German Elections: Angela Merkel will be the stern, bleak but sturdy breakwater people accept amidst interminable turmoil

Photograph: Angela Merkel in 2012 from the European People's Party (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, Angela Merkel leads her party to the polls looking to secure a fourth term as Chancellor of Germany. The polls suggest that she is on course to do it.

Despite her SPD rivals taking a poll lead for the first time in six years in February, Merkel's CDU now hold a fifteen point lead. But for all the hype, she is a problematic figure for progressives.

This certainly hasn't stopped her ascent. Merkel has arguably reached the apex of her political career, in the eyes of many even taking up the mantle of the leader of the free world (courtesy in part to the abdication of that role by a certain President of the United States).

Yet if Angela Merkel's way is the medicine for instability in Europe, then it is a bitter pill for progressives. Reform has been slow under CDU governments.

Merkel was late, and reluctant, to support a vote on equal marriage. While she conceded in allowing a vote to take place, she still voted against equality - a contest that she did however lose.

And though fiscal rectitude at home has steered away from slashing taxes in pursuit of debt reduction, for pro-European progressives Merkel's way is a doubled-edged sword.

While she is held as a key pillar in keeping the European Union standing, the rise of Merkel has coincided with the decline of Social Europe - in fact wolfgang schauble, her finance minister, has been the arch-enforcer of the austerity agenda that has Greece locked in a debt-spiral and the stern opponent of leniency.

The decline of a Social Europe, with a tendency toward long-termism and cooperation, has run opposite to growing instability, growing disatisfaction with globalisation and a wedge being driven between Northern and Southern Europe - typified in Greece.

Much of that decline and these growing problems have happened under the influence of conservative parties like the CDU hiding behind the symbols and offices of the EU to project their agendas.

Yet Merkel remains above these potential controversies. Caution leads her to an inoffensive and vague centre, where easy platitudes reign and moves are made only gradually - and only when the wind is firmly seen to be blowing in a decisive direction.

That tendency can be seen in the dramatic transition for Merkel in the last few years from a cold response to a frightened young child whose family faced deportation, to the embrace of refugees - opening the doors to relieve the pressure on Southern Europe.

A turn that, with substantial political consequence, has garnered fresh respect among younger voters. Through such means have Merkel and the CDU, conservative Christian Democrats, kept just ahead of the curve.

The Election

After seven years of government by the SPD and Gerhard Schroeder came to an end in 2002, there began a widening of the groups that won representation in the Bundestag, with the share of the vote for the biggest parties falling.

The 2013 election seemed to break that trend. The falling vote share of the big two reversed and party representation dropped from to four. The CDU established for themselves a commanding place - largely at the expense of their former coalition partners, the FDP.

However, 2017 seems likely to render 2013 just a blip in a larger trend. Polling suggests the two main parties will lose ground again and as many as six parties will win seats in the Bundestag for the first time since the 1950s.

The remarkable thing is that the CDU has over time proved itself far more resilient than the SPD to this fragmentation of the vote. More remarkable still is that in this election it will be young people who keep Merkel's conservative party in power. Their support has been critical in several recent regional elections.

The Oppostion

At the head of Merkel's opposition is Sigmar Gabriel and the SPD, the Social Democrats who have for the passed four years been her coalition partners in a grand coalition between the two main parties of German politics.

At times in the last few years, particularly back in February, Gabriel and the SPD would have been forgiven for thinking their opportunity had come to return to office as the senior party. Yet the lull in support for the CDU in February did not last.

Once again, the SPD will instead enter an election looking to stem the flow of support away to third parties - a pattern seen not just in Germany but across Europe where Social Democrats have struggled to find a narrative for the times.

This election will also likely see the return to the Bundestag of Merkel's former coalition partners the FDP - her free market liberal allies whose decline prompted her to warn the Coalition partners in Britain of the likely affect of such an arrangement on the Liberal Democrats' fortunes.

The FDP have slowly recovered across regional elections since they fell below the seat threshold in 2013 and are back up to 9% in the polls. Under Germany's proportional system that could deliver around 60 seats and could mean the return of a CDU-FDP government.

For the Left, influence in the next legislative term will depend on polls translating to seats for Die Linke (The Left) and Die Grune (The Greens), one democratic socialist, the other environmentally conscious and concerned about finding a sustainable future.

The strength of the big two, and especially their grand coalition of the passed four years, tends to freeze them out of federal politics. But both parties put pressure of the SPD to move Leftwards and away from the CDU and the far-right AfD - who threaten the SPD base in much the same way as UKIP have threatened Labour in Britain.

It is perhaps testament to the centrist positioning that Merkel pursues, that there is talk that her administration may even turn to the Greens as a possible coalition partner after Sunday - with her decision to begin a nuclear phase out as a statement of credentials.

A Bitter Pill

Amidst the turmoil - the returned spectre of nuclear war, regional wars and the resultant refugee crisis, fundamentalist terrorism, the slide into authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, the return of Nationalism to the West - Angela Merkel is, understandably, seen as a fixed point.

A stable, constant, and reassuring presence. There will not be many voices that cry out loudly against the result, if she is reelected to office. It will be seen as inevitable. But there is something bitter in the triumph of conservatism amidst neverending crisis.

What the progressive heart cries out for is something, for Germany and for Europe, that can roll back the darkness. What they will accept for now is the stern, bleak but sturdy breakwater.

The Alternative Year: Five stories that defined UK & European politics in 2015

To round out a very eventful year in European politics, here's a review of the big stories - as covered here on The Alternative. We'll be back in January 2016 with more articles that look behind the political curtain to put policies in their proper contexts, to lay bare the ideologies and the theories, and to try and find the progressive alternatives.

The Radical Left Breakthrough

Alexis Tsipras and Syriza's offer of a united social front saw the first major breakthrough for the Radical Left. Photograph: Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ-ΕΚΜ για την παραγωγική ανασυγκρότηση της Θράκης by Joanna (License) (Cropped)

In January, candidates of the anti-austerity, Radical Left party Syriza were elected to 149 of 300 seats in the Parliament of Greece in a huge upset. Having made clear their opposition to the economic establishment, party leader and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, along with Finance Minister and Economist Yanis Varoufakis, provided a further shock by proceeding to sit down and negotiate bailout deals with the much despised troika - the IMF, the European Bank and the European Commission. Their choice raised big questions about the value of working within the European system in order to reform it.

It wouldn't be the Syriza leader's only decision to raise a few eyebrows. In the Summer, as the crisis in Greece grew worse and negotiations came to a head, Tsipras announced a referendum on whether to accept the austerity-imposing bailout terms that Greece had been offered. In a comprehensive turnout, the people of Greece voted No. Tsipras then agreed to the terms of the deal anyway. That decision has been interpreted a number of ways - some not particularly kindly - but the most positive interpretations might be that it was intended as a powerful show of dissent in the act of accepting coerced conformity.

Yet Tsipras wasn't finished. Accepting the deal and passing it through Parliament led to a rebellion, and breakaway, by Syriza's Left faction, leaving the party's position perilous. So the Greek PM stunned the world again by resigning and calling an election, looking for a mandate to implement the deal he had negotiated. Despite opposition, he swept back into office with 149 of 300 seats once more, but this time with a more compact party, shorn of its rebellious elements. However, the Syriza leader's pragmatic approach has drawn criticism - particularly for his repeated use of popular votes on major issues.

With two elections and a referendum, in all of which he was victorious, its hard to believe that all of this has only been Alexis Tsipras first year as Prime Minister. It wouldn't be a surprise if he, and the citizens of Greece, would like his second to at least begin a little less eventful.

'Syriza's negotiation with European Leaders is a reminder that we need to take Europe back, not abandon it'; in The Alternative; 16 February 2015.

'The referendum in Greece is asking a deeper question about dissent: do we have to conform in order to belong?'; in The Alternative; 5 July 2015.

'Tsipras' repeat use of popular votes raises questions about radical democracy and his approach of 'pragmatic radicalism''; in The Alternative; 24 August 2015.

'Tsipras has his governing mandate, but weariness and disaffection dominate the mood and demand a positive response'; in The Alternative; 21 September 2015.

The Bad Night for Progressives

Ed Miliband gives his first keynote speech to Labour Party conference as leader, in September 2010. He would contest just one election as leader. Photograph: At Labour Party Conference in Manchester (License) (Cropped)

Spring brought the UK general election campaign, which was heralded as the build up to the closest election in modern UK history. Labour and the Conservatives were tough to separate on most issues, although that didn't stop the Liberal Democrats from taking the inexplicable decision to pitch themselves as the party of equidistance between them. Early polling and debates suggested it might be a strong showing for the Left in terms of the popular vote. Yet concerns remained about how the first-past-the-post system might distort the result.

The reality on the day was a nightmare for progressives. The polls had been way off. The Labour Party failed to make up any ground, losing dozens of seats to the SNP in Scotland. The Liberal Democrats collapsed to just eight seats, losing stalwart MPs like Charles Kennedy, Vince Cable and Simon Hughes and important former Ministers like Lynne Featherstone and Jo Swinson. Nor did the Greens didn't manage to make their big breakthrough. And, above all, the Conservatives picked up the advantage in every key constituency in England.

Especially after the polls had suggested a close contest, the emergence of a Conservative majority was traumatising. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrat leaders resigned. The resulting Labour leadership was to produce one of the more surprising stories of the year - from which the party has still not resettled.

'Election 2015: A Shorthand Guide to the 2015 UK General Election'; in The Alternative; 6 April 2015.

'Election 2015: Seven-way debate sees the Left outnumber the Right to talk about ideals, fairness and being open to the world'; in The Alternative; 2 April 2015.

'Election 2015: The BBC's opposition leaders debate sees Farage cornered by the Left and lash out at the audience'; in The Alternative; 16 April 2015.

'Election 2015: A bad night for progressives. What now for the Left?'; in The Alternative; 8 May 2015.

The Conservative Assault on Human Rights

Lady Justice standing atop the Old Bailey courthouse in central London.

No sooner had David Cameron moved back into 10 Downing Street, than the Conservative Government had begun to come under fire - even from members of their own party. Campaign groups and MPs alike were incensed by proposals from the Conservative government to reintroduce illiberal policies, previously blocked by Liberal Democrats under the Coalition.

With, plans to do away with the Human Rights Act where soon joined by plans to reintroduce the Snooper's Charter there were people already announcing how much they missed the influence of the Lib Dems. But the Conservatives where far from done. In the midst of the refugee crisis, where local communities where pulling together with an internationalist and humanitarian spirit to support those driven from their homes, the Prime Minister David Cameron was criticised for using dangerous and dehumanising language to refer to refugees.

The lack of respect for human rights, combined with domestic policies that pursued further austerity and slashed into fundamental parts of the welfare state, designed to provide the most basic humanitarian support, earned Cameron's ministry the ire of the opposition. However, Britain's unrepresentative voting system had awarded his party a majority and the opposition to his government was weak, divided and scattered. The question became: how would popular discontent express itself?

'Scrapping the Human Rights Act removes the safeguards that protect individuals from the arbitrary power of the state'; in The Alternative; 14 May 2015.

'Conservative Queen's Speech offers some relief to Human Rights campaigners, but also holds new threats to civil liberties'; in The Alternative; 27 May 2015.

'Local and provincial communities are showing the chief internationalist value of empathy in the face of the refugee crisis'; in The Alternative; 13 July 2015.

'Humanitarian government is under attack and progressive opposition can no longer afford to be weak, scattered and resigned'; in The Alternative; 27 August 2015.

The Corbyn Momentum

The new Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn addresses a thousand people in Manchester Cathedral, while several thousand more assemble outside. The speech capped a weekend of protest outside the Tory Party Conference.

Jeremy Corbyn entered the Labour leadership race as the complete outsider, pushed forward to at least give a token place in the debate to the party's Left-wing faction. What the Labour Party establishment did not count on was a huge groundswell of popular support for the 66 year old Islington MP. Membership of the party increased drastically as Corbyn's campaign gained traction, with Left-wingers old and new returned to the Labour Party after years in the wilderness. Even so, it was still thought that the Right-leaning establishment would still have the final word. But Corbyn's momentum couldn't be halted.

The final result was a landslide victory for Jeremy Corbyn, in every voter category. However, it appeared that winning the leadership would be the easy bit. Corbyn came under attack from the beginning, on everything from whether he bows sufficiently to whether he sings the national anthem. Even his own party has been restless, with the MPs in Labour's Parliamentary Party feeling rebellious under what they believed to be a disastrous Left-wing leader they felt had been forced upon them by the membership, the trade unions and constituency organisations.

At a long weekend in Manchester, in parallel with the Tory Party Conference, the energy that Corbyn's election had injected into the Left was tangible. A rally in the sunshine at Castlefields Arena, at the end of a weekend of concerts, talks and marches - drawing figures from across the anti-austerity movement - was the peak. But the weekend has one more moment to offer. At Manchester Cathedral, trade union leaders and progressive voices spoke to a packed house. But they where only the warm up act.

Ten thousand people, a thousand of them crammed inside with the rest gathered about an impromptu stage outside, had gathered to hear Jeremy Corbyn speak. Regardless where your progressive sympathies lie, it is hard not to be enthused about so large a spontaneous audience gathering to listen to a mild mannered figure call for a politics with a renewed social conscience.

'Corbyn has brought idealism to the campaign, but needs to show how public ownership can further the pursuit of a just, inclusive and power-devolving society'; in The Alternative; 6 August 2015.

'Jeremy Corbyn wins the Labour leadership election in a revolution of party members overthrowing the party establishment'; in The Alternative; 12 September 2015.

'Anti-austerity 'Take Back Manchester' event tries to prove that the Left is back in fashion'; in The Alternative; 5 October 2015.

'"We don't pass by" - Jeremy Corbyn lays foundations for compassionate narrative based on renewing belief in public service'; in The Alternative; 6 October 2015.

The Autumn Election Season

Justin Trudeau led the Liberals back from their worst ever result to a upset landslide majority. Photograph: Toronto Centre Campaign Office Opening with Chrystia Freeland and Justin Trudeau by Joseph Morris (License) (Cropped)

Elections on either side of the Atlantic in the Autumn served to highlight some differences in the political mood. In Canada, Justin Trudeau's Liberals won out in a multi-party contest between three moderate parties. Meanwhile in Argentina, a broad centrist coalition led by neoliberal Mauricio Macri replaced outgoing President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's Peronist, popular nationalist, Justicialist Party.

By contrast, populist and Far-Right parties had sprung up once more in Europe. In Poland, the Left was swept away and even progressive liberalism was struggling under a Right-wing, conservative tide. Further elections in France and Spain confirmed that, in Europe, the political mainstream was suffering a substantial decline. In France, the establishment managed hold off Front National through tactical voting, while in Spain the more proportional voting system allowed for a plural, indecisive, multi-party result - bringing Spain's two-party system to an end and which may prove difficult terrain from which to create a government.

What, at least, did seem to be confirmed on both sides of the Atlantic was the weakness of two-party systems and their distorting effect upon pluralistic societies. In Canada, Trudeau's party won a majority in a shift that only seemed to take place in the final week, as either/or decisions forced voters to choose between worst case scenarios.

Above all, however, these elections all made clear just how much work is necessary to build a progressive politics and just how easily popular conservatism can tear it all down. In France particularly - where the established parties looked weak and discredited - the danger of failing to engage, educate and inspire people with progressive ideals, to build a progressive civic space with a bridge to humanitarian institutions, was brought into sharp focus. 'Winning' on a technical level alone isn't enough.

'Shift in Canadian federal election from three party race to two party polemic shows importance of electoral reform in ensuring a truly representative politics'; in The Alternative; 19 October 2015.

'What can progressives learn from elections around the world?'; in The Alternative; 26 October 2015.

'When the Centre is discredited only the Right benefits - the Left has no shortcuts, it has to build and engage to move forward'; in The Alternative; 13 December 2015.

'The 'new politics' is being put to the test in Spain, where Podemos hopes to show that Syriza was not an anomaly'; in The Alternative; 20 December 2015.

The Lessons for 2016

For progressives, despite a lot of setbacks, there were at least some positives to take from 2015. The unexpected landslide majority for Justin Trudeau's Liberal Party in Canada. The surprising popular successes of radical democrats like Jeremy Corbyn, Alexis Tsipras and Syriza, Pablo Iglesias and Podemos. The little, flickering, light of hope amongst all of the conservatism is that, liberals and democrats alike, have begun to find ways to reach out to the public, to connect with them and to get them engaged with the idea that there are progressive alternatives and that people do have the power to make them happen.

Tsipras has his governing mandate, but weariness and disaffection dominate the mood and demand a positive response

Alexis Tsipras has been returned to power in Greece. Photograph: Alexis Tsipras - Caricature, by Donkey Hotey (License) (Cropped)

Once again, reality has made a fool of the polls. Against all of the indications pointing to a tight and inconclusive contest, Alexis Tsipras and Syriza have once again secured the position as the largest party at the elections in Greece (Smith & Wearden, 2015).

For Syriza though, it won't be all smiles and celebrations. The election also showed the clear limits of Tsipras' style of popular radical democracy. Voter turnout has waned drastically, with people worn thin by crisis after crisis and exhausted by Victory or Death stand-offs with creditors.

Alexis Tsipras resignation, back in August, was a gambit that triggered an election, with the purpose of shoring up his parliamentary support (Smith, 2015) - and possibly in acknowledgement of public weariness. His party's numbers in parliament had been irreparably dented by the rebellion of the Left Platform faction over the signing, by the Syriza leader, of the bailout terms negotiated with the European Union (Henley & Traynor, 2015).

In the run up to the election, the power of Tsipras' populist approach and personal appeal, for which Tsipras has been criticised (Patrikarakos, 2015), appeared to be on the wane (Smith, 2015{2}) - in line with the general disaffection. Yet on election day, Tsipras and Syriza proved resilient. In that sense, his gambit was successful.

Victory gives to Tsipras the task of building a majority coalition. At one stage, Syriza's falling popularity made it necessary to float the possibility of a coalition with Pasok and To Potami - the establishment social democratic and social liberal parties, respectively - in a centre-left and pro-European alliance (Ruparel, 2015).

In the end, though, the scale of the victory matched that of January and will allow Tsipras to rebuild his coalition with ANEL (BBC, 2015). But this time, he will be able do so without the most rebellious of the factions within his own party. That group, the Left Platform, had split away to form up under their own banner as Popular Unity. They stood against Syriza in the election, only to lose every single one of their seats, falling beneath the parliamentary representation threshold (Nardelli, 2015).

Few of Syriza's other opponents fared much better (Malkoutzis, 2015). New Democracy, under their acting leader Vangelis Meimarakis, could not, in the end, close the gap to Syriza and finished over seven points adrift. No other party managed to collect more than 7% of the vote. When it came down to it, it did not seem to be that Tsipras had triumphed, so much as he had found himself as the last man standing.

Being the only credible option left has given the Syriza leader a strong position that he will need, as the task facing the victor doesn't offer much in the way of joy (Elliott, 2015). The second term Prime Minister now has implement the austerian conditions of the bailout agreement and, importantly, negotiate for debt relief - without which the country will plunge back into chaos.

Tsipras will also need his strong parliamentary position because the biggest winner of the night was not Syriza. With voter turnout down to just 56%, the mood in Greece is now clearly dominated by disaffection and weariness. Despite his emphatic victory, Tsipras will have to lead his Syriza government without the kind of popular public mandate he had enjoyed for the first half of 2015.

Until now, Tsipras has tried to follow a radical democratic course in which he aimed, it seemed, to use the popular mobilisation of the people as a powerful political bargaining chip. Yet Syriza's victories with this strategy were limited and, in the case of the OXI referendum vote, became little more than a pyrrhic demonstration of dissent in the act of compliance.

With the people clearly tired from the strain of the crisis and weary and frustrated by pyrrhic acts of dissent and defiance, Tsipras and Syriza - at least for the moment -  have exhausted their popular political capital. That fatigue will limit the hands that Tsipras will be able to play in his game of political poker with the European austerian establishment.

Tsipras idea of radicalism has long been about popular power (from Horvat, 2013).

"I believe that today 'radical' is to try to be able to take responsibility for the people, to not be afraid of that, and at the same time to maintain in the democratic road, in the democratic way. To take the power for the people and to give it back to the people."

He and his party must now, because the people are tired, instead show that they can use parliamentary power - and they must use it to restore the people's belief. Their disaffection and weariness need to be healed with hope and opportunity, because, in the long run, a political crisis can be as dangerous to Greece as the economic crisis that currently engulfs it.

As the dissenting economist Yanis Varoufakis has made clear (Varoufakis, 2015; Luis Martin, 2015), the collapse of the mainstream systems into crisis does not, and has never, benefited a rational and progressive Left. Crisis breeds fear and fear feeds narrow and extreme responses.

Tsipras has his mandate, but the big challenge is still ahead. He must rebuild the economy and visibly tackle the old corrupt establishments, both in Greece and in Europe. And he must, above all, find a way to show people in Greece and Europe a positive and reforming way forward.

Tsipras' repeat use of popular votes raises questions about radical democracy and his approach of 'pragmatic radicalism'

Alexis Tsipras' radical united social front faces a challenge as breakaways found Popular Unity party ahead of September election. Photograph: Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ-ΕΚΜ για την παραγωγική ανασυγκρότηση της Θράκης by Joanna (License) (Cropped)

Alexis Tsipras, Prime Minister of Greece, has resigned. Having succeeded in steering a new bailout agreement through the Eurozone and then through the Greek Parliament, Tsipras has taken the decision to resign and submit his work to the electorate for their judgement (Henley, 2015).

The decision has been seen as either a canny political gamble (Smith, 2015), albeit one with good odds of paying off, or as the latest in a line of dangerous political games that exploit the system (Patrikarakos, 2015). There is, however, an alternative explanation.

From very early on, Alexis Tsipras has been clear as to what he thought was meant by being 'radical' (from Horvat, 2013).

"I believe that today 'radical' is to try to be able to take responsibility for the people, to not be afraid of that, and at the same time to maintain in the democratic road, in the democratic way. To take the power for the people and to give it back to the people."

By that barometer, what Tsipras has done is entirely consistent. His radical democratic vision is a difference of method. Compete at elections and win power, of course. But to then reform and change that power, or through the party give access to that power, to the wider public - rather than allowing them to be alienated from it by their own representatives (Gourgouris, 2013).

Radical democracy of this kind requires action. It requires a radical to engage with political games and try to win. To that end, Tsipras and Syriza did something quite remarkable: they brought together in a single party - at first a coalition, an electoral alliance - for however short a time, a broad progressive group that included communists, socialists, radicals, social democrats and even centrists.

While for many, radicalism has been epitomised best by Yanis Varoufakis' symbolic opposition to austerity and the European austerian establishment order, Tsipras' radicalism is not about the particular policies that come out of the process. The Syriza leader's version is a radicalism of methods not necessarily of ends - an assessment that has led to the unsurprising detachment of Syriza's Left-wing in advance of the autumn elections (Henley et al, 2015).

This has been particularly obvious in how Tsipras and Syriza has often had to be pragmatic about the kind of changes they can actually make (White, 2015) and begrudging, even defiant, in their compliance when forced to accept the implementation of policies with which they do not agree (Gourgouris, 2015).

The idea of radical leaders who take moderate positions and try to reform from within the system, accepting to an extent its challenges and constraints, is not a unique situation (Frankel, 2015) - Lula in Brazil, Mitterand in France, and others, have all made such attempts. But Tsipras' version brings the people along as an active participant.

In that light, Tsipras' surprise use of a referendum during bailout negotiations (Traynor, 2015), maybe should not have been so surprising. Its seemingly confusing message might then be seen as asking the people for a judgement on him and for their endorsement of his approach: a show of dissent in the act of compliance. With this coming election, Tsipras again turns to the people according to his method of keeping them engaged with the business of government.

Tsipras' version of radical democracy could in fact be called 'pragmatic radicalism'. It aims to end the alienation of the people from the business of government, not just to achieve this or that policy. Doing so requires pragmatic leaders, willing to wade into public affairs on behalf of the people, who can be realistic and accept the practical limitations of what can be achieved in that sphere - relying instead on what might be achieved in the future by having the people as an active and vigilant partner.

This alternative viewpoint comes, however, with a few words of caution.

A leader falling prey to their own popularity, or of seeing the opportunity to exploit it, is always a risk. Yanis Varoufakis, Tsipras' former right-hand, has already suggested that Tsipras is turning into a figure like France's former President Mitterand (Anthony, 2015), who led Parti Socialiste to power on a Left-wing Keynesian platform, only to, ultimately, conform to the pressures of the European economic order (Birch, 2015). There is also a fine line in democratic politics between involving the people in the form of popular rule, and in using their support, ostensibly for a personality, to strong arm the political system.

Understanding the difference will have become a crucial issue by the time Yanis Varoufakis and Pablo Iglesias, leader of Podemos, meet for a conversation hosted by The Guardian in October. By then, Tsipras will have presumably won a resounding endorsement for Syriza from the people of Greece, Jeremy Corbyn will have been elected to the Labour party leadership, and Iglesias will be on the verge of leading Podemos into December's Spanish general election.

A new Left-wing politics will be taking its first steps into the sun. When it does, it needs to be in possession of positive lessons derived from serious critique of popular radical democracy. That means understanding what keeps people engaged with the decision making that affects their lives, and, how radical parties can reform the system to empower these people in their day to day lives. But it also means being aware of the danger of potentially falling into simplistic, even personal, popularity contests.

Local and provincial communities are showing the chief internationalist value of empathy in the face of the refugee crisis

The Greek Island of Lesbos, where locals have voluntarily rescued and cared for refugees. Photograph: Mytilene, Lesvos Island by Anna Apostolidou (License) (Cropped)

The past decade has seen the rise of two forms of nationalism in Europe. One is a vaguely Left-leaning provincial separatism and the other is a Right-wing nation-state sovereigntism. Both of them have found support expressed both at elections and in popular protest.

For internationalists, who have struggled for fifty years to open up Europe and break down its borders, the return of nationalism - of any stripe - has been seen, and treated, as a threat. In that mindset, no differentiation has been made between these different kinds of nationalism.

This isn't particularly surprising. To an internationalist, a return to nationalism represents a retreat into a closed-minded, closed society. The fear is that such a closed state would only further the alienation of people from others living elsewhere in Europe and so result in a substantial decrease in common understanding and empathy.

In light of the Eurozone's imperious attitude towards Syriza and Greece, it isn't hard to see why internationalism has struggled to make its case. The European Union, the great internationalist project, has been hijacked by national conservatism as a means to spread and enforce its social and economic beliefs. But, more than any other factor, it is migration that has exposed the tensions that Right-wing nationalism feeds upon: the fear of the other, the anxiety of difference.

Those anxieties have found particular expression in the UK, where the Foreign Secretary and even the Prime Minister have made dangerous and dehumanising references to migrants - humans travelling to escape poverty and war - as 'marauding' 'swarms' (Perraudin, 2015; Elgot & Taylor, 2015). It is the pinnacle of internationalist fears that people who are safe in settled stable societies, though scared and rattled by an ongoing financial slump, could show such a lack of empathy for the plight of those whose lives and homes are torn apart by violence, terrorism, war and poverty.

From refugees to migrant workers, exploited for everything from farming to prostitution (Lawrence, 2015; Harper, 2015), there is a painful tendency to blame these victims rather than those exploiting their desperation.

In the UK, part of that comes in a gross overstatement of the scale of the 'threat' posed by migration. Contrary to the opinion of UK Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond, the overwhelming majority of migrants are not 'economic', but refugees fleeing from dangerous situations (Kingsley, 2015).

With a continental population of 750 million, and a European Union population of 500 million, it is unsurprising that a United Nations expert - Francois Crepeau, UN special rapporteur on the humans rights of migrants - believes it would be not only feasible but practical and desirable to offer resettlement of one million Syrian refugees, across the continent, over a period of five years (Jackson, 2015; Jackson, 2015{2}), as a way to end the present humanitarian catastrophe.

However, his recommendations seem as if they'll fall on deaf ears as national governments, retreating deep into sovereigntist nationalism in the face of the financial crisis, aggressively reaffirm national borders and national control over decision-making.

And yet, even as governments, like that of Greece, have struggled under the weight of debt and austerity and have been stretched to breaking in managing the refugee crisis (Kingsley & Henley, 2015), or have turned inwards to exploit anger and mistrust, there are still beacons of hope for those who champion commonality beyond borders.

Where governments are failing, volunteers, local activists and communities have taken up the responsibility. On Greek islands, even in the midst of their own crisis, locals have saved refugees from their stranded boats, taken them in, fed them and provided them with supplies and shelter (Kingsley, 2015{2}; McVeigh, 2015).

In such actions, in their wilful choice of empathy in defiance of the establishment, there is hope for internationalism. What there is for the internationalists still to see, however, is how to comprehend that this empathy, this pursuit of self-determination and anti-establishment opposition to hegemony, has also been at the root of the Left-leaning separatist 'nationalism'.

These ideals are what have differentiated the Left-leaning separatism from the Right-leaning sovereigntist nationalism. The open, reformist, pro-European attitudes, so deeply connected to internationalism, can be seen in the motivations of voters electing separatists - particularly in Scotland where the SNP want to break away from the UK, which is itself rapidly turning inwards, in order to remain an integrated part of a wider Europe.

That pattern has been repeated from Catalunya to Greece to the Green Party in the UK, where Caroline Lucas had called for reform of the old establishment - nationally and continentally - in pursuit of Europe's founding principles of co-ordination, co-operation and solidarity (Lucas, 2015).

The current crisis has internationalists, like the Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron, calling for more compassion and more positive action to alleviate suffering during this crisis (Leftly, 2015).

But in order to address the crisis in full, the difference between nationalists, retreating in fear to the shelter of the old institutions, and the separatists who want self-determination, reform and progress, has to be comprehended. In the one, nationalism, is national, social and fiscal conservatism that is driving a wedge between people. In the other, separatism, there are radical and democratic ideas to which internationalists are instinctively drawn.

To build a comprehensive movement that supports internationalism and human rights, across borders, with a broad empathy, means understanding all of the different strains of local, provincial and international activism that are so closely interlinked in their values. With such an alliance, in the spirit of the solidarity that has been seen in the anti-austerity movement, the compassionate empathy of Greek Islanders could be turned into a general, political and even economic campaign for human dignity and the common good.

Crisis after crisis from Greece to Calais and the Mediterranean have dented the Left's belief in a European future - but they show internationalism is needed more than ever

The agreement between Greece and its European creditors has sent ripples spreading outwards across the continent. Greece, despite its comprehensive referendum rejection of austerity, has nonetheless been forced to accept harsh terms and without debt relief will still face more trouble in the long run (Smith & Stewart, 2015).

That forced capitulation has dented the belief of the Left, and of the radical Left in particular, that it can challenge and overcome the dominant neoliberal austerian narrative. That feeling of powerlessness has clearly shaken the Left's commitment to a future in Europe - though there are those such as Caroline Lucas who are argue that reform, not surrender, of the EU is still the way forward.

In Spain, Podemos - the radical Left party seen as equivalent to Greece's Syriza - has suffered from a slump in the polls (Nixon, 2015), while the mainstream Left, across Europe, is stumbling. Even Denmark's Social Democratic government, under Helle Thorning-Schmidt, has fallen (BBC, 2015). That leaves just eight EU countries with Left-of-Centre governments (Nardelli & Arnett, 2015 - including Italy and France.

There are those who have begun to argue, in the UK, for a 'Lexit' campaign, focussing upon a Left-wing scepticism towards the European project (Jones, 2015) - on a campaign critical of 'European' austerity politics.

The trouble with that assessment is that it ignores how 'Europe', and its institutions, have simply been the vehicle, rather than the originator and pusher, of the neoliberal agenda (Chessum, 2015).

"European project has been used by capital, and national governments which represent that capital, to make the poor pay for the economic crisis, and to bring down left wing governments where they seek to prevent this. With European politics at a crossroads, it is vital that the British left focusses on the real task at hand – building a radical political alternative that can challenge these forces – and not just on building an obsession with fighting the super-structure of the European Union."

National, social and fiscal conservative governments have used their positions on the European Council - the assembled representatives of the EU member states - to roll out their austerian economic scheme (Lucas, 2015).

"With the European council made up of ministers from each member state, it often simply reflects the prevailing currents in European politics. The imposition of austerity in Greece – forcing a population to pay the price for a crisis they didn’t cause – is simply an extension of an economic logic that spans our continent."

Caroline Lucas has argued that simply lashing out the EU itself isn't enough and isn't directing the blame where it really lies (Lucas, 2015). Lucas argues that the aim should be, instead, to reform the Union.

Amongst Europe's mainstream Leftists too, there are still those who are arguing for more European integration. Pier Carlo Padoan, Italy’s finance minister, wants new movement towards EU political union to be seen as the solution to the problem of national conservative member-state governments using the EU to impose their terms on Greece (The Economist, 2015).

That 'stay and fight for reform' mentality has been also been picked up by anti-austerity Labour leadership candidate Jeremy Corbyn (Watt & Wintour, 2015). After being pressured to make his position clear on Europe, Corbyn said that Labour should work with European allies for reform.

In a Europe where the dehumanisation of migrants and refugees (Elgot & Taylor, 2015) and Far-Right rhetoric (Mudde, 2015) are on the rise, the answer cannot be to retreat. For the Left, walking away means giving up on internationalism and solidarity.

Instead, the priority must be to reclaim Europe. To reform its institutions, around internationalism and humanitarianism, and return to Europe a spirit of coordination and cooperation - an energy that desperately needs to felt, all across the continent, from Greece to Calais and the Mediterranean.

The fiscal politics of Osborne and Merkel are a retreat to the Nineteenth Century - fortunately we find Oscar Wilde there reminding us why we need to resist

In The Soul of Man, Oscar Wilde warns against impertinent attempts to tyrannise over the lives of those to whom support is extended. Photograph: Oscar Wilde via photopin (license) (cropped)

When looking at the harsh terms laid before Greece, as the conditions for the aid it needs (Traynor et al, 2015), it's hard not to draw comparisons with five years of budgets authored by George Osborne and welfare policy managed by Iain Duncan Smith.

The Osborne-Duncan Smith approach has been to make harsh cutbacks in funding for welfare and offer harsh terms of compliance for receipt of what little is available  (Stewart & Wintour, 2015; Malik, 2013). Greece has been offered much the same austerian deal by European leaders, headed by Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel.

After all of the poverty and destitution, with support shrinking under the weight of austerity cuts, there came one more indignity: conservative European leaders demanding that Greece effectively surrender its fiscal sovereignty. The proposal seems almost like something out of Victorian England, where the charitable would offer, as Oscar Wilde describes:

"a sentimental dole, usually accompanied by some impertinent attempt on the part of the sentimentalist to tyrannise over their private lives."

France's Socialist President Hollande apparently spent considerable effort trying to wrangle a deal out of Chancellor Merkel, only for the deal that emerged to be something unlikely to achieve much more than incite further resistance - as seen by #ThisIsACoup trending on twitter. Italian Premier Matteo Renzi, of the Centre-Left Partito Democratico, has also been open in his opposition to austerian attempts to further humble or humiliate Greece (Ekathimerini, 2015).

However, there were others who did not want to extend any assistance at all and appeared more favourable to Greece being shown the Eurozone door (Traynor & Rankin, 2015).

Between the UK Conservative Party, and its trimming away of social security, and the conservative leaders of the Eurozone, there seems to be more concern for a kind of narrow and ideological fiscal rectitude than for the alleviation of suffering, for either individuals or communities. A society where freedoms reduced to a framework within which we must compete for dignity. It's like the nineteenth century conservative-liberal French Premier Francois Guizot has returned.

When challenged by radicals over suffrage being restricted to a propertied elite, he responded with the words "enrichissez-vous". That is, "enrich yourselves". (Rapport, 2008). That social attitude seems to have returned, throughout Europe. It says: there is the ladder - your rights, liberties and hopes are at the top, as privileges to be attained - if you want what is enjoyed by the elites, climb and put yourself on their level.

That ideological composition can only function on an assumption that humans are equals, with failure as the exposure of a weakness of 'moral character' - all of which, of course, precludes incapacity or plain disagreement. The historical interest that the democratic Left has taken in equality of outcomes, and the liberal Left has taken in equality of opportunity, is not the result of people being equal. It is because they are not - and nor is the world in which they live.

As such, the Left has tried to resist these conservative narratives, where money comes first and limited support is only offered with conditions (Williams, 2015) - though often not resisted enough (Wintour, 2015), at least by the standards of Oscar Wilde:

"We are often told that the poor are grateful for charity. Some of them are, no doubt, but the best amongst the poor are never grateful. They are ungrateful, discontented, disobedient, and rebellious. They are quite right to be so. Charity they feel to be a ridiculously inadequate mode of partial restitution, or a sentimental dole, usually accompanied by some impertinent attempt on the part of the sentimentalist to tyrannise over their private lives. Why should they be grateful for the crumbs that fall from the rich man's table? They should be seated at the board, and are beginning to know it. As for being discontented, a man who would not be discontented with such surroundings and such a low mode of life would be a perfect brute. Disobedience, in the eyes of any one who has read history, is man's original virtue."

Europe and its spirit of internationalism and co-operation has been taken hostage. Austerian national conservatives have subsumed its values beneath fiscal conservatism and the 'national interest' (The Guardian, 2015).

Not only in Greece, but in the UK and the rest of Europe, the Left need to find an answer to the power of the politics of austerity. Part of that will be reclaiming Europe as a coordinator of positive, co-operative and democratic movements. The rest will be rising above rivalries to co-operate in pursuit of an alternative, one that puts the common good at the very heart of any fiscal plan - instead of leaving it on the periphery to be handled and fed by the invisible hand of the market.

The referendum in Greece is asking a deeper question about dissent: do we have to conform in order to belong?

Protesters gather on Syntagma Square in the centre of Athens. Photograph: Syntagma sqr @ 3-Jul-15 via photopin (license) (cropped)

Last week's deadlines for Greece to secure the money it needed, to pay what was due to its creditors, came and went without a deal (Traynor et al, 2015). Even with the deadlines being pushed back, and the future of the Eurozone in the balance, no agreement was found.

Without alerting his European creditors first, Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras, of the Radical Left Syriza party, subsequently announced his intention to hold a referendum on whether Greece should reject or accept the austerian terms to which Greece have been expected to conform (Traynor, 2015). It was a decision that has been treated as controversial by those who reject his party's anti-austerity agenda.

But this referendum stands for even more than whether to say no, or say yes and submit to austerity. The big question that will hang over the whole referendum concerns the right to dissent.

Syriza's election victory, on a manifesto that promised an end to austerity has already been opposed by Europe's economically conservative elite (Lapavitsas, 2015). Pressure has again now been exerted by them to ensure a result favourable to their priorities at the referendum (BBC, 2015).

This struggle between Greece and its creditors - between their conflicting ideological aims - forces us to ask whether, in order to belong and take part, must we always toe the same narrow line as everybody else, or do we have the right to disagree and yet remain?

There is a strong feeling on the Left think that, as far as the Right are concerned, the answer they're receiving is no. Voices on the Left have criticised Eurozone policy towards Greece as an ideological crusade designed to inflict humiliation upon a country for deviating from, and posing a threat to, a particular political script (Williams, 2015). The Left have also faced opposition within Greece, where former Prime Ministers have joined the Yes campaign (Smith, 2015).

Meanwhile there has been support from the Left for the difficult game that Alexis Tsipras and his finance minister Yanis Varoufakis are playing (Elliott, 2015), presenting themselves as reasonable, responsible reformists. Back in 2013, Tsipras made clear his wish to save Europe, to reform it back onto its old path of democratic co-ordination and co-operation (Horvat, 2013; Tsipras & Zizek, 2013).

Even with the referendum looming, Greece's leaders have continued to try and squeeze out a negotiated deal (Rankin, 2015). As they have struggled to find a deal, there has been a show of support even in the UK, which has seen anti-austerity protests in solidarity with Greece and the creation of a crowdfunding campaign to raise money for a bail out (The Guardian, 2015; Feeney, 2015).

There have also been efforts to demonstrate the theoretical validity of Syriza's position of opposition to austerity, by exposing the failures of the austerian approach (Fazi, 2015). Even the IMF, one of Greece's creditors, has admitted that the debts of Greece are unsustainable without greater support and, effectively, and end to the pure austerity approach (Khan, 2015).

In the face of these arguments, there have been the first signs of a softening towards the hardship in Greece from their major opponents, represented by the German finance minister Wolfgang Schauble who said that Greek people would not be left 'in the lurch' (Hooper, 2015).

However, compassion in the face of suffering is one thing - and important. But tolerance and acceptance of difference is also essential. Greece has a right to dissent that has not been respected - a right to refuse the conditions with which it has been presented and yet remain a part of the Eurozone, and the European Union.

Underlying this referendum will be the question of whether the European powers will respect the democratic will of the people of Greece should there be a no vote - and austerity be again rejected. If that decision is respected, then there may yet be hope for Europe. It might still become a truly democratic place, with the necessary space for dissenting and alternative voices.

The crisis in Greece makes for a painful reminder of why solidarity and co-operation are so important to democracy

Greece has not been shown much solidarity in its time of crisis. Photograph: Greek flag via photopin (license) (cropped & flipped)

As Greece and their European creditors have scrambled to work out a deal to prevent their exit from the Eurozone (Traynor, 2015), there has been a stark absence of solidarity. The apparent lack of a political will to negotiate, compromise and co-operate for mutual benefit, seems very much at odds with the values upon which Europe was founded.

Against the dominant values of the twentieth century - a world divided between collectivism and competition, communism and capitalism, East and West - Europe stood apart. Social democracy dominated the political arena, with negotiated settlements between capital and labour, free enterprise taxed to provide welfare, and co-operation and co-ordination trusted to produce superior results (Feffer, 2015).

As the present economic crisis has rumbled on, the urge of European conservatives to impose their rigorous austerian economics onto the economies of other European nations - in pursuit of some capitalist revival grounded in 'competitiveness', or the power to produce cheaply and therefore profitably - has called into question the commitment of the member states to the core ideals of the great European project (Krugman, 2015).

No where has that been more apparent than in the alarming way that a debate centred on the state's fiscal responsibility, to citizens, to businesses and to creditors, has seen the creeping introduction of the politics of identity. Some have tried to stress cultural roots to the ongoing global economic crisis as if it were the result of certain failings of a collective national character (Harvey, 2010). Those sentiments have spiralled outwards to feed into the Far-Right response to the crisis, with the likes of UKIP, Front National, Golden Dawn - regressively more extremist, respectively - dredging up early twentieth century notions of national sovereignty, identity and intolerance to immigration.

For an internationalist, the European project was supposed to be the beginning of the end, not to diversity or distinctiveness through gentrification, but to the chains of dogma - built out of ethnicities, cultures, religions, nations and even class - that have been used to shackle, divide and keep control over people. It was hoped that peace and co-operation could instead bring about greater tolerance and acceptance of diversity, which might be celebrated, and through freedom lead to more diversity still (Riotta, 2012). It was and remains a very progressive liberal dream.

What the crisis in Greece has told us, is that the old shackles are hard to shake and that the progressive dreams cannot be achieved without a strong, reciprocated will to co-operate.

Saturday's massive anti-austerity, protests across the UK and particularly in London, brought together a mix of Greens, Labour, trade unionists, environmentalists, socialists and campaigners on a range of progressive issues (Khomami, 2015; BBC, 2015). But to succeed in their aims, there are more who need to get on board.

There is hope for that outcome in the form of ex-leader of the Liberal Democrats Paddy Ashdown's suggestion of a progressive convention (Wintour & Watt, 2015), following up on Caroline Lucas' rallying call for a progressive alliance (Lucas, 2015) Ashdown has suggested holding a convention where progressive groups might put aside their tribalism and co-operate on formulating a joint progressive agenda. His suggestion did however fall short of the electoral pacts proposed by Lucas.

The old Left had some key values to which it aspired. For the democrats and socialists they were justice and community. For the liberals is was freedom and individualism. For the environmentalists it has been sustainability. But their visions have been dimmed by a lack of solidarity between these movements, which have often taken to fighting against each other to establish their own grand narratives, determined to pull everyone into their big tent - and thus usually diluting their own message while suppressing that of others.

The progressivism of the future must be defined instead by co-operation - the likes of which, if it had been embraced across Europe from the start, might have been able to stave off the present Greek tragedy before it ever began (Pianta, 2015).

As the Labour leadership candidates had their second debate on Saturday (BBC, 2015{2}), they would have had the anti-austerity protests and the down-to-the-wire struggle between Greece and the Eurozone hanging over their heads. And those events bring with them a big question: does Labour embrace these new proposals or does it continue to try and wrestle with the Conservatives over control of the establishment?

It is well worth considering that a progressive alliance, based on the spirit of co-operation, may well consign the concerns of the old system to obsolescence - thus freeing Labour from its endless and disaffecting chase after majority power. A progressive alliance could put from and centre electoral reform, to create a system that is representative, with a multi-party system that reflects ideals and values, and where co-operation brings those smaller parties together on common ground rather than herds them all into a faceless, ideology-less big tent.

Greece has shown us what happens without co-operation, without solidarity. A detached and emote system that ignores the social aspect of economics and shows more concern for creditors receiving their payments than for ensuring that Greek people have enough food. We are long overdue embracing a better way of doing politics.

Greece's creditors are playing with fire - Grexit would be bad for Greece, but could ultimately be worse for the Eurozone

With their creditors circling and the IMF in particular apparently tired of negotiating (Inman et al, 2015), it does appear as if Greece is being bullied towards a Eurozone exit due to its unwillingness to sacrifice the country's dignity by slashing pensions (BBC, 2015).

Yet as bad as fears are that a 'Grexit' would be bad for Greece, and so might act as an incentive for it to agree to the terms of conservative austerity laid out by its creditors, their exit could be a lot worse for the Eurozone and those with a vested interest in its success (Garton Ash, 2015).

With debts due, and passed due, Greece has been scrambling to scrape together the funds needed to make repayments (Kirby, 2015). Without the repayments, Greece will not qualify for the bailout funds it needs to afford continued debt payments and to run the country.

Alexis Tsipras, the Prime Minister of Greece from the Radical Left Syriza party, has remained determined to resist the pressure from creditors for conservative economic reforms in exchange for the bailout (BBC, 2015). Tsipras has been attempting to negotiate the terms of the bailouts and the repayments, in opposition to the deep public sector cuts expected by creditors. Europe's rivals are already circling. China has a major interest in Greece, via its stake in the port at Piraeus (Smith, 2015), and, in what has been seen as a negotiation tactic, Greece has even held talks with the Russian government (Christides, 2015).

But on top of the demands of creditors, there have been warnings to Greece of the dangers and consequences of defaulting on its debt and leaving the Eurozone (Khan 2015). There are fears that a newly introduced currency would plummet in value quickly against the value of the Euro, and that this could result an effective pay cut for ordinary citizens of as much as 50% (The Hamilton Spectator, 2012).

Between being bludgeoned with creditor demands and being warned of the danger of default and withdrawal from the Eurozone, the present situation has the feeling of a deliberate strategy designed to diminish the negotiating power of Greece, and back the country into a corner. By bullying Greece into a corner, it would certainly be a lot easier to force the country to reform in a particular way - notably conservative and austerian (Jones, 2015).

That situation is being compounded by the pressure that Alexis Tsipras faces from his own supporters at home over electoral promises to reinstate the public sector's role and to protect pensions (Morris, 2015).

However, the determination to force Greece into playing by the conservative rules or face a damaging exit looks like a dangerous game for those with an interest in the Eurozone to be playing. It has been noted that, rather than talk of solidarity with the Greek people in their time of need, the attitude of negotiators has been of cold "matter-of-fact talks that take place when a big indebted business gets into trouble" (Peston, 2015).

If that attitude were allowed to force Greece out, then something very stark will have been stated about the Eurozone: that it is only for the 'economic convenience' of certain members, and that it is not necessarily for everyone - something that would surely undermine the future of the Euro.

With the Euro's future undermined, the Eurozone project itself could be undermined (Garton Ash, 2015). If one debt ridden nation might default and withdraw to pay off its debts with a new devalued currency, are creditors to other economically weak European countries with substantial debts going to refrain from increasing their demands - thus increasing pressures across Europe.

For what its worth, the attitude of Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister of Greece, has been that Greece should not leave, instead seeking to reform the old system (J. Luis Martin, 2015). Varoufakis has talked at length about the need to work within the old system to arrest the dangerous social impact of the conservative austerity agenda and the crises that result, from which progressives do not benefit (Varoufakis, 2015). That means supporting a 'modest agenda for stabilising a system that I criticise', in order to 'minimise the unnecessary human toll from this crisis'.

Though Tsipras and Varoufakis have been unwilling to give ground on issues like pensions, tied to the welfare of a currently struggling people and key party election promises, they have shown a willingness to negotiate. Considering that while leaving the Eurozone is clearly not ideal for Greece, and reforms to the system would be preferable, an exit would at least mean more freedom over its own economic affairs - though it would purchase that freedom at a very high cost for to its citizens - their unwillingness to leave, has at least been a show of a constructive attitude.

For the Eurozone, however, there would be less of a sunny side. A Greek exit would undermine the Eurozone itself, severely weakening what has become one of the most recognisable cornerstones of European project by cast doubts upon other debt-beleaguered Eurozone nations. For now, the conservative austerians remain in charge and it is they who will continue to dictate the narrative of negotiations in Greece according to their own ideological terms.

Yet saving the Eurozone will need Greece's creditors to show some reciprocal goodwill. Through cooperation and reciprocity, there remains an alternative and progressive way out of the present crisis, where the common good can be placed at the heart of economic action.

Syriza's negotiation with European Leaders is a reminder that we need to take Europe back, not abandon it

Logo of the anti-austerity party Syriza painted on a pavement in the build up to the January election. Photograph: Syriza logo by Thierry Ehrmann (License) (Cropped)

Greece's anti-austerity party Syriza may well have surprised many with their decision to sit down with European leaders to hash out a deal that would keep Greece in the Eurozone (Monaghan, 2015). After their strident attacks on European economic policy, in an election campaign where they pledged to end those policies in Greece (BBC, 2015), for many a Greek exit from the Euro must have seemed sure, soon and swift.

So if Eurozone austerity is so unbearable, why would Syriza bother to stay and negotiate?

Italy, which has been treated as Europe's economic case study because of its own debt crisis comparable to that of Greece, has resisted austerity and is trying to dig its way out of debt (Traynor, 2014). In that task Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi actually wants the European Central Bank to lead, encouraging the institution to lead the way with its latest round of efforts to boost growth by pumping money into the European economy (Treanor et al, 2015).

As for others in Europe, the reality is that reforming Europe's institutions rather than simply abolishing them, with the countries of Europe working together within a better system, is preferable to a return to isolation and handling these crises without support. Those feelings are reflected around Europe, and demonstrate a positive vision of what Europe could be: a co-ordinating body, a network supporting solidarity between member states.

Right now though, Europe's institutions are in the hands of bartering and deal-making national interests. Those forces have co-opted what was once a juxtaposition to their aims - a broad body looking at the greater community interest rather than narrow nationalisms - and re-centred it on a commitment to the national conservative economics of fiscal austerity and privatisation (Jones, 2015). But, if reformed, Europe could do so much more.

The European Union was once the middle road between the American capitalist and Soviet communist super powers, looking to co-operation over American competition or Soviet collectivisation. It supported co-operation between members of the community of nations, and between labour and management. It supported new member states in getting up to the same speed as existing members (Feffer, 2015).

That path to successful integration and co-ordination followed on from a long succession of plans dating back to the Second World War. During the war, the countries of Europe had taken on huge debts that made post-war reconstruction a daunting task. In response, the United States drew up the Marshall Plan, an Act of Congress - with Bipartisan support - that authorised a huge financial investment in rebuilding Europe's infrastructure.

That plan played a large role in rebuilding the UK, France, Italy and West Germany. East Germany, which had been under Soviet control, would only join a reunited Germany in 1990. By that time, the East was in an economic state that lagged far behind the West. Germany responded with massive deficit spending to rebuild the East and accelerate its ability to catch up with the rest of the country (Feffer, 2014).

The European Union of today has its own version of these functions, but it is not employed to nearly the same degree. It is particularly telling that Europe, in the face of the financial crisis, rather than collaborate and pursue a co-ordinated spending program aimed at helping the member states back up to an even footing, individual member states were expected to find their own individual response, to their own crises.

The 2008 financial crash and the Great Recession that followed, essentially caused by reckless capitalism, was initially tackled through the bailing out of private debts by the public treasuries. That private debt, as a result, became public debt (Bellofiore, 2011). The matter the public has been faced with since, is figuring out how to deal with the crushing weight of the debt that was taken on.

One thing has been obvious in the last seven years of crisis. Individual countries, alone, can't manage the accumulated debts that were inherited from the private sector, not least without massive sacrifices. Despite the crisis clearly being interconnected, and global, with debts comparable to the outcome of another great war, this time there has been no concerted collaborative response.

It is in this case, as much as any other, that Europe's fragmentation and disunity has hurt the most. Europe, as a whole, could have shouldered the weight. Instead, the individual countries have been forced to cut and cut and cut. Instead of a Europe that recognised its common bonds and pulled together, we have a Europe of many interconnected parts, acting like parts alone rather than as the parts of a whole.

That disunity is symbolised in the fact that the European currency is not fully underwritten by the political unity which could have brought with it the capacity to hold debt and to lend against the full weight of European wealth (Bellofiore, 2011). Instead, each individual member is using austerity, cutting back its spending in an attempt to surmount and reduce their individual debts.

That comes with a heavy price (Inman, 2015). That austerity effort has attacked market demand by putting a huge strain on personal incomes. As welfare and public sector work is cut back, the amount that people can spend falls and their insecurity increases. At the same time the cuts have also tightened access to credit, squeezing lending to business and making the possibility of finding alternative forms of security and livelihood in the private sector slim.

The absence of cheap credit puts further pressure on the private sector, leading to demands for more 'labour flexibility' - which, in lay terms, means lower pay, shorter hours and less secure contracts for workers - in an effort to cut costs. Those efforts have only squeezed personal incomes and security further still. The whole effect is compounded for future generations, as young people are suffering through colossal levels of unemployment and lack of training opportunities.

The result has been political turmoil in each member state as they find themselves caught between responding to the debt, under pressure from other nations and private sector interests, and an increasingly hostile public response on the other, from people angry about being expected shoulder all of the fallout from the crisis. That has led to huge protests, democratic rejection of mainstream parties and a dangerously rising nationalism and connected intolerance - people, feeling insecure, afraid and under attack, are circling the wagons.

Some of the larger and more prosperous countries have fared better than others, as the economic policies pursued have suited them, or at least their ideologically dominant parties. However, Europe is bound together. The manufacturing regions are bound to the agricultural regions, and they to the commercial and the financial. So, even for prosperous and powerful Germany, there is no escaping the interdependence.

Germany's neo-mercantilist policies have made them dependent upon exports to the surrounding countries, and to the United States (Bellofiore, 2011). As such, it relies upon the spending power and trade deficits of its neighbours, who over time have responded to their trade 'partnership' with Germany by rearranging their economies. That has meant a decline in their own internal production, and an economy steered ever more towards imports from Germany, the service industry and the US-UK system of speculation on inflated capital assets (such as housing) along with propping up spending with consumer debt.

When austerity was applied, cutting back public sector work and public services, and with no strong internal economy to fall back on, it led to stagnation and decline in their own economies. That, in turn, has led to a broader stagnation as countries, like (predominantly) Germany, now have fewer partners to trade with. It has become a destructive cycle.

Italy and its political and economic crisis, as the country that most resembles a microcosm of Europe at large, has become the case study for solving the crisis in Europe as a whole. Both sides, the Right and the Left, have attempted to justify their solution to the Italian crisis, which represents to both sides a core example of what is wrong with European economics.

On the Right, there is an idea that the root of the problem in Italy, and Europe, is a lack of 'competitiveness' (Sinn, 2014). Prices are too high, so the cost of doing business is too high. The solution for the Right, amongst other efforts at depreciation, is to reduce the protections surrounding labour, so wages can be decreased and hours and contracts be made more 'flexible'. With these things achieved, businesses would start to grow again and employment would increase, spurring growth - although with admitted carnage along with the way with households going bankrupt. For their efforts in pursuing this painful direction, former Prime Ministers Silvio Berlusconi and Mario Monti have been praised, and electoral politics has been criticised for getting in the way of the brutal necessary.

The left takes the opposite tack. If Europe's financial bodies would step up to tackle national debts, and to invest towards creating more employment and stronger wages, then:

'If internal demand and production increase more than productivity, the consequent higher employment could ground consumption on income rather than on debt.'

New sources of funding, more jobs and higher wages - supported by Europe as a whole tackling the matter of the collective debt - could lead to a way out of the crisis through the empowering of labour, of individualism, rather than the curbing of it. Public welfare could be funded to shield people during the harsher times, rather than cut to pay off debts. The problem of prices could be handled in moderation during stronger economics times, not least through the increased competition created by a recovering economy.

The debate between Right and Left becomes a matter of cutting debt, cutting spending, and cutting wages; or to borrow in order to prop up spending and up prop labour. Force what would effectively be an economic recession to lower wages and allow private investment to reboot, at the cost of private debts and hardships; or let the co-ordinating whole take on the burden for everyone at the cost of additional debt in the short term.

For the Right, it becomes a matter of nation-states handling the matter internally, alone, through cuts that place the heavy burden on individuals. For the Left, the nation-states would act in common, pursuing the European ideal of the self-governing communities standing together in solidarity, supporting welfare and investment that finds a path out of the crisis that takes the burden off the shoulders of the individual.

That role, looked for by The Left, is a vision of what Europe could be, and why Europe is so important. The European project marks the ultimate point, for the people of Europe at present, of overcoming the divisions that our differences create between us. It means reaching across those differences to find commonality, solidarity and potential.

And yet, Europe is faced with resentment and hostility by Far Right nationalist movements; an economic and political crisis eating away at its individual member states; and the mistrust and scorn of people caught under the weight of austerity promulgated through Europe's institutions. Europe is held in the grip of a system of bartering national conservatisms, which prevent it from playing the sorely needed co-ordinating role, with a view to the broader community welfare.

Progressives, from Italy to Greece and onwards, want to reform Europe, but frequently find their efforts running up against a brick wall. The continental institutions are in the hands of conservative groups that unwaveringly push their agenda, and struggle between the reformers and the establishment results in a stalemate.

The answer to breaking the deadlock is to take back Europe. Movements like Occupy and Indignados, Syriza and Podemos show us the means. Radical democracy, conducted through new parties founded on new principles, with more direct involvement and engagement by and with the people. Among the primary aims of these groups has to be the reform of Europe's institutions around those principles.

If these new movements are to achieve progressive ends, however, they cannot be like-for-like replacements for the old parties. Instead of  top down, patronising leaderships, they need be the co-ordinators of Europe's fragmented communities. The spaces where people can meet and debate, and where they can find solidarity in their struggles.

That too is a role that a reformed Europe could play. The place where Europe's fragmented communities come to discuss, debate and act in common, and where they come to find solidarity. The beginning of the road to achieving it, is to rebuild our political movements along the same principles.