Italian Election 2018: Can progressives settle their differences and work together? The heavy right-wing leaning of other possible governments makes cooperation a must

The Palazzo Montecitorio, home to the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Photograph: Palazzo Montecitorio by Nick Kenrick (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, Italy goes to the polls. Considering how turbulent the past few years have been, it is astonishing that the last election was a full five years ago now. In 2013, with help from the electoral system, the Partito Democratico - led by Pier Luigi Bersani - came out on top.

Things did not go to plan for the Democrats. Without enough seats for a majority, the three way division of Italian politics became an insurmountable obstruction. Bersani failed to form a government and stood down. With tentative agreements, successive Democrats have been Prime Minister: Enrico Letta, Matteo Renzi and Paolo Gentiloni.

It was Renzi who had the longest run at the head of the government, but his popularity waned as he kept pushing for reforms and he was toppled by his own constitutional referendum - to change the electoral system - which he staked against his own position and lost.

Since Renzi left office in the December 2016, Paolo Gentiloni has led the government and has proved fairly popular, with good approval ratings, back by most centre and left parties. However, he is not running at the head of the Centre-Left on Sunday.

In his absence, it is instead the centre-right, that look most likely to gain enough seats to form a government. The question for the centre-left, and the leading Democrats, is how to recover to the position they had early in Renzi's tenure, when they topped the European Parliament polls with 40% of the vote.

The Centre-Left

Matteo Renzi speaks at a university in October 2015. Photograph: Matteo Renzi a San Giobbe by the Università Ca' Foscari Venezia (License) (Cropped)

The 'centre-left' is led by Partito Democratico (PD), with Matteo Renzi returned as leader. A dispute over methods led to an ultimatum from left-wing Democrats, including stalwarts like former leader Bersani and former Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema, that if Renzi ran to return as leader of the party, they would leave.

Renzi ran again, and won. So they left - leaving the party largely in the hands of the Renziani faction, as many of their followers went with them. As a result, the party's more left-wing factions departed, and gone with them are a number of small left-wing parties that the Democrats previously counted on for support.

The PD's main allies this time around will be centrists and liberals, such as radical Emma Bonino's +Europa and Beatrice Lorenzin's Civica Popolare list of the centre-right Alternativa Popolare. These allies reflect the reality that the Democrats have found themselves under the consolidated control of the Renziani faction.

For the Renziani, this election is about defending their policies in government. Under his watch, civil administration was reformed, labour laws were relaxed and taxation simplified - it was these policies, a typical neoliberal agenda, that their left-wing critics found intolerable.

However. While economic reforms they oversaw are broadly accepted by the Centre-Right, they were accompanied by social measures, such as same-sex civil unions, which are likely to be targeted by the Centre-Right if it returns to government. It is also possible that Italy's fidelity to European commitments may also suffer - especially where they require unpopular fiscal sacrifices.

In the name of protecting such policies, a small part of the dissenting left has stuck around. As a result, the PD will get a little support from the left through from 'Italia Europa Insieme', or Insieme (Together), which gathers parties including Partito Socialista Italiano (Social Democrats), Federazione dei Verdi (Greens) and others from the recently faltered Campo Progressista.

The Centre-Right

Silvio Berlusconi, through controversies and legal battles, has intermittently held the post of Prime Minister of Italy during nearly a quarter century on the political frontline. Photograph: Silvio Berlusconi by paz.ca (License) (Cropped)

The name 'centre-right' is a bit of a misnomer, as it is composed of parties ranging from right-wing to far-right. Silvio Berlusconi is still there (or back, if you prefer) with Forza Italia, his vehicle of some twenty five years, leading the right.

He is joined once more by his long time, on again off again, allies, though they have expanded their appeal to all of Italy, quietly dropping their call for Northern separatism. Also in tow once more are Fratelli d'Italia, Brothers of Italy - the successors on the far-right to the National Alliance.

Despite everything, the octogenarian Silvio is still in the middle of everything. But he isn't having it all his own way. He faces strife within his own coalition list, with Lega leader Matteo Salvini - the influence behind taking the party national - not happy to play second fiddle. How that power struggle plays out could have a huge impact.

It wouldn't be an election featuring Silvio Berlusconi if there weren't some wild promises. The Forza Italia electoral pitch includes a basic income of E1000 for all Italians, along with free vet treatment for pets. Silvio has also promised tax breaks for adopting pets and to cut VAT on pet food.

It would be unwise for progressives to be seduced by these trinkets. These are pitches to win over any supporters of the populist party M5S who aren't looking too closely at the rest of the centre-right agenda, which - with the influence of FdA and Lega - would be terrible for virtually anyone except white male Italians pleased by tax breaks.

That is reinforced by Berlusconi's commitment to cutting income taxes across the board. Italy has a top rate of tax well above the European average and Silvio's solution is the darling of right-wing libertarians: a flat rate income tax set at 23%. As ever, the question arises as to how any of these promises can be paid for.

The particular driving force behind the campaigns of the right-wing parties is immigration. While tensions of been heightened by murders and revenge killings in recent months, the refugee crisis has been feeding anti-immigrant, nationalist rhetoric for some time.

Matteo Salvini and his party Lega, slogan 'Italy First', have been allowed to set the tone on the immigration debate and their tone has been aggressive. Salvini refers to a 'tide of delinquents', 'drug dealers, rapists, burglars' and says he 'wants to send them home'.

That aggressive, oppressive tone has been softly mimicked by Berlusconi, as you might expect, but also been followed by the Five Star Movement - the populist rival to the two main coalitions. The Democrats have not shied away from appeasing this stance either.

The Populists

Beppe Grillo talks to the crowd at party event in 2015. Luigi Di Maio stands in the group behind him, second from right. Photograph: Italia 5 Stelle at the Autodromo Enzo e Dino Ferrari - Imola by RevolWeb (License) (Cropped)

Movimento 5 Stella were the surprise of the 2013 election, presenting themselves as a true third force in Italian politics - much to the dismay of the centre-left and centre-right. Founded by comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, the party built a following that came for the establishment with a fire for tearing it down.

Or at least, that was the impression they liked to give. Led in the Italian Parliament by the 31 year old Luigi Di Maio, they present themselves as Anti-establishment, almost anti-politics, Eurosceptic and outspoken against administrative corruption. Di Maio has tried to professionalise that outline, in order to steer the party into government.

The M5S quest for respectability included an attempt last year to join the pro-EU liberal group in the European Parliament. The liberals gave them a hearing, but declined their application after members of the group objected (the other groups in the parliament had quietly turned them down, while the Greens overtly stated their mistrust of Grillo).

Yet they are a party filled with contradictions. M5S has found itself mired - from laughable amateurishness, like their programme apparently being copy-pasted from Wikipedia, to being itself caught up in corruption. Virginia Raggi's time in office as Mayor of Rome has been dogged by corruption allegations. And nationally, delegates were forced to resign after it was discovered they had fiddled commitments to donate parts of their salaries and expenses.

The party, or Movement, has also been linked to the spread of fake news, and propaganda from Russian sources. The party leadership has been accused of making money off the back of a fake news aggregator. This shouldn't come as a tremendous surprise.

The party itself is a spawn of Grillo's blog, and the party's branding remains his property. That makes it as much a controversialist media business venture as a political movement - much like that of a certain president in North America, with his penchant for crying fake news of mainstream media journalism included to boot.

But what are the controversialists standing for? They have been described as an anti-representative democracy movement - calling for direct democracy through digital means. But Di Maio has focused on more practical measures in his campaign.

Their policies include a basic income, which Berlusconi has felt the need to copy, but also cutting public debt and simplifying many laws. The left should be concerned with just how much common ground M5S has with the parties of the so-called 'centre-right' grouping.

Dissenting Left

The outspoken Pier Luigi Bersani, pictured during his time as leader of Partito Democratico, was instrumental in the breakway of the Movimento Democratico e Progressista and the formation of it's coalition Liberi e Uguali. Photograph: Floris e Bersani, Non stop Banda Larga PD venerdì 18 giugno 2010 by Bee Free - PGrandicelli (License) (Cropped)

The dissenting left has, after it's recent exodus from the Renziani dominated Partito Democratico, gathered a number of like minded parties in an alliance by the name of Liberi e Uguali (Free and Equal) - under the rather familiar slogan of "For the many, not the few".

It's leader is the former antimafia prosecutor Pietro Grasso, at present the President of the Senate. It's leading figures include former Premier Massimo D'Alema, former PD leader Pier Luigi Bersani, former leader of the left-wing Sinistra Ecologia Liberta party Nichi Vendola, and Laura Boldrini who is currently the President of the Chamber of Deputies and formerly the spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The LeU groups unites the breakaway factions of PD in the form of Movimento Democratico e Progressista, with other left-wing groups gathered into Sinistra Italia (Italian Left) - that acts as a successor to the Sinistra Ecologia Liberta party that has been a significant left-wing block in recent years.

The joint programme for LeU promises that the group will fight to turn the tide of globalisation, to counter the trend towards precarity, to put education and work back at the centre of people's lives. While the reforms under Renzi increased jobs by one million, they haven't arrested the slide of 18 million people into poverty, with most new jobs being on a part time basis.

In practice, the LeU programme comes as a pledge to restore 'good employment' with a Green New Deal, an investment programme to convert and expand the economy across many areas; to undo the 'blackmail' of precarity by restoring restoring Article 18; to undo recent school reforms and boost investment - along with abolishing university fees; to reorganise taxes to be more progressive and close loopholes - with the money being used to fund reformed health and welfare provision; and to shore up inclusion of LGBT people, particularly couples.

It may be that this pitch is more about shifting the position of the Democrats back in their direction than expecting to implement these plans in government. But it is an ambitious programme which has brought together a number of left-wing, democratic socialist parties and factions - not an easy task in Italian politics.

But what unites LeU as much as politics is a deep mistrust of Renzi and his methods. Pier Luigi Bersani - former leader of the Democrats and one of the founders of the breakaway Movimento Democratico e Progressista that formed LeU - has taken particular exception to Renzi's tearing up of the root of what Bersani considers his party.

Bersani has gone as far as expressing the belief that Renzi plans to form a government with Berlusconi - the old enemy as far as the left in Italy is concerned. It is perhaps notable then that the party's main objectives require largely dismantling the changes to job security and pensions that the Renziani faction oversaw.

Polling and Possible Governments

Despite spending since 2013 in government, and even riding high in the polls during that time, the Centre-Left has a lot to do if it wants to end up in government. The Democrats have fallen to around 22% - with their allies +Europa on 3%, and their whole coalition list sitting at just 27%.

Even if the dissenting left could be reconciled, that would at present add just 5% more support. Bersani is optimistic that Free and Equal can take double their poll numbers - perhaps hoping their borrowed slogan brings a little of Corbyn's campaigning fortunes. But even if the party reaches towards 12-15%, they will still need allies. Can they work with Renzi?

Unless there is some serious turn in favour of the Democrats - such as winning well in FPTP constituencies - it may be that forcing a fresh election might be their best outcome. With support for a progressive government struggling to crest 30%, things do not bode well for other options.

While the LeU want nothing to do with Renzi, would it be possible to attract the support of sufficient centrists to cobble together a (very) broad centre-left government under someone like Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni? It seems unlikely at this point.

As a result, the Centre-Right finds itself perhaps best positioned to form a government. But it would be a government of fractious interests and hostility to otherness. However, collectively at 38%, they hold the strongest position - though who will lead such a group after the election is another question - it is too close to call in the polls between Berlusconi's Forza Italia and Salvini's Lega.

For Berlusconi's part, he has ruled out both a grand coalition, or national unity government, and even a limited confidence & supply arrangement between the Centre-Right and Centre-Left. He says there will be a new election if his coalition falls short of a governing majority. Renzi has agreed with this - but such proclamations may be taken with a pinch of salt, as pragmatic dealmaking rules in Italy.

So the renewal of the Centre-Left/Centre-Right grand coalition should be considered very possible. The denials of the leaders of both coalitions have been offset by voices among the allies of both, who note that a grand coalition is the most likely outcome. But will it be a long term option or just a stop-gap until a fresh election?

It could presented as stop-gap but run as long as needed. What is clear is that neither Renzi nor Berlusconi could lead such a government (in Silvio's case, because he is still banned from holding political office). That would mean the appointment of some third figure - such as current Premier Paolo Gentiloni.

The current Prime Minister Gentiloni is, personally, Italy's most popular leader. But people know he isn't the leader of the PD, and so his polling has yet to figure into the election. With his record - at present overseeing Italy's GDP up on 2010, while both deficit and debt are falling, thanks to reforms that have received praise in Europe - he might assemble a stable government, for a time.

But it will likely be seen as another stitch up. Stirring up the pot will be the M5S, and the share of votes and seats they are able to capture this time. Contrary to previous elections, M5S seem keen to get into government this time. But the question is: who with?

The nightmare outcome for the left is M5S throwing it's lot in with the right-wing parties. It does not seem like a big leap for M5S to work with the Centre-Right in a small state, Eurosceptic, socially conservative government.

There is an outside prospect for M5S, in the form of fleeting hints that the dissenting left group 'Free and Equal' might be prepared to work with them in government. It seems unlikely with so much ground between the two - but it would certainly be considered change. It is more likely that M5S will tip the centre-right into government.

Advent of Populist Government?

However, from our perspective, the prospective government for progressives to be most concerned about  is some sort of tie-up between M5S and Lega. It would, of course, require both to have particularly strong elections - though they are currently polling at around 26% and 15% respectively, and Lega particularly may punch above their weight in seats thanks to regional concentration.

Both parties have a history of being aggressively anti-establishment. That is not, in itself a reason for dismay, but it is something they may find common ground on. But what is worrying are their common ground on pushing anti-immigration stances and their criticised ties to the wider populist and nationalist waves that have been backed by Russian interventions in Western democracy.

If these two were able to patch over their differences - and Grillo has shown himself to be very flexible about making friends, allying with Farage and UKIP in Europe, praising a certain US President - they might assemble between them the kind of low tax, protectionist, nationalist and hostile-to-difference socially conservative agenda that will spook every country around them.

More pressing is that this toxic brew - the mix of Grillo's anti-representative democracy, Salvini's 'promotion of the family' at expense of LGBT people, and both party's scapegoating of refugees and immigrants - might do significant damage to the rights and wellbeing of a lot of people.

Salvini has certainly indicated a desire to shake off Berlusconi and assert his own leadership. An alliance with M5S could give him an outlet to pursue a government built on the exploitation of the kind of unrestrained nationalism and disaffection that a certain US President rode into office.

Don't expect a clear result on Monday morning

The complicated electoral system will play a role in which of the possible governments Italy ends up with and a lot will ride on the performance of the smaller parties. The election has two components: a third of seats are first-past-the-post constituencies, while two thirds are proportionally distributed according to the popular vote - above a 3% threshold.

It is important to note that just reaching the popular threshold delivers a substantial number of seats: just 3% would award 11-12 seats. Meanwhile, the FPTP element, just as seen in Britain with the SNP, favours small but regionally concentrated parties and rewards them very heavily.

For instance, the smallest of the parties allied to Berlusconi is Noi con l'Italia, which is standing locally known candidates, against very little opposition, in the poor Southeastern region of Apulia. Standing in just 34 seats, if it were to win even half that would be 17 seats - even if it took less than 3% of the vote.

It will take days to sort through the permutations. But whether Italy has a functioning government will be in the hands of many competing factions, across the spectrum, doing deals long after the distribution of seats is decided.

For progressives, there is no clear route to building a government and everything depends on a big shift come polling day. If voters turn out to give the Centre-Left and the dissenting left sufficient seats, they must sort out their differences and work together, because the other possible governments do not bode well for progressive values.

Argentina midterms raise the question: What's so funny about compassionate realism?

Mauricio Macri's hold on La Casa Rosada lightly reinforced by small gains at the Argentina legislative midterms. Photograph: La Casa Rosada from Pixabay (License) (Cropped)

The midterm elections in Argentina did little to settle the future of Argentina. President Mauricio Macri's movement gained a few seats, just enough to keep his project rolling forward.

That Macri's project is essentially austerity in a more extreme context is important for progressives to consider. It presents the epitome of what the Centre-Right consider the justification for strong dose of 'realism', but raises the question of why that has to be delivered in the form of harsh measures?

The Midterms elections covered a third of the Senate and half of the lower House. It would have been hoped by Cambiemos to be an opportunity to reinforce Macri's presidency with a stronger legislative contingent - just 16 of 72 in the Senate, with just 86 Deputies out of 257 in the Chamber, to around 46 and 105 for various Justicialist groups combined, respectively.

The four biggest parties each had about half of seats their Chamber seats up for reelection, while most of the Senate seats were being defended by Justicialists (Peronists).

As it happened Cambiemos made gains, though they were few. The coalition took 19 seats, not enough reach a majority, while those were offset by the 25 seats gained by former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, rallying voters from various populist parties to her particular faction.

Even if this result is more than Macri and Cambiemos might have feared, it is still less than they will have hoped. Part of the reason why may be that, after two years in office, Macri has yet to deliver a deep sea shift in the country's economic condition.

That shouldn't really be a massive surprise, because two years is nothing. But the public are restless and what Macri has asked for is a huge change in approach from the Kirchnerist-Peronist years.

Not least are the cuts to subsidies that help with the cost of living for low income families. This is the austerity programme familiar to many progressives around the world.

In Argentina this has particular significance. In reason years, at the least, the Kirchnerist-Peronist populists - especially under the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner - have tended to offer up big promises, comfortable lies to package harder truths and deeper crises.

Of relevance to all of those resisting austerity is the response of Centre-Right, Argentina as elsewhere: to serve up cold reality and a cold shoulder.

The Cambiemos coalition, that Macri has serving up a meagre helping, includes most of Argentina's Centre and Soft Left - social democrats and social liberals - and you have to wonder have these partners feel about their direction.

Macri has bet the house on austerity, in the meantime putting the poorest in some jeopardy, gambling that foreign private investors will step in and take a chance on Argentina. But it's yet to pan out that way.

The midterms buy Macri some space. Over that past year he has poured the blame for the present situation on the Kirchner "K" movement - calling it the "K Inheritance", probably fairly. But that approach will only work for so long.

Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner is already building for a comeback, taking seats at the midterms while Macri's approval ratings hover dangerously low at 41%/46% (approve/disapprove).

Macri has offered some consolation to his Cambiemos partners. Last year he announced what he called a 'Marshall Plan' - a reference to the huge public investment made by the US government in it's allies after World War II.

In reality, it was a public-private investment initiative foucsed on lowering the cost of business - in that conservative vein of reduced costs hopefully leading to reduced prices and reduced cost of living.

But these pledges are coming alongside efforts to force Trade Unions and dockworkers to accept pro-competition measures - and while cornered, they are far from convinced.

All of this leads back to the central question. Populists offer an unrealistic view smothered in giveaways and the Right demand a reaction steeped in a cold austere reality. The question is, why can't we address reality with warmth?

Why is it so difficult to imagine a compassionate realism? To pursue a course that does not abandon the most vulnerable to the mercy of corporate interests and charity, when righting a sinking ship.

Politics in Argentina is raising this question. Progressives and their allies the world over need to find a way to respond.

French Legislative Elections: Macron's ascent asks a tough question of social democrats and social liberals

Macron's ascendancy consumed the parties of social democrats and social liberals, reducing them to a sliver of seats. Will they be represented in his En Marche majority? If Macron doesn't give enough thought to them, the Left opposition will look to build progressive alliances under his left-wing.

Emmanuel Macron has completed what he set out to do. He has won the Presidency and an Assembly majority riding the crest of his new movement 'La Republic En Marche'. However, the poor turnout suggests all is not yet what it appears.

Macron and En Marche won a landslide, yes. But the wave of disaffection was greater still. In the two rounds of voting, just 49% and 43% of the people voted. Macron has a majority in the Assembly, but not yet in the country. Far from it.

That disparity will only make it harder and more desperate, not easier, to win people over. The pressure is now tangible. Macron has to deliver - and not just his own programme. He has to deliver it in a way that meets with public expectation.

People are already disaffected, with turnouts low, and the call for people to rally about the Centrist candidate has not exactly been answered - regardless how it has been portrayed by those excited by a pro-European Centre revival.

Macron's Centrist success also came largely at the expense of the Centre-Left, practically wiping it out save for those who aligned with En Marche.

Leading figures in the social democratic 'Parti Socialiste' lost their seats as the the party was nearly wiped out, reduced from 280 to just 29 seats. The Left-wing Presidential candidate Benoit Hamon and Assembly leader Jean-Christophe Cambadelis were defeated - though former Premier Manuel Valls survived, standing as an independent.

Social democracy also managed to take social liberalism down with it. The 'Parti Radical de Gauche', their social liberal allies, lost all but three of their seats, though their leader Sylvia Pinel survived. It is worthy of note that three more radicals survived under the En Marche banner.

That poses an interesting question. How much of these ideologies was carried over to La Republic En Marche? Progressives will be watching closely for the answer.

In the mean time, there are questions of how to go about forming a progressive opposition. The main opposition will be the Centre-Right 'La Republicains'. They also suffered a defeat, though less damaging, and along with their allies dropped to 131 seats.

In opposition on the Left, Social democrats and social liberals are now present only in small numbers - in terms of their traditional, recognisable forms. Their supporters may be forced to look to En Marche and their MoDem allies in government for representation.

There is now, though, the possibility of a clear democratic socialist caucus in opposition. If the Socialists stick to the agenda that Benoit Hamon presented for the Presidential election, there is a possibility of forming a largely coherent DemocSoc group.

While the Socialists hold more seats, the leading voice of that group would be Jean-Luc Melenchon - who performed well at the Presidential election from the Left as the outsider candidate.

His movement 'France Insoumise' gained seats, and with what remains of the PS, along with the support of the PCF (Communists), there is a core of fifty seats with which to build an opposition group. That is enough, perhaps, to put pressure on Macron - and maybe enough to act as the beginning of a new Left alignment.

Macron's new movement - his new party of government, created just for that purpose out of the ashes of social democracy and social liberalism - has work to do.

That work has been described as Nordic in style, mixing controls on spending and cuts to regulation, with public investment and a strong social safety net - shifting the public role from keeping people in work to supporting them when they're not.

But to do that, he must first pull down the intensive labour institutions and the DemocSoc Left will not take that lightly. Expect protests on the streets and, if they can organise, a Left bloc voting against him. They will also resist plans aiming to cut taxes for the wealthy and corporations.

Caught in the midst of these struggles will be the social democrats and social liberals - both those within Macron's caucus and those in small numbers outside. They will have a difficult choice over their relationship to the Presidential majority.

Macron will likely have some of his greatest difficulties dealing with the threat of social democrats and social liberals pulling to the Left, if he tacks too far to the Republican Right, and threatening to vote with an organised DemocSoc bloc - perhaps giving both groups more influence than their initial numbers might suggest.

However, right now, Macron has the numbers. If he and his Premier move with energy, the most controversial elements of his approach might be completed early enough that En Marche can ride the wave. But the longer he waits, the harder change will get.

One last note. As a reminder that the far-right is far from beaten, Marine Le Pen was among a handful of Front National deputies elected to the National Assembly.

As Macron and his Centre-Right Premier Edouard Philippe lead the Assembly, they should keep Le Pen's deputies in sight. They represent the cost, for France, of failure to deliver on public perception. En Marche must deliver to France a tangible fresh start.

What to expect from President Trump? To see how an opportunist backed by the far right will fare in government, look no further than Italy's Silvio Berlusconi

Silvio Berlusconi, through controversies and legal battles, held the position of Prime Minister in Italy for nine years out of seventeen on the political frontline. Photograph: Silvio Berlusconi by paz.ca (License) (Cropped)

If progressives are going to start building a meaningful opposition to the global rise of far right populism, seen most recently in the Trump Presidential Campaign, they first need to understand what they will be standing against. What will the representatives of the far right pursue when actually in office?

When considering what to expect, its important to look to history. For Trump in particular, there are obvious comparisons to Ronald Reagan (Rich, 2016) - though, it seems, except for those who really buy into the Myth of Reagan but don't like Trump, and so want to distance the two as much as possible.

But perhaps a better guide for expectations, both for Trump and beyond, might be the rise of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy in the early 1990s, out of the wreckage of the Italian political system that imploded with the exposure of  huge corruption under the Mani Pulite investigation.

Amidst massive political disillusionment and a global downturn, a seeming outsider, with business credentials, and in alliance with parties of the far right, put themselves forward as the champion of the populist opposition to the corrupt old establishment - despite plenty of their own legal battles, to which their support seems immune.

Sound familiar? Trump's rise mirrors Berlusconi's own route to power. The media chief, and chairman of football club AC Milan, began his long relationship with political power in Italy at the head of his party Forza Italia - named for a popular football chant.

If that does not say enough, as a measure of the man consider that Berlusconi once claimed, with extravagant outrage, that one of his longest running political opponents, Romano Prodi, called him a drunk during a 2006 election debate - and offered him a "no, you are" in return (Popham, 2006). What Prodi had actually said was:

"He uses statistics like a drunk uses lamp-posts, more for support than illumination."

For those who want decency and reason in the political arena, this level of obfuscating outrage is infuriating. When a political candidate is willing to twist anything, to play whatever role happens to be convenient to the relevant situation, coherency be damned, it makes it impossible to get to grips with what that candidate actually believes - and so to have a meaningful political exchange.

But whether that was what he actually believes is besides the point. What that exchange presented was an opportunity. And the seizing of such opportunities defined Berlusconi's career - as it does Trump's as well.

Silvio Berlusconi rose to power on the back of a career as a media personality, a celebrity, just as much as he did on his career in business. His media company took on the establishment and broke through the state owned monopoly on broadcasting - though in part thanks to his connections in that very same government establishment.

And when that - again, very same - government establishment collapsed amidst one of the biggest political corruption scandals ever seen, Berlusconi took to the political field - despite his own connections and the spreading of investigations into his own businesses (The Economist, 2001).

Berlusconi promised to keep Italy pro-Western and pro-Market, create a million new jobs and protect the country from the communists - the Italian Communist Party successor, the Democrats of the Left, were virtually the last party standing in the Italian political system after the corruption scandal.

The coalition he put together to achieve those promises - with the separatist Lega Nord in the North and the post-fascist Alleanza Nazionale in the South - backed by a massive publicity campaign on his own TV channels, received the most votes and seats in the 1994 Italian general election.

His first government collapsed after only nine months, torn apart by its own internal contradictions. Yet, though often with only a tenuous grip, Berlusconi returned to power time after time, with rebuilt coalitions that pushed the same mix of social conservatism and economic neoliberalism.

And he was never far from controversy. Berlusconi was accused of being sexism in Italy's most powerful apologist, as his personal life often spilling over into the political and even sparking protests (Marshall, 2016). His legal troubles also followed him constantly.

The same kinds of fate are now being predicted for Trump's Administration, as he tries to marry his misogynist and nativist support with the Republican mainstream - itself a contradictory collections of libertarians and nativist Christian nationalists.

Just as legal scandals chased Berlusconi throughout his career, they're likely also to follow Trump. With numerous cases still outstanding against him, some commentators are even predicting that Trump may ultimately end up being impeached by the Republican-controlled Congress (Oppenheim, 2016).

The election of Trump answered one question to which the answer was already known: that negative campaigning is used because it works - even, it seems, in its most extreme forms. It also drew parallels between Trump and Berlusconi, that suggest that far right populism is unlikely to hurt the Reagan-esque tax-cutting, laissez-faire, pro-business establishment.

But what about about in Europe, where far right parties have pushed their way into the mainstream with fewer compromises and mainstream alliances? As with Trump, promises of social conservatism, anti-immigration and harsh law and order policies have abounded. Yet on economic policy, the stances of far right movements have been inconsistent.

Trump's one elaborated economic policy was for a massive tax cut. That matches up with UKIP's policies, which have historically leaned toward less compromising version of Conservative manifestos, with tax cuts, especially for those at the top and large amounts of deregulation.

Yet while Trump has hinted at protectionism, it has been more strongly pushed in Europe. For instance, Front National have travelled over time from aggressively, anti-welfare, 'parasite' opposing, Reagan neoliberals, to ardent advocates of state control and protectionism (Shields, 2007).

Other far right parties in Europe, such as the Freedom Party of Austria and the Party for Freedom of the Netherlands, or elements of the Five Star Movement in Italy, have expressed a kind of national liberalism, to which the French Front National seems aligned.

The parties are standing, ostensibly, to 'protect' their 'national values', which have over time extended to include liberal tolerance, particularly of native homosexual and Jewish communities; and attempted to reconcile what amounts to 'national welfare', claiming to expel outsiders from the system, with the neoliberal capitalist system.

These positions express profound contradictions: between the rousing of intolerance and promises of social protection, and between deep connections to the low tax, low regulation and big business neoliberal order and promises of economic protection.

Berlusconi showed that these contradictions can be maintained, though not without difficulty and obvious fragility, over a long political career. So whichever way these parties break, caught between intolerant, nationalist and statist demands and their neoliberal connections, progressives need to have a strong argument that counters the flaws of both. And that argument needs to bring together radicals and moderates, democrats and liberals.

Justice, Liberty and Progress; equality, cooperation and sustainability; these values drive progressives. The far right stands opposed to them, picking and choosing between them as it suits their cause. Progressives need to unite around them - whether against neoliberalism or nationalism, as both are disastrous.

Petty squabbles are the opportunities that the Berlusconis and Trumps exploit. They disillusion the public and open the doors to opportunists and extremists. That pattern needs to end, in the name supporting those made most vulnerable by the rise of such forces: women, minorities, refugees, immigrants and the impoverished.

US Presidential Election 2016: Alexander Hamilton said it had fallen to America to prove citizens capable of unselfish government that served the public good

Alexander Hamilton, Founding Father of the United States and the chief champion of its constitution. Image: Alexander Hamilton from Marion Doss (License) (Cropped)

In The Federalist No.1, arguing for the ratification of America's then brand new constitution, Alexander Hamilton wrote that:

"It seems to have been reserved to the people of this country to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force."

Hamilton drew up an image of a grave responsibility having fallen upon America, as the symbol and example of citizen government, to prove that government by consent, by reason and by dispassionate and sound judgement was something of which ordinary people - once removed from the compulsions of force or fear or hierarchical and servial duties - were capable.

But Hamilton also warned of the prejudicial interests which the new Constitution must overcome to pursue that ideal. Not least the "perverted ambition" of those who seek to "flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation" or "aggrandise themselves by the confusions of their country".

Sound like anyone?

Donald Trump has, at every turn, taken the path of division and self-aggrandisement. At every turn he has taken the low road, driving wedges into the heart of the country to exploit fear, disenfranchisement and confusion.

As much as the citizens of the United States likes to see their country as something that stands apart, it has nonetheless remained on trend. The rise of the language of far right politics - sectarian, intolerant - is not unique to America. It is feeding on desperation and hopelessness wherever it can find it.

Around the world, opportunistic individuals are stoking confusion to aggrandise themselves and pursue perverted ambitions at the expense of the public good. Trump is part of that: someone who will use the people while they're useful, only to drop them and persecute them the moment they're not.

At the Presidential Election, and at the many Senate and Congressional and other elections happening this week, America faces a stark choice - almost nowhere else in the Western world has two-party politics so deeply embedded itself.

On the one hand, the Republican Party has been consumed by its own folly. Trump is just the vile symptom of a deeper sickness - the boil than alerts us to the plague hidden within. Intolerance and sectarianism were seized upon as electoral tools in the Sixties and the price is now come due: to be overthrown and subsumed beneath an egotistical populist.

For progressives, the failures of the Democrats are different. They are the product of compromise, of playing within the system, of trying to achieve gradual reform from the inside - that has left them tainted by association with those they have had to work with to build consensus.

Hillary Rodham Clinton symbolises those compromises to many on the Left, and beyond, perhaps more than any other Democrat. A life long career of those compromises have also made her perhaps the most qualified Presidential candidate in history.

That is the upside and down of trying to get things done from the inside: there is a cost to claims of being a reformer when you have been part of the establishment for so long. If a person spends long enough in the political arena, it becomes hard to see for what they actually.

But that is where the people come in: the activists, the radicals, the social reformers, ordinary citizens in thousands of constituencies. As Laurie Penny argues, those who want radical change always see those in power as an enemy and Hillary Clinton is the enemy she has wanted all her life.

Clinton is a centrist, a moderate, a woman, a political insider with a lifetime of experience: a graduate of Yale; a consistent campaigner for healthcare reform, achieving successes for children and reservists; as First Lady, she spoke in China to tell the world that Women's Rights were Human Rights; she built an international consensus to pull Iran in from the cold; and her name is cited as a leading campaigner for numerous reforming policies - like equal pay and care for 9/11 first responders.

For progressives, with narrow but stark options, voting for Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential Election is a vote for the public good. In his own time, Alexander Hamilton stood opposed to the political fortunes of Aaron Burr, because he believed him to serve no interest but his own. Between the pragmatic public servant and the self-serving egotist, there is no debate as to who the arch-Federalist Hamilton would have supported between Clinton and Trump. As Hamilton argued:

"Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the public good."

But it doesn't stop there. One person alone does not make the future. No President, no leader, of no country, not even America, wields that kind of power. That is the work of movements. Progressives must find theirs and with it their voice. Remember: politics doesn't end with an election.

Vote Hillary, but don't do so expecting that you can just leave everything in her lap. Hillary Rodham Clinton is not a perfect candidate. No candidate is. She is human and flawed. So progressives voters must be prepared to hold her to account, to provide scrutiny and be critical, prepared to demand excellence at every turn.

Closed or Global - is that the only choice? South America's political tides hold an important lesson for Europe

Mauricio Macri, Argentina's new globalising President, casting his ballot in 2015. Photograph: Mauricio Macri vota by Mauricio Macri (License) (Cropped)

Europe, after nearly a decade of economic turmoil, seems to find itself on a precipice. Behind lie the shattered ruins of the social democratic consensus and the overbearing shadow of its failing replacement globalisation. Ahead in the darkness is sectarianism: populist, nationalist and authoritarian.

Populism in South America

While wrestling with this seemingly polarised and precarious position, Europe should look to South America. After its own struggles to shake off America imperialism, the Regan-Thatcher neoliberal doctrine, a crisis of poverty and, in parts, conservative authoritarianism, South America saw a popular electoral revolt in favour of populist parties offering social rights.

In obviously varying circumstances, but with some common discontents, from Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian Socialists in Venezuela 1998, to Nestor Kirchner's Peronist Justicialists in 2003, and Evo Morales' Campesino Socialists in 2005, and others in between, a so-called pink tide overturned the neoliberal status quo.

Despite the obvious allusions to socialism, the popular campaigns for social rights where fought within an increasingly closed state system, with overtly nationalist overtones - and frequently at the cost of political rights and transparency. Those who began as reformers faced accusations of endorsing narrow and unshakeable parties of power, with the "typical vices: personalism, clientelism, corruption, harassing of the press" (Bosoer & Finchelstein, 2015).

Populist-Globalist Revolving Door

As social conditions have undermined the globalist response to Europe's crisis, economic conditions have undermined South America's closed populist system. Weak exports have led to a continuing downturn (The World Bank, 2016) - exposing the fact that it is easier to maintain repression if social rights keep being extended along with the money to fund them.

As Europe is increasingly turning from globalism to find populism ahead, South America is doing the opposite. Mauricio Macri, for Republican Proposal party and Cambiemos coalition, presented Argentina with an open globalised alternative to the closed populist nationalist government of the Justicialists in 2015 and was elected President.

But there is little reason to believe that South America's new open global option is likely to meet any less dissatisfaction than it has in Europe, where the 2008 financial crisis, and the sovereign debt accrued in managing it, was seen as an opportunity by the globalised financial sector - ostensibly pressing the idea that governments are not above the law, in order to effectively claim rent on state debt.

Argentina itself already has long experience of wrangling with this system, that has used American courts to try and force state policy on repayment of national debts, accumulated through bond sales. The power of that global finance sector and its power to shape fiscal policy, in effect essentially shaping the economics of entire states, is all too familiar a subject of exasperation in Europe.

The Role of Social Democracy

While South America has struggled for stability between populism and globalism against a back drop of military juntas, in Europe, for a time, there was shelter to be found within social democracy. The social democratic project provided safeguards against either extreme, closed and global, while trying to include the benefits - like social rights and widespread access to capital and investment.

However, the 2008 crisis undermined social democracy. Its adherent parties have been severely weakened, perhaps fatally. Too many times, social democracy chose to back the alienating establishment instead of reforming it and the moderate left, in Europe and South America, found itself shackled to neoliberalism as part of a desperately defended mainstream.

South America's leaders responded to economic pressures by advancing a closed system. Leaders in Europe, after 2008, embraced the global system to overcome its problems. Now, with both under pressure, they seem ready to swap. But neither have proved to be a sound solution.

What is needed is a 'new' social democracy, a replacement for the old and worn out system. But a new balance has to be found. It isn't enough to be a part of the establishment, to be an insider, taking the edge off of its worst extremes. A consensus that recognises the demand for political liberties, civil rights and pluralism alongside social rights, that embraces an open society through internationalism rather than globalism.

Right now, the choice presented to the people of South America and Europe is between closed and global. But it doesn't have restricted to these exclusive polar positions. It is a false and exclusionary dilemma. A better consensus is possible.

Around the World: Turkey, off the Periphery

Istanbul, once known in Europe as Constantinople, is a symbol of the historic relationship between Turkey and Europe. Photograph: Genoese built Galata Tower in Istanbul from Pixabay (License) (Cropped)

Over a frantic night and day in Turkey an attempted coup looked at first to threaten the country's social fabric (Kingsley & Abdul-Ahad, 2016). Western leaders rushed to denounce undemocratic power grabs, calling for respect for Turkey's democratically elected government.

In hindsight, Western leaders may look back at that night as the starting point of an important shift in the balance of Middle East politics. A moment in which Turkey, under a popular authoritarian leader, stepped off of Europe's periphery to place itself instead at the centre of the Middle East.

The Coup of 15th July

Those behind the attempted coup announced their aim to be the protection of democracy and to reinstate "constitutional order, human rights and freedoms" (Beauchamp, 2016). Whatever the truth in this claim to legitimacy, its hard not to see what has followed the coup's defeat in that light. The harshness of the reaction that has followed is enough to make it seem like there were two, not one, attempted coups on 15th July, with one coming out victorious ahead of the other.

The government of Turkey, headed by President Recep Erdogan, swept away what turned out to be only a minor attempt by a small faction. But that was not where the reaction ended. A purge was under way almost immediately with arrests and expulsions in the thousands (BBC, 2016). Human Rights have been suppressed in a state of emergency (Shaheen & Bowcott, 2016). There has even been much criticised talk of bringing back the death penalty (Verhofstadt, 2016).

Erdogan's government swiftly claimed exiled former ally now opponent Fethullah Gulen to be the ring-leader demanding of the United States his extradition (BBC, 2016{2}). Gulen in turn suggested that the coup was a false flag operation, set up by Erdogan to justify his increasingly authoritarian stance and allowed for a witch hunt to follow (Fontanella-Khan, 2016; Plett Usher, 2016).

The US response to claims against Gulen, who lives in exile in Pennsylvania, has been unhurried and tempered. That seems only to antagonised the Erdogan government, which stepped up the rhetoric (Withnall & Osborne, 2016). Accusations flew that the West was harbouring terrorists and even that the West was supporting them.

In the last decade Turkey seemed to be heading ever more towards liberal democracy and membership of the European Union. Its future membership was a much discussed factor of the Brexit referendum. It was a key ally to both the EU and NATO. The steps taken in the last month suggest, sadly, that progress has been halted.

A Change of Step

Turkey has become a lesson in the fragility of liberal democracy. A symbol of how easily even a well settled constitutional order might be destabilised by economic and political tides, or even by the drive of ambition and grip of authoritarianism.

Recep Erdogan's Presidency had already seen the free press suppressed long before the coup (Shaheen, 2016) and was thought to be working towards changing the country's political system into a strong executive presidency (Finkel, 2016).

Whatever the purpose behind the attempted coup, and however the ramshackle attempt on power came about, it seems to have triggered - or afforded an opportunity for - Erdogan's party to clean house of political and intellectual opposition, inflaming Turkey and accelerating its embrace of popular authoritarianism (Tugal, 2016).

As power is centralised and the opposition suppressed, it is worth asking: What is it that Erdogan's party wants?

Even with stronger opposition at the last election, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) won decisively - AKP took 50% of the vote, ahead of Secular Republican and Kurdish Nationalist opposition. It doesn't seem like the party has much trouble staying in power under constitutional and democratic conditions.

And Erdogan himself was Prime Minister for eleven years, before his subsequent election as President in 2014 - for a total of thirteen years at the peak of Turkish politics. During that time Erdogan and the AKP were thought to be prioritising ascension to the European Union as the country's primary objective.

Yet the party is also propelled by other ideas. A party of conservative democracy, and now increasingly a party of popular authoritarianism, Erdogan's AKP seek to create a 'New Turkey', based on a revival of cultural and traditional values from the Ottoman Empire and the rejection of pro-western modernisation (Cagaptay, 2016) - symbolised in three pillars of glorification of the Ottoman Empire, suspicion of the West and anti-Kemalism, that opposes the constitutional secularism of Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic.

Upon those pillars, Erdogan has strengthened central authority in Turkey even as chaos rages at the border - and pours over onto Turkish streets - with at the least Iraq, Syria and Lebanon engulfed in violence.

From Weakness, Opportunity

The strengthening of central authority in Turkey stands in stark contrast with its European neighbour. The crisis in the Middle East, the desperate mass of refugees - fleeing death at the hands of a paramilitary cult of mercenary terrorists - have exposed the weakness of the European federal project. European unity has been tested on foreign affairs, on refugees, and found wanting.

In Europe's weakness Erdogan may see the opportunity to implement his vision of Turkey. Erdogan certainly has the backing for such a move, stoked by resentment of Western interference. A deep ill-will towards the Western mandated break-up of Turkish power in the region a century ago and has long been a theme.

Seeing the region as it is now, mired by the fallout of a Western intervention that left a power vacuum - which was occupied by a terrorist cult that has even struck on Turkish streets - could easily seem like confirmation or justification of Pro-Ottoman, anti-Western sentiments. It certainly makes it easy to see why a change of policy, away from the periphery of the West to the central power of the Middle East, might seem to Erdogan like an opportunity.

With neighbours both East and West seemingly paralysed with crisis, a political vacuum has opened. It isn't a leap to imagine a popular authoritarian leader, espousing an Ottoman Revival, wants to pivot his country into the central role in the region, at a time when planning for the foundations of its future have to be at least starting.

In Argentina, Macri's broad Centre coalition secured the Presidency. Yet the question remains: when can the Left cut ties with neoliberals to pursue truly radical reforms?

Mauricio Macri, pictured casting his vote in the August primaries, united the Centre-Right and Centre-Left opposition to defeat the Kirchner candidate and become the first non-Peronist, non-UCR President. Photograph: Mauricio Macri vota by Mauricio Macri (License) (Cropped)

After twelve years in power, the Kirchnerist faction of the Peronist movement, in the form of the Partido Justicialista, lost their grip on the Presidency of Argentina (Watts & Goni, 2015). In the second round of voting Mauricio Macri, leading the broad centre coalition Cambiemos, defeated the Justicialista, and former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, backed Frente para la Victoria candidate Daniel Scioli (BBC, 2015).

Macri's victory has been received positively as, possibly, the beginning for a new moderate Argentina (Cottle, 2015). And yet, while neoliberals, in particular, rejoice in a pro-market victory, Macri's Presidency has only come with the complicity of the centre-left, specifically the Union Civica Radicale (UCR, Radical Civic Union).

That tentative alliance raises the question of whether, sooner or later, those with Left-wing tendencies, particularly within UCR, will feel the need to go their own way - though there is a lot of work ahead before a progressive slate could win without some sort of agreement with, or against, the Peronist movement.

Not the least consideration is that the election of the conservative liberal Mauricio Macri will not, alone, be enough to change the direction of Argentina. Although, the defeat of Kirchner's populist Peronist candidate - which has brought a positive response from neoliberal pro-market voices - has been regarded as a new turn for Argentina and, possibly a little optimistically, the overthrow of populism (Rodriguez-Brizuela, 2015).

While the Peronists are still the largest group in the Congress, that may shift over the course of Macri's term as half of the Chamber of Deputies is elected every two years in legislative elections. And the efforts already launched by Macri at tackling Argentina's immense economic challenges have received praise (The Economist, 2016). So, for the moment, the momentum is with Macri.

However, Macri's support came from a coalition primarily divided between the Centre-Right party Propuesta Republicana (Republican Proposal, PRO) and the Centre-Left party Union Civica Radical - backed by a mix of supporters from across the centre (The Argentina Independent, 2015). So what of Macri's Radical partners?

Despite the party's name, the UCR is a moderate centre-left party, seen by the harder Left as bourgeois, that has for decades been caught between other factions. The traditional opponents of the Peronists, some internal and breakaway factions such as the Radicales K have nonetheless found themselves sometimes allies with Peronist factions, in pursuit of reforms that promise social justice and improvements to the lives of citizens (La Nacion, 2006).

Yet the authoritarian character of the Justicialista - with fears ranging from electoral fraud to intimidation and suppression of the press, along with policies like the confiscation of pension funds to plug financial holes (Marty, 2015; Crandall, 2012) - seems to have helped align the UCR with the opposition. That has led the UCR on the path joining Cambiemos, despite its mainstream, globalising, neoliberal approach (Rodriguez, 2015).

Now, it would not be a surprise to see the election of 2015 presented as a contest between the market and the state. Yet in reality, it was more after the fashion of the statist, populist and nationalist Peronists, holding a long-term authoritarian grip on power, versus a broad opposition, that Macri has succeeded in rallying around his open and 'neoliberal' way - that embraces the global system.

That is a story replicated across Europe in different shades - liberals and social democrats shackled to the neoliberal mainstream, in the face of rising fear and nationalism, rallying to protect positive gains embodied in the the establishment institutions. So why, the question might well be asked, would or should the Centre-Left consider breaking away from the Centre-Right? It is certainly clear that the global economic crisis is not over and that populist nationalism has not retreated - even in Argentina after its defeat.

The answer is because, ultimately, neoliberalism is no friend to social progress.

For all his moderate liberal credentials, as Mayor of Buenos Aires Mauricio Macri behaved in a typically neoliberal way - defunding social programs in search of competition at the expense of social security (Esperanza Casullo, 2015). And Argentina's Macrinomic path out of its present crisis will likely follow the same austerian path as many countries in Europe - particularly the UK under George Osborne Chancellorship.

But that doesn't mean that some overnight, clean break is imminent. Progressives in Argentina must build gradually towards an unshackling, because the election demonstrated that there is not yet much of a political space for a radical alternative to Peronist statism or the neoliberal market. Yet Macri's election has levered open the door and progressives must step into that new space to develop a fresh consensus around a just, sustainable and liberating alternative, amenable to the building of broad Left movement.

The 'new politics' is being put to the test in Spain, where Podemos hopes to show that Syriza was not an anomaly

The Indignados protests in Madrid, in May 2011, that began the decline of the establishment that opened the way for this tight election race. Photograph: Puerta del Sol, Madrid, 2011 by Pablo Garcia Romano (License) (Cropped)

All indications are that the general election in Spain is likely to mark the end of that country's two-party system (Scarpetta, 2015). Following the trend in other European countries, the political establishment is struggling for credibility and that has opened up the possibility of multi-party politics and substantial change.

With four parties running close in a tight race there is a chance, there is a chance that casting a ballot can make a much bigger kind of change than usual. For the Left, this situation presents an opportunity to find out whether the 'new politics', an experiment in decentralised democratic movements, can be effective in practice - the answer to which could have a huge impact far from Spain (Jones, 2015).

To do so, the 'new politics' - symbolised by Podemos - has to prove that it can win, up against a political establishment in Spain that, like most countries in Europe, has settled into a comfortable pattern. After Franco's death, and the restoration of democracy, Spain's political system was been dominated by the Partido Popular (People's Party, PP), founded by followers of Franco, and the Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE).

Yet the cyclical passing of power from one traditional party to the other was rocked by the financial crisis. The struggles of Spain under the subsequent strain of bailouts and austerity, largely implemented by the Centre-Left PSOE (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2015), led to the the Indignados movement. People took to the streets in huge numbers and the scale of their discontent forced Premier Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero to stand down and resulted in PSOE being voted out of office, to be replaced by the People's Party (Tremlett, 2011).

However, while the PP took power, the cycle appears to have been broken by the Indignados movement transforming into two new challengers - parties dependent upon popular movements rather than the old establishment and both, in their own way, standing against the traditional political class.

These 'popular' parties - Podemos ('We Can', on the Left) and Ciudadanos ('Citizens', on the Right) - despite roots in the same movement, have some very apparent differences from each other, evident in the way progressives are split in their opinions of the two movements. Liberals, on the one hand, seem to want to dismiss Podemos as a militant Hard Left faction (Petts, 2015), while on the other side, democrats & socialists talk of Ciudadanos as corrupt capitalists preaching with prejudice and bigotry (Shea Baird, 2015).

Podemos, born fairly directly out of the spirit of the Indignados, enjoyed early success in the EU parliament elections which was followed up in May this year at the regional and municipal elections. Victories were won in Barcelona, Cadiz and La Coruna, amongst others, and most notably in Madrid - where conservatives had held control for 20 years (BBC, 2015).

In these places, candidates backed by Podemos had stood for participatory democracy along with the Left-wing staples of feminism, environmentalism and opposition to austerity. These victories were hailed as a justification of the decentralised approach, with campaigner candidates backed by active citizens who had engaged with people and debated on the streets and in the civic spaces (Colau, 2015).

Yet behind the scenes there is an internal struggle, between two identities, that threatens the 'new politics' image (Ferreira, 2015). One of those identities is that of the horizontal grassroots civic movement, with its citizen's assemblies. The other is symbolised by Pablo Iglesias, the national party's leader, and the faith he places in the power of singular charismatic leaders, particularly himself, and in media savvy (Williams, 2015).

The danger of this charismatic leadership is that it ties the fate and fortunes, ideals and policies, of a whole movement to the personal popularity of one individual - which can have wildly varying, and often fluctuating, results. It also risks reducing a broad popular movement into little more than a fan club, which in turn risks taking the impetus, the momentum, out of the hands of the broader movement upon which the 'new politics' depends.

Ciudadanos, by contrast is much more conventional, supporting small state policies and anti-corruption, and claims to be a centre and liberal party (Kassam, 2015). Its leader Albert Rivera has compared himself to Matteo Renzi, the Democrat in Italy, and to Nick Clegg, the former Liberal Democrat leader in the UK (Shea Baird, 2015). In practice, though, accusations of corruption and prejudice paint a picture too similar to the negative image encircling UKIP in the UK for the comfort of a progressive (Finnigan, 2015) - with claims of patronising attitudes towards women and connections between the party and Far-Right politics

Whatever their differences, both of these parties have found fertile ground and plenty of material with which to express their, and their followers', discontent. Spain's situation, following the financial crisis, has been dire. Unemployment has escalated to around 25% generally and for the young to over 50% (Navarro, 2014), with a lack of job security facing those who manage to find jobs, (Jones, 2015).

Those facts are represented in national polling, which has all four of the chief parties in a close race, hovering around 20%, more or less (Nardelli, 2015). The People's Party have been averaging around 25%, the PSOE at 21%, Podemos at 20%, and Ciudadanos at 17%. The chance is clearly present for the Radical Left to pull off another extraordinary result.

As for deciding on a government in Spain after the election, that is likely to be a messy affair. Neither of the new parties, even where they are close to the old parties on policy matters, is likely to want to become too entangled with the old establishment. Yet Spain's proportional electoral system will demand some compromises.

Ideologically, this election is asking big questions of the Radical Left, that have little direct concern with who governs Spain. Across Europe, progressives will want the election to provide the answer as to whether the 'new politics' is effective in what must seem like fertile ground - even with rivals Ciudadanos crowding Podemos' political space.

It is of course true that Syriza showed that the Radical Left can win, regardless of how you interpret the struggles that followed. Yet that was a solitary win in extraordinary circumstances - or so it might be dismissed while it remains a singular event. Jeremy Corbyn's Labour leadership win added to the Left's tally, but what the Left's experiment in decentralised, democratic movement politics needs is a major electoral victory that can follow up on Syriza's success.

In Spain, without some major breakthrough for Podemos, the PP and Ciudadanos on the Right will probably have just enough votes to keep progressives out of office - meaning more austerity and more status quo. For Europe, Podemos failing to make a breakthrough could make life hard for the 'new politics' movements across Europe, like the one supporting Corbyn, that want to reshape their societies around active citizens, engaged with politics and supporting broader participation and co-operation.

Building a genuine, lasting, progressive alternative in Europe can only be done if parties and movements can reach people and get them politically engaged. Winning elections is only a small part. Achieving substantive changes requires the public to be engaged, informed and empowered in a way that is only being offered at present by the Radical Left parties and their 'new politics'. From that perspective, progressives - whether Liberal, Democrat or Socialist, Moderate or Radical - have an interest in finding out whether Podemos, following Syriza, unlocked a way to re-engage citizens with their democracies.