Argentina midterms raise the question: What's so funny about compassionate realism?

Mauricio Macri's hold on La Casa Rosada lightly reinforced by small gains at the Argentina legislative midterms. Photograph: La Casa Rosada from Pixabay (License) (Cropped)

The midterm elections in Argentina did little to settle the future of Argentina. President Mauricio Macri's movement gained a few seats, just enough to keep his project rolling forward.

That Macri's project is essentially austerity in a more extreme context is important for progressives to consider. It presents the epitome of what the Centre-Right consider the justification for strong dose of 'realism', but raises the question of why that has to be delivered in the form of harsh measures?

The Midterms elections covered a third of the Senate and half of the lower House. It would have been hoped by Cambiemos to be an opportunity to reinforce Macri's presidency with a stronger legislative contingent - just 16 of 72 in the Senate, with just 86 Deputies out of 257 in the Chamber, to around 46 and 105 for various Justicialist groups combined, respectively.

The four biggest parties each had about half of seats their Chamber seats up for reelection, while most of the Senate seats were being defended by Justicialists (Peronists).

As it happened Cambiemos made gains, though they were few. The coalition took 19 seats, not enough reach a majority, while those were offset by the 25 seats gained by former President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, rallying voters from various populist parties to her particular faction.

Even if this result is more than Macri and Cambiemos might have feared, it is still less than they will have hoped. Part of the reason why may be that, after two years in office, Macri has yet to deliver a deep sea shift in the country's economic condition.

That shouldn't really be a massive surprise, because two years is nothing. But the public are restless and what Macri has asked for is a huge change in approach from the Kirchnerist-Peronist years.

Not least are the cuts to subsidies that help with the cost of living for low income families. This is the austerity programme familiar to many progressives around the world.

In Argentina this has particular significance. In reason years, at the least, the Kirchnerist-Peronist populists - especially under the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner - have tended to offer up big promises, comfortable lies to package harder truths and deeper crises.

Of relevance to all of those resisting austerity is the response of Centre-Right, Argentina as elsewhere: to serve up cold reality and a cold shoulder.

The Cambiemos coalition, that Macri has serving up a meagre helping, includes most of Argentina's Centre and Soft Left - social democrats and social liberals - and you have to wonder have these partners feel about their direction.

Macri has bet the house on austerity, in the meantime putting the poorest in some jeopardy, gambling that foreign private investors will step in and take a chance on Argentina. But it's yet to pan out that way.

The midterms buy Macri some space. Over that past year he has poured the blame for the present situation on the Kirchner "K" movement - calling it the "K Inheritance", probably fairly. But that approach will only work for so long.

Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner is already building for a comeback, taking seats at the midterms while Macri's approval ratings hover dangerously low at 41%/46% (approve/disapprove).

Macri has offered some consolation to his Cambiemos partners. Last year he announced what he called a 'Marshall Plan' - a reference to the huge public investment made by the US government in it's allies after World War II.

In reality, it was a public-private investment initiative foucsed on lowering the cost of business - in that conservative vein of reduced costs hopefully leading to reduced prices and reduced cost of living.

But these pledges are coming alongside efforts to force Trade Unions and dockworkers to accept pro-competition measures - and while cornered, they are far from convinced.

All of this leads back to the central question. Populists offer an unrealistic view smothered in giveaways and the Right demand a reaction steeped in a cold austere reality. The question is, why can't we address reality with warmth?

Why is it so difficult to imagine a compassionate realism? To pursue a course that does not abandon the most vulnerable to the mercy of corporate interests and charity, when righting a sinking ship.

Politics in Argentina is raising this question. Progressives and their allies the world over need to find a way to respond.

Closed or Global - is that the only choice? South America's political tides hold an important lesson for Europe

Mauricio Macri, Argentina's new globalising President, casting his ballot in 2015. Photograph: Mauricio Macri vota by Mauricio Macri (License) (Cropped)

Europe, after nearly a decade of economic turmoil, seems to find itself on a precipice. Behind lie the shattered ruins of the social democratic consensus and the overbearing shadow of its failing replacement globalisation. Ahead in the darkness is sectarianism: populist, nationalist and authoritarian.

Populism in South America

While wrestling with this seemingly polarised and precarious position, Europe should look to South America. After its own struggles to shake off America imperialism, the Regan-Thatcher neoliberal doctrine, a crisis of poverty and, in parts, conservative authoritarianism, South America saw a popular electoral revolt in favour of populist parties offering social rights.

In obviously varying circumstances, but with some common discontents, from Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian Socialists in Venezuela 1998, to Nestor Kirchner's Peronist Justicialists in 2003, and Evo Morales' Campesino Socialists in 2005, and others in between, a so-called pink tide overturned the neoliberal status quo.

Despite the obvious allusions to socialism, the popular campaigns for social rights where fought within an increasingly closed state system, with overtly nationalist overtones - and frequently at the cost of political rights and transparency. Those who began as reformers faced accusations of endorsing narrow and unshakeable parties of power, with the "typical vices: personalism, clientelism, corruption, harassing of the press" (Bosoer & Finchelstein, 2015).

Populist-Globalist Revolving Door

As social conditions have undermined the globalist response to Europe's crisis, economic conditions have undermined South America's closed populist system. Weak exports have led to a continuing downturn (The World Bank, 2016) - exposing the fact that it is easier to maintain repression if social rights keep being extended along with the money to fund them.

As Europe is increasingly turning from globalism to find populism ahead, South America is doing the opposite. Mauricio Macri, for Republican Proposal party and Cambiemos coalition, presented Argentina with an open globalised alternative to the closed populist nationalist government of the Justicialists in 2015 and was elected President.

But there is little reason to believe that South America's new open global option is likely to meet any less dissatisfaction than it has in Europe, where the 2008 financial crisis, and the sovereign debt accrued in managing it, was seen as an opportunity by the globalised financial sector - ostensibly pressing the idea that governments are not above the law, in order to effectively claim rent on state debt.

Argentina itself already has long experience of wrangling with this system, that has used American courts to try and force state policy on repayment of national debts, accumulated through bond sales. The power of that global finance sector and its power to shape fiscal policy, in effect essentially shaping the economics of entire states, is all too familiar a subject of exasperation in Europe.

The Role of Social Democracy

While South America has struggled for stability between populism and globalism against a back drop of military juntas, in Europe, for a time, there was shelter to be found within social democracy. The social democratic project provided safeguards against either extreme, closed and global, while trying to include the benefits - like social rights and widespread access to capital and investment.

However, the 2008 crisis undermined social democracy. Its adherent parties have been severely weakened, perhaps fatally. Too many times, social democracy chose to back the alienating establishment instead of reforming it and the moderate left, in Europe and South America, found itself shackled to neoliberalism as part of a desperately defended mainstream.

South America's leaders responded to economic pressures by advancing a closed system. Leaders in Europe, after 2008, embraced the global system to overcome its problems. Now, with both under pressure, they seem ready to swap. But neither have proved to be a sound solution.

What is needed is a 'new' social democracy, a replacement for the old and worn out system. But a new balance has to be found. It isn't enough to be a part of the establishment, to be an insider, taking the edge off of its worst extremes. A consensus that recognises the demand for political liberties, civil rights and pluralism alongside social rights, that embraces an open society through internationalism rather than globalism.

Right now, the choice presented to the people of South America and Europe is between closed and global. But it doesn't have restricted to these exclusive polar positions. It is a false and exclusionary dilemma. A better consensus is possible.

An Alternative Easter Round-up: Three political stories from around the world

With Parliament away on Easter Recess, politics in the UK has been reduced to the government hoping for quiet days with as few intermittent controversies as possible. So while politics takes a breather in the UK, here are some of the stories brewing elsewhere around the world.

An Individual's Scandal and Stability in Iceland

Faced with popular pressure following the Panama Papers leak, Iceland Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson has resigned. Photograph: Reykjavik from Pixabay (License) (Cropped)

The story that has excited press reaction the most this Easter has of course been the leak of the Panama Papers. The leak has made life difficult for the leaders of a number of countries, from those affected more directly like Mauricio Macri in Argentina (TeleSur, 2016), to those more tangentially involved like David Cameron in the UK (Sparrow, 2016).

Not least affected was Iceland's Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson. Having been connected to millions in offshore accounts, he sought an election to, it would seem, seek the absolution of the people. However, his request was denied by the President - who pointed to the lack of Parliamentary support for new elections.

Backed into a corner, with no escape hatches left and protests being held against him, Gunnlaugsson resigned (Henley, 2016). It is both fascinating and deeply troubling that he seemed willing to throw a country's entire political sphere into upheaval and instability, just to save his own position and career.

He would not, by a long margin, be the first to seek out politics for such reasons and be prepared to use its powers and mechanisms in such a way. But in this case, at least, it seems that the constitutional structure of the government in Iceland was robust enough to fend off such efforts.

'Macri Gov't Claims President's Innocence in Panama Papers Leak'; on TeleSur; 5 April 2016.

Andrew Sparrow's 'What David Cameron did and didn't say about his father's offshore trust: The prime minister chose his response to reporter’s question about Blairmore Holdings very carefully – and he will probably get away with it'; in The Guardian; 5 April 2016.

Jon Henley's 'Iceland PM steps aside after protests over Panama Papers revelations: Sigmundur David Gunnlaugsson steps aside amid widespread anger over allegations his family attempted to hide millions in offshore account'; in The Guardian; 5 April 2016.

Institutional Corruption and Hypocrisy in Brazil

Politics in Brazil is mired by the corruption investigation into its current and its former President. Photograph: National Congress of Brazil from Pixabay (License) (Cropped)

The situation facing Brazil, where a corruption controversy threatens to pull apart an already divided country, there do not seem to be the same constitutional assurances to fall back on.

President Dima Rousseff, Vice President Temer and former President Lula all face impeachment over corruption charges (BBC, 2016). There is allegedly mounting evidence of kickbacks, deal-making and corruption in the billions and apparently trusted polls suggest two-thirds of the people support impeachment (Davies, 2016).

Yet the country is divided (Davies, 2016). Rousseff's party - the social democratic Workers Party, which under her and her predecessor's governance has introduced far reaching welfare programs to help the poorest - is largely supported by the working class, while the opposition protesters have been largely from the white middle classes.

Amongst the working class there seems to be genuine concern that the scandal is little more than an attempted coup (Weisbrot, 2016). That isn't helped by the fact that the opposition seem to have overstepped the mark, by politicising corruption probes with orders for police detentions and questioning, and the leaking of wire taps.

Middle class double standards have also been singled out (Davies, 2016). Less concern has been shown by Rousseff's opponents for the Swiss bank accounts and corruption allegations, shielded by the legal protections of Congressional office, that have been levelled at opposition politicians.

That hypocrisy exposes one of the most dangerous facets of widespread corruption. When everyone is dirty, within a system set up only to serve divisive interests, there can be nowhere to turn for help and little hope of bipartisan action that could both clean matters up and be a bridge to rebuild commonality and unity.

Wyre Davies' 'Brazil crisis: There may be bigger threats than Rousseff's removal'; on the BBC; 21 March 2016.

'Brazil Vice-President Michel Temer could face impeachment'; on the BBC; 5 April 2016.

Mark Weisbrot's 'Attempted Coup in Brazil Seeks to Reverse Election Results'; on TeleSur; 5 April 2016.

Barcelona Municipalism and the Cities of Europe

Barcelona En Comu's municipalism is getting an outing on the continental stage, as Europe's elected city administrations look for a voice in setting policy. Photograph: Barcelona from Pixabay (License) (Cropped)

Beneath the press coverage of the refugee crisis, there have been frantic discussions in Europe over how to address the large numbers of people fleeing to the continent. The primary mechanism has become a migrant-exchange deal with Turkey to facilitate deportation of migrants, out of Greece to Turkey (Connolly, 2016).

However, the refugees welcome campaign refuses to go away. On Tuesday, Mayors from a number of EU cities gathered to discuss ways of supporting refugees already in Europe. For Ada Colau, Mayor of Barcelona and face of the Podemos-affiliated and citizen-led Barcelona En Comu, the meeting represented a chance to show the merits of municipalism on the continental level and issue a call to action to shelter refugees.

And it would seem that the municipalist message is getting through. The EuroCities group, bringing together and giving a voice to the elected administrations of European cities, conducted a survey that suggested that, despite the role being played by cities in managing the refugee crisis, they distinctly lack a voice in setting policy (Bramley, 2016).

While there clearly wasn't unanimous agreement on the EU's refugee plan at the meeting, there was at least agreement that central governments were failing to allow enough discretion to cities over the control of funds that could be helping people now (Valero,2016).

Kate Connolly's 'EU-Turkey deal begins as Syrian refugees arrive in Germany and Finland: Three planes from Turkey, carrying a total of 43 people, land as part of migrant-exchange agreement'; in The Guardian; 4 April 2016.

Jorge Valero's 'Red Cross questions Turkey refugees deal'; on EurActiv; 5 April 2016.

Ellie Violet Bramley's 'Cities need more power to deal with refugee crisis: report - Refuge cities - Despite urban centres having to receive and integrate huge number of refugees, cities lack crucial input when it comes to policy, says a new European report'; in The Guardian, with the Rockefeller Foundation; 4 April 2016.

Citizen Government as a remedy for Corruption?

From individual to institutional corruption, it always poses a threat to good governance. And that is never more obvious than when poverty is spreading and budgets are tight - as less eyes are turned blind to those grafting something extra for themselves or their friends.

In the face of austerity and broad discontent with the political system, Spain's local governments have looked to the horizontal rather than the vertical for solutions - pooling resources, and working side by side, with other municipalities.

That message of devolution and citizen government, for municipalism, is a tonic for anyone needing to feel a reinvigorated belief in democratic government. Alone, it cannot do everything that is needed to chase out corruption. But what might municipalism achieve as a broad movement of democratic citizen-governments, in league, working together?

What can progressives learn from elections around the world?

Progressives have struggled in recent years to get their distinct narratives heard over the cry of populist nationalism. Photograph: Argentina Elections posters from 2013 by Beatrice Murch (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday there where general elections in two countries separated by eight thousand miles, including two half continents and an ocean. Yet they both told a similar story. In neither Argentina nor Poland was there a revival of the Centre-Left like that which brought Justin Trudeau to office in Canada.

In Argentina, the populist and nationalist Justicialist Party, of outgoing President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, had nearest competitors who were fiscal conservatives, ruling party dissenters, and small state neoliberal capitalists. In Poland, that contest was reversed, with the neoliberals in power and the populist nationalists as the main opposition.

In both cases, the populist and nationalist parties were victorious. For the Left, that serves as a stark reminder that there are many places where the progressive voice remains quiet in opposition to populist nationalism, or where centre-left collapsed during the seemingly global discrediting of social democracy and has yet to be rebuilt (Lawson, 2011; Guinan, 2013).

General elections in Argentina

In Argentina, President Kirchner had reached her term limit and so her successor Daniel Scioli was leading their populist coalition Frente para la Victoria (FpV, Front for Victory), dominated by their Peronist Justicialist Party (PJ, Partido Justicialista), into the election. Their main opposition was the broad centrist coalition Cambiemos (Let's Change), featuring Presidential candidate Mauricio Macri's Centre-Right Propuesta Republicana (PRO, Republican Proposal) and Centre-Left Union Civica Radical (UCR, Radical Civic Union). The third major group were the conservative UNA, Unidos por una Nueva Alternativa (United for a New Alternative), a dissenting faction of the ruling Justicialists.

In the Presidential primaries, Front for Victory took 38% of the vote, while Cambienos took 30% and the UNA took 20% (Hodari, 2015). FpV and Cambienos had 8 and 12 senate seats at stake, respectively (with the Radical Civic Union alone holding 7 of them), while the majority of the 130 lower house seats at stake were Justicialist, in total 84, with only 21 from Cambienos (again, the Radical Civic Union alone holding 13 of them).

These parties and coalitions went into an election with the national economy facing escalating inflation and stagnant wages, with a slow recovery from high unemployment on uncertain ground. The election was also mired in scandals, with fears of electoral fraud and intimidation, and somewhat unsettling outbursts from Scioli accusing social network users of plots to damage his image.

Observers had expressed exasperation at the impact of Peronist populism remaining strong, with its nationalists and crowd pleasing facets, for its obstruction of a much more serious debate (Lampa, 2015). Criticism was levelled at the parties only drawing vagaries between the centrist's Cambiemos' more neoliberal approach, toned down to fiscal responsibility, and the populist FpV's centralised state intervention.

The election itself produced a recognisable situation: a country divided multiple ways between several parties. In the Presidential election, there was no clear winner with FpV's Scioli and Cambiemos' Macri both claiming around 35%, with the UNA candidate Massa claiming 21%, which will have to be settled in a run-off in a month's time (Davies, 2015). In the Senate and the House of Representatives, the indications where that there would be more division, with FpV increasing its upper house seats but losing overall control of the lower house (Watts & Goni, 2015).

General elections in Poland

In Poland a similar situation had evolved where one essentially conservative party ruled with others as their primary opposition. Yet in Poland, the situation was slightly reversed. The ruling party where the neoliberal Civic Platform party and the opposition where the populist, nationalist, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration and anti-abortion  Law and Justice party (Nardelli, 2015).

Despite eight years in government and having steered the country through the economic crisis with relative calm, in comparison to other European countries, polling and a loss in the Presidential election in May showed that the Civic Platform party was losing support - falling from 39% at the last election to 25%. For progressives that would have been welcomed as part of the rising tide of support for the radical Left or the recovery of the Centre-Left.

Yet the Presidential election was won, not by the Left, but by the hard-Right Law and Justice party (The Guardian, 2015). That party took 30% at the last election but had risen in the polls to 36%. Meanwhile, efforts to assemble a United Left group to contest the election have only managed to gather around 9% in the polls.

When the exit polls where released, it became apparent that the shift from the Centre-Right to the hard-Right in Poland was in fact being undersold by polling data. Law and Justice were set to take 39% and enough seats to govern alone of the vote while their Centre-Right opponents had fallen even further to 24% (BBC, 2015).

Even more remarkable was that the exit polls suggested the complete failure of a parties of the Left to gain even a single seat. The United Left electoral alliance appear to have fallen short the 8% lower threshold (Cienski, 2015).

Progressives still haven't found their voice

In both countries, the full official results are still coming in. Yet what is clear is that elections in neither Argentina nor Poland have shown the strong progressive movements that the Left in other countries, like Canada and Portugal (Evans-Pritchard, 2015), have tapped into. The progressives parties that do play a prominent role, such as Argentina's Radical Civic Union, find themselves caught up in a politics polarised between conservative electoral factions that are split only over state intervention and whether they should pursue big state or small state conservatism.

Both elections serve as a stark reminder that the Left has still not found a convincing answer to popular nationalism. In the UK, Ed Miliband, under the influence of Blue Labour, simply tried to mimic it so as to steal it away from conservatives. Yet nationalism, and appeals to popular power, remain difficult subjects for the Left. Progressives are at once drawn to popular movements - to protests, marches and popular organisation - and critical of the dangers of suppression of the individual and irrationality inherent to them. The Left is also often seduced by the cohesion and commonality of national pride, even as it undermines internationalist humanitarian ideals.

If progressives are going to compete with and defeat conservatism - and the political divisions apparent across the world say it is very possible, whether it is popular, traditional or economic conservatism - they must build a convincing approach founded in co-operation and pluralism. Those are the characteristics by which the Left stands truly apart from the Right and progressives need to be brave in making the case for them, regardless of how much better nationalism may play with the crowd.