The Alternative Year: Five stories that defined UK & European politics in 2015

To round out a very eventful year in European politics, here's a review of the big stories - as covered here on The Alternative. We'll be back in January 2016 with more articles that look behind the political curtain to put policies in their proper contexts, to lay bare the ideologies and the theories, and to try and find the progressive alternatives.

The Radical Left Breakthrough

Alexis Tsipras and Syriza's offer of a united social front saw the first major breakthrough for the Radical Left. Photograph: Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ-ΕΚΜ για την παραγωγική ανασυγκρότηση της Θράκης by Joanna (License) (Cropped)

In January, candidates of the anti-austerity, Radical Left party Syriza were elected to 149 of 300 seats in the Parliament of Greece in a huge upset. Having made clear their opposition to the economic establishment, party leader and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, along with Finance Minister and Economist Yanis Varoufakis, provided a further shock by proceeding to sit down and negotiate bailout deals with the much despised troika - the IMF, the European Bank and the European Commission. Their choice raised big questions about the value of working within the European system in order to reform it.

It wouldn't be the Syriza leader's only decision to raise a few eyebrows. In the Summer, as the crisis in Greece grew worse and negotiations came to a head, Tsipras announced a referendum on whether to accept the austerity-imposing bailout terms that Greece had been offered. In a comprehensive turnout, the people of Greece voted No. Tsipras then agreed to the terms of the deal anyway. That decision has been interpreted a number of ways - some not particularly kindly - but the most positive interpretations might be that it was intended as a powerful show of dissent in the act of accepting coerced conformity.

Yet Tsipras wasn't finished. Accepting the deal and passing it through Parliament led to a rebellion, and breakaway, by Syriza's Left faction, leaving the party's position perilous. So the Greek PM stunned the world again by resigning and calling an election, looking for a mandate to implement the deal he had negotiated. Despite opposition, he swept back into office with 149 of 300 seats once more, but this time with a more compact party, shorn of its rebellious elements. However, the Syriza leader's pragmatic approach has drawn criticism - particularly for his repeated use of popular votes on major issues.

With two elections and a referendum, in all of which he was victorious, its hard to believe that all of this has only been Alexis Tsipras first year as Prime Minister. It wouldn't be a surprise if he, and the citizens of Greece, would like his second to at least begin a little less eventful.

'Syriza's negotiation with European Leaders is a reminder that we need to take Europe back, not abandon it'; in The Alternative; 16 February 2015.

'The referendum in Greece is asking a deeper question about dissent: do we have to conform in order to belong?'; in The Alternative; 5 July 2015.

'Tsipras' repeat use of popular votes raises questions about radical democracy and his approach of 'pragmatic radicalism''; in The Alternative; 24 August 2015.

'Tsipras has his governing mandate, but weariness and disaffection dominate the mood and demand a positive response'; in The Alternative; 21 September 2015.

The Bad Night for Progressives

Ed Miliband gives his first keynote speech to Labour Party conference as leader, in September 2010. He would contest just one election as leader. Photograph: At Labour Party Conference in Manchester (License) (Cropped)

Spring brought the UK general election campaign, which was heralded as the build up to the closest election in modern UK history. Labour and the Conservatives were tough to separate on most issues, although that didn't stop the Liberal Democrats from taking the inexplicable decision to pitch themselves as the party of equidistance between them. Early polling and debates suggested it might be a strong showing for the Left in terms of the popular vote. Yet concerns remained about how the first-past-the-post system might distort the result.

The reality on the day was a nightmare for progressives. The polls had been way off. The Labour Party failed to make up any ground, losing dozens of seats to the SNP in Scotland. The Liberal Democrats collapsed to just eight seats, losing stalwart MPs like Charles Kennedy, Vince Cable and Simon Hughes and important former Ministers like Lynne Featherstone and Jo Swinson. Nor did the Greens didn't manage to make their big breakthrough. And, above all, the Conservatives picked up the advantage in every key constituency in England.

Especially after the polls had suggested a close contest, the emergence of a Conservative majority was traumatising. Both Labour and the Liberal Democrat leaders resigned. The resulting Labour leadership was to produce one of the more surprising stories of the year - from which the party has still not resettled.

'Election 2015: A Shorthand Guide to the 2015 UK General Election'; in The Alternative; 6 April 2015.

'Election 2015: Seven-way debate sees the Left outnumber the Right to talk about ideals, fairness and being open to the world'; in The Alternative; 2 April 2015.

'Election 2015: The BBC's opposition leaders debate sees Farage cornered by the Left and lash out at the audience'; in The Alternative; 16 April 2015.

'Election 2015: A bad night for progressives. What now for the Left?'; in The Alternative; 8 May 2015.

The Conservative Assault on Human Rights

Lady Justice standing atop the Old Bailey courthouse in central London.

No sooner had David Cameron moved back into 10 Downing Street, than the Conservative Government had begun to come under fire - even from members of their own party. Campaign groups and MPs alike were incensed by proposals from the Conservative government to reintroduce illiberal policies, previously blocked by Liberal Democrats under the Coalition.

With, plans to do away with the Human Rights Act where soon joined by plans to reintroduce the Snooper's Charter there were people already announcing how much they missed the influence of the Lib Dems. But the Conservatives where far from done. In the midst of the refugee crisis, where local communities where pulling together with an internationalist and humanitarian spirit to support those driven from their homes, the Prime Minister David Cameron was criticised for using dangerous and dehumanising language to refer to refugees.

The lack of respect for human rights, combined with domestic policies that pursued further austerity and slashed into fundamental parts of the welfare state, designed to provide the most basic humanitarian support, earned Cameron's ministry the ire of the opposition. However, Britain's unrepresentative voting system had awarded his party a majority and the opposition to his government was weak, divided and scattered. The question became: how would popular discontent express itself?

'Scrapping the Human Rights Act removes the safeguards that protect individuals from the arbitrary power of the state'; in The Alternative; 14 May 2015.

'Conservative Queen's Speech offers some relief to Human Rights campaigners, but also holds new threats to civil liberties'; in The Alternative; 27 May 2015.

'Local and provincial communities are showing the chief internationalist value of empathy in the face of the refugee crisis'; in The Alternative; 13 July 2015.

'Humanitarian government is under attack and progressive opposition can no longer afford to be weak, scattered and resigned'; in The Alternative; 27 August 2015.

The Corbyn Momentum

The new Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn addresses a thousand people in Manchester Cathedral, while several thousand more assemble outside. The speech capped a weekend of protest outside the Tory Party Conference.

Jeremy Corbyn entered the Labour leadership race as the complete outsider, pushed forward to at least give a token place in the debate to the party's Left-wing faction. What the Labour Party establishment did not count on was a huge groundswell of popular support for the 66 year old Islington MP. Membership of the party increased drastically as Corbyn's campaign gained traction, with Left-wingers old and new returned to the Labour Party after years in the wilderness. Even so, it was still thought that the Right-leaning establishment would still have the final word. But Corbyn's momentum couldn't be halted.

The final result was a landslide victory for Jeremy Corbyn, in every voter category. However, it appeared that winning the leadership would be the easy bit. Corbyn came under attack from the beginning, on everything from whether he bows sufficiently to whether he sings the national anthem. Even his own party has been restless, with the MPs in Labour's Parliamentary Party feeling rebellious under what they believed to be a disastrous Left-wing leader they felt had been forced upon them by the membership, the trade unions and constituency organisations.

At a long weekend in Manchester, in parallel with the Tory Party Conference, the energy that Corbyn's election had injected into the Left was tangible. A rally in the sunshine at Castlefields Arena, at the end of a weekend of concerts, talks and marches - drawing figures from across the anti-austerity movement - was the peak. But the weekend has one more moment to offer. At Manchester Cathedral, trade union leaders and progressive voices spoke to a packed house. But they where only the warm up act.

Ten thousand people, a thousand of them crammed inside with the rest gathered about an impromptu stage outside, had gathered to hear Jeremy Corbyn speak. Regardless where your progressive sympathies lie, it is hard not to be enthused about so large a spontaneous audience gathering to listen to a mild mannered figure call for a politics with a renewed social conscience.

'Corbyn has brought idealism to the campaign, but needs to show how public ownership can further the pursuit of a just, inclusive and power-devolving society'; in The Alternative; 6 August 2015.

'Jeremy Corbyn wins the Labour leadership election in a revolution of party members overthrowing the party establishment'; in The Alternative; 12 September 2015.

'Anti-austerity 'Take Back Manchester' event tries to prove that the Left is back in fashion'; in The Alternative; 5 October 2015.

'"We don't pass by" - Jeremy Corbyn lays foundations for compassionate narrative based on renewing belief in public service'; in The Alternative; 6 October 2015.

The Autumn Election Season

Justin Trudeau led the Liberals back from their worst ever result to a upset landslide majority. Photograph: Toronto Centre Campaign Office Opening with Chrystia Freeland and Justin Trudeau by Joseph Morris (License) (Cropped)

Elections on either side of the Atlantic in the Autumn served to highlight some differences in the political mood. In Canada, Justin Trudeau's Liberals won out in a multi-party contest between three moderate parties. Meanwhile in Argentina, a broad centrist coalition led by neoliberal Mauricio Macri replaced outgoing President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's Peronist, popular nationalist, Justicialist Party.

By contrast, populist and Far-Right parties had sprung up once more in Europe. In Poland, the Left was swept away and even progressive liberalism was struggling under a Right-wing, conservative tide. Further elections in France and Spain confirmed that, in Europe, the political mainstream was suffering a substantial decline. In France, the establishment managed hold off Front National through tactical voting, while in Spain the more proportional voting system allowed for a plural, indecisive, multi-party result - bringing Spain's two-party system to an end and which may prove difficult terrain from which to create a government.

What, at least, did seem to be confirmed on both sides of the Atlantic was the weakness of two-party systems and their distorting effect upon pluralistic societies. In Canada, Trudeau's party won a majority in a shift that only seemed to take place in the final week, as either/or decisions forced voters to choose between worst case scenarios.

Above all, however, these elections all made clear just how much work is necessary to build a progressive politics and just how easily popular conservatism can tear it all down. In France particularly - where the established parties looked weak and discredited - the danger of failing to engage, educate and inspire people with progressive ideals, to build a progressive civic space with a bridge to humanitarian institutions, was brought into sharp focus. 'Winning' on a technical level alone isn't enough.

'Shift in Canadian federal election from three party race to two party polemic shows importance of electoral reform in ensuring a truly representative politics'; in The Alternative; 19 October 2015.

'What can progressives learn from elections around the world?'; in The Alternative; 26 October 2015.

'When the Centre is discredited only the Right benefits - the Left has no shortcuts, it has to build and engage to move forward'; in The Alternative; 13 December 2015.

'The 'new politics' is being put to the test in Spain, where Podemos hopes to show that Syriza was not an anomaly'; in The Alternative; 20 December 2015.

The Lessons for 2016

For progressives, despite a lot of setbacks, there were at least some positives to take from 2015. The unexpected landslide majority for Justin Trudeau's Liberal Party in Canada. The surprising popular successes of radical democrats like Jeremy Corbyn, Alexis Tsipras and Syriza, Pablo Iglesias and Podemos. The little, flickering, light of hope amongst all of the conservatism is that, liberals and democrats alike, have begun to find ways to reach out to the public, to connect with them and to get them engaged with the idea that there are progressive alternatives and that people do have the power to make them happen.

Tsipras has his governing mandate, but weariness and disaffection dominate the mood and demand a positive response

Alexis Tsipras has been returned to power in Greece. Photograph: Alexis Tsipras - Caricature, by Donkey Hotey (License) (Cropped)

Once again, reality has made a fool of the polls. Against all of the indications pointing to a tight and inconclusive contest, Alexis Tsipras and Syriza have once again secured the position as the largest party at the elections in Greece (Smith & Wearden, 2015).

For Syriza though, it won't be all smiles and celebrations. The election also showed the clear limits of Tsipras' style of popular radical democracy. Voter turnout has waned drastically, with people worn thin by crisis after crisis and exhausted by Victory or Death stand-offs with creditors.

Alexis Tsipras resignation, back in August, was a gambit that triggered an election, with the purpose of shoring up his parliamentary support (Smith, 2015) - and possibly in acknowledgement of public weariness. His party's numbers in parliament had been irreparably dented by the rebellion of the Left Platform faction over the signing, by the Syriza leader, of the bailout terms negotiated with the European Union (Henley & Traynor, 2015).

In the run up to the election, the power of Tsipras' populist approach and personal appeal, for which Tsipras has been criticised (Patrikarakos, 2015), appeared to be on the wane (Smith, 2015{2}) - in line with the general disaffection. Yet on election day, Tsipras and Syriza proved resilient. In that sense, his gambit was successful.

Victory gives to Tsipras the task of building a majority coalition. At one stage, Syriza's falling popularity made it necessary to float the possibility of a coalition with Pasok and To Potami - the establishment social democratic and social liberal parties, respectively - in a centre-left and pro-European alliance (Ruparel, 2015).

In the end, though, the scale of the victory matched that of January and will allow Tsipras to rebuild his coalition with ANEL (BBC, 2015). But this time, he will be able do so without the most rebellious of the factions within his own party. That group, the Left Platform, had split away to form up under their own banner as Popular Unity. They stood against Syriza in the election, only to lose every single one of their seats, falling beneath the parliamentary representation threshold (Nardelli, 2015).

Few of Syriza's other opponents fared much better (Malkoutzis, 2015). New Democracy, under their acting leader Vangelis Meimarakis, could not, in the end, close the gap to Syriza and finished over seven points adrift. No other party managed to collect more than 7% of the vote. When it came down to it, it did not seem to be that Tsipras had triumphed, so much as he had found himself as the last man standing.

Being the only credible option left has given the Syriza leader a strong position that he will need, as the task facing the victor doesn't offer much in the way of joy (Elliott, 2015). The second term Prime Minister now has implement the austerian conditions of the bailout agreement and, importantly, negotiate for debt relief - without which the country will plunge back into chaos.

Tsipras will also need his strong parliamentary position because the biggest winner of the night was not Syriza. With voter turnout down to just 56%, the mood in Greece is now clearly dominated by disaffection and weariness. Despite his emphatic victory, Tsipras will have to lead his Syriza government without the kind of popular public mandate he had enjoyed for the first half of 2015.

Until now, Tsipras has tried to follow a radical democratic course in which he aimed, it seemed, to use the popular mobilisation of the people as a powerful political bargaining chip. Yet Syriza's victories with this strategy were limited and, in the case of the OXI referendum vote, became little more than a pyrrhic demonstration of dissent in the act of compliance.

With the people clearly tired from the strain of the crisis and weary and frustrated by pyrrhic acts of dissent and defiance, Tsipras and Syriza - at least for the moment -  have exhausted their popular political capital. That fatigue will limit the hands that Tsipras will be able to play in his game of political poker with the European austerian establishment.

Tsipras idea of radicalism has long been about popular power (from Horvat, 2013).

"I believe that today 'radical' is to try to be able to take responsibility for the people, to not be afraid of that, and at the same time to maintain in the democratic road, in the democratic way. To take the power for the people and to give it back to the people."

He and his party must now, because the people are tired, instead show that they can use parliamentary power - and they must use it to restore the people's belief. Their disaffection and weariness need to be healed with hope and opportunity, because, in the long run, a political crisis can be as dangerous to Greece as the economic crisis that currently engulfs it.

As the dissenting economist Yanis Varoufakis has made clear (Varoufakis, 2015; Luis Martin, 2015), the collapse of the mainstream systems into crisis does not, and has never, benefited a rational and progressive Left. Crisis breeds fear and fear feeds narrow and extreme responses.

Tsipras has his mandate, but the big challenge is still ahead. He must rebuild the economy and visibly tackle the old corrupt establishments, both in Greece and in Europe. And he must, above all, find a way to show people in Greece and Europe a positive and reforming way forward.

The fiscal politics of Osborne and Merkel are a retreat to the Nineteenth Century - fortunately we find Oscar Wilde there reminding us why we need to resist

In The Soul of Man, Oscar Wilde warns against impertinent attempts to tyrannise over the lives of those to whom support is extended. Photograph: Oscar Wilde via photopin (license) (cropped)

When looking at the harsh terms laid before Greece, as the conditions for the aid it needs (Traynor et al, 2015), it's hard not to draw comparisons with five years of budgets authored by George Osborne and welfare policy managed by Iain Duncan Smith.

The Osborne-Duncan Smith approach has been to make harsh cutbacks in funding for welfare and offer harsh terms of compliance for receipt of what little is available  (Stewart & Wintour, 2015; Malik, 2013). Greece has been offered much the same austerian deal by European leaders, headed by Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel.

After all of the poverty and destitution, with support shrinking under the weight of austerity cuts, there came one more indignity: conservative European leaders demanding that Greece effectively surrender its fiscal sovereignty. The proposal seems almost like something out of Victorian England, where the charitable would offer, as Oscar Wilde describes:

"a sentimental dole, usually accompanied by some impertinent attempt on the part of the sentimentalist to tyrannise over their private lives."

France's Socialist President Hollande apparently spent considerable effort trying to wrangle a deal out of Chancellor Merkel, only for the deal that emerged to be something unlikely to achieve much more than incite further resistance - as seen by #ThisIsACoup trending on twitter. Italian Premier Matteo Renzi, of the Centre-Left Partito Democratico, has also been open in his opposition to austerian attempts to further humble or humiliate Greece (Ekathimerini, 2015).

However, there were others who did not want to extend any assistance at all and appeared more favourable to Greece being shown the Eurozone door (Traynor & Rankin, 2015).

Between the UK Conservative Party, and its trimming away of social security, and the conservative leaders of the Eurozone, there seems to be more concern for a kind of narrow and ideological fiscal rectitude than for the alleviation of suffering, for either individuals or communities. A society where freedoms reduced to a framework within which we must compete for dignity. It's like the nineteenth century conservative-liberal French Premier Francois Guizot has returned.

When challenged by radicals over suffrage being restricted to a propertied elite, he responded with the words "enrichissez-vous". That is, "enrich yourselves". (Rapport, 2008). That social attitude seems to have returned, throughout Europe. It says: there is the ladder - your rights, liberties and hopes are at the top, as privileges to be attained - if you want what is enjoyed by the elites, climb and put yourself on their level.

That ideological composition can only function on an assumption that humans are equals, with failure as the exposure of a weakness of 'moral character' - all of which, of course, precludes incapacity or plain disagreement. The historical interest that the democratic Left has taken in equality of outcomes, and the liberal Left has taken in equality of opportunity, is not the result of people being equal. It is because they are not - and nor is the world in which they live.

As such, the Left has tried to resist these conservative narratives, where money comes first and limited support is only offered with conditions (Williams, 2015) - though often not resisted enough (Wintour, 2015), at least by the standards of Oscar Wilde:

"We are often told that the poor are grateful for charity. Some of them are, no doubt, but the best amongst the poor are never grateful. They are ungrateful, discontented, disobedient, and rebellious. They are quite right to be so. Charity they feel to be a ridiculously inadequate mode of partial restitution, or a sentimental dole, usually accompanied by some impertinent attempt on the part of the sentimentalist to tyrannise over their private lives. Why should they be grateful for the crumbs that fall from the rich man's table? They should be seated at the board, and are beginning to know it. As for being discontented, a man who would not be discontented with such surroundings and such a low mode of life would be a perfect brute. Disobedience, in the eyes of any one who has read history, is man's original virtue."

Europe and its spirit of internationalism and co-operation has been taken hostage. Austerian national conservatives have subsumed its values beneath fiscal conservatism and the 'national interest' (The Guardian, 2015).

Not only in Greece, but in the UK and the rest of Europe, the Left need to find an answer to the power of the politics of austerity. Part of that will be reclaiming Europe as a coordinator of positive, co-operative and democratic movements. The rest will be rising above rivalries to co-operate in pursuit of an alternative, one that puts the common good at the very heart of any fiscal plan - instead of leaving it on the periphery to be handled and fed by the invisible hand of the market.

Greece's creditors are playing with fire - Grexit would be bad for Greece, but could ultimately be worse for the Eurozone

With their creditors circling and the IMF in particular apparently tired of negotiating (Inman et al, 2015), it does appear as if Greece is being bullied towards a Eurozone exit due to its unwillingness to sacrifice the country's dignity by slashing pensions (BBC, 2015).

Yet as bad as fears are that a 'Grexit' would be bad for Greece, and so might act as an incentive for it to agree to the terms of conservative austerity laid out by its creditors, their exit could be a lot worse for the Eurozone and those with a vested interest in its success (Garton Ash, 2015).

With debts due, and passed due, Greece has been scrambling to scrape together the funds needed to make repayments (Kirby, 2015). Without the repayments, Greece will not qualify for the bailout funds it needs to afford continued debt payments and to run the country.

Alexis Tsipras, the Prime Minister of Greece from the Radical Left Syriza party, has remained determined to resist the pressure from creditors for conservative economic reforms in exchange for the bailout (BBC, 2015). Tsipras has been attempting to negotiate the terms of the bailouts and the repayments, in opposition to the deep public sector cuts expected by creditors. Europe's rivals are already circling. China has a major interest in Greece, via its stake in the port at Piraeus (Smith, 2015), and, in what has been seen as a negotiation tactic, Greece has even held talks with the Russian government (Christides, 2015).

But on top of the demands of creditors, there have been warnings to Greece of the dangers and consequences of defaulting on its debt and leaving the Eurozone (Khan 2015). There are fears that a newly introduced currency would plummet in value quickly against the value of the Euro, and that this could result an effective pay cut for ordinary citizens of as much as 50% (The Hamilton Spectator, 2012).

Between being bludgeoned with creditor demands and being warned of the danger of default and withdrawal from the Eurozone, the present situation has the feeling of a deliberate strategy designed to diminish the negotiating power of Greece, and back the country into a corner. By bullying Greece into a corner, it would certainly be a lot easier to force the country to reform in a particular way - notably conservative and austerian (Jones, 2015).

That situation is being compounded by the pressure that Alexis Tsipras faces from his own supporters at home over electoral promises to reinstate the public sector's role and to protect pensions (Morris, 2015).

However, the determination to force Greece into playing by the conservative rules or face a damaging exit looks like a dangerous game for those with an interest in the Eurozone to be playing. It has been noted that, rather than talk of solidarity with the Greek people in their time of need, the attitude of negotiators has been of cold "matter-of-fact talks that take place when a big indebted business gets into trouble" (Peston, 2015).

If that attitude were allowed to force Greece out, then something very stark will have been stated about the Eurozone: that it is only for the 'economic convenience' of certain members, and that it is not necessarily for everyone - something that would surely undermine the future of the Euro.

With the Euro's future undermined, the Eurozone project itself could be undermined (Garton Ash, 2015). If one debt ridden nation might default and withdraw to pay off its debts with a new devalued currency, are creditors to other economically weak European countries with substantial debts going to refrain from increasing their demands - thus increasing pressures across Europe.

For what its worth, the attitude of Yanis Varoufakis, the finance minister of Greece, has been that Greece should not leave, instead seeking to reform the old system (J. Luis Martin, 2015). Varoufakis has talked at length about the need to work within the old system to arrest the dangerous social impact of the conservative austerity agenda and the crises that result, from which progressives do not benefit (Varoufakis, 2015). That means supporting a 'modest agenda for stabilising a system that I criticise', in order to 'minimise the unnecessary human toll from this crisis'.

Though Tsipras and Varoufakis have been unwilling to give ground on issues like pensions, tied to the welfare of a currently struggling people and key party election promises, they have shown a willingness to negotiate. Considering that while leaving the Eurozone is clearly not ideal for Greece, and reforms to the system would be preferable, an exit would at least mean more freedom over its own economic affairs - though it would purchase that freedom at a very high cost for to its citizens - their unwillingness to leave, has at least been a show of a constructive attitude.

For the Eurozone, however, there would be less of a sunny side. A Greek exit would undermine the Eurozone itself, severely weakening what has become one of the most recognisable cornerstones of European project by cast doubts upon other debt-beleaguered Eurozone nations. For now, the conservative austerians remain in charge and it is they who will continue to dictate the narrative of negotiations in Greece according to their own ideological terms.

Yet saving the Eurozone will need Greece's creditors to show some reciprocal goodwill. Through cooperation and reciprocity, there remains an alternative and progressive way out of the present crisis, where the common good can be placed at the heart of economic action.

Syriza's negotiation with European Leaders is a reminder that we need to take Europe back, not abandon it

Logo of the anti-austerity party Syriza painted on a pavement in the build up to the January election. Photograph: Syriza logo by Thierry Ehrmann (License) (Cropped)

Greece's anti-austerity party Syriza may well have surprised many with their decision to sit down with European leaders to hash out a deal that would keep Greece in the Eurozone (Monaghan, 2015). After their strident attacks on European economic policy, in an election campaign where they pledged to end those policies in Greece (BBC, 2015), for many a Greek exit from the Euro must have seemed sure, soon and swift.

So if Eurozone austerity is so unbearable, why would Syriza bother to stay and negotiate?

Italy, which has been treated as Europe's economic case study because of its own debt crisis comparable to that of Greece, has resisted austerity and is trying to dig its way out of debt (Traynor, 2014). In that task Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi actually wants the European Central Bank to lead, encouraging the institution to lead the way with its latest round of efforts to boost growth by pumping money into the European economy (Treanor et al, 2015).

As for others in Europe, the reality is that reforming Europe's institutions rather than simply abolishing them, with the countries of Europe working together within a better system, is preferable to a return to isolation and handling these crises without support. Those feelings are reflected around Europe, and demonstrate a positive vision of what Europe could be: a co-ordinating body, a network supporting solidarity between member states.

Right now though, Europe's institutions are in the hands of bartering and deal-making national interests. Those forces have co-opted what was once a juxtaposition to their aims - a broad body looking at the greater community interest rather than narrow nationalisms - and re-centred it on a commitment to the national conservative economics of fiscal austerity and privatisation (Jones, 2015). But, if reformed, Europe could do so much more.

The European Union was once the middle road between the American capitalist and Soviet communist super powers, looking to co-operation over American competition or Soviet collectivisation. It supported co-operation between members of the community of nations, and between labour and management. It supported new member states in getting up to the same speed as existing members (Feffer, 2015).

That path to successful integration and co-ordination followed on from a long succession of plans dating back to the Second World War. During the war, the countries of Europe had taken on huge debts that made post-war reconstruction a daunting task. In response, the United States drew up the Marshall Plan, an Act of Congress - with Bipartisan support - that authorised a huge financial investment in rebuilding Europe's infrastructure.

That plan played a large role in rebuilding the UK, France, Italy and West Germany. East Germany, which had been under Soviet control, would only join a reunited Germany in 1990. By that time, the East was in an economic state that lagged far behind the West. Germany responded with massive deficit spending to rebuild the East and accelerate its ability to catch up with the rest of the country (Feffer, 2014).

The European Union of today has its own version of these functions, but it is not employed to nearly the same degree. It is particularly telling that Europe, in the face of the financial crisis, rather than collaborate and pursue a co-ordinated spending program aimed at helping the member states back up to an even footing, individual member states were expected to find their own individual response, to their own crises.

The 2008 financial crash and the Great Recession that followed, essentially caused by reckless capitalism, was initially tackled through the bailing out of private debts by the public treasuries. That private debt, as a result, became public debt (Bellofiore, 2011). The matter the public has been faced with since, is figuring out how to deal with the crushing weight of the debt that was taken on.

One thing has been obvious in the last seven years of crisis. Individual countries, alone, can't manage the accumulated debts that were inherited from the private sector, not least without massive sacrifices. Despite the crisis clearly being interconnected, and global, with debts comparable to the outcome of another great war, this time there has been no concerted collaborative response.

It is in this case, as much as any other, that Europe's fragmentation and disunity has hurt the most. Europe, as a whole, could have shouldered the weight. Instead, the individual countries have been forced to cut and cut and cut. Instead of a Europe that recognised its common bonds and pulled together, we have a Europe of many interconnected parts, acting like parts alone rather than as the parts of a whole.

That disunity is symbolised in the fact that the European currency is not fully underwritten by the political unity which could have brought with it the capacity to hold debt and to lend against the full weight of European wealth (Bellofiore, 2011). Instead, each individual member is using austerity, cutting back its spending in an attempt to surmount and reduce their individual debts.

That comes with a heavy price (Inman, 2015). That austerity effort has attacked market demand by putting a huge strain on personal incomes. As welfare and public sector work is cut back, the amount that people can spend falls and their insecurity increases. At the same time the cuts have also tightened access to credit, squeezing lending to business and making the possibility of finding alternative forms of security and livelihood in the private sector slim.

The absence of cheap credit puts further pressure on the private sector, leading to demands for more 'labour flexibility' - which, in lay terms, means lower pay, shorter hours and less secure contracts for workers - in an effort to cut costs. Those efforts have only squeezed personal incomes and security further still. The whole effect is compounded for future generations, as young people are suffering through colossal levels of unemployment and lack of training opportunities.

The result has been political turmoil in each member state as they find themselves caught between responding to the debt, under pressure from other nations and private sector interests, and an increasingly hostile public response on the other, from people angry about being expected shoulder all of the fallout from the crisis. That has led to huge protests, democratic rejection of mainstream parties and a dangerously rising nationalism and connected intolerance - people, feeling insecure, afraid and under attack, are circling the wagons.

Some of the larger and more prosperous countries have fared better than others, as the economic policies pursued have suited them, or at least their ideologically dominant parties. However, Europe is bound together. The manufacturing regions are bound to the agricultural regions, and they to the commercial and the financial. So, even for prosperous and powerful Germany, there is no escaping the interdependence.

Germany's neo-mercantilist policies have made them dependent upon exports to the surrounding countries, and to the United States (Bellofiore, 2011). As such, it relies upon the spending power and trade deficits of its neighbours, who over time have responded to their trade 'partnership' with Germany by rearranging their economies. That has meant a decline in their own internal production, and an economy steered ever more towards imports from Germany, the service industry and the US-UK system of speculation on inflated capital assets (such as housing) along with propping up spending with consumer debt.

When austerity was applied, cutting back public sector work and public services, and with no strong internal economy to fall back on, it led to stagnation and decline in their own economies. That, in turn, has led to a broader stagnation as countries, like (predominantly) Germany, now have fewer partners to trade with. It has become a destructive cycle.

Italy and its political and economic crisis, as the country that most resembles a microcosm of Europe at large, has become the case study for solving the crisis in Europe as a whole. Both sides, the Right and the Left, have attempted to justify their solution to the Italian crisis, which represents to both sides a core example of what is wrong with European economics.

On the Right, there is an idea that the root of the problem in Italy, and Europe, is a lack of 'competitiveness' (Sinn, 2014). Prices are too high, so the cost of doing business is too high. The solution for the Right, amongst other efforts at depreciation, is to reduce the protections surrounding labour, so wages can be decreased and hours and contracts be made more 'flexible'. With these things achieved, businesses would start to grow again and employment would increase, spurring growth - although with admitted carnage along with the way with households going bankrupt. For their efforts in pursuing this painful direction, former Prime Ministers Silvio Berlusconi and Mario Monti have been praised, and electoral politics has been criticised for getting in the way of the brutal necessary.

The left takes the opposite tack. If Europe's financial bodies would step up to tackle national debts, and to invest towards creating more employment and stronger wages, then:

'If internal demand and production increase more than productivity, the consequent higher employment could ground consumption on income rather than on debt.'

New sources of funding, more jobs and higher wages - supported by Europe as a whole tackling the matter of the collective debt - could lead to a way out of the crisis through the empowering of labour, of individualism, rather than the curbing of it. Public welfare could be funded to shield people during the harsher times, rather than cut to pay off debts. The problem of prices could be handled in moderation during stronger economics times, not least through the increased competition created by a recovering economy.

The debate between Right and Left becomes a matter of cutting debt, cutting spending, and cutting wages; or to borrow in order to prop up spending and up prop labour. Force what would effectively be an economic recession to lower wages and allow private investment to reboot, at the cost of private debts and hardships; or let the co-ordinating whole take on the burden for everyone at the cost of additional debt in the short term.

For the Right, it becomes a matter of nation-states handling the matter internally, alone, through cuts that place the heavy burden on individuals. For the Left, the nation-states would act in common, pursuing the European ideal of the self-governing communities standing together in solidarity, supporting welfare and investment that finds a path out of the crisis that takes the burden off the shoulders of the individual.

That role, looked for by The Left, is a vision of what Europe could be, and why Europe is so important. The European project marks the ultimate point, for the people of Europe at present, of overcoming the divisions that our differences create between us. It means reaching across those differences to find commonality, solidarity and potential.

And yet, Europe is faced with resentment and hostility by Far Right nationalist movements; an economic and political crisis eating away at its individual member states; and the mistrust and scorn of people caught under the weight of austerity promulgated through Europe's institutions. Europe is held in the grip of a system of bartering national conservatisms, which prevent it from playing the sorely needed co-ordinating role, with a view to the broader community welfare.

Progressives, from Italy to Greece and onwards, want to reform Europe, but frequently find their efforts running up against a brick wall. The continental institutions are in the hands of conservative groups that unwaveringly push their agenda, and struggle between the reformers and the establishment results in a stalemate.

The answer to breaking the deadlock is to take back Europe. Movements like Occupy and Indignados, Syriza and Podemos show us the means. Radical democracy, conducted through new parties founded on new principles, with more direct involvement and engagement by and with the people. Among the primary aims of these groups has to be the reform of Europe's institutions around those principles.

If these new movements are to achieve progressive ends, however, they cannot be like-for-like replacements for the old parties. Instead of  top down, patronising leaderships, they need be the co-ordinators of Europe's fragmented communities. The spaces where people can meet and debate, and where they can find solidarity in their struggles.

That too is a role that a reformed Europe could play. The place where Europe's fragmented communities come to discuss, debate and act in common, and where they come to find solidarity. The beginning of the road to achieving it, is to rebuild our political movements along the same principles.