Monday 29 June 2015

Rainbow celebration needs to fuel fresh momentum in the long struggle to create societies that take consent seriously

Photograph: Rainbow American via photopin (license) (cropped)
In two terms, mired in partisan politics bitterly divided between Liberals and Conservatives, US President Barack Obama has struggled to give his administration a definitive identity. A pair of Supreme Court (SCOTUS) rulings from the past week have certainly helped make that task a little easier.

The first Supreme Court ruling ensured the continued existence of Obama's flagship healthcare reforms, for the near future at least (Roberts & Jacobs, 2015). The ruling decided that the Federal government could deliver its affordable health insurance plan in all fifty states.

The second ruling confirmed equal marriage as a constitutional right (Roberts & Siddiqui, 2015). That means that in all fifty states same-sex couples will have the right to marry, and that marriages from other states have to be recognised.

These rulings, lauded as successes by Obama (Jacobs, 2015), have been heralded as a triumph for liberalism and individual freedoms, over the conservatism of the established social order. Along with having earlier overseen the end of the ban on openly gay military service (McVeigh & Harris, 2011), these rulings have made civic equality into a major theme of the Obama administration.

Although there clearly is still resistance, some of which has been aggressively intolerant (Butterworth, 2015), people will adapt. But that doesn't mean that the work is over. Combined, these steps have established a new social plateau, which represents a renewed acknowledgement of the rights of consenting adults to live on equal terms with their peers. Yet, those who have won equal marriage will still face discrimination and legal hurdles (Roberts and Siddiqui, 2015; Buncombe, 2015).

Though by themselves these rulings are huge victories for human rights, civil rights and individual liberty, they also represent smaller parts of a broader human struggle, towards the attainment of respect for consent as a central human value.

The ideal of a representative democracy is based around consent. Government by the consent of the governed, laws created with the consent of those who have to abide by them, economics with the consent of the community, and social interactions with the consent of the participants.

Without the removal of coercion and fear, whether from economic conditions in which you cannot afford to get ill or from social conditions where you cannot openly define your own identity due to discrimination, there can be no civic participation on the basis of consent. Without liberty from coercion and fear, there can be no free choices.

To get there, the Supreme Court rulings need now to be the inspiration for the next step (Thrasher, 2015). They are breakthroughs in their own right and just cause for celebration, but that energy and solidarity needs to be poured into renewed motivation to keep moving forward.

Wednesday 24 June 2015

For Cameron and the Conservatives, austerity is the long term economic plan

Anti-austerity protesters out in large number on Saturday 20th June. Photograph: #EndAusterityNow March in London via photopin (license) (cropped).

If it wasn't already clear, David Cameron made sure of it at Prime Minister's Questions today: the Conservatives have no intention of austerity being just a corrective interim measure (Eaton, 2015).

Last week Cameron laid out that his intention to turn the UK from a "low-wage, high-tax, high-welfare society to a higher wage, lower tax, lower welfare society" (Mason, 2015). For those who feel this deviates from the Conservative message of prioritising debt and deficit reduction as the purpose of austerity, they're missing the bigger picture.

Tackling debt and deficits was only ever the first phase. For the Conservatives, austerity is the long term economic plan. As Cameron stressed at the Lord Mayor's Banquet in 2013:
"We are sticking to the task. But that doesn't just mean making difficult decisions on public spending. It also means something more profound. It means building a leaner, more efficient state. We need to do more with less. Not just now, but permanently."
This reaffirmation of the Conservative agenda comes in advance of the announcement of, what will likely be, enormous cuts to public sector spending by the Chancellor in July. If the Conservatives are likely to get anywhere near their stated 'spending reduction' targets, there are going to be some very painful budget cuts.

While Cameron was being challenged at the dispatch box during PMQs by Harriet Harman, Acting Labour leader, over the impact of cuts to tax credits on the poor, Parliament was invaded by protesters who were campaigning to protect welfare spending on disability allowances (BBC, 2015) - both likely Conservative targets.

Along with the anti-austerity protests of last weekend, these outbursts seem more in tune with what the data tells us. Even as of last year, the UK public stated their willingness to pay higher taxes if that was what it took to have fully funded public services (Campbell, 2015).

So why is the talk of high wages with lower taxes and little welfare, when it could be of high wages with higher taxes to fund better welfare? The answer is that the Conservatives are pursuing a long term, ideologically driven plan, to redraw the UK according to the austerian agenda.

The disparity between the Conservative majority government and the rest of the UK over austerity, with the governments mandate coming from less than a quarter of the UK, presents an opportunity - but only if Progressives can come up with a compelling alternative. At the 2015 UK general election the Liberal Democrats and the Greens both offered Tax rises, while Labour and the SNP both offered to slow cuts to allow economic growth to lessen the burden over time. They now have to find a way to bring their themes - of liberty, sustainability, justice and local self-determination - together into a coherent opposition narrative.

Monday 22 June 2015

The crisis in Greece makes for a painful reminder of why solidarity and co-operation are so important to democracy

Greece has not been shown much solidarity in its time of crisis. Photograph: Greek flag via photopin (license) (cropped & flipped)
As Greece and their European creditors have scrambled to work out a deal to prevent their exit from the Eurozone (Traynor, 2015), there has been a stark absence of solidarity. The apparent lack of a political will to negotiate, compromise and co-operate for mutual benefit, seems very much at odds with the values upon which Europe was founded.

Against the dominant values of the twentieth century - a world divided between collectivism and competition, communism and capitalism, East and West - Europe stood apart. Social democracy dominated the political arena, with negotiated settlements between capital and labour, free enterprise taxed to provide welfare, and co-operation and co-ordination trusted to produce superior results (Feffer, 2015).

As the present economic crisis has rumbled on, the urge of European conservatives to impose their rigorous austerian economics onto the economies of other European nations - in pursuit of some capitalist revival grounded in 'competitiveness', or the power to produce cheaply and therefore profitably - has called into question the commitment of the member states to the core ideals of the great European project (Krugman, 2015).

No where has that been more apparent than in the alarming way that a debate centred on the state's fiscal responsibility, to citizens, to businesses and to creditors, has seen the creeping introduction of the politics of identity. Some have tried to stress cultural roots to the ongoing global economic crisis as if it were the result of certain failings of a collective national character (Harvey, 2010). Those sentiments have spiralled outwards to feed into the Far-Right response to the crisis, with the likes of UKIP, Front National, Golden Dawn - regressively more extremist, respectively - dredging up early twentieth century notions of national sovereignty, identity and intolerance to immigration.

For an internationalist, the European project was supposed to be the beginning of the end, not to diversity or distinctiveness through gentrification, but to the chains of dogma - built out of ethnicities, cultures, religions, nations and even class - that have been used to shackle, divide and keep control over people. It was hoped that peace and co-operation could instead bring about greater tolerance and acceptance of diversity, which might be celebrated, and through freedom lead to more diversity still (Riotta, 2012). It was and remains a very progressive liberal dream.

What the crisis in Greece has told us, is that the old shackles are hard to shake and that the progressive dreams cannot be achieved without a strong, reciprocated will to co-operate.

Saturday's massive anti-austerity, protests across the UK and particularly in London, brought together a mix of Greens, Labour, trade unionists, environmentalists, socialists and campaigners on a range of progressive issues (Khomami, 2015; BBC, 2015). But to succeed in their aims, there are more who need to get on board.

There is hope for that outcome in the form of ex-leader of the Liberal Democrats Paddy Ashdown's suggestion of a progressive convention (Wintour & Watt, 2015), following up on Caroline Lucas' rallying call for a progressive alliance (Lucas, 2015) Ashdown has suggested holding a convention where progressive groups might put aside their tribalism and co-operate on formulating a joint progressive agenda. His suggestion did however fall short of the electoral pacts proposed by Lucas.

The old Left had some key values to which it aspired. For the democrats and socialists they were justice and community. For the liberals is was freedom and individualism. For the environmentalists it has been sustainability. But their visions have been dimmed by a lack of solidarity between these movements, which have often taken to fighting against each other to establish their own grand narratives, determined to pull everyone into their big tent - and thus usually diluting their own message while suppressing that of others.

The progressivism of the future must be defined instead by co-operation - the likes of which, if it had been embraced across Europe from the start, might have been able to stave off the present Greek tragedy before it ever began (Pianta, 2015).

As the Labour leadership candidates had their second debate on Saturday (BBC, 2015{2}), they would have had the anti-austerity protests and the down-to-the-wire struggle between Greece and the Eurozone hanging over their heads. And those events bring with them a big question: does Labour embrace these new proposals or does it continue to try and wrestle with the Conservatives over control of the establishment?

It is well worth considering that a progressive alliance, based on the spirit of co-operation, may well consign the concerns of the old system to obsolescence - thus freeing Labour from its endless and disaffecting chase after majority power. A progressive alliance could put from and centre electoral reform, to create a system that is representative, with a multi-party system that reflects ideals and values, and where co-operation brings those smaller parties together on common ground rather than herds them all into a faceless, ideology-less big tent.

Greece has shown us what happens without co-operation, without solidarity. A detached and emote system that ignores the social aspect of economics and shows more concern for creditors receiving their payments than for ensuring that Greek people have enough food. We are long overdue embracing a better way of doing politics.

Thursday 18 June 2015

The Labour leadership election begins in earnest. But what will the candidates stand for?

With the nominations counted and the candidates confirmed, the 2015 Labour leadership election campaign has begun in earnest. The day was marked with the first televised debate last night in Nuneaton, which had been a prime Labour election target seat where the party had failed spectacularly (BBC, 2015).

For the position of party leader the candidates are Andy Burnham, Yvette Cooper, Jeremy Corbyn and Liz Kendall (BBC, 2015{2}). At the same time, there will also be an election for the deputy leadership. Standing for the position of deputy leader are Ben Bradshaw, Stella Creasy, Angela Eagle, Caroline Flint and Tom Watson (New Statesman, 2015).

The most pressing issues for the leadership candidates will be to address what they believe went wrong in 2015 (Wintour, 2015), and to find answer to those beginning to ask what the point is of the Labour Party (Jones, 2015; Todd, 2015).

Amongst the prospective leaders, Andy Burnham and Yvette Cooper most represent continuity with the New Labour project, having both been deeply involved with Blair and Brown governments and regular frontbenchers over the last Eighteen years. Both Burnham and Cooper announced their candidacy with an appeal to the party not to move Left or Right, but to make a broad appeal with an emotional connection to everyday lives (Wintour, 2015{2}; Gayle, 2015).

Liz Kendall was the first, and is both the youngest and most right-wing, candidate on the list, having made it clear that she believes the Labour Party did not 'do enough to appeal to Conservative supporters' (Chakelian, 2015).

The final candidate, who just scraped onto the list, is Jeremy Corbyn, representing the old Socialist Left-wing of the party. His candidature has been commended for opening up the leadership contest, turning it into an open, public debate between the Left and Right on the future of the Labour Party (Kelner, 2015). Corbyn declared his candidacy by mocking the other candidates' obsession with 'aspiration', by declaring his aspiration the close the inequality gap (Corbyn, 2015).

At last night's debate in Nuneaton, all four had their first chance to connect with an audience (Wintour, Watt & Mason, 2015; Watt, 2015). What was most starkly remarkable about three of the four candidates was how very little seems to have changed from the 2015 general election campaign message. The leaders in waiting are still talking about immigration, work as a responsibility to work, of leaving Labour's past behind and embracing business.

There is a growing consensus that Labour is going to need something more from its next leader if it is going to get into government after the next election. A big idea (Robinson, 2015). Conviction (Behr, 2015). The Green Party MP Caroline Lucas even offered her thoughts, proposing that Labour finally embrace multi-party politics (Lucas, 2015). All of these things will factor as decision time approaches for Labour. It awaits to be seen whether the party will the party stay in the Centre-Right, hoping to beat the Tories at their own game, or if they will try to come up with a real, progressive, alternative message?

Monday 15 June 2015

Greece's creditors are playing with fire - Grexit would be bad for Greece, but could ultimately be worse for the Eurozone

With their creditors circling and the IMF in particular apparently tired of negotiating (Inman et al, 2015), it does appear as if Greece is being bullied towards a Eurozone exit due to its unwillingness to sacrifice the country's dignity by slashing pensions (BBC, 2015).

Yet as bad as fears are that a 'Grexit' would be bad for Greece, and so might act as an incentive for it to agree to the terms of conservative austerity laid out by its creditors, their exit could be a lot worse for the Eurozone and those with a vested interest in its success (Garton Ash, 2015).

With debts due, and passed due, Greece has been scrambling to scrape together the funds needed to make repayments (Kirby, 2015). Without the repayments, Greece will not qualify for the bailout funds it needs to afford continued debt payments and to run the country.

Alexis Tsipras, the Prime Minister of Greece from the Radical Left Syriza party, has remained determined to resist the pressure from creditors for conservative economic reforms in exchange for the bailout (BBC, 2015). Tsipras has been attempting to negotiate the terms of the bailouts and the repayments, in opposition to the deep public sector cuts expected by creditors. Europe's rivals are already circling. China has a major interest in Greece, via its stake in the port at Piraeus (Smith, 2015), and, in what has been seen as a negotiation tactic, Greece has even held talks with the Russian government (Christides, 2015).

But on top of the demands of creditors, there have been warnings to Greece of the dangers and consequences of defaulting on its debt and leaving the Eurozone (Khan 2015). There are fears that a newly introduced currency would plummet in value quickly against the value of the Euro, and that this could result an effective pay cut for ordinary citizens of as much as 50% (The Hamilton Spectator, 2012).

Between being bludgeoned with creditor demands and being warned of the danger of default and withdrawal from the Eurozone, the present situation has the feeling of a deliberate strategy designed to diminish the negotiating power of Greece, and back the country into a corner. By bullying Greece into a corner, it would certainly be a lot easier to force the country to reform in a particular way - notably conservative and austerian (Jones, 2015).

That situation is being compounded by the pressure that Alexis Tsipras faces from his own supporters at home over electoral promises to reinstate the public sector's role and to protect pensions (Morris, 2015).

However, the determination to force Greece into playing by the conservative rules or face a damaging exit looks like a dangerous game for those with an interest in the Eurozone to be playing. It has been noted that, rather than talk of solidarity with the Greek people in their time of need, the attitude of negotiators has been of cold "matter-of-fact talks that take place when a big indebted business gets into trouble" (Peston, 2015).

If that attitude were allowed to force Greece out, then something very stark will have been stated about the Eurozone: that it is only for the 'economic convenience' of certain members, and that it is not necessarily for everyone - something that would surely undermine the future of the Euro.

With the Euro's future undermined, the Eurozone project itself could be undermined (Garton Ash, 2015). If one debt ridden nation might default and withdraw to pay off its debts with a new devalued currency, are creditors to other economically weak European countries with substantial debts going to refrain from increasing their demands - thus increasing pressures across Europe.

For what its worth, the attitude of Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister of Greece, has been that Greece should not leave, instead seeking to reform the old system (J. Luis Martin, 2015). Varoufakis has talked at length about the need to work within the old system to arrest the dangerous social impact of the conservative austerity agenda and the crises that result, from which progressives do not benefit (Varoufakis, 2015). That means supporting a 'modest agenda for stabilising a system that I criticise', in order to 'minimise the unnecessary human toll from this crisis'.

Though Tsipras and Varoufakis have been unwilling to give ground on issues like pensions, tied to the welfare of a currently struggling people and key party election promises, they have shown a willingness to negotiate. Considering that while leaving the Eurozone is clearly not ideal for Greece, and reforms to the system would be preferable, an exit would at least mean more freedom over its own economic affairs - though it would purchase that freedom at a very high cost for to its citizens - their unwillingness to leave, has at least been a show of a constructive attitude.

For the Eurozone, however, there would be less of a sunny side. A Greek exit would undermine the Eurozone itself, severely weakening what has become one of the most recognisable cornerstones of European project by cast doubts upon other debt-beleaguered Eurozone nations. For now, the conservative austerians remain in charge and it is they who will continue to dictate the narrative of negotiations in Greece according to their own ideological terms.

Yet saving the Eurozone will need Greece's creditors to show some reciprocal goodwill. Through cooperation and reciprocity, there remains an alternative and progressive way out of the present crisis, where the common good can be placed at the heart of economic action.

Friday 12 June 2015

The UK general election result appears to be no big surprise when seen alongside results from across Europe

The number of seats won aside, the UK general election produced a result pretty close to expectation. The big mainstream parties, austere conservatives and austerity-leaning social democrats - in this case the Conservative and Labour parties - saw their stranglehold on voters slipping away, with liberals struggling to avoid obliteration while a new challenge arose in the form of various anti-establishment parties.

While Britain might see itself as a special case, this pattern certainly isn't isolated to those islands. It has been repeated right across the continent.

Spanish Regional Elections

In Spain, where the ruling Partido Popular - the conservative, pro-austerity party - are struggling with 20% unemployment and trying to suppress separatism in Catalonia, the end of last month saw regional and municipal elections (BBC, 2015). Since the last round of regional elections, Partido Popular had recovered a substantial lead in the polls in many of the regions.

But it was a polling lead that looked large mostly through comparison to a divided opposition. The opposition to Popular was split between the traditional social democratic, Left-wing party, Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE), and two rising anti-establishment groups, reflecting trends across Europe.

Podemos and Ciudadanos, the Left-leaning radical and Right-leaning populists respectively, represent a growing, organised, mass movement against the politics of the old order. While Ciudadanos has recognisable party appearance - offering a Centre-Right, fiscal conservative, balanced budget, anti-corruption ticket, kind of like UKIP without the intolerant overtones - Podemos has been built by forming alliances with, and offering support to, local campaigners and regional movements, pouring mass support into decentralised, grass roots campaigns.

Yet their rise has helped to divide the response to austerity, and allowed the conservative narrative to hold its own. But it hasn't all been the result of splitting the vote - the Centre-Left response has been weak or uncertain all across Europe, and so has been displaced in many regions and provinces by the new radical and populist parties.

However, despite Partido Popular polling  fairly well, and the opposition being split between at least four parties nationally - plus a number of regional parties strong in their own provinces - the vote share in the Spanish regional election was even more fragmented than in the UK's general election.

Partido Popular took only around 31%, falling from a previous 46% (Buck, 2015), and the PSOE also fell to 25%. The two anti-establishment movements, Podemos and Ciudadanos, took 14% and 11% respectively, and could well find themselves in government in Madrid and Barcelona (Kassam, 2015). The nationalist and regionalist parties took between them a combined 15% of the vote.

With the establishment parties only taking 56% of votes, and the main opposition to Partido Popular taking 65% of the vote divided up between three parties and a range of regionalist and nationalist groups, the results of Spain's election tell us that the political establishment is in disarray (Buck, 2015{2}) - with Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy expressing disappointment at the fragmented result (Kassam, 2015{2}).

Italian Regional Elections

In Italy, the situation was initially balanced a little differently. At the 2013 election Prime Minister Matteo Renzi's Partito Democratico (PD), which represents the Centre and Centre-Left of the spectrum, became the biggest party on just 30% of vote - though Renzi himself only became Prime Minister after months of wrangling over how to form a government saw two Democratic Premiers, Pier Luigi Bersani and Enrico Letta, come and go.

The PD, which groups together some vociferously socially democratic voices, has under Renzi, considered by some to of the same mould as Tony Blair (Day, 2013), nonetheless imposed elements of austerity on Italy, seeking to make the country's economy more 'competitive' (The Economist, 2015). Those moves have damaged their position, with trade unions striking against 'reforms' to the labour market (BBC, 2014).

Yet over the past couple of years the party has benefited from an opposition that has crumbled. The controversies facing Silvio Berlusconi, the long time leader of the country's Centre-Right movement, has split the Right-wing group into two blocks (The Telegraph, 2013). Berlusconi's own return to the political limelight has been rather less than spectacular, with the former Premier turning to up in support of the wrong party's candidate in Lombardia (Johnston, 2015).

These divisions have left the opposition to the Centre-Left Democrats split up between a Berlusconi rump, the broad anti-establishment group Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) and the Right-wing Northern separatist group Lega Nord. In recent months Lega Nord have moved, from a fringe regionalist party on the Far-Right, to overtake Berlusconi's group in the polls and in local elections, under their controversially popular leader Matteo Salvini (Sanderson & Politi, 2014).

In the regional election Renzi's Democrats took over 40% of the vote in five of the seven regions. Meanwhile Berlusconi's party struggled, falling as low as fourth in some regions behind Lega Nord, who made huge gains (Kirchgaessner, 2015) - even in areas on the fringes of their traditional heartlands. However, despite Renzi's Democrats winning outright in five of seven regions - including two gains in the south - they lost in Liguria and, when the concurrent municipal reforms are accounted for, popular support for the party was 24%, even as it remained the largest party (Ellyat, 2015; BBC, 2015{2}).

German Regional Elections

For those concerned as to what comes next, the results in German over the last two years look like being an interesting guide - appearing almost to be a couple of years ahead of the European trend. Back in 2013 - in what now seems like an indication that the Liberal Democrats in the UK should have expected their poor performance in May - the liberal Frei Democratische Partei (FDP) lost every single one of their seats in the German Bundestag, down from a previous total of 93 seats. However, in the regional elections held over the last two years there have been signs of a recovery.

Having fallen below five percent of vote, the FDP did not meet the threshold to qualify for Bundestag seats. Amongst the problems the party had faced were many that will be familiar to the UK Lib Dems: struggling to recover votes lost to their former Centre-Right coalition partner (who they partnered with for primarily economic reasons), and being squeezed for votes by their antithesis, a popular anti-EU party, plus faith lost due to a failure to deliver promised tax reforms. Two-thirds of votes the party lost went to the CDU, many whom still wanted the FDP to keep the CDU in check but had lost faith in the party after internal party struggles (Wagstyl, 2013).

After the FDP's federal election defeat, the party suffered further losses: just 3% in the 2014 European Parliament election, 7th place with 3% and no seats in Saxony, 7th place with 2% and no seats in Thuringia, and down to 1% and 7th place with no seats in Brandenburg. Yet by February 2015 the party was polling back up at 6% nationally, and then took 7% of the vote to retain all 9 of its seats in Hamburg, and 6.5% with 6 seats, all brand new, in Bremen.
At the present rate they look on course for 6-9%, from down at 3-4%, by the time of the next federal election in 2017, which could mean a recovery to as many as 40-60 seats - reflecting a recovery to their 2005 position. That should at least give liberals hope that when they are gone, they are quickly missed (The Guardian, 2015), and boost their efforts to restore credibility (Wagstyl, 2014).

What the German results also show is that liberals are not alone in the struggle to restore electoral credibility. As has been seen in Spain and Italy, and with Labour in the UK, social democratic parties are struggling to come up with an electorally successful alternative narrative to conservative austerity. In Bremen, Germany, the German Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) has governed continuously since the end of the second world war and yet even here support for social democrats has weakened (The Economist, 2015).

The conservative ascendancy is not all it appears to be

The struggles of all of the main parties have been largely to the benefit of conservatives everywhere except Italy, which is being governed from the Centre by Democrats struggling for support. But the conservative is not all that it seems to be. The message from voters in Britain seems to be a match for the voices of voters across Europe: austerity has been allowed to limp because the opposition has not yet managed to construct a compelling alternative narrative. In all of these countries all of the establishment parties are teetering on the brink.

Yet, even in the face of the grip of austerity, disillusionment and anti-establishment movements, there is hope for the recovery of lost ground on the Left. But a recovery will require the Left to learn the lessons of the past few years and to adapt to the times by changing its methods. More decentralisation, co-operation, and an end to the mainstream chic of sycophancy towards the established order is essential. Only then can any party on the Centre-Left hope to gain the support of radical movements and find a broad consensus behind a real alternative to austerity.

Monday 8 June 2015

Conservative meritocracy is leaving British society feeling cold and lacking in kindness

The front page of the Conservative Party's 2015 manifesto made some pretty bold statements. It promised, in stark colours, a 'clear economic plan', and a 'brighter, more secure future'. Once David Cameron had secured a majority, he stood outside of Number 10 Downing Street and compounded that message by committing his party to running a 'one nation' government (Stone, 2015).

One month into Cameron's second term as Prime Minister, it is still hard to reconcile those statements with the party's intent to dismantle the UK's social security apparatus (Keegan, 2015). Through the Right-to-Buy scheme, the reserve of social housing looks like being further depleted (Helm & Boffey, 2015) and further cuts are expected to be coming for the welfare support and services depended upon by the most vulnerable (Stewart, 2015).

Whatever the, allegedly existing, plan that is supposed to secure this bright, united future will actually involve, it appears to be very much embedded within the Conservative meritocratic attitude (Watt, 2015) - an attitude that has underwritten their strivers & skivers rhetoric (Williams, 2013). That attitude itself already has questions enough to answer in the name of proper scrutiny: what is considered worthy of merit? On what playing field is merit earned? And, what happens to those considered to be without merit?

However it is the third question in particular that is perhaps the most revealing, exposing a kindness deficit every bit as serious as the fiscal one.

The last five years have proven tough for the most vulnerable, with visits to food banks growing drastically in number (BBC, 2015). That pressure, a crushing weight upon the poorest, has not been alleviated over the past few months with councils behaving unconscionably towards the homeless - by criminalising sleeping rough (Sparkes, 2015) - and earning the disgust of celebrities in the process (The Guardian, 2015).

While the government might feel able to distance itself from the actions of local councils, it is much harder for the Conservatives to separate themselves from how their welfare policies are being implemented. Government delays in the payment of benefits to people with disabilities have been ruled unlawful (The Guardian, 2015{2}). And news for the most vulnerable doesn't get much better with the Prime Minister not ruling out the possibility of more cuts to disability benefits (Watt, 2015{2}).

This coldness all seems to be part of an attempt at reshaping the British state. Policies like selling off state assets, from social housing to the Post Office (Wintour, 2015; Macalister, 2015) - being as they are only one-off and short term ways of raising funds - are not much use in addressing the deficit. But what they do reflect is a determination to shift social responsibilities away from the state - acting on behalf of a society that contributes its fair share to a collective public service - and onto the individual.

That shift, which comes hand in hand with the mean and cold Conservative meritocratic attitude and its policy of austerity, has taken to treating vulnerable people like errant Victorian children - to be disciplined through a Gladstonian frugality while being pontificated to on the values of the ruling elite. That attitude is exemplified by the Tory anti-liberal attitude on security. The Prime Minister has suggested that Britain has for too long had a 'passively tolerant society', standing 'neutral between different values' (Stone, 2015{2}).

In the face of this Tory calculated coldness, in the pursuit of an ideologically redrawn society, it is important for the opposition to make kindness a big part of their approach. The Left opposition needs to do more than just oust a ruling party. It needs to confront and expose an an unkind vision of society, and to develop an open, compassionate and liberal alternative in the name of the common good.

Tuesday 2 June 2015

Charles Kennedy's advocacy for liberty, justice and internationalism will be missed

Sadly, Charles Kennedy has passed away (Watt & Brooks, 2015). The former leader of the Liberal Democrats led the party through its most successful period - from 1999, when he was elected the successor to Paddy Ashdown, until 2006, when he was forced to stand down due to a struggle with alcoholism.

His most famous moment as Liberal Democrat leader was to lead his party in a principled and liberal stand against unilateral war and to decry the derogation of the role of the United Nations in settling international disputes. With these campaigns, and with a commitment to socially liberal and Left-leaning policies like the abolition of tuition fees (Wheeler, 2009), he slowly increased Liberal Democrat support amongst people who began to see the Lib Dems as having supplanted Labour's place on the Left (Watt, 2015).
"He was a man who had even greater potential that will now forever remain unfulfilled and his loss will be felt deeply by all of us, particularly those who care about progressive values." (Gordon Brown)
Kennedy was an important voice for a progressive alternative, and led a party that, under his stewardship, was committed to justice, liberty and progress. His voice and presence on the political stage will be missed, not least by the campaign to keep Britain a part of the European Union - a movement of which he was a great advocate and leader.

At such a fractious time in the political history of Britain, it is well worth remembering some of the insight which Charles Kennedy brought to public life (2006):
"Fewer people are joining political parties, yet single-issue pressure groups continue to flourish. Mass international movements - from opposition to the war in Iraq to last year's Live 8 - demonstrate how great issues and principles can still motivate on a huge scale. But somehow our current political culture seems unable to accommodate and address such concerns...

...The danger in all of this is that if sufficient people conclude that there is nothing in the conventional political process for them then they may opt for more simplistic and extreme options on offer. I remain an optimist. But across the mainstream political spectrum there is a candid recognition of the danger."
Liberalism in the UK took a huge blow in May with the substantial defeat of the Liberal Democrats. It has taken as big a blow today with the loss of Charles Kennedy. The process of rebuilding the Left of British politics will have to go on without him, but it will keep moving forward with his substantial contributions intact.

Monday 1 June 2015

Avengers: Age of Ultron warns of the danger when we let fear and powerful emotions drive us to trust in power without vigilance

Spoiler warning: This article contains spoilers for Marvel's Avengers: Age of Ultron

When the times are evil, and the world is at its worst, we look to  protect ourselves and those traditionally dearest to us - our family, our friends, our people. Whatever the motivation - fear, regret, vengeance, or even ambition - it does not necessarily guarantee that we will act cleverly.

In Marvel's latest entry to their Cinematic Universe (MCU), Avengers: Age of Ultron, the inception of Ultron, and the events for which Ultron is the catalyst, serve as an exploration of the danger that such motivations can pose.

The main driving force behind the events of the MCU so far have been these deep motivations, crystallised in forms such as Tony Stark's fears and Loki's ambitions. In Avengers: Age of Ultron, we see Tony Stark's fears exposed. Stark, in response to those fears, seeks control over events, even over the world, as his way to combat the danger that chaos brings. In Ultron, he seeks to create an entity that cares about humanity and will act independently in its stead as a suit of armour around the world.

The Maximoff twins, Wanda and Pietro - Scarlet Witch and Quicksilver - enter the MCU driven by a desire to seek redress for what they have suffered at the hands of Tony Stark. Yet, their quest for vengeance against one man, for the death of their parents and to protect their people, draws them into dark and dangerous alliances with villainous figures like Hydra and Ultron, that ultimately threaten far more people.

Into that mix of motivations comes Ultron. The artificial intelligence offers to those seeking action a means - but in their need, driven by their own persuasive motivations, they do not consider that Ultron may have its own purposes and ways of achieving them. In their fear, in their wrath, they are not careful and so they get something for which did not plan.

Stark and the Maximoff twins saw something that could be a tool to their own ends, but they did not consider what that tool might mean in context or what it could do in the wrong hands. Their strong emotional motivations allowed practical necessity to win out over the ideal, and so they perceived that the power of  Ultron could help themselves achieve their goals, but did not take the time to properly comprehend the full nature of the AI and what it might or could do. As the enigmatic Lutece siblings remind us in BioShock Infinite:
"Perception without comprehension is a dangerous combination."
In the old world you were warned to beware Greeks bearing gifts, for fear of a Trojan horse. In all worlds you must also beware false heroes bearing a Trojan cause. Those who will bring their own purposes, veiled within populist solutions, pose an incredible threat to those who are not vigilant and allow their own fears or selfish motivations to blind them. Marvel's Avengers: Age of Ultron reminds us that they may be used against us and exploited to achieve ends which we never intended.