Italian Election 2018: Can progressives settle their differences and work together? The heavy right-wing leaning of other possible governments makes cooperation a must

The Palazzo Montecitorio, home to the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Photograph: Palazzo Montecitorio by Nick Kenrick (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, Italy goes to the polls. Considering how turbulent the past few years have been, it is astonishing that the last election was a full five years ago now. In 2013, with help from the electoral system, the Partito Democratico - led by Pier Luigi Bersani - came out on top.

Things did not go to plan for the Democrats. Without enough seats for a majority, the three way division of Italian politics became an insurmountable obstruction. Bersani failed to form a government and stood down. With tentative agreements, successive Democrats have been Prime Minister: Enrico Letta, Matteo Renzi and Paolo Gentiloni.

It was Renzi who had the longest run at the head of the government, but his popularity waned as he kept pushing for reforms and he was toppled by his own constitutional referendum - to change the electoral system - which he staked against his own position and lost.

Since Renzi left office in the December 2016, Paolo Gentiloni has led the government and has proved fairly popular, with good approval ratings, back by most centre and left parties. However, he is not running at the head of the Centre-Left on Sunday.

In his absence, it is instead the centre-right, that look most likely to gain enough seats to form a government. The question for the centre-left, and the leading Democrats, is how to recover to the position they had early in Renzi's tenure, when they topped the European Parliament polls with 40% of the vote.

The Centre-Left

Matteo Renzi speaks at a university in October 2015. Photograph: Matteo Renzi a San Giobbe by the Università Ca' Foscari Venezia (License) (Cropped)

The 'centre-left' is led by Partito Democratico (PD), with Matteo Renzi returned as leader. A dispute over methods led to an ultimatum from left-wing Democrats, including stalwarts like former leader Bersani and former Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema, that if Renzi ran to return as leader of the party, they would leave.

Renzi ran again, and won. So they left - leaving the party largely in the hands of the Renziani faction, as many of their followers went with them. As a result, the party's more left-wing factions departed, and gone with them are a number of small left-wing parties that the Democrats previously counted on for support.

The PD's main allies this time around will be centrists and liberals, such as radical Emma Bonino's +Europa and Beatrice Lorenzin's Civica Popolare list of the centre-right Alternativa Popolare. These allies reflect the reality that the Democrats have found themselves under the consolidated control of the Renziani faction.

For the Renziani, this election is about defending their policies in government. Under his watch, civil administration was reformed, labour laws were relaxed and taxation simplified - it was these policies, a typical neoliberal agenda, that their left-wing critics found intolerable.

However. While economic reforms they oversaw are broadly accepted by the Centre-Right, they were accompanied by social measures, such as same-sex civil unions, which are likely to be targeted by the Centre-Right if it returns to government. It is also possible that Italy's fidelity to European commitments may also suffer - especially where they require unpopular fiscal sacrifices.

In the name of protecting such policies, a small part of the dissenting left has stuck around. As a result, the PD will get a little support from the left through from 'Italia Europa Insieme', or Insieme (Together), which gathers parties including Partito Socialista Italiano (Social Democrats), Federazione dei Verdi (Greens) and others from the recently faltered Campo Progressista.

The Centre-Right

Silvio Berlusconi, through controversies and legal battles, has intermittently held the post of Prime Minister of Italy during nearly a quarter century on the political frontline. Photograph: Silvio Berlusconi by paz.ca (License) (Cropped)

The name 'centre-right' is a bit of a misnomer, as it is composed of parties ranging from right-wing to far-right. Silvio Berlusconi is still there (or back, if you prefer) with Forza Italia, his vehicle of some twenty five years, leading the right.

He is joined once more by his long time, on again off again, allies, though they have expanded their appeal to all of Italy, quietly dropping their call for Northern separatism. Also in tow once more are Fratelli d'Italia, Brothers of Italy - the successors on the far-right to the National Alliance.

Despite everything, the octogenarian Silvio is still in the middle of everything. But he isn't having it all his own way. He faces strife within his own coalition list, with Lega leader Matteo Salvini - the influence behind taking the party national - not happy to play second fiddle. How that power struggle plays out could have a huge impact.

It wouldn't be an election featuring Silvio Berlusconi if there weren't some wild promises. The Forza Italia electoral pitch includes a basic income of E1000 for all Italians, along with free vet treatment for pets. Silvio has also promised tax breaks for adopting pets and to cut VAT on pet food.

It would be unwise for progressives to be seduced by these trinkets. These are pitches to win over any supporters of the populist party M5S who aren't looking too closely at the rest of the centre-right agenda, which - with the influence of FdA and Lega - would be terrible for virtually anyone except white male Italians pleased by tax breaks.

That is reinforced by Berlusconi's commitment to cutting income taxes across the board. Italy has a top rate of tax well above the European average and Silvio's solution is the darling of right-wing libertarians: a flat rate income tax set at 23%. As ever, the question arises as to how any of these promises can be paid for.

The particular driving force behind the campaigns of the right-wing parties is immigration. While tensions of been heightened by murders and revenge killings in recent months, the refugee crisis has been feeding anti-immigrant, nationalist rhetoric for some time.

Matteo Salvini and his party Lega, slogan 'Italy First', have been allowed to set the tone on the immigration debate and their tone has been aggressive. Salvini refers to a 'tide of delinquents', 'drug dealers, rapists, burglars' and says he 'wants to send them home'.

That aggressive, oppressive tone has been softly mimicked by Berlusconi, as you might expect, but also been followed by the Five Star Movement - the populist rival to the two main coalitions. The Democrats have not shied away from appeasing this stance either.

The Populists

Beppe Grillo talks to the crowd at party event in 2015. Luigi Di Maio stands in the group behind him, second from right. Photograph: Italia 5 Stelle at the Autodromo Enzo e Dino Ferrari - Imola by RevolWeb (License) (Cropped)

Movimento 5 Stella were the surprise of the 2013 election, presenting themselves as a true third force in Italian politics - much to the dismay of the centre-left and centre-right. Founded by comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, the party built a following that came for the establishment with a fire for tearing it down.

Or at least, that was the impression they liked to give. Led in the Italian Parliament by the 31 year old Luigi Di Maio, they present themselves as Anti-establishment, almost anti-politics, Eurosceptic and outspoken against administrative corruption. Di Maio has tried to professionalise that outline, in order to steer the party into government.

The M5S quest for respectability included an attempt last year to join the pro-EU liberal group in the European Parliament. The liberals gave them a hearing, but declined their application after members of the group objected (the other groups in the parliament had quietly turned them down, while the Greens overtly stated their mistrust of Grillo).

Yet they are a party filled with contradictions. M5S has found itself mired - from laughable amateurishness, like their programme apparently being copy-pasted from Wikipedia, to being itself caught up in corruption. Virginia Raggi's time in office as Mayor of Rome has been dogged by corruption allegations. And nationally, delegates were forced to resign after it was discovered they had fiddled commitments to donate parts of their salaries and expenses.

The party, or Movement, has also been linked to the spread of fake news, and propaganda from Russian sources. The party leadership has been accused of making money off the back of a fake news aggregator. This shouldn't come as a tremendous surprise.

The party itself is a spawn of Grillo's blog, and the party's branding remains his property. That makes it as much a controversialist media business venture as a political movement - much like that of a certain president in North America, with his penchant for crying fake news of mainstream media journalism included to boot.

But what are the controversialists standing for? They have been described as an anti-representative democracy movement - calling for direct democracy through digital means. But Di Maio has focused on more practical measures in his campaign.

Their policies include a basic income, which Berlusconi has felt the need to copy, but also cutting public debt and simplifying many laws. The left should be concerned with just how much common ground M5S has with the parties of the so-called 'centre-right' grouping.

Dissenting Left

The outspoken Pier Luigi Bersani, pictured during his time as leader of Partito Democratico, was instrumental in the breakway of the Movimento Democratico e Progressista and the formation of it's coalition Liberi e Uguali. Photograph: Floris e Bersani, Non stop Banda Larga PD venerdì 18 giugno 2010 by Bee Free - PGrandicelli (License) (Cropped)

The dissenting left has, after it's recent exodus from the Renziani dominated Partito Democratico, gathered a number of like minded parties in an alliance by the name of Liberi e Uguali (Free and Equal) - under the rather familiar slogan of "For the many, not the few".

It's leader is the former antimafia prosecutor Pietro Grasso, at present the President of the Senate. It's leading figures include former Premier Massimo D'Alema, former PD leader Pier Luigi Bersani, former leader of the left-wing Sinistra Ecologia Liberta party Nichi Vendola, and Laura Boldrini who is currently the President of the Chamber of Deputies and formerly the spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The LeU groups unites the breakaway factions of PD in the form of Movimento Democratico e Progressista, with other left-wing groups gathered into Sinistra Italia (Italian Left) - that acts as a successor to the Sinistra Ecologia Liberta party that has been a significant left-wing block in recent years.

The joint programme for LeU promises that the group will fight to turn the tide of globalisation, to counter the trend towards precarity, to put education and work back at the centre of people's lives. While the reforms under Renzi increased jobs by one million, they haven't arrested the slide of 18 million people into poverty, with most new jobs being on a part time basis.

In practice, the LeU programme comes as a pledge to restore 'good employment' with a Green New Deal, an investment programme to convert and expand the economy across many areas; to undo the 'blackmail' of precarity by restoring restoring Article 18; to undo recent school reforms and boost investment - along with abolishing university fees; to reorganise taxes to be more progressive and close loopholes - with the money being used to fund reformed health and welfare provision; and to shore up inclusion of LGBT people, particularly couples.

It may be that this pitch is more about shifting the position of the Democrats back in their direction than expecting to implement these plans in government. But it is an ambitious programme which has brought together a number of left-wing, democratic socialist parties and factions - not an easy task in Italian politics.

But what unites LeU as much as politics is a deep mistrust of Renzi and his methods. Pier Luigi Bersani - former leader of the Democrats and one of the founders of the breakaway Movimento Democratico e Progressista that formed LeU - has taken particular exception to Renzi's tearing up of the root of what Bersani considers his party.

Bersani has gone as far as expressing the belief that Renzi plans to form a government with Berlusconi - the old enemy as far as the left in Italy is concerned. It is perhaps notable then that the party's main objectives require largely dismantling the changes to job security and pensions that the Renziani faction oversaw.

Polling and Possible Governments

Despite spending since 2013 in government, and even riding high in the polls during that time, the Centre-Left has a lot to do if it wants to end up in government. The Democrats have fallen to around 22% - with their allies +Europa on 3%, and their whole coalition list sitting at just 27%.

Even if the dissenting left could be reconciled, that would at present add just 5% more support. Bersani is optimistic that Free and Equal can take double their poll numbers - perhaps hoping their borrowed slogan brings a little of Corbyn's campaigning fortunes. But even if the party reaches towards 12-15%, they will still need allies. Can they work with Renzi?

Unless there is some serious turn in favour of the Democrats - such as winning well in FPTP constituencies - it may be that forcing a fresh election might be their best outcome. With support for a progressive government struggling to crest 30%, things do not bode well for other options.

While the LeU want nothing to do with Renzi, would it be possible to attract the support of sufficient centrists to cobble together a (very) broad centre-left government under someone like Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni? It seems unlikely at this point.

As a result, the Centre-Right finds itself perhaps best positioned to form a government. But it would be a government of fractious interests and hostility to otherness. However, collectively at 38%, they hold the strongest position - though who will lead such a group after the election is another question - it is too close to call in the polls between Berlusconi's Forza Italia and Salvini's Lega.

For Berlusconi's part, he has ruled out both a grand coalition, or national unity government, and even a limited confidence & supply arrangement between the Centre-Right and Centre-Left. He says there will be a new election if his coalition falls short of a governing majority. Renzi has agreed with this - but such proclamations may be taken with a pinch of salt, as pragmatic dealmaking rules in Italy.

So the renewal of the Centre-Left/Centre-Right grand coalition should be considered very possible. The denials of the leaders of both coalitions have been offset by voices among the allies of both, who note that a grand coalition is the most likely outcome. But will it be a long term option or just a stop-gap until a fresh election?

It could presented as stop-gap but run as long as needed. What is clear is that neither Renzi nor Berlusconi could lead such a government (in Silvio's case, because he is still banned from holding political office). That would mean the appointment of some third figure - such as current Premier Paolo Gentiloni.

The current Prime Minister Gentiloni is, personally, Italy's most popular leader. But people know he isn't the leader of the PD, and so his polling has yet to figure into the election. With his record - at present overseeing Italy's GDP up on 2010, while both deficit and debt are falling, thanks to reforms that have received praise in Europe - he might assemble a stable government, for a time.

But it will likely be seen as another stitch up. Stirring up the pot will be the M5S, and the share of votes and seats they are able to capture this time. Contrary to previous elections, M5S seem keen to get into government this time. But the question is: who with?

The nightmare outcome for the left is M5S throwing it's lot in with the right-wing parties. It does not seem like a big leap for M5S to work with the Centre-Right in a small state, Eurosceptic, socially conservative government.

There is an outside prospect for M5S, in the form of fleeting hints that the dissenting left group 'Free and Equal' might be prepared to work with them in government. It seems unlikely with so much ground between the two - but it would certainly be considered change. It is more likely that M5S will tip the centre-right into government.

Advent of Populist Government?

However, from our perspective, the prospective government for progressives to be most concerned about  is some sort of tie-up between M5S and Lega. It would, of course, require both to have particularly strong elections - though they are currently polling at around 26% and 15% respectively, and Lega particularly may punch above their weight in seats thanks to regional concentration.

Both parties have a history of being aggressively anti-establishment. That is not, in itself a reason for dismay, but it is something they may find common ground on. But what is worrying are their common ground on pushing anti-immigration stances and their criticised ties to the wider populist and nationalist waves that have been backed by Russian interventions in Western democracy.

If these two were able to patch over their differences - and Grillo has shown himself to be very flexible about making friends, allying with Farage and UKIP in Europe, praising a certain US President - they might assemble between them the kind of low tax, protectionist, nationalist and hostile-to-difference socially conservative agenda that will spook every country around them.

More pressing is that this toxic brew - the mix of Grillo's anti-representative democracy, Salvini's 'promotion of the family' at expense of LGBT people, and both party's scapegoating of refugees and immigrants - might do significant damage to the rights and wellbeing of a lot of people.

Salvini has certainly indicated a desire to shake off Berlusconi and assert his own leadership. An alliance with M5S could give him an outlet to pursue a government built on the exploitation of the kind of unrestrained nationalism and disaffection that a certain US President rode into office.

Don't expect a clear result on Monday morning

The complicated electoral system will play a role in which of the possible governments Italy ends up with and a lot will ride on the performance of the smaller parties. The election has two components: a third of seats are first-past-the-post constituencies, while two thirds are proportionally distributed according to the popular vote - above a 3% threshold.

It is important to note that just reaching the popular threshold delivers a substantial number of seats: just 3% would award 11-12 seats. Meanwhile, the FPTP element, just as seen in Britain with the SNP, favours small but regionally concentrated parties and rewards them very heavily.

For instance, the smallest of the parties allied to Berlusconi is Noi con l'Italia, which is standing locally known candidates, against very little opposition, in the poor Southeastern region of Apulia. Standing in just 34 seats, if it were to win even half that would be 17 seats - even if it took less than 3% of the vote.

It will take days to sort through the permutations. But whether Italy has a functioning government will be in the hands of many competing factions, across the spectrum, doing deals long after the distribution of seats is decided.

For progressives, there is no clear route to building a government and everything depends on a big shift come polling day. If voters turn out to give the Centre-Left and the dissenting left sufficient seats, they must sort out their differences and work together, because the other possible governments do not bode well for progressive values.

A new realignment of the Left is underway and Proportional Representation and the Basic Income are at the core

In Castlefields arena, Natalie Bennett addresses protesters from many different movements, who came together in opposition to the Conservative government in Manchester last Autumn.

Back in the 1980s and 1990s, Liberal and Liberal Democrat leaders Roy Jenkins, Paddy Ashdown and Charles Kennedy followed a course that sought to 'realign the Left' in Britain. Powered by the dominance of Thatcherite conservatism, it sought to change the approach of the left and ultimately lead to co-operation between progressive parties, in opposition to the Conservatives.

First through Liberal-Labour pacts, of which there is an even longer history, next through the breakaway SDP/Liberal Alliance, and then in the form of New Labour-Liberal Democrat talks and cooperation. And Kennedy's 'Real Alternative' campaign banner, even in opposition to a Labour government, reflected the general cohesion of aims on the Left, if not of methods.

That particular movement on the part of the Lib Dems ended with Nick Clegg's leadership. Clegg took the Liberal Democrats back to a policy of equidistance between the two big parties, Labour and the Conservatives.

However, the fall of the coalition and succession of a Conservative to a majority government seems to have triggered a new phase of realignment. The resignations of Clegg and Miliband led to the election of new party leaders, seen to be of very different stripes from their predecessors.

Tim Farron, the new Lib Dem leader, is a campaigning Northern MP and former Party President who stood aloof from, and in polite opposition to, the coalition. So far his efforts have been concentrated on focussing the Lib Dem fightback on the party's roots - in campaigning locally for community issues and nationally on matters of conscience.

Jeremy Corbyn's election as Labour leader seemed to send shockwaves through British politics. Portrayed by the media as a move back to some Michael Foot and Tony Benn, 80s-esque, hard Left position, Corbyn has faced disquiet and malcontent within the Parliamentary party since taking over with a landslide of party members' votes.

After the last five years, the seemingly inevitable alignment of the Liberal Democrats and Labour was shattered. It would be understandable to think finding new common ground would be difficult or impossible between the party Clegg had taken to the Centre, even Centre-Right, and the party Corbyn has been accused of taking to the hard Left.

Yet a new realignment of the Left is under way and the policies that will define the shift are already emerging in the policy debates of both parties.

Both the Liberal Democrats and Labour now seem to be on the same page, finally, when it comes to proportional representation. Both Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell, from Labour's Left, and Chuka Umunna, from Labour's Right, have expressed support for PR. And both parties are engaged in consultations over their future approach to policy, including the welfare system - debates in which the idea of a universal basic income is playing a prominent role.

Ahead of the EU referendum, Farron has even called for a progressive political alliance on Europe - making internationalism again a core value across progressive parties. That matches, in a limited way, the arguments that Caroline Lucas, the Green MP, has been making since the last election that progressive parties need to start working together.

As for the Green Party, in true Green fashion Natalie Bennett is following Caroline Lucas' lead in standing down as party leader once her term is up later this year. So who will lead the Greens through this new realignment, and how they will handle it on into the 2020 general election, is unknown.

But the challenge ahead of the three leaders of Britain's main progressive parties is clear: to stop the Conservatives winning their way to back-to-back governments. Aligning in support of some core common policies is a start.

The next step is to commit to the kind of cooperation on various campaigns and causes that can foster the good will between parties. That mutual respect will be needed to build a real electoral alliance, that stands together behind a limited set of core ideals in opposition to conservatism.

In Argentina, Macri's broad Centre coalition secured the Presidency. Yet the question remains: when can the Left cut ties with neoliberals to pursue truly radical reforms?

Mauricio Macri, pictured casting his vote in the August primaries, united the Centre-Right and Centre-Left opposition to defeat the Kirchner candidate and become the first non-Peronist, non-UCR President. Photograph: Mauricio Macri vota by Mauricio Macri (License) (Cropped)

After twelve years in power, the Kirchnerist faction of the Peronist movement, in the form of the Partido Justicialista, lost their grip on the Presidency of Argentina (Watts & Goni, 2015). In the second round of voting Mauricio Macri, leading the broad centre coalition Cambiemos, defeated the Justicialista, and former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, backed Frente para la Victoria candidate Daniel Scioli (BBC, 2015).

Macri's victory has been received positively as, possibly, the beginning for a new moderate Argentina (Cottle, 2015). And yet, while neoliberals, in particular, rejoice in a pro-market victory, Macri's Presidency has only come with the complicity of the centre-left, specifically the Union Civica Radicale (UCR, Radical Civic Union).

That tentative alliance raises the question of whether, sooner or later, those with Left-wing tendencies, particularly within UCR, will feel the need to go their own way - though there is a lot of work ahead before a progressive slate could win without some sort of agreement with, or against, the Peronist movement.

Not the least consideration is that the election of the conservative liberal Mauricio Macri will not, alone, be enough to change the direction of Argentina. Although, the defeat of Kirchner's populist Peronist candidate - which has brought a positive response from neoliberal pro-market voices - has been regarded as a new turn for Argentina and, possibly a little optimistically, the overthrow of populism (Rodriguez-Brizuela, 2015).

While the Peronists are still the largest group in the Congress, that may shift over the course of Macri's term as half of the Chamber of Deputies is elected every two years in legislative elections. And the efforts already launched by Macri at tackling Argentina's immense economic challenges have received praise (The Economist, 2016). So, for the moment, the momentum is with Macri.

However, Macri's support came from a coalition primarily divided between the Centre-Right party Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal, PRO) and the Centre-Left party Union Civica Radical - backed by a mix of supporters from across the centre (The Argentina Independent, 2015). So what of Macri's Radical partners?

Despite the party's name, the UCR is a moderate centre-left party, seen by the harder Left as bourgeois, that has for decades been caught between other factions. The traditional opponents of the Peronists, some internal and breakaway factions such as the Radicales K have nonetheless found themselves sometimes allies with Peronist factions, in pursuit of reforms that promise social justice and improvements to the lives of citizens (La Nacion, 2006).

Yet the authoritarian character of the Justicialista - with fears ranging from electoral fraud to intimidation and suppression of the press, along with policies like the confiscation of pension funds to plug financial holes (Marty, 2015; Crandall, 2012) - seems to have helped align the UCR with the opposition. That has led the UCR on the path joining Cambiemos, despite its mainstream, globalising, neoliberal approach (Rodriguez, 2015).

Now, it would not be a surprise to see the election of 2015 presented as a contest between the market and the state. Yet in reality, it was more after the fashion of the statist, populist and nationalist Peronists, holding a long-term authoritarian grip on power, versus a broad opposition, that Macri has succeeded in rallying around his open and 'neoliberal' way - that embraces the global system.

That is a story replicated across Europe in different shades - liberals and social democrats shackled to the neoliberal mainstream, in the face of rising fear and nationalism, rallying to protect positive gains embodied in the the establishment institutions. So why, the question might well be asked, would or should the Centre-Left consider breaking away from the Centre-Right? It is certainly clear that the global economic crisis is not over and that populist nationalism has not retreated - even in Argentina after its defeat.

The answer is because, ultimately, neoliberalism is no friend to social progress.

For all his moderate liberal credentials, as Mayor of Buenos Aires Mauricio Macri behaved in a typically neoliberal way - defunding social programs in search of competition at the expense of social security (Esperanza Casullo, 2015). And Argentina's Macrinomic path out of its present crisis will likely follow the same austerian path as many countries in Europe - particularly the UK under George Osborne Chancellorship.

But that doesn't mean that some overnight, clean break is imminent. Progressives in Argentina must build gradually towards an unshackling, because the election demonstrated that there is not yet much of a political space for a radical alternative to Peronist statism or the neoliberal market. Yet Macri's election has levered open the door and progressives must step into that new space to develop a fresh consensus around a just, sustainable and liberating alternative, amenable to the building of broad Left movement.