It is perhaps testament to the centrist positioning that Merkel pursues, that there is talk that her administration may even turn to the Greens as a possible coalition partner after Sunday - with her decision to begin a nuclear phase out as a statement of credentials.

A Bitter Pill

Amidst the turmoil - the returned spectre of nuclear war, regional wars and the resultant refugee crisis, fundamentalist terrorism, the slide into authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, the return of Nationalism to the West - Angela Merkel is, understandably, seen as a fixed point.

A stable, constant, and reassuring presence. There will not be many voices that cry out loudly against the result, if she is reelected to office. It will be seen as inevitable. But there is something bitter in the triumph of conservatism amidst neverending crisis.

What the progressive heart cries out for is something, for Germany and for Europe, that can roll back the darkness. What they will accept for now is the stern, bleak but sturdy breakwater.

The Breached Cap: Austerity wavers as the pressure on the Tories mounts

A hole has been burst open in through wall of austerity built by the Tories. The demands of NHS staff threaten to widen that breach and bring the prospect of toppling the wall altogether closer to reality.

Since the impromptu 2017 general election - where the Conservatives were the biggest losers, foiled by their own arrogant power grabbing scheme - the austerity regime has been badly shaken.

Austerity has depended upon Tory swagger, and myths about Labour's profligacy, and the election punched holes in both of those. Their majority lost, the Tories have been under mounting pressure to scale back. To compromise.

Last week they finally cracked. The public sector pay cap was breached. Now, on paper, it is a very small breach. In fact, there was anger as the breach was not even enough to prevent a real terms pay cut for those receiving it. But it is the first sign of austerity finally wavering after seven long years.

So, last Tuesday the Government took the decision to rescind the public sector pay cap for the police and prison officers. It was only a small breach of their long term policy. In fact, half of the 2% has been designated a 'reward' and won't be permanent.

The fact that it was only for a selected few was deeply criticised. Unions were obviously upset at what appeared to be an attempt, from their perspective, of pitting public sector workers against one another - undermining their collective bargaining stance.

The Government followed up with more announcements that didn't help to assuage the Trade Unions. The Government departments would now be allowed to make some discretionary decisions about where to breach the pay cap for it's public servants - but within a limited purview of managing recruitment issues.

The breach of the cap is not, however much the Tories would like to advertise it as such, a pay rise. In reality, the rise in prices, with consumer price inflation hitting 2.9%, will leave the less than 2% pay increase (for the select staff the Tories deigned to give it to) as, effectively, a pay cut. As with any good Tory policy, there's always a way to get out of actually funding it.

The Tories did win some important votes last week. They just about edged their key vote on the second reading of the exit bill, but with expectation even from Tory benches of huge changes to prevent a massive Government legislative power grab. The Government also won the vote to control the key legislative oversight committee.

But from the Tories there came a tangible sense that the wagons were being circled. Defeated on a non-binding motion, which they ultimately chose not to oppose, calling for a fair pay rise for NHS staff, they announced they would take no part in other non-binding motions. NHS staff immediately called for a 3.9% pay rise.

While the votes have no practical effect, they represent the will of Parliament. While for the Tories it will be about avoiding any fights that might provide the possibility of a perceived defeat, it doesn't look good for them after their power grabbing actions over the last few months - from the election, to the exit bill, to the legsilative oversight committees.

The Tory backdown on the pay cap, even if slight; it's incessant grasping after legislative power; it's choice to avoid fights; these are the signs of a Government on the backfoot, with the tide against it. The limited lifting of the cap is a first big breakthrough for anti-austerity campaigners in a long, long war.

The Tory's loss at their power grabbing election may prove to have been the first nail in the coffin of austerity. And it's long overdue. The most vulnerable in Britain have been put through seven years of pain. And for what?

More debt, a Government spending millions taking disabled people to court to cut their welfare, no recovery, the cost of living still outstripping wages, a 'light touch' approach to welfare that has driven homelessness.

There is light coming through the breach. But austerity is not yet toppled. The next big fight against austerity will be on the rollout of Universal Credit. The Commons Work and Pensions Committee heard testimony from a range of contributors from charities and councils, who all warned of impending disaster.

Failures in the set up of previous rollouts, failure in project delivery, claimants facing a cliff edge on rising rents. The Tory failure on other rollouts doesn't bode well either: the 'free' childcare expansion was underfunded and is falling short.

This is the Britain of austerity, where the impact of policies, and approaches implementing them, on ordinary people is seen as less important than headline announcements and the artificial balancing of numbers for moralistic ideological reasons.

We can do better and progressives need to come together to oppose austerity, to get hands into that breach and bring down the wall.

The questions the Prime Minister doesn't answer are usually the important ones, like Layla Moran's question on free childcare

Photograph: Child Care by Lubomirkin on Unsplash (License) (Cropped)

On Wednesday, new Liberal Democrat MP Layla Moran attempted to ask a question at PMQs. Her effort was drowned out - and ultimately upstaged by - the Tories' reaction. The bad behaviour of MPs got the headlines and successfully buried the lead.

Getting the media to write headlines about bad behaviour - the proverbial dead cat on the table - rather than the substance of policy is the basic aim of cynical political strategy. For the Conservatives, that's a point scored.

Moran was finally able to ask her question, though, and called on the PM to take action on the problems that have arisen with the Government's longstanding pledge to expand free childcare to thirty hours a week for 3 and 4 year olds.

The Prime Minister's response was less than convincing and that shouldn't be a surprise. The problems encountered in delivering this flagship policy underline the fundamental failings of the May Government and it's predecessor.

The plan to expand free childcare, a major campaign promise, has run into major problems. The moderated version of these events are that some thousands of families can't access the service thanks to 'technical issues'.

However, Layla Moran turned a light on the deeper problems underlying the implementation: the Tory claim that they were offering so called 'free' childcare masks the fact that they're not paying the full cost of the childcare.

This is a persistent habit of the Tories. They make big pledges, but then shift responsibility for delivery, and for raising funding, to others. Local government has also been hurt by this Conservative approach.

The Tories hand off ever further responsibility from central government, while drastically reducing funding as they devolve control over it. Social care in particular has been badly hit, even as the costs in the sector continually rise.

It's worth noting it was Theresa May's attempt to respond to that self-created social care crisis that hurt the Tories so badly at the election. The party's new plans for social care - to raid middle class homeowners - didn't survive beyond the manifesto launch.

In the case of childcare, it means that many providers won't offer the service as it is simply not finacially viable to do so. That will restrict access to free care. For others, it will mean increased costs as providers are forced to spread the costs across other service users.

This is a trend with the Conservatives, one that has plagued the policies enacted by the government. Privatised delivery has produced poor results and ethical violations in the provision of welfare. Local government has had funding taken away and then been called out for not keeping front line services, such as libraries, open.

Outcomes can be explained away. They can be put down to ideological differences as to the end goals, or dismissed with excuses blaming past governments or other bodies. But the failure of flagship policies shouldn't be shrugged off.

The expansion of free childcare is a long standing promise, but one that has had a cloud over it for most of that time. Failure to provide the plans with adequate funding was pointed out as far back as the end of 2016.

Problems have been noted and gone unaddressed, undermining the fundamental promise contained in the pledged policy. Failures like this need to be catalogued, because it keeps happening under these Conservative governments.

Shifting responsibility to others, denying funding. At some point, the buck has to stop and the Conservatives have to be held to account for their policies and their failure in the delivery of them.

Macron and Popularity: The President of France has yet to win a sceptical public back over to the political process

Photograph: LEWEB 2014 Conference - in conversation with Emmanuel Macron by LE WEB (License) (Cropped)

The victory of Emmanuel Macron attracted the attention and plaudits of centrists across Europe, desperate for a way out of the slump that has undermined social and liberal democratic parties. But the talk in many countries of needing their own Macron and En Marche is all just buying into a myth, because the rise of Macron was an illusion.

Reports this last month talked of Macron and his government already facing a decline in public support. But what those reports ignore is that support was never that high in the first place - the election landslide was more due to the electoral system than a swell of support.

Macron's movement was perhaps well organised or made a particularly well tailored pitch, but En Marche mostly benefited from a system that favours voters' picking their least worst option - which served En Marche who were the heirs of the collapse in the credibility of the centre-left and centre-right.

Macron took just 24% in the full field first round of the Presidential vote, and La Republic En Marche took 32% on a first round legislative election turnout of just 49%. These numbers delivered political power, but not broad public support or high approval. There was no rising wave, just a window of opportunity.

The problem for Macron is not that he has been discredited, but that he has yet to win voters back to the political process. Taking power on the support of a quarter and a fifth, his approval ratings will begin low, with scepticism high and everything to prove.

Turning political power in decent approval ratings was never something that was going to happen overnight. The pledges of Macron were built around big promises with no easy solution, like cleaning up politics.

The difficulties faced by Macron and En Marche were underlined when, within the opening weeks of his new office, his MoDem political allies and their leader Francois Bayrou were hit by corruption investigations.

The other big promise Macron made was to reform France's labour laws, famous for their scale and complexity. It is an issue on which there is a clear public support for action, but no real consensus on what action.

Macron has his own ideas, but has set about a negotiating strategy, rather than trying to force it through. Even trade unions have gotten around the table for talks - with the two of the largest unions even declining to take part in protests against any watering down of labour protections.

While the left under Jean-Luc Melenchon and the union CGT push for protests and strikes, Macron's consensus approach with no legislative surprise has got enough of the key players involved to reduce action to the harder left organisations that media find it easier to discredit.

But the dissatisfaction with politics in France is too broad to be convincingly reduced to the bellyaching of the radical left. And despite the lean times and discrediting of the centre, neither the radical left nor the far right have taken a decisive advantage.

The people of France are not itching to rise up for either extreme, but nor have they fallen back in love with the Republican centre. Macron was never the unquestioned messiah and he has yet to win the public over.

The election results showed all of this. The approval ratings just confirm it. The task ahead of Macron is to rebuild the Republic and he has no gordian solution. A facsimile of Macron in another country would face the same problems.

Macron's ascendency is not the revival that liberals crave, nor are his low approval ratings the death knell of moderate-led reformist capitalism for which socialists are straining their ears. Macron got enough support to get through the door.

But to stay there, Macron and En Marche must win people back to the political process. Sure, his failure to reengage people would be a blow to neoliberals trying to cling to power. But it would be just as bad for progressives of all stripes, for whom public faith in democracy and a politically active and interested people are a cornerstone.