Macron appears to have consolidated power, but is there anything for 'centrists' to learn from his success? Not really

Macron's landslide was not quite what it appeared, exposing how neoliberal Centrism depends upon disinterest and abstention. Photograph: Emmanuel Macron campaign poster 'Macron President' in Paris by Lorie Shaull (License) (Cropped)

Nearly three-quarters of a year has passed since Emmanuel Macron took up the post of President of France. In that time he has seemingly managed to consolidate power (despite of some rocky moments). So: job done, new centrist model ready to roll out? Not so fast.

Well, let's look beneath the surface. The election landslides for Macron and La Republique En Marche were always going to provoke a response, especially with the near wipeout of the old centre-left Parti Socialiste (PS).

One small, but significant, reaction - an indication of how sizeable a reorganisation of French politics Macron has caused - is the reunification of the old Parti Radical with the breakaway Radical Party of the Left, as the new Mouvement Radical.

For years, the two radical parties - in former times a powerful party of government - were occasionally a crucial coalition partner of the larger parties. But they split from one another down the old left-right lines.

The Radical Party of the Left would partner with the Parti Socialiste and the centre-left, and the Radical Party would partner with the various centre-right parties. It appears that Emmanuel Macron has helped to settle the dispute between the two.

The reunification of the Radicals is a small thing, but also suggests that Macron's victory (and the collapse of PS) was big enough to put into abeyance the question of whether to partner with left or right. The radicals are happy with the centre.

That perhaps also says a lot about where Les Marcheurs lie on a political spectrum: European Federalist, social liberal, and for equality of opportunity (rather than of outcomes) within a free market.

Those were also the bones of Macron's pitch at the election. An election that left Macron with a severely weakened opposition, a a left-wing reduced to around 50-60 social liberals, social democrats and socialists, and a right-wing of around 130-140.

One potential problem Macron faced was if those with divided loyalties between En Marche and the social liberals and social democrats in opposition organise, Macron might face difficulty from a voting-bloc under his own left-wing.

However, the Left is still in disarray - and the Radicals seem set jump ship. The election was a disaster for the Parti Socialiste, it's bastion, who fell from 280 seats to just 30. Even their 2017 Presidential candidate Benoit Hamon has walked away.

Hamon has formed a new party, Generation.s, which has formed a tentative European alliance with Yanis Varoufakis and DiEM25. It had been hoped that Hamon might do for PS what Corbyn did for Labour in Britain, but now he will have to start from scratch.

There are also two separate far-left groups in the National Assembly, that have yet to find a way to work together - France Insoumise with 17 seats and Gauche Democrate et Republicaine with 16 seats.

With the collapse of the Left and, so far, no sign of a new rallying position, Macron has for the moment usurped the place of the Parti Socialiste in two-party system. Does this mean that the centre is saved and the model can be copy and pasted elsewhere?

No.

The hope for a centrist revival is not giving due credit the particular circumstances of Macron's victory - nor that both Macron and Les Marcheurs won, across the board, as the least worst option amidst raging disinterest. Not exactly an inspiring rallying call.

Macron's victory also has shadows of the upswell that took Barack Obama to  the US Presidency in 2008. Macron, undeniably a member of the party establishment, rode on the back of a movement that was then jettisoned when office was achieved.

The leading talents of that movement were absorbed into the government machinery, while the movement itself has been left without it's leading figures and central purpose. Will it survive or find a new role?

That Macron has succeeded in consolidating his position must still be put to the test at the ballot. As Obama learned, when you set high expectations, the movement will want practical changes it can touch. A legacy they can touch.

What Macron has right now is a governing majority. He doesn't even have a campaign machinery for himself or his supporters to sustain their agenda. Nothing has really changed over the past year.

Copy the En Marche model at peril. Macron's was a victory for charismatic leadership, but it's hollow inside. The future, never mind success, will depend on the support existing parties like MoDem and the Radicals, and the creation of some sort of plain, traditional electoral machinery for Les Marcheurs.

Macron's victory was a lesson in how to get into government, not in how to stay there. He made waves, a tidal wave, that upset the system and forced some realignment. But politics is fickle.

Alliances can seem unbreakable, until they aren't. Break ups are forever, until they aren't. Just ask the Radicals.

The Alternative Year: It's the little victories that keep us moving forward

Twenty Seventeen was... a year. While 2016 was always going to be tough act to follow, 2017 really did it's darnedest - and it was certainly eventful. Sequels are always difficult, but last year had turned many people numb.

But a lot that happened in 2017 that was important - and some of it was even positive. So here's our breakdown of four of the big political themes in Britain, Europe and around the world this year as The Alternative covered them - and a fifth point, in spirit of the season, looking forward.

I. Election of Opportunity

Theresa May wanted to cement seven years of Tory government with the certainty of five more years with a majority and saw an opening when polls put her a long way out front. Luckily for anyone sick to their teeth with the Tories, the election didn't go the way she thought it would.

The unnecessary election backfired. Theresa May survived the blow but it very nearly knocked her out of 10 Downing Street. Over the campaign, Corbyn's Labour made up a staggering amount of ground and proved it could win. The rhetoric had been wrong, the Corbyn brand was electable.

Theresa May, now without a majority, clung on to power with a coalition deal with the DUP - the Democratic Unionist Party, of Northern Ireland. Gone were the frills of the manifesto and in was a billion in extra funding for Northern Ireland.

Facing her in May and June was a resurgent Labour, led by Jeremy Corbyn who was found to be more at home on the campaign trail than under the spotlights. But May also faced a patched up, locally-led, progressive alliance.

It wasn't the scale of cooperation that some hoped for (The Alternative, for instance), but it was a remarkable step that made a difference in a few of close battles. As a trial run, it showed promise for what alliance might achieve in the future.

Between Corbyn and the Progressive Alliance, it showed that the left had found how to win. But it was a beginning that needs an end. It's a job that needs finishing.

'General Election 2017: The Alternative guide to a critical general election for Britain'; in The Alternative; 8 May 2017.

'Election 2017: Is this the Progressive Alliance moment? It's up to you'; in The Alternative; 19 April 2017.

'General Election 2017 - A hopeful night for progressives: It's time to do opposition right'; in The Alternative; 9 June 2017.

'Queen's Speech: Theresa May has her DUP pact. What comes next for the Progressive Alliance in opposition?'; in The Alternative; 26 June 2017.

II. The Far Right Returns

Photograph: Bundestag by Hernán Piñera in 2011 (License)

And the left learning how to win again could not come at a better time, because the far right is back. It had been creeping up for years. UKIP. Brexit. That President. Cracks were appearing and the far right was beginning to slip itself through them. The presence of a far right party in the German Bundestag was only the latest warning.

In 2017, the far right began to win seats in European parliaments in earnest. And yet, everywhere they fell short of power. The far right failed to make the breakthroughs it was hoping for - despite apparently hefty backing from Russia, which was finally called out by leaders in Berlin and in Westminster.

In the Netherlands, in France, in Germany and in Britain, far right parties have not been able to breach a barrier at around 13% of the vote. For all the rhetoric of a 'far right surge', they're a long way from convincing the people of Europe to turn back the clock.

In these defeats of the far right, centrists and progressives were left with feelings of relief - and often proclaimed them loudly. But there is no future in that feeling. Progressives need real reasons for optimism, based on good ideas that take hold in the public imagination.

'Relief as Far Right falls short in Dutch election, but there's no future in that feeling: Progressives need reasons for optimism'; in The Alternative; 20 March 2017.

'French Legislative Elections: Macron's ascent asks a tough question of social democrats and social liberals'; in The Alternative; 20 June 2017.

'What next for Merkel and Germany?'; in The Alternative; 25 September 2017.

III. Neoliberalism Hanging On

Photograph: Emmanuel Macron campaign poster 'Macron President' in Paris by Lorie Shaull (License) (Cropped)

So far, the fact that far right has fallen short of power has been claimed as a victory for a certain kind of centrism and it's neoliberal hegemony - particularly in the case of President of France Emmanuel Macron.

But the yellow tide is not what it seems. Neoliberals are still winning the way they did in the 90s - by lethargy. With no better option, neoliberalism will continues to be the bitter pill that is accepted.

Neoliberalism is getting and staying in power aided by abstention as disinterest prevails and because the far right remains just repulsive enough that people are not persuaded by populist nationalism.

If neoliberal leaders are a bulwark, then they're a mossen edifice - an wooden post stood amid turbulent seas, sheltering a small pool of stagnant waters. It is the job of progressives to use the, relative, calm that this to come up with better ideas.

'The Yellow Tide isn't what it seems: The neoliberal centre has depended upon abstention and prevails amid disinterest'; in The Alternative; 10 July 2017.

'Macron and Popularity: The President of France has yet to win a sceptical public back over to the political process'; in The Alternative; 4 September 2017.

'German Elections: Angela Merkel will be the stern, bleak but sturdy breakwater people accept amidst interminable turmoil'; in The Alternative; 21 September 2017.

'Argentina midterms raise the question: What's so funny about compassionate realism?'; in The Alternative; 13 November 2017.

'Italian Left: Upheavals reveal progressive cross-section - struggle between pro-European current and rejection of neoliberalism. Can they be reconciled?'; in The Alternative; 11 December 2017.

IV. Seven Years of Tory Government

Photograph: Theresa May in Estonia in September 2017, by Arno Mikkor/EU2017EE (License)

It seemed that when Theresa May took over, she was at least willing to acknowledge that raw austerity thinking was hurting rather than helping. She voiced her belief in the Unionism of Joseph Chamberlain and promised a shared society - social harmony with a square deal for those who mucked in.

There has been little evidence of it in policy and the facts tell a sorry story about the state of Britain. While the government scapegoats anyone it can find, lives are becoming precarious and uncertain. Vulnerable people are squeezed of their benefits and poverty, including child poverty, is rising.

Poverty, real despair and destitution, has returned to visibility on the streets of the Britain. Only this week, in the run up to Christmas, are exposes being run on just how widespread poverty is - even among the working people Tories call the 'deserving'.

A fundamental component of the social contract has been broken by the Conservatives. Even with their heinous rhetoric towards the poor, that tries to draw lines between the deserving and undeserving, they at least maintain the semblance of offering a square deal in return for work. So where is it?

Work is precarious and poorly paid. Homes are expensive and even renting is getting out of reach. Prices of even basic goods are rising faster than wages. Personal debts are getting higher. The poor - those considered by Tories deserving and undeserving alike - are paying a heavy toll for realisation of the Conservative vision. Where is the fair deal?

'Unionism: What is Mrs May pitching?'; in The Alternative; 16 January 2017.

'Conservative's callous attitude to disability benefits underlines the reasons to embrace principles behind universal welfare'; in The Alternative; 27 February 2017.

'Asylum distribution scandal less about immigration and more about inequality'; in The Alternative; 10 April 2017.

'Pay Cap: Hammond focus on 'overpaid' public sector workers is just a distraction from Tories failing those in private sector'; in The Alternative; 17 July 2017.

'The reality of austerity Britain: work and life are now poor, precarious and uncertain'; in The Alternative; 23 October 2017.

'Affordable Housing: That seven years of government was nearly reduced to a bitter meme reflects disappointment with Conservative broken promises'; in The Alternative; 27 November 2017.

'The government social mobility commission resigns in protest at lack of progress on 75th anniversary of the Beveridge Report'; in The Alternative; 4 December 2017.

V. Little Victories

Changing things for the better, in the long run will not be the result of grandstanding. It will be hard fought and hard won, by thousands of people on a thousand issues, little victories that add up to a much bigger sense of momentum.

At times, the forces arrayed against progress can seem overwhelming. But for progressives, it's how things have always been. All we can do is pitch in. Start small. Begin by making the little differences that are within our reach.

There have been small victories in 2017. For instance, in Barcelona the municipal government began fining energy companies for cutting off the supply to vulnerable households. It's a small change. But it could make a practical difference and in communities across Europe, there will be stories like this. Little actions that, together, can build into a bigger change of the tide.

At the end of our "The Alternative Year" for 2016, we said that the lesson for 2017 was that social progressives remain the majority, their ideas can win, can engage and can empower. 2017 was a step forward on that road. Let's hope 2018 sees these truths lead to breakthroughs and, as ever, The Alternative be back in the New Year doing the best we can.

'Little Victories: Tackling energy costs would be a small win with big consequences'; in The Alternative; 21 August 2017.

'World on Fire: This week just shows how important empowered local government and international cooperation really are'; in The Alternative; 14 August 2017.

Macron and Popularity: The President of France has yet to win a sceptical public back over to the political process

Photograph: LEWEB 2014 Conference - in conversation with Emmanuel Macron by LE WEB (License) (Cropped)

The victory of Emmanuel Macron attracted the attention and plaudits of centrists across Europe, desperate for a way out of the slump that has undermined social and liberal democratic parties. But the talk in many countries of needing their own Macron and En Marche is all just buying into a myth, because the rise of Macron was an illusion.

Reports this last month talked of Macron and his government already facing a decline in public support. But what those reports ignore is that support was never that high in the first place - the election landslide was more due to the electoral system than a swell of support.

Macron's movement was perhaps well organised or made a particularly well tailored pitch, but En Marche mostly benefited from a system that favours voters' picking their least worst option - which served En Marche who were the heirs of the collapse in the credibility of the centre-left and centre-right.

Macron took just 24% in the full field first round of the Presidential vote, and La Republic En Marche took 32% on a first round legislative election turnout of just 49%. These numbers delivered political power, but not broad public support or high approval. There was no rising wave, just a window of opportunity.

The problem for Macron is not that he has been discredited, but that he has yet to win voters back to the political process. Taking power on the support of a quarter and a fifth, his approval ratings will begin low, with scepticism high and everything to prove.

Turning political power in decent approval ratings was never something that was going to happen overnight. The pledges of Macron were built around big promises with no easy solution, like cleaning up politics.

The difficulties faced by Macron and En Marche were underlined when, within the opening weeks of his new office, his MoDem political allies and their leader Francois Bayrou were hit by corruption investigations.

The other big promise Macron made was to reform France's labour laws, famous for their scale and complexity. It is an issue on which there is a clear public support for action, but no real consensus on what action.

Macron has his own ideas, but has set about a negotiating strategy, rather than trying to force it through. Even trade unions have gotten around the table for talks - with the two of the largest unions even declining to take part in protests against any watering down of labour protections.

While the left under Jean-Luc Melenchon and the union CGT push for protests and strikes, Macron's consensus approach with no legislative surprise has got enough of the key players involved to reduce action to the harder left organisations that media find it easier to discredit.

But the dissatisfaction with politics in France is too broad to be convincingly reduced to the bellyaching of the radical left. And despite the lean times and discrediting of the centre, neither the radical left nor the far right have taken a decisive advantage.

The people of France are not itching to rise up for either extreme, but nor have they fallen back in love with the Republican centre. Macron was never the unquestioned messiah and he has yet to win the public over.

The election results showed all of this. The approval ratings just confirm it. The task ahead of Macron is to rebuild the Republic and he has no gordian solution. A facsimile of Macron in another country would face the same problems.

Macron's ascendency is not the revival that liberals crave, nor are his low approval ratings the death knell of moderate-led reformist capitalism for which socialists are straining their ears. Macron got enough support to get through the door.

But to stay there, Macron and En Marche must win people back to the political process. Sure, his failure to reengage people would be a blow to neoliberals trying to cling to power. But it would be just as bad for progressives of all stripes, for whom public faith in democracy and a politically active and interested people are a cornerstone.

The Yellow Tide isn't what it seems: The neoliberal centre has depended upon abstention and prevails amid disinterest

Macron's landslide was not quite what it appeared, exposing how neoliberal Centrism depends upon disinterest and abstention. Photograph: Emmanuel Macron campaign poster 'Macron President' in Paris by Lorie Shaull (License) (Cropped)

The rise of Macron was met with a chorus of celebration from some corners for the resurgence of the 'Centre'. In France, we are to believe, the neoliberal Centre has recovered. But has the centre really found a new revitalising note?

In the presidential election, Macron prevailed as the neoliberal Centrist candidate thanks to a number of factors: the collapse of social democracy, repeated Centre-Right scandals, and because the Far-Right was sufficiently repulsive.

Now, even with the Left non-committal, Macron did secure the support of around 45% of registered voters in the head-to-head with the Far Right. But was the high water mark.

At the legislative elections Macron's party, La Republic En Marche, took a landslide majority. Yet it came amid a low turnout. While his party took 49% of second round votes, just 43% of voters turned out - giving them the support of only about 20% of eligible voters.

The neoliberal Centre is holding on to power, but it doesn't seem to be the result of its own arguments. If anything, it seems as if the Centrists are standing still as the turbulent waters wash around them. As protest votes and popular dissensions of the Left and the Right ebb and flow, the stagnant Centre appears to rise or fall.

Just look at Italy. Despite losing a crucial referendum in December and resigning as Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi won back the leadership of the Partito Democratico in a landslide. And judging from the polls, he will likely return as Premier at the next election.

If he does, it would be explicitly at the head of a party of Renziani Centrists and neoliberals, looking to replicate Macron's success. That comes thanks to the Left-wing of the party going through with its threat to leave if Renzi won back the leadership.

Under former party leaders Pierluigi Bersani and Massimo D'Alema, the Centre-Left walked away to work towards concentrating all of the many Left factions - including their own Democratici e Progressisti vehicle - under a single progressive banner.

This move leaves Renzi as the undisputed leader of a definitively Centrist party. Matteo Renzi again proves himself to be - in the years of turmoil created by Berlusconi finally, if only partially, falling from grace - pretty much the last man standing.

But what else does Renzi have? Other that his political skill that earned him the nickname 'il Rottamore' - the scrapper. He lost the constitutional referendum on which he staked his Premiership and the Renziani approach has alienated the Centre-Left and driven them out of the party - much as the Hollande governments did and Macron risks doing with his programme.

Furthermore, it was his political skill - not electoral success - that saw him rise to the position of Premier, after a succession of resignations when the Democrats under Bersani failed to gain enough support to govern with it's Centre-Left platform in 2013.

While the Democrats had consistently polled well under Renzi, up on 2013, their lead has slipped and the recent turmoil has seen them fall into a neck and neck race with the populist anti-establishment party Movimento 5 Stella (M5S).

The sum of this is that in Italy, the 'third way' Centrism - blending social democracy and neoliberalism - may return to power with Renzi, but it's unlikely to do so with sweeping triumph. Again, the waters are moving and the Centrists are not the ones moving them.

In the Netherlands, Prime Minister Mark Rutte celebrated his party remaining the largest and the halting of the Far-Right advance. But the figures tell a different story. Between the coalition partners - the Centre-Right liberal-conservative VVD and the Dutch Labour Party PdvA - they lost 37 seats and 24% of the vote.

For Rutte's VVD, it was the failure of an alternative to muster sufficient support from a fractured and plural political landscape that has kept him in power: they remained the largest party with just 21% of the vote.

It will take an across the spectrum alliance of at least four parties to keep Rutte's VVD in office. While that kind of pluralism is a positive thing, it's not exactly evidence of a great Centre revival.

In Britain, the failure of the Liberal Democrats to increase their share of the vote reinforced the point.

By succeeding in getting people to engage with politics, to turnout and vote, Jeremy Corbyn shut down what appears to be the main avenue along which the neoliberal Centre has travelled: abstention.

If this is the case, it makes the pitch made by the Lib Dems over the last few elections and the New Labourite obsession misguided. Pitching to be the party of faceless bureaucrats, the party of government, the party of business, only seems to work if people have lost interest.

Could a new British party of the centre have done better than the Lib Dems? A party of economically neoliberal social democrats, uniting Labour MPs with some liberals and even some Tories, and pitching to as broad a base as possible, under a leader like Yvette Cooper?

The numbers don't really support it. Even with the Tories and Labour getting their largest vote share for some time, abstention was still the largest block. The reality is that Centrism doesn't seem to have a convincing story to tell and so stands still as events move around it.

Macron was the rallying point to see off a threat. And while Justin Trudeau did indeed lead the Liberals to a huge comeback and landslide majority in Canada in 2015, he did so with the support of just a quarter of eligible voters - the gift of an electoral system - against the waning power of an ever more rightward leaning government.

If Renzi wins back to the Premiership in Italy with effective power, it will also be likely thanks to an electoral system. And, in the Netherlands, Rutte held on thanks to support being fractured across the plural options.

While the Right rallies an angry minority around a crude nationalism that makes wild promises and the Left assembles behind a hopeful interventionism, the Centre mostly benefits from disengagement. The the relative recovery of the Centre comes to look more like a holding pattern.

This isn't the sign of a recovery - it's the absence of one.

The Centre remains with a hand on power because disengagement remains a real issue and neither a Left Alternative nor the angry Far Right have, so far, won over enough support with the broader public.

While this does seem to toll the bell for neoliberalism, Centrism need not necessarily follow it. There is a place for Centrism, but right now it seems like the Centre is struggling to understand itself.

The Centre is supposed to be about balance. About inclusion. That is not the same thing as 'equidistance'. And the occupation of the centre ground by neoliberalism is more about 'received wisdom', the present consensus, than the ideals of the Centre.

In a pluralist society, Centrism has an important role to play. It pursues a stake in society for people on all sides and tries to maximise the utility of the society - to ensure the maximum number of people enjoy the benefits.

What that can't mean is accepting conservative narratives on the economy, the trap that the heirs of New Labour have frequently fallen into. That centrism, of neoliberalism, has become like a technical government, a bureaucratic caretaker while we await something better.

Those that values the ideal of the Centre - inclusion - need to wake up. The revival of the Centre is not what it appears. The politics of management is offering nothing and standing still. People are ready to move. Centrists need an answer as to where.

French Legislative Elections: Macron's ascent asks a tough question of social democrats and social liberals

Macron's ascendancy consumed the parties of social democrats and social liberals, reducing them to a sliver of seats. Will they be represented in his En Marche majority? If Macron doesn't give enough thought to them, the Left opposition will look to build progressive alliances under his left-wing.

Emmanuel Macron has completed what he set out to do. He has won the Presidency and an Assembly majority riding the crest of his new movement 'La Republic En Marche'. However, the poor turnout suggests all is not yet what it appears.

Macron and En Marche won a landslide, yes. But the wave of disaffection was greater still. In the two rounds of voting, just 49% and 43% of the people voted. Macron has a majority in the Assembly, but not yet in the country. Far from it.

That disparity will only make it harder and more desperate, not easier, to win people over. The pressure is now tangible. Macron has to deliver - and not just his own programme. He has to deliver it in a way that meets with public expectation.

People are already disaffected, with turnouts low, and the call for people to rally about the Centrist candidate has not exactly been answered - regardless how it has been portrayed by those excited by a pro-European Centre revival.

Macron's Centrist success also came largely at the expense of the Centre-Left, practically wiping it out save for those who aligned with En Marche.

Leading figures in the social democratic 'Parti Socialiste' lost their seats as the the party was nearly wiped out, reduced from 280 to just 29 seats. The Left-wing Presidential candidate Benoit Hamon and Assembly leader Jean-Christophe Cambadelis were defeated - though former Premier Manuel Valls survived, standing as an independent.

Social democracy also managed to take social liberalism down with it. The 'Parti Radical de Gauche', their social liberal allies, lost all but three of their seats, though their leader Sylvia Pinel survived. It is worthy of note that three more radicals survived under the En Marche banner.

That poses an interesting question. How much of these ideologies was carried over to La Republic En Marche? Progressives will be watching closely for the answer.

In the mean time, there are questions of how to go about forming a progressive opposition. The main opposition will be the Centre-Right 'La Republicains'. They also suffered a defeat, though less damaging, and along with their allies dropped to 131 seats.

In opposition on the Left, Social democrats and social liberals are now present only in small numbers - in terms of their traditional, recognisable forms. Their supporters may be forced to look to En Marche and their MoDem allies in government for representation.

There is now, though, the possibility of a clear democratic socialist caucus in opposition. If the Socialists stick to the agenda that Benoit Hamon presented for the Presidential election, there is a possibility of forming a largely coherent DemocSoc group.

While the Socialists hold more seats, the leading voice of that group would be Jean-Luc Melenchon - who performed well at the Presidential election from the Left as the outsider candidate.

His movement 'France Insoumise' gained seats, and with what remains of the PS, along with the support of the PCF (Communists), there is a core of fifty seats with which to build an opposition group. That is enough, perhaps, to put pressure on Macron - and maybe enough to act as the beginning of a new Left alignment.

Macron's new movement - his new party of government, created just for that purpose out of the ashes of social democracy and social liberalism - has work to do.

That work has been described as Nordic in style, mixing controls on spending and cuts to regulation, with public investment and a strong social safety net - shifting the public role from keeping people in work to supporting them when they're not.

But to do that, he must first pull down the intensive labour institutions and the DemocSoc Left will not take that lightly. Expect protests on the streets and, if they can organise, a Left bloc voting against him. They will also resist plans aiming to cut taxes for the wealthy and corporations.

Caught in the midst of these struggles will be the social democrats and social liberals - both those within Macron's caucus and those in small numbers outside. They will have a difficult choice over their relationship to the Presidential majority.

Macron will likely have some of his greatest difficulties dealing with the threat of social democrats and social liberals pulling to the Left, if he tacks too far to the Republican Right, and threatening to vote with an organised DemocSoc bloc - perhaps giving both groups more influence than their initial numbers might suggest.

However, right now, Macron has the numbers. If he and his Premier move with energy, the most controversial elements of his approach might be completed early enough that En Marche can ride the wave. But the longer he waits, the harder change will get.

One last note. As a reminder that the far-right is far from beaten, Marine Le Pen was among a handful of Front National deputies elected to the National Assembly.

As Macron and his Centre-Right Premier Edouard Philippe lead the Assembly, they should keep Le Pen's deputies in sight. They represent the cost, for France, of failure to deliver on public perception. En Marche must deliver to France a tangible fresh start.

France 2017: Elections will be a stern test for the French political mainstream

The relationship between France and Europe will need to change regardless of who comes out on top in the 2017 presidential and legislative elections. Photograph: France and EU-flag, somewhere in Dunkerque by Sebastian Fuss (License) (Cropped & Flipped)

This year's French elections, both presidential in April and the legislative in June, represent the next important watershed in the struggle against the Far-Right. For progressives, they represent the next big hope for pushback against the extreme political trend represented by Brexit and Trump.

In the Netherlands, the failure of Wilders' Far-Right PPV to become the biggest party was celebrated by the mainstream - even by VVD's, despite their own loss of seats which makes their position as the largest and governing party more tenuous. Progressives have to start thinking bigger.

That won't be easy in France, where the political climate is fractious - which has been a consistent factor in the Far-Right's success wherever around the world it has reared its head. The governing Parti Socialiste and its President Francois Hollande and suffered a severe decline in its popularity and the fall in its credibility seems to have weakened the entire political mainstream.

As the Far-Right - the Front National under Marine Le Pen - threaten to gobble up a fifth or more of the votes, the parties from the Right through the Centre and Left are tangled in a close multi-party fight for the rest of the votes. The Far-Right is thriving on a mainstream in turmoil.

If the social conservatism, nationalism and hostile extremism of the Far-Right is going to be defeated, progressives in France need to find a way to work together despite their fractious splits. That will likely mean crudely rallying behind a single candidate in the presidential election. But for the legislative elections, it can mean a more practical alliance between separate parties or a simple willingness to engage and work together to freeze out extremists.

Electoral System

The presidential election, the first to happen on 23rd April, is a two-round contest. The election is completed in the first round if any candidate gets an outright majority. If not, the top two candidates face one another in a second round run-off.

The legislative election is contested in 577 single member constituencies, also over two rounds of voting - said to treated as the first vote cast with the heart and then the second with the head. The first round takes place on 11th June and the run-off is on 18th June (Henley, 2017).

Socialists and the Left - Hamon and Melenchon

Photograph: Benoit Hamon painted portrait by Thierry Ehrmann (License) (Cropped)

Under the Hollande Presidency, the Socialist government has faced painfully low approval ratings (Fouquet, 2016). Prime Minister Manuel Valls tried to bring about unpopular labour reforms and it has cost himself and his President dearly in political capital (BBC, 2016).

The result of the party leadership's unpopularity is that the chances of the party retaining power, either the presidency or in parliament, are low. Last year's regional election saw them drop to just 23% and 3rd in the first round - though they recovered a little to 28% and 2nd on second preferences.

In the face of a polling decline that was discrediting the mainstream of the party, the party's primary to nominate a presidential candidate saw an upset. Benoit Hamon, a centre-left critic of Hollande and a supporter of the basic income, became their official candidate for the 2017 election (Chrisafis, 2017).

But things are rarely simple for the Centre-Left these days. The Socialist situation is made much more difficult by the surge of support for an alternative candidacy. Emmanuel Macron, a former Socialist economy minister has launched an outside run - that is avowedly pro-European, liberal and centrist - for the presidency.

Macron's campaign, hoping to be a unifying candidate for the mainstream against Le Pen, even has the support of Socialist Premier Valls (BBC, 2017) - breaking a commitment Valls made to honour the outcome of the party primary, in order to back a candidate closer to his own position.

The socialist difficulties don't end there. They also face more opposition from further to the Left, in the form of Jean-Luc Melenchon's party Unsubmissive France. Melenchon received a positive public reception for a 'convincing' performance in the debate at the start of April (Willsher, 2017), thrusting him in amongst the leaders in the polls.

The nature of problems facing the progressive centre and left in France is demonstrated well by the Parti Radical du Gauche (PRG). The backing of the Radical Party of the Left is one of the few notes of consistency for the Socialists.

They have been a long time ally of the Socialists and, even entered their own candidate, party leader Sylvia Pinel, into the Socialist Party Presidential Primary. The Socialists had some relief when Sylvia Pinel announced last month that her party would honour the commitment to back the primary winning candidate (Le Monde, 2017).

And despite despite talk of discussions between the PRG and Emmanuel Macron, she acknowledged the need to unite and fight against the threat posed by the Front National. However, the Radicals are far from united behind the official stance, and some of its parliamentarians have announced their support for the outside candidacy Macron.

As for policy, there seems to be little on display in the campaign on any side - all of the focus is the notion of who best represents France. For Benoit Hamon's part, he has presented a more fleshed out set of policies than others.

Hamon has been vocal on wanting to further democratise Europe and to subject more of its policy convergence to be subject to the scrutiny and control of a democratic assembly (Flausch, 2017) - striking a compromises between a pro-EU position and the rising demand for change in the way the EU works.

At home he has made a pitch to recover working class support with policies like a robot tax, to tax automation that takes away jobs and cutting the working week to 32 hours (Serhan, 2017). He is also an advocate of the universal basic income.

However, without even the full support his party, it's unlikely that Hamon will even be amongst the chief contenders in the first round of the presidential election. The damage to the image of the Socialists seems just too much to overcome.

The Centre - Macron and Bayrou

Photograph: LEWEB 2014 Conference - in conversation with Emmanuel Macron by LE WEB (License) (Cropped)

In light of the negative perception that is hampering the Socialists and their nomination of a candidate some way to the left of the party mainstream, the party's former economy minister Emmanuel Macron launched a hastily arranged campaign for the presidency called 'En Marche!' (Lorimer, 2017).

From being dismissed as a bubble bound to burst, Emmanuel Macron has become the favourite, leading in all of the polls for both the first and second round votes. He has held rallies that, even in Britain (DW, 2017), received the attendance of crowds in their thousands (Gendron, 2017) - numbers comparable to those who flocked to see Bernie Sanders in the US election.

Liberals and pro-Europeans from across Europe have flocked to his side and offered endorsements - including Nick Clegg and EU liberal leader Guy Verhofstadt, with others taking a close interest.

But beyond his promise to run a hard campaign against the Far-Right and to stand up for the European mainstream, his policy positions seem somewhat thin - one French commenter described his campaign as like a movie, a canvas for a beautiful image without much depth (Gendron, 2017).

That may change when En Marche! has its list of candidates up and running for the legislative election, as appears to be the plan - and it would be hard to see them running without some sort of platform.

But that isn't so critical for a Presidential race where the aim is broad unity. It is notable that he has invoked a legacy of France governed from the centre in which he includes Jacques Chirac - in 2002, Chirac was elected overwhelmingly as the mainstream candidate versus Jean-Marie Le Pen, father of Marine, and his more openly extreme version of Front National.

Like with the Socialists, Macron is not the sole candidate of the Centre. But his chances are more clear cut. In theory, the 'official' centrists candidate would come from Francois Bayrou's Democratic Movement (Mouvement Democrate, MoDem).

In fact Bayrou only ruled out running again himself when he was sure Nicolas Sarkozy would not be running. As it stood, the centre was represented only by Jean Lassalle, a former MoDem Member of the National Assembly, on a 'Résistons!' ticket.

However Bayrou, having ruled out his own candidacy, proposed support for Macron (Willsher, 2017{2}) - an unsurprising move considering Macron's centrist campaign and rapid rise in popularity. The deal for Bayrou's support came a demand for a law to clean up French politics.

The tougher question is, how will Macron's En Marche! and Bayrou's MoDem mesh when it comes time for the legislative election? With plans in any definite form, it is hard to say what logo to expect candidates from the centre to be standing under come June.

The Right and the Far Right - Fillon and Le Pen

Photograph: EPP Summit Brussels December 2016 by the European People's Party (License) (Cropped)

The Republicans (Les Républicains, LR) started this campaign looking to have the presidency all sewn up. Former presidents and prime ministers were queueing up for a shot at being the party candidate (Vinocur, 2016) - including Nicolas Sarkozy, attempting a political comeback.

Yet their hopes have sunk low since then. Nearly every candidate was plagued with some sort of controversy or historical accusations of corruption in office. From Sarkozy to Alain Juppe, to Jean-Francois Cope, the leading candidates had track records they needed to overcome.

While it seemed for a brief moment that they had settled on a nominee free from such troubles in Francois Fillon, a social traditionalist and Thatcherite free marketeer, he also quickly found himself embroiled in controversy.

Fillon has been accused of creating, in essence phony, jobs for family members and using public funds to pay them. At a time when there is dissatisfaction with the political class in every country, it is the kind of story that won't go away.

If he had steered clear of trouble, he would still have found himself undercut - in efforts to be the mainstream candidate to face the Front National - by Macron, thanks to his platform that leans deeply into the territory of the Right.

On top of wanting tough measures against trade unions and ending the 35 hour working week, with restrictions on immigration, he wants cuts to public spending and an end to the wealth tax (McKenzie & Dewan, 2016). Hardly a broad platform.

The Right's ever further drift rightwards was to try and cover off the threat of the Far Right. After their performance in the regional elections last year, Marine Le Pen's Front National was seen as being in the strongest position amongst Europe's Far Right parties to rock the establishment.

Brexit only reinforced that idea. The fearful mainstream and grinning extremists alike presaged the EU's death in her victory. The trouble is, the 'surge' for Marine Le Pen and her party was never really what it seemed.

While passing 20% in the polls was a troubling landmark, her party has not been able to advance. The key is that it hasn't been able to convince a wider audience, despite efforts to make the Front National the respectable face of Far Right nativist nationalism.

In a departure from the more outspoken racism of her father, she co-opted mainstream values of French republicanism and sought to equate them with nationalism - as that which is native and needs protection. It hasn't worked. The most ambitious projections see her reaching the second round presidential run-off, only to lose profoundly.

Under the respectable surface are disturbing movements. There are dark and extremist rumblings. The face might be respectable but it is façade covering and benefiting from the rise of a cancerous extremism (The Guardian, 2017).

Implications

One thing is clear: the fallout from the French election will come with demands for things to change in Europe. Amongst the agreements that have kept the PS and PRG together is a commitment to overhaul the economic governance of the Eurozone and a call to harmonise Corporation Tax across the continent (Le Monde, 2017).

These would be gigantic, and necessary, steps and be a positive direction for the European Union, particularly in the fight against corporate tax evasion. From Far Left to Far Right, there will be pressure for some kind of action.

The presidential race is only the first and symbolic step. The second step will be taken in the legislative election, where some sort of consensus will need to be found among the progressive parties if they are to set the agenda.

Neither the Right, nor the Far Right, yet hold the balance. So what stands in the way of a progressive next step for France is whether or not the parties of the Left and Centre can find common ground.

In 2002, voters rallied around conservative Jacques Chirac in the presidential against Le Pen's father. It seems likely that the same will to unite behind anyone to 'beat the fascists' will stymie Marine in 2017.

But the various parties - the different streams of the Parti Socialiste, the Parti Radical de Gauche, Macron's En Marche!, Bayrou's centrist MoDems, Melenchon's Left groups and others - will need to pull together to ensure a positive progressive government emerges from the legislative election.