Mandates and Majorities: May's abuse of the FTPA to protect her minority government has broken the Parliamentary system

Theresa May continues to cling to power. Despite promising to resign to retain hold of the leadership of her party, despite being defeated on her Finance Bill, despite a historic defeat in Parliament, May utterly refuses to compromise or alter course.

You would think, from her actions, that the Prime Minister sits on an electoral majority with a clear mandate. She doesn't. She heads an internally divided minority government, with no electoral majority - which means she has no mandate, let alone a clear one.

And the arithmetic of Parliament is divided too. Parties are divided and across a number of different lines, not just Brexit vs Remain. Yet the Prime Minister refuses to accept the fundamental fact that Parliament is right to rein her in and take a leading role - instead calling them rebels and traitors.

The big question is how can Theresa May act like she has so much more power than she does? That would be the disastrous affect that the Fixed Term Parliaments Act (FTPA) has had on the constitution.

When it was first introduced, there were positives. A useful restriction on executive power, such as limiting government abuse of it's executive powers over calling elections brought by setting fixed dates for elections - and how restricting how they could be called.

During the Coalition, this was intended to keep the alliance between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats stable - with neither party, especially the Lib Dems, able to hold the other hostage to an election over policy squabbles.

But there have been unintended consequences. The act has extraordinarily empowered minority governments, changing the conditions of a government's fall to make it overwhelmingly difficult for Parliament to vote out a minority government.

This has become a crucial factor in the present consitutional crisis. Theresa May cannot govern, especially on the key piece of her legislative agenda, and yet cannot be toppled. Using the FTPA, she has near single-handedly brought the functioning of the Parliamentary system to a halt.

The ridiculous nature of what the FTPA and May's use of it have done is shown in how her government survived last week: despite the largest margin of defeat for any government on Parliamentary record, a critical and embarrasing disaster, she survived the vote of no confidence the following day.

How? Thanks to the Act, she was able to separate her key legislation from confidence in the government - literally, separate being able to competently govern from whether or not they should govern. As a result, her own MPs rejected her Brexit deal in a humiliation, demonstrating their inability to govern, but then voted to keep themselves in power.

This needs to be addressed by future governments. It cannot be that a government can stand, despite dmonstrably being unable to govern. While that is a common occurance in the American system, it is not in the Westminster system of Parliamentary democracy - where the fundamental principle has always been that a government that cannot govern, does not.

Without a majority, Theresa May doesn't have a mandate. She doesn't have the authority to force through her deal - especially when it has been rejected multiple times. However, unfortunately, the Parliamentary system has been hindered and restricted in it's ability to prevent her pursuing this course.

The Alternative Debunk: Populism, democracy and where it ends

In refusing to rule out further votes on her Brexit Deal - should it be defeated in the Commons - Prime Minister Theresa May has doubled down on a stubborn stance. Adamant that she has a Brexit mandate, May won't countenance a challenge to it.

Whether she likes it or not, that puts the Prime Minister in the same camp has the hardcore Brexiters, who argue that the first referendum was the final say - however flatly untrue that stance may be when it comes to UK constitutional conventions.

In a time when interest and participation in democracy has been slipping, when democracy has been increasingly under assault from fake news and far right populism, it is unhelpful when the Prime Minister coopts their arguments.

Populism and democracy

Populism is a word that gets thrown around in the media, being used to refer to popular movements of left as well as right. But it's not accurate to equate the two.

On the left, popular movements are increasingly horizontal, cooperative and reflective of a belief not in a single struggle, but in the commonality between different struggles to shake off inequalities that affect people based on their identities - ethnicity, sexuality, gender - and stand together in solidarity.

On the right, popular movements are emotional, exclusionary and 'competitive' - highlighting difference between groups of people and pitting them against each other, even against good sense. These are the so-called 'populist' movements. It is a populist idea that one vote is enough to settle something in a democracy.

Like he idea that the referendum ended the conversation, that the will of the people was crystalised in one popular vote - which is clearly undermined by the fact that any political party could stand at a future election on a manifesto to stop Brexit, and upon winning a majority have the right to implement it.

The populist sentiment is a trap that Theresa May fell into the moment she tried to claim the referendum mandate for her own government. It was aggravated by the fact that she hasn't been able to covert the referendum result into a Parliamentary majority - functionally necessary to delivering any change.

With the referendum vote in her pocket, Theresa May triggered a snap election and stood on a party manifesto that promised to deliver Brexit. But she failed to win a majority. And in that failure was exposed the problem with the referendum in the first place: there wasn't, and still isn't, a party of Brexit with a Parliamentry mandate to deliver it.

Lincoln and the Union

In a democracy, the ideal is that even those who lose out most in the result of a poll will be able to appreciate the importance of respecting the will of the majority - it's a key aspect of democracy. Populists have been quick to label their Remainer opponents as undemocratic sore losers.

However, with the Brexit referendum, the populist Brexiter side has exploited their temporary majority and failed to respect the fact that majoritarianism is two sided: yes, the will of the majority needs to be respected. But democracy also means that the will of the majority can change. There is no final say.

The trouble with that fact is that it doesn't quite have the emotional reasonance of 'one vote and done' - it doesn't feel as good. It doesn't feel as cathartic. Yet it's at the core of why a minority should respect the will of the majority. Some day, you may change their minds. You may be the majority.

In an old biography of Abraham Lincoln, there is a discussion of his view of the importance of the political union and disavowal of secession. He had questioned the right to secession, asking, "Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain itself?"

Following Lincoln's stance against secession as undermining a democratic political union, his biographer asks:

"...if by democratic government is meant the rule of the majority, may there not be occasions when the majority is tyrannical or where the division of opinion between majority and minority is so acute, that the minority is entitled to leave?"

Lincoln had argued that adhering to majority rule, properly held in restraint by constitutional checks and balances, was not only a good, but a safeguard against the severed consequences of undermining majority rule - chaos, disorder, the threat of war.

As Lincoln said, "that ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors of bullets." To Lincoln, elections and majority rule held out always the possibility that the majority might be persuaded and would change it's mind at a subsequent election.

That while a minority must adapt and integrate to the majority conditions - and could, perhaps should, be helped along to do so - it would still be able to seek to peacefully win over the majority. Laid plain, that democracy, that majority rule, was never to be seen as final.

May and the Union

Theresa May has her own Unionism. For her part, it has driven her to pursue a particularly single-minded path. One that does not really account for, especially, the divergent path upon which Scotland is travelling compared to the rest of the UK.

Theresa May has caught herself in a difficult position, of jealously holding one union while dissolving another - in opposing one secession while enacting another, a confusing circumstance of competing sovereignties.

Arguing against dissolving the British Union, while also arguing for the permanence of the referendum vote, May finds herself caught in an inconsistent position - that the Union cannot be dissolved, but it also will not allow for the changing of minds.

That position undermines the point of democratic majority rule. As Lincoln argued, the preservation of the Union is in large part achieved by acknowledging that there is no end point to a debate - that there is no definitive, inalienable vote.

Theresa May has pulled out all stops to protect her position, the mandate she claims and the policies she pursues, especially Brexit. The result has been that she has turned to the arguments populist right for justification of her actions - the Brexit was a final vote, there can be no change of position.

Legitimising the positions of the populist right is a very dangerous game to play, but as Conservative leader Theresa May inherited a legacy of taking advantage of the over loud and amplified grumbling and scapegoating of the far right.

The Conservatives have spent a long time courting the rise of the far right, feeding off the populist energy to attack Labour and the Liberals. But it's a source of energy that comes with a high cost, giving light and air to emotive scapegoating.

From the beginning, the Conservative plan for a referendum - spawned of a need to satisfy the right-wing energy it was exploiting - didn't really factor in the possibility that the Leave campaign would win the public vote.

Conservative leader David Cameron resigned, having backed Remain as the Prime Minister in a deeply pro-Remain Parliament. With no Parliamentary majority for Brexit, the country was thrown into political turmoil - which May has tried to navigate.

Her failing was to try and do so without a proper constitutional mandate, gained in the form of a Parliamentary majority from an election with an explicit Brexit manifesto commitmnt. She waited too long to pursue that, trusting instead to exluding Parliament in favour of using executive power to forge ahead.

Democracy never ends

When the question is settled, the post-Brexit Union will be defined by this period in time. Disrespect for democratic process, political division, ignoring or exploiting well-established constitutional conventions - all of these things will feed into the new shape of the British Union, whether it remains European for the long haul or ultimately pulls away.

Theresa May has allowed the far-right populist view of democracy - as a competition not a compromise, pitting ideas against each other for mastery - to infect the mainstream and take route in the public consciousness. These represent lasting damages inflicted in pursuit of short term political goals. May will have to reflect on that.

The reality is that the referendum vote could never have been binding, but the view it expressed needed to be respected. That has never really happened. Theresa May and the Conservatives didn't go to the electorate for a Brexit mandate until a long time after the fact. By then, moods had begun to shift.

Brexit was always undermined by the absense of a mandate to deliver it - a party, or parties, explicitly elected on a manifesto commitment to deliver it, awarded the power by the electorate to do so in the form of a Parliamentary majority.

Now, with the deal an unsupportable mess, public opinion is polling as even less inclined. And Parliament remains ill-disposed towards Brexit. Saying that there is no justification for further votes undemocratically protects the power of a majority that may now have become the minority.

Is a second referendum, the People's Vote, the answer?

The first referendum resolved little, as it didn't produce the political conditions within the constitutional framework to deliver on the 'Brexit mandate'. Can another referendum do anything more than simply affirm one of the positions?

Another referendum will still need the explicit mandate from an election to deliver on the public will, if it is to have the legitimate power to implement the decision. In the end, the only way out of this mess is to return to democracy.

Populism sees an end to democracy in the satisfaction of it's own will - the realisation of it's own supremacy. But democracy, to be a valid basis for political union, has no end point. There is no definitive say. Only limited mandates that expire.

The Brexit mandate is close to expiration - largely thanks to the failures of the Conservative party, who brought forward the first referendum and failed to empower it. What comes next must be instructed and empowered by the people.

Government, Parliament and the Centralisation of Power: If stability is what you want, you must resist the Government's attempts to strip power from Parliament

Parliament is back in session this week and the neverending turmoil inside the Conservative Party continues. In doing so, it exposes one of the primary weaknesses of a presidential system - and one of the reasons why the UK doesn't have one.

Or rather, why the UK doesn't have a presidential system in theory, at least. During the Tory conference, Theresa May's disastrous speech contained an apology for running too presidential an election campaign. But the grounds for such a campaign have been long in the preparing and only exposes the dramatic shift towards the centralising of decision-making at westminster.

This is a trend stretching back decades and is one of those trends for which New Labour were particularly criticised for not reversing. Even while some powers have been devolved, the Cabinet has continued to accumulate power at the expense of Parliament.

Theresa May's Government has threatened the most drastic veer into excluding Parliament in recent times, with parts of the Brexit Bill. The bill sparked controversy for potentially allowing the Government, embodied in the Cabinet, to make major changes to the law - even to the constitution - without first submitting them to Parliament for scrutiny and vote.

There defense amounted to 'we'll be responsible with that power', but that isn't enough. This is just the latest step in a long term trend. Parliament has been getting weaker for decades and with it has come a, perhaps unintended, consequence: instability.

In the strictest terms, the constitutional and governmental powers of the United Kingdom are vested in Parliament. It is the supreme authority in state. Collectively, the power of the state is embodied by - primarily - the Members of Parliament in the House of Commons.

Theresa May promised a state that was strong and stable centred on her personal rule. So did David Cameron. And neither on them has been able to deliver. In the late twentieth century and the early part of the new millenium, there were brief periods when the winds were just right, or the two party system rigid and exclusive enough, that singular leaders could stick around for a while.

But betting on stability rooted in the personal longevity of a single person would get you long odds and for good reason. Power embodied in a single person or a single party is inherently unstable, because their power base is fundamentally just a fraction of the people of a country.

That the power of state is, in theory, vested in Parliament is above all a reflection of the futility minority rule. Theresa May can never offer stability if power is not rooted in inclusive, democratic assemblies.

As her speech showed, power hangs on a thread. A persistent cough can weaken the power of one person. And if that person must embody the state and all it's people and power, you start down a dark road that leads nowhere good.

When the Brexit Bill returns, MPs - especially Tories - must be brave enough to resist to flagrant concentration of power. If for nothing else, to put an end to a trend that has guaranteed a near permanent condition of instability that affects everyone.

Italian Constitutional Referendum: No wins and Renzi to resign - what next for Italy?

Matteo Renzi staked his Government on the referendum and lost. Photograph: Matteo Renzi a San Giobbe, October 2015, by the Università Ca' Foscari Venezia (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, voters in Italy rejected the proposed constitutional reforms on which Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has staked his Government (BBC, 2016). Renzi put voting Yes in the referendum as the condition for his continued leadership - and with it the seeming last piece of stability in Italian political life.

Ahead, in the not too distant future, seems to be an election where the rising populist parties will pit themselves against whatever the coalition the establishment can assemble. But no deadlock has been broken and the politically divided do not look likely to be united.

It was just these interminable political stalemates Renzi's referendum reforms were aimed at ending. Yet the centralising - to its critics, executive power-hoarding - aims of the proposal had alienated groups across Italy's political spectrum, from Left to Right.

The Prime Minister's proposed reforms included weakening the Senate and the Regional Councils in favour of further the House of Deputies, while furthering the majority prize electoral system - in all, handing an extraordinary amount of power to a future Prime Minister through a guaranteed and untouchable lower house majority.

The idea of such centralised majority power is in itself controversial. Even on the Left of Renzi's own Partito Democratico, veterans like former leader Pier Luigi Bersani warned that the reforms would create a "government of the boss", centred on a strongman who would control the Parliament (Follain, 2016).

Perhaps for precisely those reasons, business and investors were supportive of the changes, so that the reforms they believe necessary to sort out Italy's economic problems could be passed with greater ease (Kirchgaessner, 2016).

Yet other moderate, and even 'establishment', opposition shared the Left's criticism of the proposals - fundamentally, that the reforms did not address what is actually wrong. While Renzi's reforms sought a solution to legislative paralysis, critics thought that dealing with the country's economic stagnation and corruption were the higher priority and strongman government no solution (The Economist, 2016).

The primary opposition to Renzi's proposed changes, and further to his government, are Beppe Grillo's Movimento 5 Stella - the populist and anti-establishment Five Star Movement. First made their first big breakthrough on the national scene in 2013, where they took the largest share of votes amongst parties, though Italy's complex electoral system assured they would receive a smaller share of seats.

Grillo's party are a strange mix. In some ways they're like UKIP in their internal incoherence. The party's membership includes everyone from young progressive libertarians to anti-Europe conservative nationalists. In the European institutions they've associated with the continent's far-right.

The Five Star Movement have set themselves up as anti-establishment, as the opponents of cronyism and corruption, a post-ideological party for the disaffected. Yet the party mixes its appeals to the Left with anti-immigration rhetoric and stood in the way of same-sex civil unions (Kirchgaessner, 2016{2}). The party is also a focal point for anti-media sentiment and for a counter-truth, conspiracy theory culture (Nardelli & Silverman, 2016).

And with Renzi's defeat, the Five Star Movement are the only force that really stand to be empowered.

Italy is going through its second major political transformation in two decades. The old parties and figures are fading away and crumbling, while social democracy is struggling with itself as elsewhere around the world. As in 1994, when Silvio Berlusconi rose to the political pinnacle he would occupy for the next twenty years, populism is taking its opportunity.

That hard situation now falls on the shoulders of the Italy's President Sergio Mattarella. His first task will be to decide whether to accept the resignation of Renzi, with no other obvious choice for a stable government. But keeping the Democrat in office will do little at this point to maintain stability.

So ultimately Mattarella must find a new government and lay out plans for a fresh election. That task will begin within the factional chaos of Renzi's Democrats. But after short term stability must come a longer term democratic solution.

An election would surely herald strong numbers for M5S and also for Matteo Salvini's Lega Nord - the less equivocally right-wing, anti-establishment, anti-immigration party. But there is not necessarily an indication that they could muster the support necessary to govern (Kirchgaessner, 2016{3}).

The most likely outcome seems to be more political paralysis, though not as a result of Italy's pluralistic system, as Renzi appeared to believe. Rather, the cause is instead the deeply partisan divisions between Left and Right in Italy, and European interference due to the country's substantial public debt.

These conditions have made only certain governments possible, with no regard for party, that pursue 'corrective' economic measures - that have been consistent from Prime Minister to Prime Minister, through Monti, Letta and Renzi - that are fundamentally neoliberal and pro-austerity.

That deadlock needs to be broken. Public trust is being severely tested and when it shatters neither Left, Centre or Centre Right, in Italy or across Europe, will be the benefactor. Populists will feed on the fear and mistrust, and fuel it further, to their own benefit.

Italy is deeply in need of a way to rebuild some semblance of what used to be termed republicanism - a government of balance, in a civic space built on bi-partisanship and pluralism, in the name of the public good. The old pluralism of Italy died amidst cronyism and corruption. The mistrust that collapse created has spent twenty years dividing people in the political space and continues to spread.

Pluralism has to be taken back. Any plan to build a progressive alternative for Italy, has to put returning pluralism to Italy's political sphere at its heart. Italy needs tangible solutions, but even the best of policies are no good if they do not reach and include those in all corners of a society.

High Court rejects Theresa May's interpretation that she could exclude Parliament because referendum result gave her executive authority to pursue Brexit

Today the High Court handed down a judgement that Parliament must have a vote on how and when to proceed with Article 50 (BBC, 2016). While the Government will appeal, the ruling is nonetheless a blow to Theresa May's approach so far: to interpret the 'Brexit' vote as a mandate to exclude Parliament and wield the executive prerogative.

If the ruling stands up on appeal, what might be the impact upon any future referendum in the UK? One thing at least seems clear: it would be hard for anyone to argue ever again that it was constitutional to take a referendum was a legal basis for executive action.

In the UK, certain powers are 'reserved' - that is to say, that it does not require the assent of Parliament for the Executive Body (the Prime Minister and the Cabinet) to wield them. These powers are referred to as the Royal Prerogative, thought they devolved to the Prime Minister.

On assuming office as Prime Minister, Theresa May made one particularly huge decision: to interpret the 'Brexit' result she had inherited from the referendum as a mandate to exclude Parliament and proceed with the process by exercising her executive prerogative.

That, of course, provoked a reaction from Parliament. Without pursuing the blocking of 'Brexit, some, including MPs, argued that proceeding without Parliament's involvement and consent would be a violation of Britain's constitutional process (Politics Home, 2016).

It should also raise concerns. Whatever the perception of the referendum, it was legally only advisory and non-binding. To interpret such a mandate - popular acclamation, without legal basis - as justification for wielding unscrutinised executive power, would be to set a very disturbing precedent.

As the High Court ruling itself explains, Parliament is sovereign, with the law and the constitution being assembled and drawing their authority from its Acts. The exception is where it had explicit handed over, or shared, sovereignty explicitly in the form of an Act.

Britain's relationship with the European Union is in fact defined by such Acts of Parliament. These Acts form a part of the UK's constitution - and further, they confer certain Rights and Protections extended to UK citizens by Britain's EU membership.

To try and undo a significant part of the constitution, and to take away these significant rights - including, not least, European citizenship - without following constitutional procedure, was a dangerous path for May to tread upon. So why attempt it?

Perhaps the simplest answer would be that it was the only way in which the result could not be potentially challenged, and so potentially defeated. That, however, confers upon the referendum, retroactively, powers it did not possess. The referendum was not legally binding, yet Theresa May decided to interpret it as being so.

Further, Theresa May decided to interpret the referendum result as extending to her, as Prime Minister, the executive power to alter the constitution and the rights of citizens, without the checks, scrutiny or consent of elected representatives.

If the High Court ruling stands, then that interpretation will be invalidated it what could be seen to be a significant precedent: popular acclamation is not accepted as sufficient grounds for the unscrutinised wielding of executive power.

Yet trouble lies ahead. The ruling puts the Judiciary and the 'Brexit' voters at direct odds in their interpretation of what the majority won by the Leave campaign means. The opinion of Brexiters towards the 48% who voted Remain is already low and suspicious.

And what if Parliament should reject the kind of deal Theresa May is pursuing? Even if only the deal and not the ultimate end of exiting the EU, it may well be taken as a direct affront. There may even have to be an election before such a vote could take place, as the MPs who sit in the Commons at present have no mandate whatsoever for a 'Brexit'.

The High Court ruling has begun a new chapter in the Brexit story. Parliament, with or without an election, must now weigh in on the negotiations - meaning the Government must come clean about its plan and priorities in the process of untangling the UK from the EU. But if the ruling against the appeal is successful? It would set precedents that do not bear thinking about.

Around the World: Renzi, Last Man Standing

Matteo Renzi, Prime Minister of Italy, speaking at a university in October 2015. Photograph: Matteo Renzi a San Giobbe by the Università Ca' Foscari Venezia (License) (Cropped)

In Italy, the Left-Right dynamic that emerged over the last two decades finally seemed to have broken in favour of the Left. Silvio Berlusconi's powerful populist Centre-Right groupings lost ground at the 2013 elections and have struggled in the polls since - falling below even the anti-establishment party Movimento 5 Stella (M5S).

Meanwhile, polling had put the party of the Centre-Left, Partito Democratico, consistently ahead as the only party with a truly national mandate. Even despite having had three separate leaders since the election, Pierluigi Bersani, Enrico Letta and now Matteo Renzi, the Democratici have remained the only stabilising force in Italy's political mainstream.

Matteo Renzi, as leader of the Democrats, is the centre point for what little stability remains. Yet he has staked it all on winning a controversial constitutional referendum - with opposition to be found in all corners of Italian politics - making the plebiscite a vote of confidence in his continued leadership and job as Prime Minister (Politi, 2016).

If that were not enough, on top of Renzi's struggle to change the political and electoral systems, he also faces a battle with the European Union over the rules regarding how he can tackle Italy's National banking crisis (Sanderson & Alex Barker, 2016) - a crisis which, if it where ever to fully unravel, would dwarf the chaos into which Greece has been plunged.

Italy's major national banks are drained of funds, burdened by impossible debts - €400bn in bad loans - and need recapitalisation. EU rules say, however, that the government cannot buy out the banks of their debt (Guerrera et al, 2016), despite support for the policy from the European Central Bank (Jones, 2016), unless the burden falls first on investors.

But in Italy that is all but impossible. The largest share of the debts now weigh heavily upon its citizens, thanks to retail bond and investment schemes. That state of affairs has already caused tragedies, when problems at regional banks led to suicides after families lost hundreds of thousands in savings (Poggioli, 2016).

To force creditors to take the burden is to invite the collapse of Italy's biggest banks and destroy the lives of and impoverish its people. Renzi has expressed his intention to defy the EU and save Italy's banking sector, to protect particularly the country's ordinary savers.

Renzi's government also has ambitious and extensive welfare plans in the works to help those in poverty. Intended to begin in September, after a significant trial period, a programme would extend support for hundreds of thousands of families with children living in poverty, covering a million people to €320/month (Conte, 2016).

The €750mn/year investment, to be doubled as the programme goes forward is conditional on meeting educational and job searching objectives, to spread the governments aim of increasing 'income inclusion'. But it could make a massive difference for the most vulnerable.

But future action depends upon Renzi and the mandate of the Democrats surviving the referendum, which looks to be taking place in increasingly heated circumstances. Anti-establishment and anti-European sentiment seem to be rising hand in hand. The banking crisis and the intransigence of European institutions is not helping. It's no big surprise then that September's vote is being touted as the next big turning point for the future of European institutions after Greece and Brexit.

In that toxic atmosphere, Renzi has staked his efforts against his own position - not the Prime Minister's first act of brinkmanship as he tries to reorganise Italy, having made a similar move to pass same-sex unions (BBC, 2016). But the move stakes more than just his own career on the vote: Renzi is virtually the last man standing in the Italian political arena.

The Democrats are internally divided (La Repubblica, 2016) and only the anti-establishment, anti-elite and Eurosceptic populists M5S, who sit with UKIP in the European Parliament, have something approaching the national mandate to take over.

Making the matter personal by making it a vote on Renzi as well is a dangerous move, not least in this political climate - as former President Giorgio Napolitano stressed (Politi, 2016). It clouds motivations, particularly when Renzi is the central figurehead of the establishment, pushing through reforms that are each time controversial to some large group - from labour reforms (BBC, 2014) to same-sex unions, to the banking crisis currently unfolding - and likely only to feed anti-establishment populism.

Europe finds itself now, once more, with a crisis on it hands. The only leader with a modicum of a mandate is risking his position and the country's stability each time he tries to push through a reform. And yet even as Renzi takes on that task, he finds himself also pressured by the EU that would force him to act punitively against citizens by nullifying their investment savings.

The institutional rules themselves are in essence intended as pro-market anti-trust regulations, aimed at preventing state-corporate collusion, as a bulwark against corruption. For progressives - who want to see an open Europe where all parts cooperate in mutual support for the common good - to see them deployed to prevent the state from performing its basic duty to the people is disappointing.

If Renzi falls, Italy risks falling back into political paralysis, much as Spain has been by its electoral deadlocks. The fact so much has come to rest on the career of one politician should be a disconcerting warning to Europe of the need to find stable ground for all of its member states. Yet at present, Europe institutions seems unwilling or unable to respond positively. Europe's present system of legal authority without sufficient democratic accountability has alienated.

Reform is needed. The need is pressing to argue the case against the flaws of the present system and for the building of a better one. The Democrats were elected in Italy on the slogan 'Bene Comune' - the Common Good. It is long overdue time to start rebuilding Europe under the same words.

Rainbow celebration needs to fuel fresh momentum in the long struggle to create societies that take consent seriously

Photograph: Rainbow American via photopin (license) (cropped)

In two terms, mired in partisan politics bitterly divided between Liberals and Conservatives, US President Barack Obama has struggled to give his administration a definitive identity. A pair of Supreme Court (SCOTUS) rulings from the past week have certainly helped make that task a little easier.

The first Supreme Court ruling ensured the continued existence of Obama's flagship healthcare reforms, for the near future at least (Roberts & Jacobs, 2015). The ruling decided that the Federal government could deliver its affordable health insurance plan in all fifty states.

The second ruling confirmed equal marriage as a constitutional right (Roberts & Siddiqui, 2015). That means that in all fifty states same-sex couples will have the right to marry, and that marriages from other states have to be recognised.

These rulings, lauded as successes by Obama (Jacobs, 2015), have been heralded as a triumph for liberalism and individual freedoms, over the conservatism of the established social order. Along with having earlier overseen the end of the ban on openly gay military service (McVeigh & Harris, 2011), these rulings have made civic equality into a major theme of the Obama administration.

Although there clearly is still resistance, some of which has been aggressively intolerant (Butterworth, 2015), people will adapt. But that doesn't mean that the work is over. Combined, these steps have established a new social plateau, which represents a renewed acknowledgement of the rights of consenting adults to live on equal terms with their peers. Yet, those who have won equal marriage will still face discrimination and legal hurdles (Roberts and Siddiqui, 2015; Buncombe, 2015).

Though by themselves these rulings are huge victories for human rights, civil rights and individual liberty, they also represent smaller parts of a broader human struggle, towards the attainment of respect for consent as a central human value.

The ideal of a representative democracy is based around consent. Government by the consent of the governed, laws created with the consent of those who have to abide by them, economics with the consent of the community, and social interactions with the consent of the participants.

Without the removal of coercion and fear, whether from economic conditions in which you cannot afford to get ill or from social conditions where you cannot openly define your own identity due to discrimination, there can be no civic participation on the basis of consent. Without liberty from coercion and fear, there can be no free choices.

To get there, the Supreme Court rulings need now to be the inspiration for the next step (Thrasher, 2015). They are breakthroughs in their own right and just cause for celebration, but that energy and solidarity needs to be poured into renewed motivation to keep moving forward.

The Future of the Left begins today: If the Centre-Left parties get the foundations right, then the momentum is all in their favour

No sooner had David Cameron returned to Downing Street as a second term Prime Minister, than London was already playing host to anti-austerity, anti-Tory marches and protests (Tapper, 2015). In London, and in Cardiff as well, with chants declaring that 75% of the people did not vote for this Conservative government, there was a sneak preview of things to come - mass activism from the Left.

In the face of these protesting oppositions, the Conservatives are striving to show themselves to be the representatives of continuity and consistency (Watt, 2015). The Left, by comparison, has no real political continuity to speak of. However, that might not be a bad thing.

For both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, the two biggest UK-wide parties of the Centre-Left, the spectacularly bad night they endured over 7th and 8th May was a pretty definitive rejection. But in that rejection, wherein both parties where very clearly broken by the result, there lies an opportunity. This is the threshold of a brand new day.

The key at this moment are the right foundations.

One of the big criticisms aimed at their parliamentary leadership by the Liberal Democrats' membership was that the approach to coalition was wrong from the beginning. Too eager and too easy. The damage done, by being seen as the party of coalition and complicit in Neo-Thatcherite austerity, the party could not recover.

However, the scale of the Lib Dems' defeat has, at least, served them by drawing a line under the last five years. They veered off from the expected script and they have been punished severely. That defeat presents the Lib Dems with the opportunity to rediscover their radicalism - their passionate campaigning, for political reform, for civil liberties and civil rights (Boyle, 2015).

David Steel, former leader of the old Liberal Party, placed the blame for the Lib Dems' poor result upon that apparent eagerness for a centre-right coalition. He argued that going into such s coalition meant abandoning 'radical progressivism' in favour of the pragmatic centre (Cowburn & Boffey, 2015).

Recovering the party's radicalism will require the election a convincingly left-liberal leader from amongst their rump. The current favourite is Tim Farron, as other possible candidates like Norman Lamb may have been too close to Clegg to be seen as representing enough of a shift to a towards distinctly liberal, rather than a Coalition, position (BBC, 2015).

If the party can find the right leader - and they can apply and embed the lessons of the last five years - there is optimism that the Lib Dems could recover (Wintour, 2015). There is even talk of the party reclaiming their position as the alternative opposition to Labour, able to work with them and others on the left.

Following the lead of the Green Party MP Caroline Lucas (Cowburn & Boffey, 2015), there is talk of co-operation between the parties of the progressive Left: first in the form of a pro-EU alliance and then maybe as some sort of electoral pact, along the lines of the old Lib-Lab pacts, by 2020 (Black, 2015).

Achieving those kinds of agreements will, however, require Labour to greatly reduce their aggressively jealous and belligerent attitude towards the other parties on the Left, that leads them to fight vindictive battles rather than fight the Conservatives.

At this election, that attitude led the party into a fight on three fronts: trying to stop the flood of voters leaving them in Scotland for the SNP - seen to be more conventionally Left-wing; trying to take back voters from the Lib Dems who were being punished for not being Left-leaning enough; and trying to fight the Conservatives head-on-head, on Tory-defined issues with Tory-style policies.

The Labour response was to put out a mix of messages and policies that left quite a puzzle as to what the party's values actually were - all over the place across Left, Centre and Right. It certainly wouldn't have helped that Labour tried to mimic so closely the Conservatives' own rhetoric, raising the question for voters: if you say Tories are right about all the main issues, why should anyone vote for you instead of them?

The debate has begun again - a particular long term internal struggle for the party - as to whether the party was too Left-wing or too Right-wing to be electable in 2015. According to an analysis of the election result, Labour did well in seats that were 'young, ethnically diverse, highly educated, socially liberal' and had a 'large public sector' (Ford, 2015) - probably helped by the lack of competition from the weakened Lib Dems. The trouble is that they bled voters in every other direction.

They lost white working class voters to UKIP, which the Blue Labour movement had warned would happen if the party did not cater to working class conservatism. They lost voters in Scotland on socialist issues, like the 'NHS, public services and redistribution'. They cannot even count on squeezing social liberal voters from the Lib Dems at every election. However they also lost out, particularly notably, amongst the wealthy, ambitious middle Englanders.

Former leader Tony Blair has staked out the New Labour case, claiming that the Centre-ground is the place for the Labour Party (Helm, 2015). Blair argued that if the party wants to achieve equality, its needs to do so without being seen to punish the ambitious - it needs to present a comprehensive vision of a society inclusive of those at the top as well as those at the bottom. Chuka Umunna, a potential Labour leadership candidate, is amongst the most Blairite of the new crop of hopefuls. Umunna's vision matches Blair's - a big tent Labour Party, able to house the poorest and the richest, which can take voters away from the Conservatives directly in those middle England constituencies (Umunna, 2015).

While there is always going to be some thinkers looking back to Blair for evidence that Labour can be broadly electable when positioned at the Centre, a task made all the more easy by the probable slight shift of the Lib Dems towards emphasising their Centre-Left credentials, that isn't the only thing the party needs.

One thing missing, or at the very least lacking in clarity, is the Labour Party's purpose. The search for a new leader can only do so much (Williams, 2015). What the party needs as much as anything else may well be the heart that the Lib Dems said they'd bring to the Tories. They need some sort of coherent vision that connects the party's soul (its values) with its head (the practical way in which those values are turned into policies suited to the times).

The decision ahead for Labour, between being part of the Left or the main party of the Centre, will have ramifications for voters and parties elsewhere. The performance of the Greens and the SNP show that Left-wing politics remains popular - taking 9% of the vote and seats between them, which is a strong showing even when you consider that many Left-wing voters will still have clung to Labour. Yet trying to reclaim their Left-wing voters will mean some stiff competition - and in the process giving up the Centre-ground contest.

If Labour sticks to the centre, they will have the potential to appeal to voters without stepping on the toes of either the Greens or the Lib Dems. But doing so means accepting the continued decline of its own Left-wing which will ultimately begin to believe that their are other options out there. The key for a Labour Party at the centre is to understand that you can be there with your values intact - you can accommodate a place for everyone within your vision of society without sacrificing ideals and principles.

For both Labour and the Lib Dems, the policy priority now seems to be returning to devolution and decentralisation, of both government and the economy, and comprehensive political, electoral and constitutional reform. The pursuit of that task will be helped by a positive thought: the immediate electoral future of both Labour and the Lib Dems looks bright... if they can resolve their issues and develop their visions.

As Cameron - digging up his One Nation Toryism (Nelson, 2015) and appearing magnanimous in victory, with praise for his opponents and appeals to the whole of the UK as one nation (White, 2015) - stood in front of Number 10, the old establishment found itself unexpectedly propped up, if only for a little while. But Cameron's grace in victory covers the fundamental weakness of his and the Conservatives' position. Cameron, the Conservatives and the Westminster establishment have on their side continuity and momentary stability. But that is all constructed around toxic attitudes towards welfare and the poor for which they no longer have the Liberal Democrats to hide behind.

The Left is not able to claim any sort of continuity. But what it has instead is time to construct, with care from the ground up, the ideas around which to build a new consensus. Combined with the spirit of political co-operation, best represented by the Green Party's Caroline Lucas, the Left now has all of the momentum. That momentum is leading to the completion of that which the advent of coalition government began - the comprehensive progressive reform of the British politics.

Italy shows the UK the dangers and difficulties involved in fixing a broken political system

The UK has once again been forced to let out a rather despairing sigh of exasperation as yet another politician is caught with a hand in the cookie jar (Toynbee, 2015). It is the third such scandal in only a matter of weeks that has called political funding into question. There is an obvious need for wholesale changes in Britain's political process.

The trouble is, changing a political system is a delicate task that is never straightforward. Italy has been caught in this particular trap for decades, and the UK can learn some important lessons from that country's struggle. In short, this kind of cash-for-influence exposé is at its worst only the tip of the iceberg, and at it's best the top of a very slippery slope.

Back in 1994, virtually the entire Italian political party system collapsed around a similar, though ultimately broader, cash-for-influence scandal, known as Tangentopoli (Carroll, 2000). The arrest of Mario Chiesa of the Partito Socialista Italiano in 1992, on charges of Bribery, triggered the tumbling of a whole house of cards. When the party distanced itself from Chiesa with accusations of his being simply a bad seed, he began to provide damning information to investigators regarding the activities of fellow politicians.

Over the next two years, as the Mani pulite ('clean hands') Judicial investigation spread across Italy, more and more politicans were implicated. To try and stem the crisis, the Socialist Prime Minister Giuliano Amato attempted to use the power of decree to alter certain criminal charges for bribery, only for it to be seen as an attempt to extend an amnesty to corrupt politicians (Moseley, 1993).

In the 1994 elections that followed, the four largest pre-scandal parties collapsed and all but disappeared. That year also saw the rise of Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party. Out of the ashes of the old discredited order rose the populist power that has since dominated the last 20 years of politics in Italy - with more than its own fair scandals.

As Silvio Berlusconi and Forza Italia were symptomatic of Italy's political sickness, so Nigel Farage and UKIP are a symptom the UK's, and Marine Le Pen and Front National are a symptom of France's (Peston, 2015). These kinds of scandals embed themselves within political systems and eat away at its legitimacy. When the cracks show through, and the rotten core is exposed, it leaves access open to an exploitable opportunity. These populist groups - with their simplistic message and solutions, and often scapegoats - seize the initiative.

Since the scandal, in response to the general public outcry, Italy has attempted to redraw its political system several times (Pastorella, 2014).

The first major reform attempted to make individual politicians more accountable, and to introduce more stability to Italy's fractious parties and coalitions, by scrapping proportional representation in favour of first-past-the-post. The second was to give the largest party, in terms of the popular vote, a prize of 55% of seats regardless of the actual size of the majority they had won (Garovoglia, 2013). The first system, led to party fragmentation and frequently collapsing coalitions. The second was ruled unconstitutional in 2013 - essentially for misrepresenting voters by handing out a large electoral prize to the biggest party, or electoral coalition, even when it had won far less than a majority.

A third major attempt is currently under way, but that has already faced criticism across the Left - including from former Partito Democratico leader, and former Prime Minister, Pier Luigi Bersani (La Repubblica; 2015). It proposes to reduce the majority prize, but also to reduce the power of the Italian Senate - a move designed once more to address the fractious nature of Italian politics - and groups on the Left are objecting to this centralising of power and diminishment of oversight.

Despite these attempted reforms, despite the investigations and the political transformations, Italy is still mired as before in the same kind of corruption allegations (Barber, 2013). There are similar concerns about connections between private business interests and political parties, and with the government through the state held ownership stakes. There are even concerns surrounding some of the same figures who were connected to Tangentopoli in the 1990s.

Italy's struggle to reform, against the influence of a tight network of vested interests, is an important lesson for the UK. Failure to reform means feeding a rising populist anti-establishment feeling, that can and may be exploited in ways that threaten both justice and liberty. Attempting reform means taking on wealthy and powerful people, embedded vested interests who have a lot to lose from changes.

The first steps to reform are clear though, even if how to achieve is not necessarily as obvious. A realistic alternative needs to be found for party funding, and outside business interests for elected representatives has to come to an end. The example of Italy shows clearly: if the UK fails to pursue - as a first step - these ideals of political independence, with greater reform to follow, it could leave the country mired in populism and scandal for decades to come:

'The danger in all of this is that if sufficient people conclude that there is nothing in the conventional political process for them then they may opt for more simplistic and extreme options on offer. I remain an optimist. But across the mainstream political spectrum there is a candid recognition of the danger.'
(Mr Charles Kennedy, 2006)

Constitutional Niceties

It's now past 100 days of the Coalition government. So far it has survived its fair share of scandals and reached the traditional time to review the early days. Here I wish to point out something that occurred to me following the post-election negotiations.

Constitutionally, Mr. Brown & Labour won the election. That fact appears indisputable. Our constitutional 'tradition' posits that if no other leader is able to muster a parliamentary majority at an election, then the sitting Prime Minister 'wins' (BBC, 2010; Blick, 2010). By that, of course, I mean he remains Prime Minister as a constitutionally appointed duty. It is also then his responsibility to form a workable government.

So when Mr.Clegg chose to disregard constitutional precedent in favour of the moral authority of 32% of the population (52% of a 65% turnout), what he in fact did was set in motion a coup d'état.

Now let me clarify that a little bit before I start a mass panic. Our constitution is often referred to as being 'unwritten'. That is not necessarily the case. It is more that it is not contained on any one piece of paper. We have one, it is however the sum of a number of separate laws and traditions.

These traditions are what we have to thank for Mr.Clegg's actions not sparking civil panic. They are what allows the press (Telegraph, 2010) to call for a candidate who has not strictly won, to have a chance to construct a majority. Some however see this not so much as one of the positives of a flexible system, but the result of an impenetrable and convoluted collection of constitutional traditions that leaves us manipulated in the dark (Blick & Wilks-Heeg, 2010).

Now, the Conservative Party, being broadly supportive of traditionalist stances, which includes the maintenance our current governing system; have taken power by that system. However the supporters of a republican style written constitution, more broadly to be found on the Labour left, did not implement that form of constitution while in power. Had it been introduced by the party for the 2010 UK General Election, it would have solidified the sitting Prime Minister's position, giving Labour the firm backing to declare victory.

This is the particular point I wish to address. With the sitting Prime Minister's constitutional role enshrined on paper, would there have been an outcry against Mr Brown remaining in Downing Street when no other majority could be found? Would we now be under a Lib-Lab or Progressive Coalition?

This I think exposes the strengths and weaknesses of our constitutional system compared to a written model:

+ The 'unwritten' model allows room for negotiation and flexibility in situations requiring adaptability.

+ However they can also create 'constitutional crises' in the event of differing or competing interpretations.

+ The written model provides a stable and accountable document demonstrating the divisions of power and constitutional roles.

+ Some written constitutions have been criticised for a perceived inflexibility and the potential for highly subjective stances to be enshrined. Arguments suggest these might be exploited as much as 'unwritten' documents, yet be harder to counter, eg. The Weimar Constitution of 1919.

The questions seems almost to come down to one of preferences. A question of comparison between a looser set of traditions & precedents, adaptable to the realities of the political situation, against a set of inflexible rules that are laid out and cover the chain of political power and everybody's roles, rights and liberties.

For me the jury is still out. However, it is nonetheless comforting (as someone who can safely be described as a NON-TORY) to know that, from a certain point of view, David Cameron is Prime Minister courtesy of a anti-constitutional coup d'état.

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References:
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+ The BBC's 'Election 2010: First hung parliament in UK for decades'; 7 May 2010

+ Andrew Blick's 'Changing the Rules by Stealth: the UK's Constitution is being written as the public follows the election'; 28 April 2010

+ Andrew Blick & Stuart Wilks-Heeg's 'Governing without majorities - coming to terms with balanced Parliaments in UK Politics'; 16 April 2010

+ The Telegraph's 'General election 2010: Labour has lost and the Conservatives deserve a chance to govern'

+ Anthony King's 'ANALYSIS: So why didn't the Tories reach the summit?';

+ The Weimar Constitution of 1919