Labour and the Lib Dems are close on policy, but they have a caustic relationship that hinders shared progressive aims

Party conference season is well under way and with it the pointless partisan finger pointing. Holding authority to account is never pointless, but progressive parties taking pot shots at each other is - with no real meaningful returns.

That has been a particularly lamentable feature of relations between Labour and the Liberal Democrats over the past decade, and a sad situation when the two parties have for a long time been very close in terms of policy.

The Liberal Democrat conference had some predictable elements, like the focus on resisting Brexit. But there were a number of policies that made it onto the table at the conference that tell an interesting story of the party's internal dynamics.

Although their leadership, through a few iterations now, have been committed to a centrist, split-the-difference, approach to how they present their policies to the public - placing them half way between Labour and the Tories - that stance doesn't reflect the wider scope of Lib Dem policy.

In our breakdown of party policies for the 2017 elections, it was clear there a not only a distinctly centre left theme, but that the gap between the Lib Dems and Labour was far narrower than you would think from either side's rhetoric.

Both parties had a positive economic outlook, aiming to increase long term public investment by hundreds of billions. Both sought to reverse tax cuts for corporations and raise taxes on the wealthiest. While the Lib Dems proposed loosening the Tories restrictions on welfare, Labour called for more democratic power for workers in their workplaces - whether through coops or through more locally owned utilities.

That same closeness can be seen in the ideas that the radical liberal factions of the Liberal Democrats put on the agenda at their conference. Policies like a redistributive sovereign wealth fund, taxing wealth to reinvest; pushing for better support for cooperatives, social enterprises and for stakeholders over shareholders; and support for a basic income trial in Wales.

Yet their leaders, elected representatives and talking heads, still feel the need to attack each other. For progressives, these caustic relationships are of no use, serving only to drive allies apart and make progressive goals harder to achieve.

Criticism is necessary. Dissent is necessary. While progressive parties have plenty in common, they often differ when it comes to priorities and methods. But being drawn into the politics-to-media-to-politics cycle of personal attacks achieves nothing.

Dissent shouldn't be a barrier to cooperation, nor should it be a cause to resort to crude attacks. It is the basis of rational debate, that holds to us to a higher standard. Progress is built on that foundation. Progressive leaders need to remember that.

Corbyn wins by default in first Labour leadership debate, Smith needs to be clearer: what makes him a better leader?

Jeremy Corbyn faced his challenger Owen Smith for the first time at the Cardiff Hustings on Thursday night. Photograph: Corbyn speaking in Manchester in October 2015.

Last night, Cardiff hosted the first hustings of the Labour leadership contest. Jeremy Corbyn and Owen Smith took to the stage to answer the write in questions and debate one another on their positions. The debate itself didn't offer much separation between the two candidates, a task made particularly difficult when they continuously agreed with each other all night.

The first question of the night was perhaps the most poignant. Are you the candidate Theresa May least wants to face at an election?

Owen Smith opened the night, saying he believed that Labour needed to offer a more vigorous opposition. But he wasn't particularly clear how he'd offer that. Corbyn defended his work so far, saying he had changed PMQs, to end the 'public school theatre' and bring PM under more public scrutiny - using methods like questions from the public.

However, Smith pointed to the low polling numbers that Labour have posted in the past month to say the party has fallen behind under Corbyn's leadership. Corbyn responded by stressing all the progress the party has made, winning at the local elections, and turns the point on its head to says that the fall in the polls was caused by MPs resignations that have disunified the party and damaged its image.

Smith seemed to take that as a personal slight saying hadn't been part of any coup and instead went to Corbyn looking for a way forward, but was disillusioned by his answers. Smith emphasises that he is running to prevent the party from splitting, that he wants unity, but Corbyn simply asks when then did he quit the Shadow Cabinet?

The audience had been fairly controlled up until this point, reserving just small applause for the answers they agreed with. However, it didn't take long for tensions to rise. When the subject party disunity arose, it was Owen Smith who bore the brunt of heckling, although he handled it well.

Corbyn responded to Smith's interpretation of events, saying that Smith cannot deny that his #ShadowCabinet reached out well beyond his own ideological positions - clear a call from Corbyn beyond the audience out to MPs to recognise that it is they that needs to meet him halfway.

The current leader made repeated reference, to highlight the fact, to how he has worked with others across the party, in particular Owen Smith himself, to fight the Tories. He also took a slight stab at Smith, saying he was glad to see the party in harmony on policy, as Owen Smith's policy announcements were all previously announced Corbyn & McDonnell policies.

Smith took the opportunity to suggest that Corbyn was very much in the back seat on those issues, like welfare, on which he was the true leader. He used lots of "I" and "me", saying "It was me" that took on the Tories on Welfare. Corbyn's response to that was short and crisp: "It was your job".

Next up where back-to-back questions on economics for the candidates. First: What is your Industrial Strategy for making UK competitive?

Corbyn pitched his National Infrastructure Bank and how it might stimulate and rebuild the British economy - investing in education, to develop skills, and investing in well paying jobs. He stressed that it would be British workers skills & innovation that would make the UK a global competitor.

Smith called for reindustrialisation. He pointed to Germany as an example that the Thatcherite, and he admits Labour, policy of deindustrialising the UK was wrong. He argued that the UK could return to being an industrial and manufacturing centre that can provide good jobs and can still compete globally.

The second part of the economic double-header was to ask the candidates what they will do to show voters the party was fiscally credible.

Corbyn says the simple key to credibility was to spend sensibly, starting with smart public investment. As an example he points to the madness of pouring money into the hands of private landlords through housing benefit rather than addressing the core problem by building more social housing.

Smith said, categorically that Tory austerity has failed, having promised not to leave debts to our grandchildren and instead doubling the national debt. He stresses that the anti-austerity position, with public investment, is real path to credibility.

He infers, but doesn't actually say, a line he has been trying out recently - ditching the language of protest, of being against, as in anti-austerity, in favour of a positive position, as in pro-prosperity.

Both candidates comment on their similar pitch and emphasise their agreement. But Owen Smith returns to main question, which he hammers ever more as the evening goes on: who is the candidate most likely to convince the voters of these ideas in the key constituencies like Nuneaton?

The only matter on which the two took truly separate positions on the night was on trident. Corbyn received a big ovation for his opposition to Trident renewal. Corbyn stance was clear, that barbaric nuclear weapons offer no solution to the security concerns of the modern day and diminish our international standing.

Smith made the case to the room for multilateral disarmament. Smith argued that none of the 'great powers', amongst whom he sits the UK, is listening to, and following the example of, those who disarm unilaterally.

Smith said that he felt unilateralism was idealistic but naive. That unilateral disarmament put aside responsibility to lead the campaign for global disarmament - for which it was necessary to go the table with something in hand. For his part, Smith was clear that this was simply a difference of opinion, with room for different views.

The candidates fell back into agreement on immigration, both agreeing that it was positive and arguing that the pressures that people feel it is applying were the result of poor support for local government. For both the answer was proper local funding and local investment.

Smith and Corbyn also agreed that putting limits or caps on immigration are not the solution. Smith added that Tories proved that putting finite numbers on immigration doesn't work, while Corbyn argued that the humanitarian way to manage European migration was to work on getting conditions more equal across Europe.

The next question, on anti-Semitism in the party, raised tensions in the room significantly. Corbyn calmly laid out the measured steps he had taken as the leader to combat it, his position even coming with a note of caution to his opponent to respect due process, as Smith said he would take a zero tolerance stance.

Smith then got a poor reaction when he repeated his previously made claim that anti-Semitism in the Labour Party is a thing that has only happened and risen in the last year. Corbyn was markedly calm, stating in a measured way that many cases were much older and pre-dated his leadership.

While Smith tried to back down slightly, saying he didn't personally blame Corbyn, the audience didn't respond well. However, Smith then tried to turn the point, attempting to equate the hostile atmosphere in the room, with the hostility within the party, with the issue of anti-Semitism and a fall in the civility of party's internal dialogue.

If there was any point on which Smith clearly lost last night, then this was it. He looked every bit the candidate of MPs, rather than members, looking graceless as he tried to pin anti-Semitism to his opponent and petulant as he tried to pin it to those heckling him.

That brought the hustings to its final two questions. The penultimate was: How will you ensure that the third woman Prime Minister is from Labour rather than the Conservatives?

The host very particularly challenged both candidates. Corbyn was to be responsible for handling party misogyny, a responsibility he accepted. But Smith was more damagingly called specifically to address accusation of his own personal misogyny.

Smith said his positions would show his support for women. He also stressed that any plans to make a difference for women ultimately needed Labour in power, in government. Corbyn was clearer, saying glass ceilings needed to be tackled even at the roots in education, with encouragement for women to go into the sciences, technology and business, and then supported on their way up through legislation that ends social and workplace discrimination.

Finally, the candidates were asked what they would do for Wales? Both Corbyn and Smith answer that more funding is justified, but Smith adds - as was quickly becoming his tag line -  that the best thing for Wales is having Labour in power.

By the end Smith had repeatedly and overwhelmingly stressed the line, pretty much the key element of the Labour Right philosophy, that Labour has to be in government, has to have power, as soon as possible. When asked about making a difference for women, he said the answer was Labour in power. Asked what can be done for Wales, the answer was Labour in power.

That theme carried into the closing statements. Smith said the UK was in crisis and the answer was a Labour government - and he would take party back to power. Corbyn argued that Labour not only can win, but are - pointing to the mayoral victories at the local elections in may. He said the way to win was to mobilise & enthuse people by presenting a real alternative.

In this first debate, neither candidate did anything decisive to put themselves clear. But the reality of the leadership race weighs more heavily on Owen Smith, who needs to prove himself to be clearly the better leader than Corbyn. Otherwise, what would be the point of changing leader?

Last night, Owen Smith focussed heavily on the need to get Labour into Power. But he didn't say enough about how to get there and or it is that makes him the candidate who'll get the party there.

In an honestly close debate, Corbyn nonetheless wins by default for that one simple reason: Owen Smith didn't do the one thing he had to, which was show or tell why he is a better leader than Corbyn.

Never mind policy, never mind showing Corbyn's supporters that he can represent them as well as MPs. If Owen Smith wants to be the next Labour leader, he has to decisively show the skills and planning that clearly marks out his distinct path, from where Labour are now, to Labour in government.

PMQs in Review: How have the government and opposition fared in Corbyn's first year?

The strike of Twelve on Wednesdays heralds the beginning of PMQs, a contest it is hard to say that progressives have been winning over the past six years.

Since Jeremy Corbyn's election as Labour leader last autumn, PMQs has had an extra layer of attention paid to it. After Corbyn offered a new politics, kinder and more reasonable, commentators wondered at how that could be translated to the hostile cauldron of PMQs.

On the whole the answer has been a barrage of criticism of Corbyn's performances opposite David Cameron. At the top of the list has been his apparent lack of aggression and persistence, that has been accused of letting Cameron's ministry off lightly. It has also been said that there has been a simple lack of professional preparedness (Hazarika, 2016).

Part of Corbyn's problem, at least initially, was an unfocussed approach, where each question would press on a different subject. While that approach allowed for the covering of more ground, it also meant that ground was covered more thinly - or occasionally not at all in the face of a persistently aggressive Cameron, who frequently turned the format upside down by firing questions of his own back.

Others who stepped up to lead PMQs received a warmer response from critics. David Cameron is considered almost universally to have PMQs firmly in his grasp and to hold a position of confident control over the proceedings that makes life difficult for any opponent - Ed Miliband just as much as Jeremy Corbyn.

Cameron's and Corbyn's deputies George Osborne and Angela Eagle also had chances to take on PMQs. Osborne comes from the same PMQs school as Cameron, so his confidence comes with little surprise. But Angela Eagle's turn standing in for Corbyn had to be considered within the context of Labour MPs dissatisfaction with Corbyn.

Angela Eagle herself was a competent performer. Yet she also received much better support from her own benches than Corbyn is often afforded, which can only have made life easier. It also clearly suited the Commons that Eagle also went back to the old bantering approach.

While some of Corbyn's difficulties might be put down to his own flaws, there where early innovations. The use of letters from members of the public to add a new dimension to a question, which might force the PM to answer more straightly - something much needed within the format.

And that format itself aught to carry some of the blame. The Prime Minister is under no real obligation to give straight and clear answers to questions and there is no arbiter of the factual accuracy, relevance or suitability of an answer. It is left to the questioner to persist - a privilege that only two MPs are afforded.

Could changes to the format help? First Minister's Questions at Holyrood adopted a new longer format this year, giving more time to press for detail, and all of its opposition party leaders get a chance to ask a couple of questions. But whether adapting to that format or more likely remaining within the current format, co-operation between opposition MPs to coordinate questions alone - to hit a consistent tone and plant follow ups - would at least go some way, in the short term, to forcing the PM to give more specific answers.

September, when the recess ends, will see the new Conservative leader Theresa May return for her second appearance - and presumably further ones - but it isn't yet settled who her opponent will be. Whoever prevails in the Labour leadership election has to look back seriously and methodically at Corbyn's first year as opposition leader.

Regardless of whether it has been the fault of Corbyn or not, the opposition has struggled to get its message out and PMQs is one of the few opportunities for free, unfiltered, media coverage. The next leader of the Labour Party, as effective leader of the opposition to the government, needs to have a clear answer to the question: How can we make best use of those six questions and thirty minutes?

PMQs isn't fit for purpose. But it is the symptom not the disease

Week after week, the noise at Prime Minister's Questions has gotten louder. The half hour sessions have been drowned in noise growing more inconsiderate, more deliberately vindictive, with each passing week. Having to listen to the Conservative benches braying, on live television, to drown out the questions of the opposition, can be an exercise in masochism.

It seems pretty obvious at first look that PMQs is broken. And yet, it fits so perfectly within the Westminster system. That in itself is a sign of a much deeper problem in the British political system.

The essential trouble with PMQs is that it fits in a little too perfectly with the adversarial political culture in the UK. The two sides, the government and opposition, line up opposite to one another to, supposedly, hold the government to account.

The trouble is that this polemic is bias refined, a subjective contest where the government holds one view and thinks it is right and the opposition holds another and thinks it is right. What follows is a sparring match between the unstoppable and the immovable.

That contest is perfectly fitted to the UK's us-versus-them, first-past-the-post and winner-takes-all politics. Two implacable foes, coming from fixed positions having arguments that by their nature cannot be resolved. The government will do what it will and the rest is theatre.

There is certainly am uncontestable need for the public to see, in the flesh, what it is that each side stands for, argued for, hopefully, eloquently - maybe even persuasively. Yet PMQs is one the very few public moments in which there is an opportunity to enforce upon the government - handed extraordinary power in the UK - some kind of accountability.

However, when you cross the two purposes, the party publicity exercise and holding the government to account, only one of them is ever going to win. Accountability is sunk beneath bravado, noise and petty point-scoring.

In Scotland there has been attempt to début a revised First Minister's questions, changing up the system to provide more time for a calmer session with more interrogation. But even that is limited in what it can achieve.

It cannot escape a political culture of fixed adversarial positions and that is expressed, at its worst, in an exercise that is not supposed to be 'political' being consumed by politics.

Ideally, the process of holding the government to account would be something akin to a committee hearing. The Prime Minister would be brought before them and have to give acceptable answers to fundamental questions: What is your government doing? From where does it derive the mandate for that action?

The government's reluctance to put PM David Cameron into the election debates suggests an immediate weakness to this particular alternative: Would the party political machine ever submit to the Prime Minister and the government being put so clearly on trial? Probably not.

Right now the European Union's democracy is under scrutiny. But Westminster's shortcoming shouldn't be swept under the rug. Winner-takes-all makes a mockery of political representation and the adversary system simply reinforces the alienation of citizens from their government - keeping the real business far from the vigilant eyes of those who would want answers to the difficult questions that could hold it to account.

Where is there left to go when politics breaks down into stark and implacable camps? The hidden peril of conflict

The latest junior doctors' strikes breached a controversial threshold when it withdrew emergency care. Ahead of the two days scheduled for the strikes, scare stories circulated talk of the NHS creaking - maybe encouraged by how the polls had previously suggested that public support would weaken.

In the event, support for the strike action actually remained in the majority with only a small percentage fall from before emergency care was withdrawn, with the public still largely seeing the government as culpable, and the NHS appeared to cope with the strain (Triggle, 2016; Broomfield, 2016).

The emergency threshold was breached and support for the strikers remained. That would seem to put matters in favour of the junior doctors. But the big question is - did the full strike change anything?

The short answer is... probably very little.

For those familiar with how things are actually achieved in politics - that is, usually through some kind of compromise - that shouldn't come as a huge shock. What the emergency strikes have not altered are the fundamental positions on either side of the divide.

The government didn't see the weakening of public support for which it might have hoped. And, short of those in other professions walking out in support, more akin to a general strike, the withdrawal of emergency care is as far as the strikers can escalate.

The doctor's duty of care means there are limits to the withdrawal of labour - unless a lingering rumour of mass resignations by doctors has any truth in it (Campbell, 2016). At this point, breaking the deadlock may require different kinds of resignations.

Not least forth in the queue for an exit has to the Health Secretary himself Jeremy Hunt, whose belligerence has allowed and encouraged the escalation of the dispute. The BMA - the British Medical Association, the doctor's union - has also firmly staked out a position specifically counter to that of the Health Secretary due to what they felt was a pointed threat to impose new contracts without negotiation.

On both sides, it seems only a toppling of their respective leaderships could allow for a change of direction while, as is often a priority in politics, saving face. The sides have so committed themselves to their respective courses, enough as to become completely entrenched, that it is hard to envision either being able to back down.

Therein lies the peril of competition and confrontation. Whatever can be said about the American, deeply partisan, political system, it is not a place where things are getting done. Instead, these grand monolithic forces butt heads, shaking the landscape and leaving people divided.

And that is the value of, not only compromise, but of cooperation. The ability to work with others is more than just cutting crude and dissatisfying compromises. It is also about creating a mutual respect that allows for healthy discussion, debate and an arena for grievance with effective means of redress.

A society at odds with itself would have a hard time finding resolutions in which all parts of society feel themselves to have a stake - which, in politics, is the short and medium term aim. Feeling represented is an important aspect of building engagement on the part of the public with the complexity of the challenges that their communities, their societies, face and the trust and comprehension of the outcomes.

That, more than anything else, puts Jeremy Hunt's name at the head of any list of those who need to resign. He has escalated and divided, an we are poorer for it: we have less cooperation, less engagement and less chance of an outcome in which all parts of society feel they are represented.

Clemenceau showed that you can achieve radical change in politics away from the establishment's institutional power

Portrait of Georges Clemenceau by Édouard Manet. Photograph: By Renaud Camus (license) (cropped)

The UK Labour Party's old guard establishment of former leaders and ministers has shown a crushing fear of the task of opposing the Tories when out office - out in the civic space where debate, protest and journalism set the political agenda. Yet history shows that it not only can be done, but that it is necessary to making radical change possible.

Clemenceau and the Dreyfus Affair

Georges Clemenceau, a leading figure amongst the French Radicals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, consistently found himself caught between more extreme forces. The man who would go on to be 'The Tiger' of France as Prime Minister during the Great War, was caught between a reactionary government and the revolutionary commune in 1871 and then later made a scapegoat, in 1893, for the Panama corruption scandal.

Ousted at the elections that followed the scandal and frozen out, Clemenceau poured his energies into journalism. After a time championing the radical causes close to his heart, he became wrapped up in a slow burning campaign, one that took several years to catch light, in support of Albert Dreyfus' innocence.

The Dreyfus Affair, involved the scandalous selling of military secrets being pinned on Dreyfus, a Jewish captain, at a time of rising anti-Semitism. Several years after a miscarriage of justice saw Dreyfus imprisoned, Clemenceau was presented with evidence by Arthur Ranc, a Dreyfusard journalist, which was seconded by the Senator Auguste Scheurer-Kestner.

Clemenceau used his position as editor of L'Aurore to demand a retrial. When that trial too proved a farce, he was approached by the famous author Emile Zola. Clemenceau published an incendiary letter by Zola - headed as 'J'accuse...!' by Clemenceau himself - as the front page of L'Aurore. It named names and called out corruption amongst the political class in a letter addressed directly to the President.

In one dramatic stroke - which saw the newspaper's readership increase from 30,000 to 300,000 - the outcast Radical had thrown himself in amongst, not only, the supporters of Dreyfus, but also amongst the opponents of anti-Semitic nationalism.

From 1897 to 1899, Clemenceau campaigned alongside others, including Bernard Lazare who had been working to prove Dreyfus innocent since the matter began in 1894, in what has been described as "one of the greatest achievements of French journalism" (Daniel Halevy, in Hampden Jackson, 1946):

"...a close-knit discussion carried on over two years, sustained each morning by an article sparkling with wit, vigour and rationality..."

That journalist-led civic discussion eventually achieved a Presidential pardon for Dreyfus (although Clemenceau thought that still to be an injustice); a sea change in parliament with government and ministers toppling and the Radicals becoming the biggest party, bringing substantial reforms like the separation of church and state, the secularisation of education and the abolition of censorship; and the return of Clemenceau himself to parliament as a Senator.

Labour's fear of impotence

In the present, Labour has been warning loudly of the danger of the impotence from which the party will suffer without the institutional mechanisms of the establishment at their beck and call. From Tony Blair to Gordon Brown (Blair, 2015; Mason & Halliday, 2015), the party members have been urged not to vote the Jeremy Corbyn.

Corbyn, according to some of the party's own MPs, is a purveyor of "crazy left-wing policies" who will leave the party out on the British political fringe and will face internal rebellions from the moment he is elected (Wilkinson, 2015). Yet that attitude from the Labour Parliamentary Party can hardly be considered a safer course. It mimics the very same, deeply unpopular, attitude towards its own membership, as the Eurozone held towards Greece. Embracing the status quo as a party of establishment bureaucracy also did little for PASOK, the main social democrat party in Greece, which collapsed at the election in January (Chakrabortty, 2015).

It also ignores Labour's essential problem - it has never changed 'the political fundamentals in its favour' (Kirby, 2015). Labour has always preferred, instead, to use them in its own service. In doing so, the Labour has forgotten about social power in order to play the best they can according to the rules of the political game (Tietze, 2015) - and so cling to an institutional power that comes with serious restraints, from various sources of pressure, and offers ever diminishing returns.

"Although the history of the Left has produced an extraordinary theoretical legacy, which continues to be the nucleus of almost all radical thinking, it has nonetheless left a trail of extraordinary failures in practice.

I understand the dialectical relation between theory and practice, of course, but we have to admit that in real historical terms this dialectic is terribly uneven, to the degree in fact that it may render questionable a great many of these theoretical achievements, which, if we are going to be rigorously leftist about it, cannot really stand entirely on their own." (Gourgouris, 2015)

When pressed, Labour's establishment figures may point to the danger of leaving the Tories with majority power. Yet their power has depended upon an effective control of the civic debate, framing and directing the discussion in a civic space that Labour has seemingly abandoned (d'Ancona, 2015).

Recovering radicalism

This boils down to an essential point: the importance of the social debate makes the direct pursuit of institutional power almost an irrelevance (Gourgouris, 2013).

In order to govern radically, a group first has to engage the public in the civic space, where is fostered the power to govern and change society regardless of hierarchies and institutions (Gourgouris, 2013). Clemenceau and the Dreyfusards were an early modern example of the power there is in the civic space. For radicals, this means encouraging localised self-organisation, opening up a space for teaching and learning, and fighting against alienation.

Labour has already made one big step in that direction when it chose to, effectively, crowdsource a leadership candidate (Perkins, 2015). But this example of radical democracy in action is only a beginning. In order to be a vital part of the Left, Labour has to accept that it is only a part.

Radicalism requires space for protest and critical dissent, for differences of opinion, for discussion, debate and disagreement (Gourgouris, 2015). The radical Left needs the internal antagonism of multi-party politics, not the domination of a singular power. It needs to be an activist outside of parliament and a disruptive troublemaker within it - not unlike the belligerent Clemenceau a century ago.

It looks unlikely that Labour will be able to muster enough enthusiasm amongst progressives to get over the majority electoral line while it continues to preach the values of the establishment. However, if any of the leadership candidates, of which Corbyn looks most likely, can embrace this kind of radical shift in the party - away from centralism, statism and party leader domination - there is hope of a new, more pluralistic, Left mounting a serious challenge in 2020.

Labour and the Lib Dems talk of reclaiming the 'Centre' - but what do they mean?

The UK general election made it abundantly clear that the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats did not have the confidence of voters. In the face of that defeat, the respective parties have begun their own internal debates over their future. One of the questions that both parties will be asking is whether either of them need to claim the political centre ground to recover their electoral fortunes.

Labour leadership candidate Yvette Cooper has already made it clear that she won't back a 'lurch' to the Left or Right (Gayle, 2015), and the Lib Dems are also being cautioned against straying from the 'liberal centre' in search of the more radical liberalism for which they built their pre-Clegg reputation in opposition (Tall, 2015).

What isn't necessarily clear for many observers is what exactly is meant by the 'centre'.

There are, in essence, two of them. The first is the position of compromise between the grand historic ideological positions of liberalism, democracy and conservatism. The other represents a shifting point which acts as the 'centre' of a space shaped by the dominant voices of the day on the main issues - usually the media outlets with the broadest audience and the main political parties.

The Historic Centre

The historic centre represents a kind of Roman ideal, holding the space where the interests and sections of society are brought together - where the Romans were seen to have built a polity that incorporates elements from all of them. It is the place of mixed government, mixed economy and compromise between the grand polemic ideological positions - which represent ideals like individualism and communitarianism, progressivism and conservatism, libertarianism and authoritarianism.

While the shifting centre depends upon parties each appealing to a perceived majority opinion, the historic centre is the both the result of the development of distinct ideological positions and a place of compromise between the sections of society these ideologies have been seen to represent.

In Nineteenth Century Europe, the stranglehold of monarchist conservatism found itself challenged by radical new ideas. The enlightenment ideas of reason and progress - that had played a significant role in the American and French revolutions - had led to the formation of political groups and associations of radicals, republicans and reformers.

That new republican Left-wing of politics was broadly composed of two separate ideological groups: the liberals and the democrats. During the revolutionary struggles of 1848 the dividing lines between the two became apparent. While the liberals had been content to reform the old system slowly - accepting limited concessions in the form of a constitution, small extensions of suffrage and more freedom for merchants and burgeoning industry to open up a free trading free market - the democrats had wanted more.

The democrats wanted control placed in the hands of the people. During the strife of 1848, the democrats decisively split from the liberals and from amongst them came the early developments of socialism - including the works of Karl Marx. That division between the liberals and democrats, on the road to their own versions of progress, allowed the conservative establishment to survive. A counter-revolution followed, but what that reaction could not suppress was the emergence of these three broad positions, two upon the Left and one upon the Right, which were seen as each representing broad progressive sections of society.

Between these positions - each with their own distinct, historical priorities: the democrats for equality, community and the workers; the liberals for opportunity, the individual and the professional and merchant classes; and the conservatives for tradition, security and the traditional hierarchy - there lies a centre ground balanced in a compromise between these positions and sections.

The use of that place has been ascribed to the Roman system of mixed government, referred to and interpreted by renaissance thinkers as civic humanism. The primary concern at this centre was to avoid tyranny of all kinds, of any ideological or sectional type, by creating a society that balanced the various parts of society within the establishment's institutions. In Roman terms that meant singular monarchical figures in the form of term-limited Consuls, the aristocratic wealthy interests in the form of the Senate, and democratic participation in the form of direct democracy and civic assemblies.

The Shifting Centre

Though it may not feel like it, what with all of their similarities, Britain does still have three main parties representing these three grand historic ideologies - Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives. Their connection to these distinct historic positions has however been weakened by their competition over the Centre ground - in the name of chasing the power to govern.

The Centre the parties compete over today is not, however, a true compromise between each ideological viewpoint and sectional interest of society. The contemporary Centre has been shaped by the times. Tony Blair's Third Way social democracy, David Cameron's attempt at a warm and fuzzy conservatism, and David Laws' Orange Book liberalism all represent responses to a Centre that shifted to the Right, deep into Conservative territory, due to the drastic changes to the balance of power between sections of society that took place in the 1980s and 1990s.

All three accepted the possibilities created by the flimsily founded wealth generated by the aggressive speculative capitalism of the 1990s and 2000s. All three accepted deregulation and light touch management, only interfering as much as was needed to ensure a small amount of wealth redistribution to serve those social purposes prioritised by the party ideology - broadly speaking equality, opportunity and security, for Labour, the Lib Dems and the Tories, respectively. All three accepted that the balance of power had shifted significantly into the hands of wealthy vested interests and so adjusted their approach accordingly.

That has, however, proved a dangerous game. The question that many will have asked over the last twenty years is: what is the point of having power if you have lost what makes your use of it distinct?

Disillusionment with the tripartite status quo, where the big three parties appear to have become indistinguishable, has fragmented the old system. Even though the Conservative Party managed to just about squeeze out a majority, it is a narrow lead on a poor mandate - less than 25% of eligible voters - which, by prizing a majority to the Conservatives, has done little to re-establish the legitimacy of the old system. If anything, it may simply accelerate its collapse.

A Decision to Make

The trouble for Labour and the Lib Dems is that to 'win' an election, under the present system, means receiving votes from the broadest groups of voters, not simply representing a section of society. That has led both parties to make compromises with the dominant social attitudes of the day in order to appeal, not to the historic centre, but to the shifting centre - first in the 1990s and 2000s with the wealth created by an economic boom, however shaky its foundation, and then in the 2010s with the growing cynicism towards welfare, free movement and immigration.

The big decision now ahead of both parties is whether to return to a purer form of the party ideology, with the risk of becoming little more than a sectional voice for a particular interest, or to embrace the chase for the votes at the shifting centre, with the risk of alienating more idealistic supporters in order to gain the support of those whose views have been formed from the dominant attitudes of the times. That decision comes with a lot of questions to answer.

Should the parties give up their distinct arguments to appeal to as large an audience as possible, in order to gain the power to implement their vision? What would then make any party distinct from another? Would there be something dishonest in that approach?

Or, should the parties be up on a platform, making their distinct arguments heard and trying to convince people of the merits of their ideals, each representing a small portion of voters? And where society remains divided in the aftermath of an election, place trust in coalition government?.

There are no simple answers. It is, however, worth considering a few things: whether we believe or not that people are fixed entities, with definite and fully formed views, bound to the narrow interests of their section of society; whether we believe or not that ideologies can offer a broader civic vision, in which people from all parts of society can find merit, without a party having to give up its distinct ideals; whether we believe that it is the justly democratic act to attend to the dominant social attitudes of the day, regardless of the evidence, or if we can or should challenge that popular consensus with idealism and evidence.

The popular consensus of today has pulled the shifting centre far into conservative territory. The voices advocating for business, for low taxes and for nationalist priorities like restricting immigration are writing the contemporary political narrative. To deviate too much means risking being seen as an idealistic extremist. To play for votes from the midst of that consensus means progressive parties straying a long way from their idealistic alternatives.

What stands before those who have to make the decision is a choice between a pragmatic path to the power to govern and a, potentially, politically impractical pursuit of idealism. The path each party has chosen won't be known until their newly elected leader begins to shape new policy ideas. But it is to be hoped that a decision to tread a practical path can still find space for presenting visions of alternative societies outside of the present limitations and boundaries. That there might be included the aim of changing minds and reconstructing social norms, values and structures so that in the future we might see our ideals represented rather than sacrificed on the road to political office.

Scrapping the Human Rights Act removes the safeguards that protect individuals from the arbitrary power of the state

The very same week in which David Cameron has been confirmed to a second term as Prime Minister offering stability, with Parliament barely having had the chance to reassemble, the new Conservative government has already lit the fires of controversy. Cameron has promised a unified Britain, yet one of his first announcements is the intention to scrap the Human Rights Act 1998 (Watt, 2015), which is likely to be the first of several big and divisive threats to the Union during this Parliament.

The Human Rights Act is woven deeply into the British social fabric. The Welsh Labour government is resistant to changes, SNP-led Scotland already has one foot out of the door and even the Good Friday Agreement for peace in Northern Ireland would have to be tampered with (McDonald, 2015) - and all of the devolved institutions possess the power to deny consent to alter this matter within their jurisdictions (Brooks, 2015; Scott, 2015).

Tensions are already high between Westminster and Scotland over the UK's continued membership of the EU - with Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon demanding that a majority be secured in each of the UK's nations for secession from the EU to go ahead (Sturgeon, 2015), and Wales is divided on the issue (ITV, 2013). This attempt to undermine British commitment to Human Rights is only going to ensure that the fault lines are riven deep between the nations of the UK, almost entirely by the hands of the Westminster Conservatives.

Under the stewardship of Justice Minister Michael Gove, formerly in charge of much criticised education reform (Garner, 2013), the Conservative plan is to end the influence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) over the UK Supreme Court - although it would leave in place the right of British citizens to appeal to the ECHR themselves (Watt, 2015{2}).

But the Human Rights Act is so much more. It allows British citizens to contest abuses of their European human rights in British courts and requires public institutions to abide by those rights (Stone, 2015). Those rights, contained within the European Convention on Human Rights - in the drafting of which Britain played a large part - protect things like the right to life, privacy and a fair trial; the freedom from torture, servitude or slavery; and the freedoms of conscience, expression and association.

While the UK has largely kept pace with the rights contained within the Convention, its removal takes away certain fundamental guarantees. A particularly important guarantee that will be to remove executive action from accountability to citizen's human rights (Starmer, 2015).

The Convention, and the Human Rights Act, are also nothing to do with the EU. They were implemented rather by the regional international organisation the Council of Europe and is enforced by the European Court of Human Rights - to which 47 states are signed up as members, a much wider membership that the EU, which include Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Norway, Switzerland and others, all in addition to the 28 members states of the EU.

As much as it is guarantee of the human rights of British citizens, the Human Rights Act 1998 is also an international commitment to upholding the principle of human rights, which requires signatory states and their lawmakers to avoid infringing, or treating arbitrarily, the rights of its citizens contained within the ECHR.

When the convention was signed up to by Churchill, all of the rights were covered by the UK's laws already (Johnston, 2015). But over time they have been applied in ways, and legal challenges have been made through the European Court, that have led to new rulings that have proved a difficulty for the UK - legal representation of migrants, arbitrary removal of the voting rights of prisoners (Ziegler, 2012).

There have been claims this means Europe is making laws for Britain, but this is simply an evolving legal system, responding to a changing environment, in the same way as the British system has evolved. But it also stands as a safeguard, aimed at ensuring that people all across Europe have access to same basic rights, and have a place where they can appeal against arbitrary treatment at the hands of their government. With regards to the prisoner voting 'scandal', Aidan O'Neill QC (2011) said that:

'What is important... is the example one gives. One of the big issues facing the European Court of Human Rights is teaching newly democratic States about democracy. One of its biggest client cases is Russia. Another one in terms of democracy is Turkey. It is a problem with the Council of Europe mechanisms that some States simply do not fix their systems as they should do and it would be a great pity if a long-established State — the United Kingdom, which was there at the founding and there at the drafting — were to set an example to other States in the Council of Europe that they do not have to abide by the law. This is where politics and international relations come in. It is incredibly important that the rule of law be respected at an international level because if we have law/law then we do not have war/war.'

There are concerns, even amongst some potential Conservative rebels, such Kenneth Clarke and the former attorney general Dominic Grieve who disagree with the move (Watt, 2015{2}), that repealing and replacing the act constitutes a step towards rejecting government under the rule of law.

Concerns have risen again about the kinds of laws the UK government is seeking to pass to which European human rights challenges would have posed a strident difficulty. Amongst them, the Snooper's charter remains the one to provoke the most controversy (Carr, 2015). The so called 'communications data bill - for which previous attempts to pass such a bill had been blocked by the Liberal Democrats (Rawlinson, 2015) - forms part of the scramble by Conservatives to give security services more access to our personal data as a way to see attacks before they can happen (Johnston, 2015), to which Boris Johnson said that:

'I'm not particularly interested in all this civil liberties stuff when it comes to these people's emails and mobile phone conversations. If they're a threat to our society then I want them properly listened to.'

These attempts have been criticised for attempting to take away important liberties for very little gain in terms of safety. One particular observation being that regular investigative methods have proven far more effective, based on specific, targeted and legally accountable procedures (Carr, 2015).

The SNP is already looking to rally Conservative backbench rebels against the party's aim to scrap the Human Rights Act (Brooks, 2015). With the devolution legislation, that brought into being both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, there comes the demand of compliance with the Convention and the 1998 Act by the decision-makers of those jurisdictions.

It is possible and likely that Holyrood will refuse to give consent to Westminster, and the Welsh Labour government has derided the attempted repeal as making Britain 'look like a Banana republic' (BBC, 2015). Even the Good Friday Agreement, essentially an International Treaty - that made it possible, in partnership with the Irish Republic, to establish a peaceful Northern Ireland - guarantees that the European Convention on Human Rights is completely incorporated into the law of Northern Ireland (McDonald, 2015).

Recently, these rights have become a political football, bound up with sovereigntist, anti-foreign narratives that have gained traction in the UK. But underneath that is a struggle between competing visions of conservative and liberal societies.

Human rights are, by their nature, fundamentally liberal. They are the defences of the individual against the many, or against the abuses of the state. They represent a guarantee, whatever the circumstances, that people are always afforded an essential respect. In that sense, they undermine many of the institutions and social orders inherent to old conservatism, from churches to the state, where a premium is placed upon hierarchy and adherence. Over the years, the more modern versions of conservatism has taken on elements of these liberal values - but only so long as those liberal values remained 'safely' contained within conservative frameworks and limits (Willetts, 2013).

By standing outside of the British state - outside of any state - the rule of human rights law instead forces conservatism to work within a liberal framework. That is what keeps the rights of individuals safe from arbitrary treatment at the hands of ideologically motivated political decisions, and ensures that we can get justice when those rights are infringed. Trying to undo that framework would represent a step backwards, favouring the power of the state over the individual.

Election 2015: The BBC's opposition leaders debate sees Farage cornered by the Left and lash out at the audience

David Cameron's refusal to engage with debates has led to some very awkward arrangements, one of which was tonight's debate. The leaders of the opposition present - Ed Miliband for Labour, Nicola Sturgeon for the SNP, Leanne Wood for Plaid Cymru and Natalie Bennett for the Green Party - but not Nick Clegg for the Liberal Democrats, who by virtue of a deal between broadcasters and the Prime Minister ends up left out (BBC, 2015).

With no place in the previous Prime Minister's debate, and no place at the opposition debate, its hard not to think that the Lib Dem have been unfairly excluded. Yet the debate itself was lopsided enough without another party of the Left or Centre taking to the stage.

With the leaders of four broadly progressive parties lining up against the leader of one Far-Right party, it was always going to feel like they were ganging up on UKIP's Nigel Farage. Farage was clearly feeling cornered - going so far as insult the entire audience and the BBC for being too Left-Wing.

The fact is though that the parties on the stage, not only the independently selected audience, were fairly representative of national polling - 13% for the Far-Right UKIP, 39%+ for the Centre-Left parties, a difference of at the least 3-1, before you even add on the numbers for the SNP and Plaid Cymru.

That was reflected throughout the debate. Nicola Sturgeon, Leanne Wood and Natalie Bennett regularly ganged up on both Nigel Farage and Ed Miliband - challenging the Far-Right anti-immigration narrative of Farage on one side and calling for Miliband to join their anti-austerity progressive movement on the other.

That three-way alliance seemed to be a clear precursor of what Sturgeon hinted about at one stage: a Progressive Alliance bloc in the next parliament formed by MPs from the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party (Mason, 2015). On the present polling that would mean a 57 seat bloc pressuring for Left-Wing anti-austerity policies.

Once more, there was less discovered by the debate than many would have hoped. However, it did provide a platform for a challenge to Farage and UKIP's anti-immigration, anti-EU, narrative that has been contested far too little over the last five years. And, once again, it showed the UK's voters that there are alternatives, and that multi-party politics is a very real possibility. Those, at least, are some positive in favour of the debate format.

Election 2015: On the campaign trail there can be more at stake than the result of just one election

The first week of the 2015 UK general election campaign has been dominated by three things: questions over how parties intend to fund their promises (Gage, 2015), televised debates and the first outbreak of negative campaigning (BBC, 2015{1}). The trouble is that these staples of election campaigning, while rarely illuminating the issues, can have significant impact. Not from the events or debates themselves, but the small and decisive moments they create.

A televised debate became a significant point of difference between Nixon and Kennedy - but not because Kennedy was the more impressive speaker (Webley, 2010). Those that listened on the radio thought Nixon had won. Yet to viewers Nixon came across sweaty and tired and Kennedy fresh and charismatic (Gabbatt, 2012).

Barack Obama's successful campaign for the Presidency in 2008 was carried on the back of a particularly catchy slogan (Edgar, 2013). 'Yes We Can' became a rallying cry of hope and positivity, along with slogans like 'Change we can believe in', and simply 'Hope'. The dynamism and vitality of Obama's message was in stark contrast to his opponent, John McCain.

The UK general election of 1983 came off the back of a chaotic four years. Labour shift to the Left under the leadership of Michael Foot and the Chairmanship of Tony Benn - both committed left-wingers - led to a number of moderate Labour members leaving, to form the SDP. The newly formed SDP-Liberal Alliance polling as high as 50% as disaffection with Labour and the Conservatives ran high thanks to years of stagflation and recession.

Running against the Conservatives, under Margaret Thatcher, who had recovered in the polls due to the impact of the Falklands War, and the SDP-Liberal Alliance ended up taking 25% of the vote - for very disproportionately few seats - Labour produced a manifesto for the election which was christened 'the longest suicide note in history' by one of their own MPs (Clark, 2008).

The scale of the Labour defeat resulted in the manifesto and its left-leaning content - featuring abolition of the House of Lords, unilateral nuclear disarmament and nationalisation of certain industries - being made a scapegoat. The defeat of the Left in 1983 has been used to discredit the Left in the UK for the last three decades, and helped lead to the more right-leaning party that spawned Tony Blair's New Labour.

As Labour announce their manifesto, trying to tackle the lasting impact upon their reputation of the financial crash happening on their watch (Robinson, 2015) and the Conservatives try to convince everyone that they will provide adequate public funding for the NHS (BBC, 2015{2}), it is important to keep in mind these historic campaign moments. The fact is that, while the theatre of the electoral campaign can be little more than a distraction at its worst, it exists because of those small things that can turn more than just an election. They can set trends and shift debates for years to come.

Election 2015: Seven-way debate sees the Left outnumber the Right to talk about ideals, fairness and being open to the world

Before tonight's ITV leader's debate began, the focus had been steadily upon David Cameron and Ed Miliband (Battersby, 2015; Hawkins, 2015). There are obvious reasons why. Polling continues to suggest either the Conservatives or Labour will be the biggest party come May - and that it will be close however the ballot papers eventually stack.

But the debate itself reflected the other thing that the polls have been saying: British politics has fragmented. There are now five parties that compete across the whole of Britain and are polling over 5%, and two regional parties with a large and growing presence within two of Britain's countries. For those smaller parties it was always going to be a major boost just to be invited to the show (Robinson, 2015).

Yet they did so much more. Natalie Bennett of the Green Party and Leanne Wood of Plaid Cymru talked about ideals like freedom of movement. Nicola Sturgeon of the SNP spoke of ending austerity. Nick Clegg joined in, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, to challenge Farage over the need to be open hearted and fair.

Despite Farage's best obsessive anti-European efforts, he was repeatedly overshadowed by the three female leaders of the SNP, Plaid and the Greens. Their anti-austerity message and language of hope frequently stole his thunder and ensured that the Left outnumbered the Right in every round of the debate. Whenever he tried to push the anti-immigration and anti-EU agenda, there was a voice - as there has been far too infrequently in recent years - to speak of being Pro-European as being open to the world, positive and fair in how we treat other people.

The reality is that TV debates have been shown not to play a particularly useful role in analysing the ideas of the different parties (Cooper, 2015). But what this debate has done is to provide people with reassurance that there are other alternatives out there. There are different narratives to the mainstream idea of fiscal austerity. There is a will to be open and co-operate, rather just compete and alienate. As Natalie Bennett put it:

"If you want change, you have to vote for it. You don't have to vote for the lesser of two evils.

The Battle for Number 10 between just two leaders and the Bercow Saga show just how desperately British politics needs reform

The first sort-of-not-a-debate was never likely to be all that exciting, but it suffers in comparison to the political machinations that preceded it earlier today. The Conservatives chose the day that their leader was making a very public appearance to try and oust the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow.

In an effort described as 'grubby', and condemned on all sides of parliament, the Conservatives attempted to pass a motion to change the rules by which MPs vote for the position of Speaker - seen specifically as an effort to remove Bercow (BBC, 2015). Considering Bercow's efforts to clean up Parliamentary politics and modernise Westminster (Dathan, 2015), it wasn't exactly the backdrop that David Cameron would have wanted for facing an interrogation by Jeremy Paxman.

The not-a-debate itself was predictably frustrating and tense - though there were some cracks. Cameron couldn't live on a zero-hours contract and Miliband claimed that his Labour predecessors were wrong on immigration and the deregulation of the banks.

The pretty odd absence of the Liberal Democrats from the debate was at least softened when their policies showed up. The Mansion Tax, and a Referendum on Europe if there is a treaty change, seem to have made it into Labour's repertoire.

However much their absence may leave them a bit isolated, the Lib Dems may be pleased not to have been on the same stage as the other leaders after all. Whatever they might have gained in terms of increased profile, that profile would have come with the great deal of frustration people will feel with the persistence of Cameron and Miliband in refusing to answer questions directly.

Early polling seems to have suggested a 'win' for Cameron (Clark, 2015), but it has been suggested that Miliband will likely be the one who gains in the long term - being seen to possibly be a capable leader will not hurt his party's election chances (Sparrow, 2015).

And yet, despite all of that, the main thing to be taken from the not-debate tonight will be the narrow focus on just two party leaders at a time when British politics has never been more open. The reality of British politics in 2015 is that there is unlikely to be a majority after the election in May, and there will be many smaller parties vying for attention.

Keeping the focus on these two - Miliband and Cameron, Labour and Conservatives - is about as bad for politics as the underhanded attempt to dislodge Speaker Bercow, a committed reformer, from office while everyone else is away or not paying attention.

The focus now switches to the debate between seven party leaders on 2nd April. That should be livelier, if for no other reason than the Clegg effect from 2010 - lots of parties and politicians entirely new to many viewers. That at least will hopefully mark a reforming step, more in line with reality.

British voters prefer moderate Centrism... so why are Far-Right groups making gains?

There has been much speculation over the years as to the dominant political attitudes of the British people. That debate has been reflected in the long term efforts of the Conservative Party to rebrand and modernise (Watt, 2015{1}). It has been the driving force behind movements within the Labour Party, such as Blue Labour (Berry, 2011).

The answer is, according to NatCen's British Social Attitudes Survey, that political attitudes in Britain appear to be very particularly Centrist and moderate (NatCen, 2015).

A recent study has shown that voters are Centrists who pull more to the Left, or more to the Right, to restrain the drift of the government in power (Watt, 2015{2}). These drifts to the Right, against Labour in 2010, and to the Left, against the Conservatives in 2015, tell us something very interesting about the electoral chances of the main parties.

The apparently determined Centrism of voters turns efforts to stay in government into a battle to stay in the middle ground, and to keep away the perception of drifting towards more extreme positions. The economic policies of the main parties - as demonstrated by the debates over last week's 2015 Budget announcement (18 March 2015) - despite being at apparent odds with one another, reflect this reality by all fitting tightly within the accepted economic consensus.

There is, however, something paradoxical in all this: the rise of the far right.

It has not happened in isolation. Across Europe and in the United States, Right-wing and Far-Right groups have gained a lot of ground. From the Tea Party in the US, to Movimento 5 Stelle in Italy, there are anti-establishment protest groups springing up across Europe that have a distinct conservative overtone. In the UK and France, Right-wing parties UKIP and Front National have been the main benefactors.

These rising reactions - with their nationalist, religious and cultural overtones - seem to defy the analysis. While UKIP have yet to break through 10% of the popular vote at an election, in France Marine Le Pen's Front National look set to become France's largest party.

It is not impossible, though, to bring these events within the findings of the study. First to consider are the groups and movements themselves which seem to have two components:

• First, an anti-establishment vote, acting in response to the government or political consensus of the day,
• and second, the deep sectarianism to which these movements have frequently appealed.

Taking the assessment of the study as a starting point, it is possible to imagine - as others have done before (Bogdanor, 1983) - the mainstream of politics not as a struggle between Left and Right, but between the Centre and extremisms on all sides.

Most multi-party, majoritarian, political systems feature the Left and the Right revolving around a centrist, moderate (even liberal) core of voters, with those centrists swapping between the two options to Centre-Left and Centre-Right. Wherever these parties began on the spectrum, competitive politics pulls everyone towards a consensus - though not necessarily at the centre.

In Britain, and in Europe, the consensus is currently firmly within in the Centre-Right. In the face of the dominant forces driving that consensus - capitalism, globalisation, modernisation - the anti-establishment element of the Far-Right movement fits well within the expectations of NatCen study.

The harder to explain element is how the anti-establishment movement has fed the Far-Right, rather than the Left - as the study predicts. The answer to that lies, again, in comprehending the political spectrum in terms of the Centre and extremes.

With multiple parties, the emphasis is placed heavily upon taking a moderate course so as to have the broad appeal needed to catch the broad range of voters needed for a majority, or to present greater grounds for co-operation in the event of a coalition. While the system forces out extremism, it reduces political debate down to a few digits here and there in a fiscal plan.

In the UK, for example, the closeness of the main parties has effectively shut out alternatives. In 2010 the Liberal Democrats were seen as the alternative, not to Labour or the Conservatives, but rather to Labour and the Conservatives - as the keepers of the establishment. With the Lib Dems joining the ranks of the governing parties, alternative debate is closed down further still.

That exclusivity can breed alienation.

In France, it has been suggested that the concerns of the working class have been ignored - allowing the far-right to feed on their discontent. While the mainstream has focused on the politics of austerity, capitalism, modernisation and globalisation - forces alienating enough - the Left has focussed itself (so the assessment goes) on the plight of 'minority groups', leaving a section of white, working-class, men feeling 'left behind' (Willsher, 2015). The last US elections certainly showed that the Right had become deeply connected to a predominantly white, older and male, Christian voter base. That tendency is also reflected in UKIP's supporters (Goodwin & Ford, 2014).

Herein lies the dangerously effective power of the Far-Right narrative. Rather than a narrative of Right versus Left, it becomes a matter of this section of the people against the establishment - frequently depicted as a detached and privileged minority.

By calling out an establishment that is detached and corrupt, and deriding an opposition as being unconcerned or dismissive of the concerns of the majority, Far-Right groups are able appeal to people beyond those who would normally find the Right-wing brand of tradition, hierarchy and nativism. It feeds on alienation and discontent, and fuels it with stories of the threat posed by immigration and European bureaucracy to the 'traditions' of 'natives' (Skey, 2013).

In short, the very same political system that pushes extremism to the fringes, also fuels it with anti-establishment fodder when it fails to address the common good.

So can the establishment respond?

Both the Conservatives and Labour seem to think that the answer lies in moving further to the Right. Both parties have made efforts to step up their anti-EU and anti-immigration rhetoric (Watt, 2013; Sabin, 2015) and Labour has seen the internal faction Blue Labour argue that the British people are inherently conservative, and that Labour has to accept that and adapt (Berry, 2011).

However, this displays a misunderstanding of the social forces involved. The rising anti-establishment movement is being exploited by Far-Right sectarian, extremist elements, against the civic consensus - but it is not of the Far-Right. Moving to the Right would do nothing but reinforce negative attitudes and confirm conspiracies and suspicions about the motives and habits of the mainstream establishment parties.

The British Attitudes Survey tells us that voters in Britain are Centrist, and that they move Left or Right as a countervailing force to reign in extreme governments. This tells us something clearly: these movements are predominantly against the establishment and the predominant consensus, and Far-Right parties have merely been a way for, some, to express an opposing opinion in a system that has become closed to alternative voices.

An important lesson can be learned from the anti-establishment movements that have leaned to the Left - Occupy, Syriza, Indignados and Podemos. They have all carried a strong and positive message of inclusion and engagement. They have challenged mainstream narratives with the common good in mind, and have sought the decentralisation of government and the devolution of its power.

These ideas have to be at the heart of a reformed establishment if it is to retain its legitimacy as a facilitator of the common good in the face of an aggressive assault by Far-Right groups.

The collapse of the political mainstream will mean more choice, but it will also call for more co-operation

With tomorrow, 27th January, marking one hundred days until the 2015 UK general election, polling figures are showing us something interesting. The main two parties are weakening, falling as low as 30% each, and the third parties, the Liberal Democrats, the Greens and UKIP, are all pushing 10% (Clark, 2015).

It is a sign of something seen in many other countries: the established political mainstream is fracturing (Nardelli, 2015). There is an upside: choice becomes a realistic possibility. People will, however, have to prepare themselves for what it will mean to be represented by many diverse parties. The parties they vote for will have to co-operate with other groups to form governments. Coalitions will be necessary.

The Liberal Democrats' choice to go into coalition with the Conservatives in 2010 has been seen by many as a controversial betrayal (Harris, 2011), but multi-party politics means multi-party governments. Those alliances often have to stretch across odd-parts of the political spectrum, working with what they find, and not everyone will get all of the things that they voted for, even if their choice makes it into government.

If we are to see greater choice between parties, all with realistic chances of governing, then people will have to get used to the idea of coalitions and the compromises that come with them. The alternative is to keep the partisan two-party system that divests all of the power upon one vision for the country, a method that can often exclude far more than half of the electorate.

The electoral battle ahead between the mainstream parties and the anti-establishment movements is already provoking fears about the impact it will have - fears that it will simply inflame the antagonism and polarisation that feeds nationalists and extremists (Behr, 2015). Fears that pluralism will bring instability, and that it will be exploited by one of the opposing factions, progressive or conservative, to crush their divided opponents.

The response of commentators has tended towards the same old framework (Jones, 2015), justifying the same old tactics: the mainstream parties (in particular Labour) need to head off and crush the small parties (in particular the Greens), and all of it to protect the position of the establishment party and its vague vision, in opposition to that of its old enemy.

But there has to be a better answer. Instead of crushing other groups on the Left, Labour could be co-operating on common issues, forming electoral alliances and creating a space on the Left for healthy debate. The alternative for the Left is more of the same old party system that has driven whole generations away from the political process.

"Political parties maintain their existence because they represent major cleavages which are persistent and long-lasting. These cleavages may be socio-economic, religious, ethnic or political. Political parties are, as it were, an institutional expression of a country's historical continuity, a mirror-image of the conflicts which past generations have found important...

...However, these traditional stances no longer coincide either with social reality, or with the natural division of opinion on political issues. The two major parties, therefore, appear less as cohesive agencies of political representation than as uneasy and incompatible coalitions held together as much by the needs of electoral survival as by common political beliefs." (Bogdanor, 1983)

When the two-party dynamic breaks down, the major parties survive by being big tents for all viewpoints, though none in particular, and dominate their traditional places on the political spectrum mostly through historical allegiance and fear-mongering about the dangers of vote-splitting. Their major concern becomes technocratic government, aiming to govern technically well according to whatever is the dominant economic system of the day, to justify their own suitability to govern. They become a refracting lens, directing and redirecting public political opinion rather than representing it (Bogdanor, 1983).

The Labour Party, as one of those mainstream, big-tent, technocratic parties, are finding themselves beset upon either side by these new political factions - UKIP, representing an older and more nationalistic crowd on the Far-Right, and the Greens, representing those younger and more liberal upon the Left (Helm, 2015; Ford, 2015).

These two parties, UKIP and Green, have two things in common: they represent a general discontent with the old system, and a fracturing of the old dualistic system into a number of separate factions of varied agendas. The old system is losing its grip. Top down control of policy and priorities is no longer in the hands of a single-faction government.

This is a function of a more open and representative democracy. It means many more viewpoints being brought into political debate, with new third parties emerging to drive change on new issues. The victory of the radical left-wing party Syriza in the Greek elections is a testament to what can be achieved in a multi-party system. However, the need of that party to form a coalition with a small right-wing anti-EU party in order to govern is a strong reminder of the compromises that follow.

The collapse of the established status-quo, and the fracturing of the system into a more open form, is far from complete. But more parties, with realistic chances of governing, and the possibility of electoral reform (Jones, 2015), mean that a more representative politics isn't far away. In that new form, the political Left - particularly the Labour Party - will have to adapt and rid itself of its own top down, patronising tendencies inherited from the present system.

The Left will need to find a way to co-operate, and to facilitate the presence of diverse views and fragmented factions. Those diverse groups, divisions and debates have always been a part of how the Left works, and that's fine. Its natural diversity is a positive, not a weakness. Openness to debate and the divisions that come with it are the lifeblood of progress.

==========
References:
==========
+ Tom Clark's 'Labour lead falls as Greens hit 20-year high in Guardian/ICM poll'; in The Guardian; 20 January 2015.

+ Alberto Nardelli's '2015 election: five key themes'; in The Guardian; 23 January 2015.

+ Evan Harris' 'The myth of Lib Dem 'betrayal''; in The Guardian; 6 May 2011.

+ Rafael Behr's 'The general election could unleash a new wave of contempt for politics'; in The Guardian; 21 January 2015.

+ Owen Jones' 'How Labour should respond to the ‘Green surge’'; in The Guardian; 22 January 2015.

+ Vernon Bogdanor's 'Multi-party politics and the Constitution'; Cambridge University Press, 1983. [Buy Now]

+ Toby Helm's 'Green surge could hit Labour in 22 election battlegrounds, new study finds'; in The Guardian; 24 January 2015.

+ Robert Ford's 'How Green party surge threatens Labour’s election hopes'; in The Guardian; 24 January 2015.