General Election 2017 - SNP and Scotland: To have a wider influence at Westminster, Scottish MPs must bring soft power to bear

Thanks to devolution, Scottish MPs occupy an awkward role at Westminster - dependent upon the soft power of Westminster outside of the reserved questions of foreign policy and defence.

MPs for Scotland, thanks to the devolution of powers, have a very particular role. The few matters still reserved to Westminster are foreign policy and defence, energy and welfare - and with the extension of tax raising powers, even welfare can now be influenced from Holyrood.

So, for those who represent Scottish constituencies, Westminster has become in fact a federal parliament - focused on collective questions of Britain's relationship with the world and how it makes use of its natural resources.

Scottish National Party

Strangely though, the SNP have chosen to release a full manifesto that covers even the devolved matters. Perhaps the opportunity to put across its intentions at Holyrood or pressure to appear comprehensive has forced the party's hand.

On the devolved matters are some major pledges: centred on an £118 billion investment package in public services to counteract Tory cuts impact on Scotland - including investment in the NHS and introducing a new 50p tax rate.

But it's on reserved matters, what the party's MPs will tackle at Westminster, that attention here will focus.

The party has pledged to push for devolution of immigration powers to ensure a fairer immigration policy. The SNP argue that Scotland has different needs to those of the UK as a whole - that free movement of working age immigrants is vital to the economy of Scotland.

The party has also pledged to fight against fight cuts to welfare, treading ground on which even other progressive parties have been timid. Labour have not pledged much and while the Lib Dems pledged a little more, they have not really campaigned on those proposals.

Now, welfare policy will soon be something that can be adjusted and added to in Scotland, but baseline will be set for UK in Westminster. The SNP has promised to fight funding cuts and to raise money to make welfare more generous North of the border.

On foreign policy and defence - including Brexit - the SNP have the advantage of a clear stance. While the party supports EU cooperation, remaining in the Single Market, and ending the use of the Trident nuclear deterrent, there is a not a lot of depth on foreign policy in the area of defence and intervention.

Historically though, the SNP has taken a similar, centrist line to the Liberal Democrats - that the military should be maintained and that interventions should be led by United Nations resolutions, in accordance with international law.

The lack of depth perhaps reflects the question which muddies the waters of the SNP's voice on foreign policy and how much it influences, or should influence, wider UK opinion: if the SNP wishes for Scotland to be independent of the UK, how can it hope to play a leading role in setting the tone of Britain's relationship with the world?

SNP and their opposition

The SNP's opponents have their own stances on foreign policy that might be more clear, for better or worse.

The Tories are now resolved to pursue Brexit, are very clearly prepared to intervene militarily, and are clearly pro-Nuclear deterrent. Opposite to them stand the Liberal Democrats, who are the pro-European party. They want EU cooperation on foreign policy. On other questions though, they tread a tightrope of centrist equivocation.

Labour has also faced being indistinct on some of these big foreign policy questions - though it has been a symptom of being deeply divided internal politics rather than pragmatism.

Despite Jeremy Corbyn's own stances, however, the party has resolved in favour of NATO and in favour of retaining Trident. The party's MPs also rebelled against the party line, following a Hillary Benn speech, to support intervention in Syria.

On foreign policy the SNP are pro-UN, anti-Nuclear weapons, pragmatists, in a field of pragmatists, with independence hanging over their stances. So it is unsurprising that they are trying to distinguish themselves by way of their role at the head of the Scottish Government.

Above all, the SNP are promising to be an anti-Tory party of strong opposition. But for the SNP, as with other parties in Scotland, MPs from Scotland's constituencies will have little voting power on the broad majority of issues.

Soft Power

Defending the party's ability to act as an opposition at Westminster, Nicola Sturgeon praised Angus Robertson - the SNP's Westminster leader - for being the effective voice of opposition at PMQs and raising important issues in key debates. The SNP have also repeatedly stressed that they are prepared to work with other progressive parties at Westminster, to cooperate and collaborate in defending common values that are threatened by Tory policies.

Sturgeon stressed how the SNP had played a pivotal role at Westminster in exposing the issues hidden within Tory policies and forcing Theresa May and David Cameron, and their respective governments, into one U-turn after another.

However, devolution for Scotland has created in fact a two-tier Parliament at Westminster and taken away the hard power, the ability to vote, of Scottish MPs on many issues. With devolved matters, the SNP's accomplishments have to be achieved with soft power. With speeches, by getting press interest on an issue, and then gathering public pressure - and bringing it to bear.

Voters in Scotland should keep this in mind when casting their ballots. Who represents them on foreign policy? On defence? On Brexit? And, who can bring the soft power of public opinion and rhetoric to bear on those issues that fall on the periphery of Scottish jurisdiction?

When it comes down to it, Scottish MPs go to Westminster with a very specific mandate to address collective UK matters of foreign policy, defence and reserved broader economic questions. It is really on these issues that Scottish voters should make their choice.

Catalonia hands pro-independence parties a majority. The road to independence starts here. But where does it end?

La Diada Catalan independence rally, which saw around a million people take to the streets of Barcelona. Photograph: Onze de Setembre, Badalona i Meridiana by Castellers d'Esplugues (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, the pro-independence parties of Catalonia put a proposition to voters in the regional election (Kassam, 2015). If you want independence from Spain, they said, then vote for us. After years of wrangling, the pro-independence leader Artur Mas promised that a majority of seats in the Catalan Parliament would begin a process leading to independence for Catalonia within eighteen months.

Voters responded by handing the pro-independence parties a majority of seats (BBC, 2015). That part, at least, is unequivocal. The rest will likely be contested down to the last possible moment and measure. Yet the separatist struggle, and how it comes to an end, will regardless have a profound effect upon the rest of Europe - particularly upon the Left.

The two sides of separatism in Catalonia

From the beginning, the legitimacy of the entire separatist movement has been challenged by the government of Spain. From constitutional rulings against holding referendums (Govan, 2014) to threats of legal action against separatist leaders (BBC, 2014), the establishment in Spain has made strenuous efforts to shut down the movement.

Yet even if Spain succeeds in preventing a breakaway, as the UK did, that will not alone solve its problems. The old establishment would most likely remain intact and those supporting the separatist movement, as in the UK, will not likely change their minds and back down after so clear a show of support. The establishment has also left it rather late to start negotiating a compromise solution.

At this point, a breakaway only looks likely to be halted by either a belated compromise deal - unlikely but at least theoretically possible, if the Spanish general election in December follows opinion polling that suggests the ruling, establishment conservative, Partido Popular will suffer a drastic loss of support (Penty, 2015) - or through further suppression. Neither of which is a recipe for long term peace and stability.

For the Catalonian Left, independence represents a new frontier on which the stubborn and intransigent old establishment might be contested. It is an opportunity to reconstruct the state and bring democratic power closer to the people, enhancing self-determination without closing off the provincial community from solidarity with the people of the wider continent (Sole i Ferrando, 2015).

The trouble is that the separatist struggle is not that simple. The Left has long struggled with the questions of identity embedded in nationalist struggles, which largely go against the internationalist and humanist themes inherent to democratic and liberal ideologies - that concern themselves instead with economic inequality and individual opportunities for people in a broader sense that crosses traditional social boundaries.

That makes the division in Catalonia uncomfortable for progressives. The contest between separatists in Catalonia and the establishment in Spain has been described as a struggle between two nationalisms (de Beer, 2014), with conservatism playing a leading role on both sides.

On the Catalonian Right, part of what Convergencia represents is a resentment, also felt in some other of Europe's richer provinces, at the unequal contributions they believe themselves to be making (Jackson, 2015). Like with prosperous industrial provinces such Bavaria, or Northern Italy where Lega Nord receive strong representation with its Far Right interpretation (Kirchgaessner, 2015), there is a belief that central government takes far more away from these regions that it gives back and is not serving their interests - not dissimilar from the sentiments of some regarding the UK's role in the European Union.

The separatists still have large hurdles to clear

After the last election, the two main pro-independence parties of Right and Left - Artur Mas' conservative Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC), leading the Convergence and Union coalition (CiU), and Oriol Junqueras' democratic socialist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) - between them held 71 of 135 seats (Nardelli, 2015).

At the European elections and in opinion polling since then, between them they have usually polled an overall plurality, and at times an outright majority, of support in the province. Individually, the ERC and CDC have polled as high as 24% and 26%, respectively. For this election they agreed to pool their support and stand together as a single pro-independence party, 'Junts pel Si' (Together for Yes, JxSi).

On Sunday that alliance resulted in the parties being just six seats short of a majority in the Catalan Parliament on 40% of the vote, but with pro-independence groups being, overall, in the majority (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). According to the pledge made by Artur Mas, that means the eighteen month countdown to independence has begun.

However, there are huge discussions to be had before the new form of Catalonia can be unveiled. The Left and the Right must still come to a settlement over their respective wishes for reconstruction. Then, together, they must manage their relationship with the establishment in Spain, which has no intention of allowing Catalonia to break away, and the European community - that will not look favourably upon a unilateral declaration of independence without the support of an outright popular majority.

That means, first, overcoming their stark political differences. The ERC and CDC each each represent a deep vein of separatist and reformist sentiment in Europe. For ERC, the pressure from the Left will be to embrace a radical democratic reform of the state. For the right, the CDC exemplifies a regionalist, pro-business, attitude that sees independence as a way of increasing economic efficiencies and integration into the European economic system.

They will both also need to find a way to work with the other pro-independence party, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) - a far left, socialist and radical democratic party in the mould of its namesake in Greece. Overcoming their differences will not be easy.

The impact of the separatist movement will be felt across Europe

The separatist struggle, however it comes to an end, will have a deeply profound effect upon the rest of Europe. As with the Scottish referendum, moderates, separatists and nationalists of all stripes across Europe will await the outcome and ponder - likely with some anxiety - what it will mean for them.

After decades of trying to achieve reform within the establishment, often being thoroughly complicit in the decisions taken by the establishment, the Left is faced with - particularly social democrats - the possibility of the peaceful and progressive break up of the establishment institutions in various European nation-states.

As shown in Scotland, the mainstream Left has struggled to find a response to the fracturing of the power structures it has come to rely on. As the arguments within the UK Labour Party have shown, it is caught between propping up a crumbling edifice and embracing a new one that does not yet have firm foundations.

For progressives, as with Syriza in Greece, the hope lies in an outcome that shows an alternative to the old establishment positions is possible. An outcome that lays out a path that might be followed to a more civil libertarian and socially just society, able to marry self-determination with an open attitude to the world. For the more cynical, the hope is for clarity as to what the modern state should look like, from where its power should be derived and upon what basis it should claim legitimacy.

Election 2015: The European Union - is the UK's future in or out?

The pressure applied by UKIP and the rest of the Conservative Party's Right-wing has succeeded in putting the question of the UK's membership of the European Union on the table. If those parties succeed in gaining enough seats at the next election, then a referendum on the UK's place in the EU will be on its way. Then, if a majority vote to leave, the UK will sail off into the Atlantic. Sounds simple, doesn't it?

The simplicity is, however, restricted to the actual decision to leave - which itself can be done with an ease that a lot of world leaders find quite disturbing, especially as most of them think the UK and the EU are better together (Preston, 2015). The potential ramifications are much greater and more complex.

Reports suggest, in a best case scenario, that everyone in the EU will lose out economically if the UK leaves, but no one more than the UK itself (Grice, 2015). While there is apparently a quiet acknowledgement even amongst Eurosceptics that - at least initially - the UK will be less well off outside of the EU, there are those who see big business opportunities away from the European system (Preston, 2015).

Amongst Eurosceptics there is talk of the UK's Financial Services industry being 'freed' from the EU Financial Transaction Tax - which was pressured into existence in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis by the campaign for a Robin Hood Tax; 'freed' from the EU cap on bankers' bonuses; 'freed' to pursue new trade deals with 'emerging markets', like India, where some feel the EU failed to negotiate a good enough deal; and even to pursue the marketing of UK agriculture to the world (Preston, 2015).

The trouble is, those arguments all seem to depend upon a lot of 'if'. If the UK is able to negotiate a substantially different deal while still maintaining its trading links (Behr, 2014). If it is able to successfully renegotiate better deals for the UK than it could get when it was able to advertise free access through Britain to the whole of the European Market - at a time when the UK's trade relationships are already very lopsided against the UK (Peston, 2015).

On that particular point: the UK would also have to convince the potential investors that they would be getting a good deal from pouring their money into the products of one of the most expensive places in the world to live and work. With a high cost of living, wages have to keep up, which means businesses fork over large sums of money on labour costs. While the EU is a free market, it nonetheless encourages protections of workers rights and measures to raise the standard of living across all member states, and trading partners, up to the same level to try and avoid anyone being undercut.

Are the UK's workers going to receive those same assurances when they are competing in a global free market against the workers of India or China? It's more likely that they will face the same calls for measures aimed at increasing 'competitiveness' - levelled at countries with high debt like Italy - which, under talk of lowering prices and increasing flexibility, ultimately demands cuts to wages so reduce the cost of labour (Sinn, 2014).

None of this is, of course, to suggest that the EU is perfect. The European Union is subject to the same pressures from globalisation as anywhere else in the world. It needs serious reform, such as the need to make the management of the European economy, and particularly of the Euro, more democratic (Garton Ash, 2015).

But achieving these reforms means getting into the spirit of internationalism. As Nick Clegg said during the BBC's Question Time Election Leaders Special on Thursday (30th April), the main issues facing us today are continental, not just national. The solutions to problems like tax dodging corporations and human traffickers will be continental and international in scale, not confined to particular countries and nations.

There are ideals in the make-up of the European Union - mostly constricted to being merely undertones in these times when ideologically conservative economics is riding high - grounded in internationalism, solidarity, commonality and liberty. There is a sense that, with reform, the European Union could be a positive progressive force for the common good.

The European Parliament has campaigned for equal pay for men and women and for the rights of pregnant workers. It derailed the ACTA treaty, which lead to most European nations refusing to ratify it, and it has also forced the TTIP treaty negotiations to be open and transparent (Robinson, 2015).

The European Globalization Adjustment Fund provides compensation when jobs move abroad, and funding for new training and start-ups. The EU even pursued the capping of bankers bonuses (at an obviously stingy 100% of their salaries) in the face of opposition from the UK government (Robinson, 2015{2}).

The cost to the UK of being part of all this is a net contribution to the EU budget £6.5bn to £8.5bn per year, less than 0.5% of British GDP. That figure extracts from the gross contribution what is spent back in the UK itself, on supporting everything from agriculture and scientific research to grants for local councils. For this investment the Confederation of British Industry suggests net economic benefit of EU membership to the UK is £62-78bn/yr (Robinson, 2015{3}).

As for immigration there is evidence that it has limited impact on wages, even coinciding with a boost in wages in the long term (Preston, 2015). While the 5% lowest paid can be disproportionately affected, the solutions lies in tackling low pay with minimum and living wages, with better education and training, and by addressing the disparities in the quality of life and levels of pay to be found across Europe - once again, continent-wide solutions. In terms of numbers, at present 2.2m British citizens live elsewhere in the EU, balancing out the 2.4m EU citizens living the UK. Less than 5% of the EU migrants claim jobseekers and less than 10% claim other working age benefits (Robinson, 2015{3}).

Are these arguments likely to dissuade fervent Eurosceptics? Probably not. There is a certain sense of Nationalism to Euroscepticism that makes talk of negotiation and reform, rather than abandonment, likely to fall unheard.

That does necessarily not mean that some satisfactory compromise cannot be reached.

A number of leading European figures have for some time been talking about a two-speed Europe - the tone of which might be seen in David Cameron's 'veto' in 2011 (Curtis, 2011). While trying to negotiate policy for the single market, the EU faced opposition from Cameron who demanded protections, exemptions and concessions for the City of London's financial sector. However, instead of actually blocking the move - as would be required for it to actually be a veto - the UK merely removed itself from consideration on the issues being discussed and the rest of the EU went on with its discussions.

Romano Prodi, former Italian Prime Minister and former President of the European Commission, has argued that the move towards a two-speed Union is well under way as a practical response to the realities of the situation (Tost, 2012). Prodi stressed that Europe is taking steps towards a common financial policy without the UK - the next big step in integration - and that Cameron's policies have only moved Britain to the fringes where they will have less influence.

The reality will be a UK that tries to opt out of what it doesn't want - within limits which will still mean much the same situation if the UK wants to trade with Europe - but will remain, in principle, a member of the Union and UK citizens will keep some of the benefits of being EU citizens like free movement and access to European Courts.

Meanwhile, the rest of Europe will continue to grow closer, gradually building a continental federation and reforming it to become more democratic. There are alternatives that would see Britain more involved or holding the EU at arms length, but this approach, of a two-speed Union - seems the only one likely to strike a balance between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics.

Election 2015: SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Regional Parties

Following their landslide victory in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections, under Alex Salmond, the SNP (Scottish National Party) looked strongly placed to lead their country towards independence. Yet in 2014, independence was rejected by referendum.

In the aftermath Alex Salmond resigned and his former deputy Nicola Sturgeon stood unopposed to succeed him (BBC, 2014). Yet even defeat and a change of leadership has not shaken the party's momentum. Polling suggests the party is set to sweep the Scottish parliamentary seats on 7th May.

All of this seems to suggest a complex relationship between the SNP and their supporters.

Despite the likelihood of the party becoming the third largest group in Parliament in May, their Westminster aims are not particularly grand. Their primary ambition appears to be shared with the Green Party: to keep pulling Labour leftwards (Greenwood, 2015).

Former leader Alex Salmond, who is himself running for a seat at Westminster, has given his support to the SNP backing a Labour minority government in the likely event of a hung parliament (The Guardian, 2014). There has even been talk of a progressive alliance being formed in the next parliament between the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party (Mason, 2015).

It is this that complicates the SNP's relationship with its supporters - the tension between the SNP's separatism and many of their supporter's Left-wing politics.

The SNP has become the latest home for progressives looking for a new alternative to the Labour Party (Wishart, 2015). Like the Greens, the SNP have benefited from the Liberal Democrats going into government, and in doing so being seen to have sacrificed their values.

The SNP has certainly tried to live up to the view of the party as Left-leaning. They have promised to oppose austerity, with a fiscal plan that sees efforts to reduce the deficit spread out over many more years than their rivals - meaning less to cut in the short term and more to spend (Settle, 2015). The party has also pushed a number of progressive policies over the years, including the opposition to tuition fees, trident and private financial initiatives in the NHS (Wright, 2012).

However, the SNP has also faced criticism over individual liberties issues - such as the Liberal Democrats opposing their attempts to create an integrated National ID database (Macwhirter, 2015). The party's own traditional leanings, historically towards the political Centre rather than the Left, have also shown through in places with a very friendly attitude towards business - seen in Alex Salmond's tendency towards low corporation taxes (Wright, 2012).

The Labour Party have, however, make it all too easy for the SNP to present themselves as different, a radical alternative, to the parties of the Westminster establishment parties. Labour were all to quick to side with the Conservative No-vote campaign against independence (Wishart, 2015).

At the 2015 Scottish leaders debate, Labour leader Jim Murphy did a good job of summarising the attitude that has turned many, both in Scotland and across the UK, away from the party (STV, 2015):

"Only Labour is big enough. Only Labour is strong enough."

That sense of entitlement from Labour has not convinced many. They persist in demanding that everyone unite against Tories, but insist that it only be in rank and file behind Labour.

Even with Labour largest impeding themselves, the SNP still struggle to establish themselves as a mainstream party due to their commitment to independence. Their separatism compromises the party's chances of having any major influence at Westminster, other than as an outside critic - strength at Westminster will all be about reinforcing their national influence in Scotland (Rawnsley, 2015).

Behind the tensions between those wanting independence and those wanting an alternative party of the Left, there is also a struggle between the newer Left-wing and the older Centrist party that is trying to juggle a coalition of different interests. And gives the party a New Labour feel to it.

The question is, without the issue of independence to unite them, is the SNP ultimately more progressive and more conservative? Unfortunately the party's contradictory policies - anti-austerity but pro-business, anti-Trident but infringing civil liberties - that make it a broad tent Centre party trying to keep everyone happy, also make it impossible to be sure of the party's ideological convictions.

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Prospects: 53 seats (for a gain of 47).*

Possible Coalition Partners: Labour (271 seats), Liberal Democrats (29), Plaid Cymru (3), Green Party (1).

Verdict: A broad tent Centre party, trying to keep and Left and Right happy in a delicate pro-Independence coalition. Leaning towards progressive for now, but not with any overwhelming conviction.

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Plaid Cymru

In Wales there is almost a complete contrast to the SNP's success. Plaid Cymru - Party of Wales - a party of much stronger Left-wing convictions, has struggled against a Labour Party much more assured of itself than its Scottish counterpart.

Both the cause of Welsh devolution and support for Plaid Cymru were launched onto the national stage in the 1950s and 60s by the controversy of the creation of Llyn Celyn reservoir to supply Liverpool by the drowning of the Welsh village of Capel Celyn.

Over the next three decades the party saw its support rise over the 10% mark until Labour held the Welsh devolution referendum in 1997. At the first Welsh Assembly election Plaid took 28% of the votes to become the official opposition to a Labour-Lib Dem coalition. Since then the party has remained firmly established in the Welsh Assembly, governing in coalition with Labour between 2007 and 2011.

Yet at Westminster the party has hovered at around 3 seats. Having the opportunity to takes its Left-wing regionalism to a national audience in the leaders debates under leader Leanne Wood will likely help the party immensely (BBC, 2015). However, the party is still only in fourth in Welsh opinion polls - behind even UKIP - on 11% and may be on course to lose one of its only 3 seats in the Commons on 7th May (The Guardian, 2015{2}).

Until the party finds a way to break Labour's stranglehold on the Welsh electorate - twenty of the forty seats in Wales are safe, with Labour holding seventeen of them (Williamson, 2015) - Plaid Cymru will likely remain an addendum.

And the rest of the regions

In Cornwall, Mebyon Kernow - Party of Cornwall or Sons of Cornwall - are the local equivalent to the SNP and Plaid Cymru. They support devolution for Cornwall, and share the Left-of-Centre approach of their equivalent parties in Scotland and Wales. So far they have only achieved representation on Cornwall Council.

As for Northern Ireland, that is an almost entirely separate political system within the larger UK system, largely divided between sectarian interests. Here is a link to some seat predictions for the seats in Northern Ireland.

Second jobs for MPs, conflicts of interest and separation of powers

In response to the recent lobbying scandal, Labour took the opportunity on Wednesday, 25th February, to test the government by making a motion in the Commons to ban all Members of Parliament from holding second jobs (BBC, 2015). However, squabbling between the two main parties as to what payments or sources of income are considered a conflict of interest - Labour focussing on consultancies and directorships, the Conservatives on the trade unions - killed the chances of the Labour motion passing.

Under the present rules MPs are allowed to have second jobs, with the majority of those taking advantage being Conservatives - although two of the three highest earners are former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Respect MP, and former Labour MP, George Galloway (Moseley, 2015). Yet, support is low for MPs juggling their time between public and private commitments (Shakespeare, 2015). There are understandable fears of corruption and conflicts of interest.

These problems are exacerbated by the fact that conflicts of interest are virtually built into the Westminster system of government used in the UK. The Prime Minister is also an MP, the Ministers in the Government are MPs, the Speaker is an MP, the members of the committees are also MPs.

In the Westminster system the executive branch - the government, that carries out the business of state - is formed by members of the legislative branch - the parliament where laws are subject to debate and vote. Theoretically this ties the everyday business of governing to the will of the people as embodied by the parliament, in what is known as responsible government.

In the UK, however, this creates a situation where MPs, elected by constituents to represent their interests in debates regarding lawmaking, are caught between various allegiances, ambitions and duties. They are conflicted between the interests of their constituency and their office, whether just an MP or a Minister in the government; the interests of their constituents, their office and their political party, from which stems the opportunity to take office; and between the conflicting duties of the parliament, to make laws, and the government, to administer and enforce them.

Furthermore, the system creates a conflict of interest between Parliament and the Government. The Government cannot govern effectively without the majority support of the Parliament, and yet if majority support is given the role of the Parliament is significantly reduced. These pressures have, over time, changed the Parliament into more of a factional power-base for Government action, than a body of representatives, itself carrying responsibilities on behalf of electors.

With the private and financial interests of MPs placed on top of these conflicts, inherent to the system, Parliament becomes mired in competing interests. The Labour Party's attempt to ban certain additional roles for MPs is just the latest, with previous attempts at restricting various outside political interests including a government-sponsored lobbying law drawing heavy criticism (Mason, 2014).

In other countries, and other systems of government, there have been attempts to avoid the inherent conflict. The separation of powers has been used, by dividing the functions of government into separate branches - typically known as executive, legislative and judicial - to, at once, ensure that the different branches might hold each other to account, and keep separate the different functions that might result in conflicted allegiances.

That idea of separation, used to address the inherent conflict, might also be applicable to our thinking regarding the public and private interests of MPs.

While serving as Members of Parliament, these elected individuals are representatives with functions, responsibilities and duties, which they carry on the electorate's behalf, in the public service. For the carrying out of their role they are compensated, to the amount of £67,000, plus expenses (White, 2015). The aim of paying these elected representatives is to ensure that they were able to devote their full time attentions to the role, and to ensure their independence.

There are understandable and reasonable arguments for a public representative to be grounded in the working realities of the world outside, or to be able to keep themselves in practice in technically complicated professional fields, such medicine or law (Wintour, 2015). Whatever the fears of the emergence of a class of career politicians, it becomes problematic for those representatives to continue to pursue - beyond some limited practices - their own financial interests while in office.

There must be a middle ground, with some room for compromise and compensation for individual service, that maintains the independence of public bodies. However, while there are no straight forward answers, it is clear we need to keep competing interests separate. As we need to remain wary of letting the powers and functions of government merge, to ensure oversight and avoid corruption, we also need to keep the private interests of individual representatives separate from the public interest which they serve.

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References:
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+ Frances Perraudin's 'Straw and Rifkind deny wrongdoing amid 'cash for access' claims'; in The Guardian; 23 February 2015.

+ 'MPs reject Labour's call for a ban on second jobs'; on the BBC; 25 February 2015.

+ Tom Moseley's 'What MPs do as second jobs'; on the BBC; 25 February 2015.

+ Stephan Shakespeare's 'Voters support ban on second jobs for MPs'; from YouGov; 25 February 2015.

+ 'MPs' second jobs: What are the rules?'; on the BBC;

+ Rowena Mason's 'Lobbying bill passes through House of Lords'; in The Guardian; 28 January 2014.

+ 'Lobbying Bill to become law after Lords rebellion falters'; on the BBC; 28 January 2014.

+ Michael White's 'Straw and Rifkind were loose lipped but MP salaries are part of the problem'; in The Guardian; 23 February 2015.

+ Patrick Wintour's 'Straw and Rifkind scandal renews questions about MPs' outside interests'; in The Guardian; 23 February 2015.

A Short Review of 2014

For those with a progressive political leaning, the themes of 2014 have been pretty dark. Austerity, cuts, and reactionary opportunism from the mainstream parties to try and respond to the rise of the Far-Right. The main hope for The Left has been in ideas like the Citizen's Income entering into serious political discussion, widespread vocal championing of feminism, and some fresh young left-wing parties beginning to gather support.

The early part of 2014 was dominated by the return of Far-Right politics, with right-wing nationalist parties polling in increasing numbers across Europe on the back of immigration scaremongering. While the Far-Right managed to make some breakthroughs, for the most part it simply served to make it easier for those pushing austerity to make scapegoats of the poorest and most vulnerable to draw attention away from the real powerbrokers.

In an intensely pragmatic response to the small victories won by the Far-Right, parts of the Labour Party believed in making opportunistic appeals to those persuaded by anti-immigration propaganda. It gave the impression only of an effort to stave off the threat posed by right-wing parties to the party's supporter base, under threat already in Scotland by the continued rise in popularity of the SNP and its campaign for Scottish Independence.

The summer saw the Scottish Independence Referendum campaign draw unusual lines of division through Britain, with splits between Unionists and Separatists pulling up issues of nationality and nationalism. Yet the campaign was plagued by negative campaigning, particularly from the No group, which rejected Scottish nationalism with its own rather hypocritical British nationalism and played heavily on economic fears by calling on voters to stick with the Westminster status quo in the name of economic security.

Despite the negativity, the world was watching. Separatist voters in Catalonia waited to see if it was possible to construct a democratic path out of the nation-state settlement. In the end independence was rejected - though by much less of a margin than most were willing to admit. That left the matter, at least partially, unresolved. In particular the general discontent with central government, echoed across Europe, was not truly addressed.

Those feelings probably helped to fuel the newly fire lit that saw, in autumn, a rising popular response to conservative driven austerity. In response to the far right and to Conservative cuts, the UK has seen the Green Party finally making a breakthrough, by polling at the same kind of levels as the other mainstream parties. In Spain, the brand new Podemos party has caused a major shock by polling ahead of all of the established parties.

In many ways, conference season and the Autumn Statement in the UK have only stoked that fire further. Both high coverage events where used by the Conservatives to lay out their plans for further austerity measures and cuts. As autumn turned to winter, those moves have led to the Liberal Democrats, junior coalition partners, to distance themselves from the plans for further cuts - something that reopens the possibility of a positive dialogue amongst leftist groups.

Despite some dark moments, particularly in the Far-Right rearing its head, there are reasons to be hopeful. There are pieces moving into position for a progressive alliance in the UK following the election next spring, with the various groups on The Left opening up to working together in common cause.

We will be back in January with more subjective observation and analysis of politics, ideology and public life.

What now for Scotland, and for Britain?

The votes are counted and Scotland will not be independent. That result will not, however, change much about the situation that the UK finds itself in.

There are 45% of the people of Scotland who wish for the country to break away. Nowhere did less than a third of voters choose independence. Those are not insignificant numbers. Furthermore, even a no vote comes with the promise of some additional autonomy.

For the Unionists, all they have won is a delay until the question is asked again. But, for supporters of the Union, there was really no way, as it presently stands, they were ever going to able to revel in a victory - shy of achieving a comprehensive 90% or more rejection of independence.

Even with a no vote, the autonomy of the provinces will increase, and continue to do so in a lopsided fashion - something bound to agitate those who see the situation to be unfair upon English voters. Westminster will, likely as not, continue to be despised as a distant and out of touch central government.

Scotland is still divided, still drifting away, still retaining its autonomy and independence remains popular. If it comes to vote again, and economic conditions are not so dire as to give Unionists such ammunition for a negative campaign, it is possible that independence could just scrape through.

The rest of Britain could also likely follow the Scottish path to greater regional autonomy and more federalisation, rather than centralisation. The close no vote could well act as a positive spur for Britain to finally claw its way towards modern institutions; towards decentralised, federal government with more power sent to the provinces and local government.

Or, the public will lose interest now that change has been prevented, and Westminster, responding with victorious flag-waving patriotism, will take the no vote to be an opportunity to change nothing at all. It is to be hoped, however, that this referendum will prove a turning point.

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References:
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+ BBC's 'Scotland Decides: Results'.

+ James Landale's 'Scottish Independence: What happens after the decision?'; on the BBC; 18 September 2014.

+ Nick Robinson's 'The people have spoken. But it's not over'; on the BBC; 19 September 2014.

+ Andrew Black's 'Scotland votes 'No': What happens now?'; on the BBC; 19 September 2014.

+ BBC's 'David Cameron sets out UK-wide changes 'to build better future''; 19 September 2014.

+ Rafael Behr's 'Nine things the indyref campaign has taught us'; in The Guardian; 18 September 2014.

+ Martin Kettle's 'Scotland votes no: the union has survived, but the questions for the left are profound'; in The Guardian; 19 September 2014.

Scottish independence is a difficult question, but there are answers to be found

As the vote on Scottish Independence draws near, the people of Scotland are being faced with difficult choices. They are being asked to decide in favour of independence and its attached risks, or to reject it for some alternative, lesser, additional freedoms within the Union - held out as a counter offer by the Conservative Party, that Scotland has little reason to trust, having been burned before (Robinson, 2014).

Scotland, on the one hand, is being lectured on the dangers of gambling financially on independence. On the other, it is being given demonstrations of unity - like those happening this evening in London (Nelson, 2014) and the far more controversial Orange Order march on Edinburgh over the weekend (Brooks & Carrell, 2014) - in which they are regaled with stories of sacrifice and bonds of tradition, all calling for a renewal of British patriotism rather than choosing to embrace Scottish nationalism.

Any way it turns, Scotland is being warned that it can't have everything.

Scotland faces difficulties with Britain, primarily over money. While First Minister Alex Salmond has repeatedly expressed a willingness to work with Britain, in a spirit of openness and cooperation even after independence, these overtures have repeatedly been met with negativity.

What currency will they use? Westminster makes the pound sound unlikely. Who pays for what part of the national debt? Westminster will want Scotland to take its share. What about the North Sea oil? Westminster will want a cut. What about the Trident nuclear defence program? Westminster thinks it too expensive to remove from Scottish soil. None of these are simple matters to address (Traynor et al, 2014).

Salmond has also openly stated that he wants Scotland to take a seat within the European Union. Yet it faces difficulties with the EU, as member states do not want to offer any encouragement to independence movements in their own countries. This is a particularly thorny issue at present for Spain, where their has been agitation in the Catalan country for independence (Burgen, 2014).

Citizens of other European states have even moved to offer warnings against separatism. Some certainly feel that the 'velvet divorce', the peaceful disentanglement of the Czech and Slovak republics from Czechoslovakia, might have been a mistake (Seifter, 2014). The argument goes that separation resulted in a problematic loss of identity, prestige and negotiating power on the world stage.

All of these arguments against independence seem to come as, either, careful pragmatisms - averse to any sort of risk - or as a warning against upsetting another nation's interests.

The financial situation is clearly a challenge, but one that can be overcome. By taking it on, there is a possibility of reshaping those finances around provincial priorities rather than trying to eke them out from within those of a separate set of provinces, with their own problems and priorities (Jenkins, 2014).

The entry into Europe is also far from an insurmountable problem, and one that is known from the beginning to be a political creation. It is a conflict of interest with other EU member states, that stand to lose prestige if independence movements within their own borders flourish, that stands between Scotland and a fast-tracked entry into the European fold.

Even the regrets of some over the Czechoslovakian split are based on outcomes that are not systemic to small nation-states, nor the products particularly of separatism. Nationalisms, extremisms, fascisms, and the flawed and simplistic politics of identity; all of these things are a product of difficult times endured by individuals with little support and little hope, in many countries, not just of Europe, but of the whole world.

The question, then, comes down to the matter of difference between union and independence. The primary differences for Scotland, between autonomous government within the Union and sovereign government with independence, will be control over their own economy, and a separation and distancing of the identity Scottish, from the identity British.

With independence they will have a government closer to the people affected by its decisions (5 million people, rather than 60 million), and potentially, in federation with Europe, solidarity with an entire continent rather than just an island. With continued union, there is status quo - security offered by Westminster, and an extension to autonomy.

The ideal of independence is self-determination. That we should be ruled by ourselves alone, and not from some distant palace. The question always comes down to where you draw the line. At 5 million people with a common language and history? At 60 million people with a language or two in common and an intertwined history?

The pragmatic talk against independence has been warnings of dire economic risks, and denouncements of petty nationalism. But it all seems so very unnecessary. It is reasonable that different regions have different needs, and divided can better debate their own, address them and represent them. But that division does not have to be about severing connections and building up walls, and closing borders, between peoples.

Independence can  be about moving the powers over local and provincial lives to the localities and the provinces, and of engaging those localities more directly with federal organisations of a much larger scale - for example, with the EU. A much more local and personal government, involving its people and connecting them with a much wider community. The best of both worlds.

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References:
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+ Nick Robinson's 'Scotland - Vote No and get something better?'; on the BBC; 8 September 2014.

+ Fraser Nelson's 'UK #unity2014 rally announced: Trafalgar Square, 6pm on Monday'; in The Spectator; 12 September 2014.

+ Libby Brooks & Severin Carrell's 'Orange Order anti-independence march a 'show of pro-union strength''; in The Guardian; 13 September 2014.

+ Ian Traynor, Katie Allen, Tom Clark, Claire Phipps, Terry Macalister, Robert Booth & Ewen MacAskill's 'If Scotland votes for independence: the key questions answered'; in The Guardian; 9 September 2014.

+ Stephen Burgen's 'Catalans to demonstrate and demand right to hold referendum'; in The Guardian; 11 September 2014.

+ Pavel Seifter's 'Czechs and Slovaks were better together'; in The Guardian; 9 September 2014.

+ Simon Jenkins' 'Scottish independence: A yes vote will produce a leaner, meaner Scotland'; in The Guardian; 4 September 2014.

Independence doesn't have to be about negativity and closing doors

Independence, devolution and autonomy are ideas starting to appear regularly in the public eye. In Scotland, there are citizens campaigning for independence (Wishart, 2014). In Catalonia too (BBC, 2014). In Italy, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is being upstaged in his wishes to devolve greater powers to the cities by the cities themselves (Adams et al, 2014).

As the opposing factions in Scotland debate tonight, the same main issue will circle the debate, as has circled the campaign thus far. From Scotland to Catalonia, the debate has come around and round again to the economic consequences (Hunter, 2014). Will it be disastrous? Can the provinces survive without the power of central government? Can central government survive without taxes being levied from the provinces?

As important as the impact of financial decisions will be, it only goes to reinforce one of the primary factors driving people away from politics in disgust. Economics drives the policy decisions, rather than policy setting the economic direction (Cave & Rowell, 2014).

Yet regional, provincial or city self-government can be about so much more than the money. Regionalism can be about bringing power back closer to the people (Gruen, 2014). There is room to give people a say in the running of the places they live, as individuals rather than always as part of some broader identity group. As such, it does not need to be about nationalism either. It can be about representation, rather than narrowing and retreating. At the moment, nation-states seem to be entirely too guilty of that themselves to be pointing fingers at the provinces (Seth-Smith, 2013).

Nation-states are scrambling to keep their grip. The political factions invested in them, and entrenched within their identities, are desperate to prop up systems that are no longer inspiring the confidence they once did (Orr, 2014). Nationalism once toppled imperialism and the politics of dynasties, all in the name of liberty - freedom for the people.

But somewhere along the way it has just morphed into yet another tool of the establishment for maintaining the status quo. Now we find central governments trying to wrestle with, or woo, globalised corporations and have stand-offs with multi-national political entities, while also telling local authorities what funding they can and cannot spend.

While central government hoards power it is either too small or too large to wield, autonomy is being lost. Open borders and globalised trade mean that progressive regionalism, bringing power back closer to individuals for the decision-making that affects their own lives, doesn't need to stymie their financial wellbeing.

That will be an important matter tonight. Alistair Darling, the former UK Chancellor on behalf of Better Together, and Alex Salmond, the Scottish First Minister on behalf of the pro-independence Yes Scotland, will debate Scotland's future on BBC Two at 20:30 (and BBC One Scotland), and the biggest issue will be whether autonomy or union will be better for each country and the individuals composing them, financially.

But the people of Scotland, and not just of Scotland, should not have to choose between the right to self-governing autonomy and co-operating with other people of other nations, in other countries or provinces. They can co-exist. If nation-states continue to force their provinces to make a choice between the two, it is likely Scotland's independence referendum will not be the last.

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References:
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+ Ruth Wishart's 'Scottish independence debate – time for the second TV ding-dong'; in The Guardian; 24 August 2014.

+ The BBC's 'Spanish parliament rejects Catalan independence vote'; 9 April 2014.

+ Eddy Adams, Raffaele Barbato & Francesco Carollo's 'Devolution, Italian-style – the cities forging their own futures'; in The Guardian; 30 July 2014.

+ Teresa Hunter's 'The true costs of Scottish independence: How it will affect your money'; in The Telegraph; 27 February 2014.

+ Tamasin Cave & Andy Rowell's 'The truth about lobbying: 10 ways big business controls government'; in The Guardian; 12 March 2014.

+ Peter Gruen's 'Leeds city council's radical step to give more power to the people'; on The Northerner Blog; in The Guardian; 30 June 2014.

+ Niki Seth-Smith's 'UKIP and the rise of English nationalism'; on opendemocracy.net; 17 July 2013.

+ Deborah Orr's 'There is a lot more to British democracy than Westminster – or there should be'; in The Guardian; 14 March 2014.