The State of the North: Conservative plans for devolution only make clear the need for truly accountable federalism

Sheffield, part of Conservative plans for a Northern Powerhouse. Photograph: Sheffield Town Hall by Matthew Black (License) (Cropped)

This week, IPPR (Institute for Public Policy Research) held a meeting in Sheffield to look in depth at the Conservative government's ongoing efforts to forge ahead with its 'Northern Powerhouse' project (Sheffield Telegraph, 2015; Cox, Prescott & Jarvis, 2015). Its report, 'The State of the North', lay out four tests that Conservative plans for local devolution have to pass.

The four tests came under the heading of a question, "How will we know whether the ‘northern powerhouse’ is working?" - and set out what the Conservative project must achieve (Cox & Raikes, 2015):

According to the IPPR, it must "generate a better type of economic growth", that brings jobs and higher wages; it must support skill development, particularly for the "very youngest"; it must invest in innovation and infrastructure to support "future success"; and it must "rejuvenate local democracy".

So far however, Conservative plans have been criticised as more about devolving the blame than devolving power (Bailey, 2015). It has been remarked that Conservative proposals hold onto or concentrate further power of decision-making at the centre, while shifting blame for outcomes onto the scapegoats who have to implement plans, on scarce funds, at the local level.

The criticism facing Conservative plans and some of challenges facing the North - highlighted by the substantial divide between North and South in areas like education (Bounds & Tighe, 2015; Dearden, 2015; Allen, 2015) - only make clear the need to embrace true federalism. And that will only the case if the North, the Midlands and the South, along with the nations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, can stand on equal footing with London's Mayoralty.

But it can't just be a case of setting up assemblies. It has to involve a comprehensive reorganisation of regional, city, local, borough, county and unitary council boundaries, as well as the administrative boundaries of essential public services like the NHS or Policing, so power over decision making and funding can be properly devolved to the appropriate level - where it must be transparent and accountable to its constituents.

Such a reorganisation, clearly done, would still leave room for the highest federal level to remain the place for the broadest strategic decision making. A central government could still set the broad scope and aims, direct investment and redirect distribution of resources to where they are needed. Yet clear separation of powers between levels of government could make work at the centre a share in a partnership, rather than dictation from an ivory tower.

Democracy functions best when the decisions made at the ballot box are transparent: when voters know clearly for what it is they are voting, what powers they are handing over, what its limits are and how they can get rid of those power-holders when the need arises.

What can progressives learn from elections around the world?

Progressives have struggled in recent years to get their distinct narratives heard over the cry of populist nationalism. Photograph: Argentina Elections posters from 2013 by Beatrice Murch (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday there where general elections in two countries separated by eight thousand miles, including two half continents and an ocean. Yet they both told a similar story. In neither Argentina nor Poland was there a revival of the Centre-Left like that which brought Justin Trudeau to office in Canada.

In Argentina, the populist and nationalist Justicialist Party, of outgoing President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, had nearest competitors who were fiscal conservatives, ruling party dissenters, and small state neoliberal capitalists. In Poland, that contest was reversed, with the neoliberals in power and the populist nationalists as the main opposition.

In both cases, the populist and nationalist parties were victorious. For the Left, that serves as a stark reminder that there are many places where the progressive voice remains quiet in opposition to populist nationalism, or where centre-left collapsed during the seemingly global discrediting of social democracy and has yet to be rebuilt (Lawson, 2011; Guinan, 2013).

General elections in Argentina

In Argentina, President Kirchner had reached her term limit and so her successor Daniel Scioli was leading their populist coalition Frente para la Victoria (FpV, Front for Victory), dominated by their Peronist Justicialist Party (PJ, Partido Justicialista), into the election. Their main opposition was the broad centrist coalition Cambiemos (Let's Change), featuring Presidential candidate Mauricio Macri's Centre-Right Propuesta Republicana (PRO, Republican Proposal) and Centre-Left Union Civica Radical (UCR, Radical Civic Union). The third major group were the conservative UNA, Unidos por una Nueva Alternativa (United for a New Alternative), a dissenting faction of the ruling Justicialists.

In the Presidential primaries, Front for Victory took 38% of the vote, while Cambienos took 30% and the UNA took 20% (Hodari, 2015). FpV and Cambienos had 8 and 12 senate seats at stake, respectively (with the Radical Civic Union alone holding 7 of them), while the majority of the 130 lower house seats at stake were Justicialist, in total 84, with only 21 from Cambienos (again, the Radical Civic Union alone holding 13 of them).

These parties and coalitions went into an election with the national economy facing escalating inflation and stagnant wages, with a slow recovery from high unemployment on uncertain ground. The election was also mired in scandals, with fears of electoral fraud and intimidation, and somewhat unsettling outbursts from Scioli accusing social network users of plots to damage his image.

Observers had expressed exasperation at the impact of Peronist populism remaining strong, with its nationalists and crowd pleasing facets, for its obstruction of a much more serious debate (Lampa, 2015). Criticism was levelled at the parties only drawing vagaries between the centrist's Cambiemos' more neoliberal approach, toned down to fiscal responsibility, and the populist FpV's centralised state intervention.

The election itself produced a recognisable situation: a country divided multiple ways between several parties. In the Presidential election, there was no clear winner with FpV's Scioli and Cambiemos' Macri both claiming around 35%, with the UNA candidate Massa claiming 21%, which will have to be settled in a run-off in a month's time (Davies, 2015). In the Senate and the House of Representatives, the indications where that there would be more division, with FpV increasing its upper house seats but losing overall control of the lower house (Watts & Goni, 2015).

General elections in Poland

In Poland a similar situation had evolved where one essentially conservative party ruled with others as their primary opposition. Yet in Poland, the situation was slightly reversed. The ruling party where the neoliberal Civic Platform party and the opposition where the populist, nationalist, Eurosceptic, anti-immigration and anti-abortion  Law and Justice party (Nardelli, 2015).

Despite eight years in government and having steered the country through the economic crisis with relative calm, in comparison to other European countries, polling and a loss in the Presidential election in May showed that the Civic Platform party was losing support - falling from 39% at the last election to 25%. For progressives that would have been welcomed as part of the rising tide of support for the radical Left or the recovery of the Centre-Left.

Yet the Presidential election was won, not by the Left, but by the hard-Right Law and Justice party (The Guardian, 2015). That party took 30% at the last election but had risen in the polls to 36%. Meanwhile, efforts to assemble a United Left group to contest the election have only managed to gather around 9% in the polls.

When the exit polls where released, it became apparent that the shift from the Centre-Right to the hard-Right in Poland was in fact being undersold by polling data. Law and Justice were set to take 39% and enough seats to govern alone of the vote while their Centre-Right opponents had fallen even further to 24% (BBC, 2015).

Even more remarkable was that the exit polls suggested the complete failure of a parties of the Left to gain even a single seat. The United Left electoral alliance appear to have fallen short the 8% lower threshold (Cienski, 2015).

Progressives still haven't found their voice

In both countries, the full official results are still coming in. Yet what is clear is that elections in neither Argentina nor Poland have shown the strong progressive movements that the Left in other countries, like Canada and Portugal (Evans-Pritchard, 2015), have tapped into. The progressives parties that do play a prominent role, such as Argentina's Radical Civic Union, find themselves caught up in a politics polarised between conservative electoral factions that are split only over state intervention and whether they should pursue big state or small state conservatism.

Both elections serve as a stark reminder that the Left has still not found a convincing answer to popular nationalism. In the UK, Ed Miliband, under the influence of Blue Labour, simply tried to mimic it so as to steal it away from conservatives. Yet nationalism, and appeals to popular power, remain difficult subjects for the Left. Progressives are at once drawn to popular movements - to protests, marches and popular organisation - and critical of the dangers of suppression of the individual and irrationality inherent to them. The Left is also often seduced by the cohesion and commonality of national pride, even as it undermines internationalist humanitarian ideals.

If progressives are going to compete with and defeat conservatism - and the political divisions apparent across the world say it is very possible, whether it is popular, traditional or economic conservatism - they must build a convincing approach founded in co-operation and pluralism. Those are the characteristics by which the Left stands truly apart from the Right and progressives need to be brave in making the case for them, regardless of how much better nationalism may play with the crowd.

The confrontation between government and opposition over Tax Credits is exposing the need to reform the House of Lords

David Lloyd George took on a Tory Landowner dominated House of Lords in his efforts to pass his Liberal 'People's Budget' of 1909. Photograph: Statue of David Lloyd George in Parliament Square by Matt Brown (License) (Cropped)

Attempts earlier this week by Labour, Liberal Democrat and Crossbench Lords to block the much derided Tax Credit cuts, where derailed yesterday due to fears of sparking a constitutional crisis (Wintour, 2015; Wintour, 2015{2}). Opposition parties where warned against threatening contravention of established parliamentary conventions by the Commons Speaker John Bercow (Wintour, 2015{3}.

The move marked an odd moment for progressive politics in the UK. Since Liberal Prime Minister David Lloyd George sought to take on the House of Lords in his attempt to pass his 1909 budget, the supremacy of the Commons over the Lords has been clearly defined: the Lords cannot impede the government's supply bills, which are concerned with taxation and government spending and, through the later establishment of the Salisbury Convention, the opposition should not block government manifesto promises for which their election is seen as a clear mandate.

The decision of progressives to use the Lords, against which Lloyd George had struggled when it was controlled by an overwhelming Tory majority, represents a severely pragmatic choice.

While the actual threat of constitutional crisis from the Lords blocking Tax Credit cuts has been called into question - on account of whether the changes actually counts as primary, budgetary legislation due to an election campaign promise not to cut them, and no reference to cutting them in the Conservative manifesto (Daily Politics, 2015) - there is a need to stop and consider the implications beyond the legal minutiae.

Both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats (in particular) have proposed, considered and attempted reform of the House of Lords in the past. Liberal Democrat attempts where foiled during the last government, due to obstinacy from Labour and Conservatives (BBC, 2015); and during the last election campaign Labour pledged to replace the Lords with a Senate of the Nations and Regions (Labour, 2015).

The willingness of the opposing parties to even approach a risk of crisis certainly shows is the depth of opposition to the Tax Credit changes, even growing with the Conservative Party itself (Watt, 2015), and the limited legitimate instruments available to the opposition to challenge their passage.

But the hypocrisy it engenders also marks out the need for reform. The UK has an entire, massive and expensive, unelected chamber that cannot act. Any of its votes, and the legitimacy of any of its actions, can be called into question because its assembled numbers are not elected. This is an unacceptable state of affairs.

Contrary to Prime Minister David Cameron's belief that the issue has passed by and should be left alone (Wintour & Watt, 2015), it remains of importance. Issues like Tax Credit cuts are too important for the legislative instruments through which they pass, or in which they are opposed, to be anything less than transparent, clearly purposed and above controversy.

Whether that means establishing a directly proportionally elected upper chamber, or one representative of the nations and regions - in either case holding a longer term view, as opposed to the shorter term community and municipality based Commons - change is needed.

The problem facing the progressive parties, is what to do with those institutions in the meantime. The pragmatic decision - that has clearly been made by Labour and the Lib Dems - is to continue using those instruments as they presently are, despite their problematic nature, because the policies they oppose demand a response and they are the only legal instruments at their disposal.

It is a pragmatic position that Lloyd George would likely have agreed with. Despite being a reformer, Lloyd George was prepared to flood the Lords with newly ennobled Liberals to get his way and, later, the Welsh Prime Minister was still prepared to go into coalition with the Conservatives to pursue his policies.

Their are alternative paths, such as the decision by Justin Trudeau - Liberal leader and newly elected Prime Minister of Canada - to withdraw the Liberal whip from unelected Liberal senators (Mackrael & Wingrove, 2014). Yet such idealistic statements risk getting in the way of practical politics, like opposing policies that have been alleged to risk impoverishing millions of people.

The only solution to this conflict between idealism and pragmatism is to reform the Lords, along with broader electoral reform - for which the necessity is demonstrated by the fact that the controversial Tax Credits policy can only be pursued by the government because the Conservatives hold an unrepresentative majority of seats. Unless there is real reform and clear representation, the policies of any government and the tactics of any opposition will continue to be challenged and undermined.