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Over a frantic night and day in Turkey an attempted coup looked at first to threaten the country's social fabric (Kingsley & Abdul-Ahad, 2016). Western leaders rushed to denounce undemocratic power grabs, calling for respect for Turkey's democratically elected government.
In hindsight, Western leaders may look back at that night as the starting point of an important shift in the balance of Middle East politics. A moment in which Turkey, under a popular authoritarian leader, stepped off of Europe's periphery to place itself instead at the centre of the Middle East.
The Coup of 15th July
Those behind the attempted coup announced their aim to be the protection of democracy and to reinstate "constitutional order, human rights and freedoms" (Beauchamp, 2016). Whatever the truth in this claim to legitimacy, its hard not to see what has followed the coup's defeat in that light. The harshness of the reaction that has followed is enough to make it seem like there were two, not one, attempted coups on 15th July, with one coming out victorious ahead of the other.
The government of Turkey, headed by President Recep Erdogan, swept away what turned out to be only a minor attempt by a small faction. But that was not where the reaction ended. A purge was under way almost immediately with arrests and expulsions in the thousands (BBC, 2016). Human Rights have been suppressed in a state of emergency (Shaheen & Bowcott, 2016). There has even been much criticised talk of bringing back the death penalty (Verhofstadt, 2016).
Erdogan's government swiftly claimed exiled former ally now opponent Fethullah Gulen to be the ring-leader demanding of the United States his extradition (BBC, 2016{2}). Gulen in turn suggested that the coup was a false flag operation, set up by Erdogan to justify his increasingly authoritarian stance and allowed for a witch hunt to follow (Fontanella-Khan, 2016; Plett Usher, 2016).
The US response to claims against Gulen, who lives in exile in Pennsylvania, has been unhurried and tempered. That seems only to antagonised the Erdogan government, which stepped up the rhetoric (Withnall & Osborne, 2016). Accusations flew that the West was harbouring terrorists and even that the West was supporting them.
In the last decade Turkey seemed to be heading ever more towards liberal democracy and membership of the European Union. Its future membership was a much discussed factor of the Brexit referendum. It was a key ally to both the EU and NATO. The steps taken in the last month suggest, sadly, that progress has been halted.
A Change of Step
Turkey has become a lesson in the fragility of liberal democracy. A symbol of how easily even a well settled constitutional order might be destabilised by economic and political tides, or even by the drive of ambition and grip of authoritarianism.
Recep Erdogan's Presidency had already seen the free press suppressed long before the coup (Shaheen, 2016) and was thought to be working towards changing the country's political system into a strong executive presidency (Finkel, 2016).
Whatever the purpose behind the attempted coup, and however the ramshackle attempt on power came about, it seems to have triggered - or afforded an opportunity for - Erdogan's party to clean house of political and intellectual opposition, inflaming Turkey and accelerating its embrace of popular authoritarianism (Tugal, 2016).
As power is centralised and the opposition suppressed, it is worth asking: What is it that Erdogan's party wants?
Even with stronger opposition at the last election, Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) won decisively - AKP took 50% of the vote, ahead of Secular Republican and Kurdish Nationalist opposition. It doesn't seem like the party has much trouble staying in power under constitutional and democratic conditions.
And Erdogan himself was Prime Minister for eleven years, before his subsequent election as President in 2014 - for a total of thirteen years at the peak of Turkish politics. During that time Erdogan and the AKP were thought to be prioritising ascension to the European Union as the country's primary objective.
Yet the party is also propelled by other ideas. A party of conservative democracy, and now increasingly a party of popular authoritarianism, Erdogan's AKP seek to create a 'New Turkey', based on a revival of cultural and traditional values from the Ottoman Empire and the rejection of pro-western modernisation (Cagaptay, 2016) - symbolised in three pillars of glorification of the Ottoman Empire, suspicion of the West and anti-Kemalism, that opposes the constitutional secularism of Kemal Ataturk, founder of the Turkish Republic.
Upon those pillars, Erdogan has strengthened central authority in Turkey even as chaos rages at the border - and pours over onto Turkish streets - with at the least Iraq, Syria and Lebanon engulfed in violence.
From Weakness, Opportunity
The strengthening of central authority in Turkey stands in stark contrast with its European neighbour. The crisis in the Middle East, the desperate mass of refugees - fleeing death at the hands of a paramilitary cult of mercenary terrorists - have exposed the weakness of the European federal project. European unity has been tested on foreign affairs, on refugees, and found wanting.
In Europe's weakness Erdogan may see the opportunity to implement his vision of Turkey. Erdogan certainly has the backing for such a move, stoked by resentment of Western interference. A deep ill-will towards the Western mandated break-up of Turkish power in the region a century ago and has long been a theme.
Seeing the region as it is now, mired by the fallout of a Western intervention that left a power vacuum - which was occupied by a terrorist cult that has even struck on Turkish streets - could easily seem like confirmation or justification of Pro-Ottoman, anti-Western sentiments. It certainly makes it easy to see why a change of policy, away from the periphery of the West to the central power of the Middle East, might seem to Erdogan like an opportunity.
With neighbours both East and West seemingly paralysed with crisis, a political vacuum has opened. It isn't a leap to imagine a popular authoritarian leader, espousing an Ottoman Revival, wants to pivot his country into the central role in the region, at a time when planning for the foundations of its future have to be at least starting.
References
Patrick Kingsley & Ghaith Abdul-Ahad's 'Military coup under way in Turkey as President Erdogan tries to assert control: Government says only a faction attempted coup and president is still in charge'; in The Guardian; 16 July 2016.
Zack Beauchamp's 'Turkey’s coup, explained in under 500 words'; on the Vox; 15 July 2016.
'Turkey coup arrests hit 6,000 as Erdogan roots out 'virus''; on the BBC; 17 July 2016.
Kareem Shaheen & Owen Bowcott's 'Turkey suspends European convention on human rights in wake of failed coup: Officials insist six-month state of emergency following coup attempt will not affect lives and freedoms of citizens'; in The Guardian; 21 July 2016.
Guy Verhofstadt's 'Verhofstadt: "Death penalty will only lead to an end of the talks with Turkey" - Guy Verhofstadt, leader of the Liberals and Democrats in the European Parliament, comments on the recent developments in Turkey'; from Alliance of Liberals Democrats for Europe (ALDE); 18 July 2016.
'Turkey coup: What is Gulen movement and what does it want?'; on the BBC; 21 July 2016{2}.
Amana Fontanella-Khan's 'Fethullah Gulen: Turkey coup may have been 'staged' by Erdogan regime - Cleric speaks to reporters including Guardian at Pennsylvania compound. Kerry: Turkey should present ‘evidence’ to back any extradition request'; in The Guardian; 16 July 2016.
Barbara Plett Usher's 'Turkey crisis: Cleric Gulen condemns post-coup 'witch-hunt''; on the BBC; 19 June 2016.
Adam Withnall & Samuel Osborne's 'Erdogan blames 'foreign powers' for coup and says West is supporting terrorism: President says in TV address that coup 'scenario was written outside of Turkey''; in The Independent; 2 August 2016.
Kareem Shaheen's 'Turkish journalists accuse Erdogan of media witch-hunt: Reporters say the government is pursuing one of the worst crackdowns on press freedoms since the military junta in 1980s'; in The Guardian; 2 May 2016.
Andrew Finkel's 'Turkey was already undergoing a slow-motion coup – by Erdogan, not the army: For the last three years, the Turkish president has been methodically moving to take over the nodes of power'; in The Guardian; 16 July 2016.
Cihan Tugal's 'Turkey coup aftermath: between neo-fascism and Bonapartism - Predictions about the consequences of Turkey's failed coup focus on how it fulfils Erdogan's desire for an omnipotent presidency. But the danger that awaits is much greater than that'; on Open Democracy; 18 July 2016.
Soner Cagaptay's 'Where Does Erdogan Want to Take Turkey?'; from The Washington Institute; 15 June 2016.
'Resentment over Sykes-Picot deal still driving Turkish foreign policy'; in The Japan Times; 15 May 2016.
David Shariatmadari's 'Middle East turmoil is fuelling Ottoman nostalgia. But it's a dead end: For the empire's successor states, romanticising political union is a mistake – they need to guarantee the rights of minorities'; in The Guardian; 6 October 2013.
Nicola Nasser's 'Syria, Egypt Reveal Erdogan’s Hidden "Neo-Ottoman Agenda"'; from Global Research, Centre for Research on Globalisation; 20 November 2013.
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