Catalonia hands pro-independence parties a majority. The road to independence starts here. But where does it end?

La Diada Catalan independence rally, which saw around a million people take to the streets of Barcelona. Photograph: Onze de Setembre, Badalona i Meridiana by Castellers d'Esplugues (License) (Cropped)

On Sunday, the pro-independence parties of Catalonia put a proposition to voters in the regional election (Kassam, 2015). If you want independence from Spain, they said, then vote for us. After years of wrangling, the pro-independence leader Artur Mas promised that a majority of seats in the Catalan Parliament would begin a process leading to independence for Catalonia within eighteen months.

Voters responded by handing the pro-independence parties a majority of seats (BBC, 2015). That part, at least, is unequivocal. The rest will likely be contested down to the last possible moment and measure. Yet the separatist struggle, and how it comes to an end, will regardless have a profound effect upon the rest of Europe - particularly upon the Left.

The two sides of separatism in Catalonia

From the beginning, the legitimacy of the entire separatist movement has been challenged by the government of Spain. From constitutional rulings against holding referendums (Govan, 2014) to threats of legal action against separatist leaders (BBC, 2014), the establishment in Spain has made strenuous efforts to shut down the movement.

Yet even if Spain succeeds in preventing a breakaway, as the UK did, that will not alone solve its problems. The old establishment would most likely remain intact and those supporting the separatist movement, as in the UK, will not likely change their minds and back down after so clear a show of support. The establishment has also left it rather late to start negotiating a compromise solution.

At this point, a breakaway only looks likely to be halted by either a belated compromise deal - unlikely but at least theoretically possible, if the Spanish general election in December follows opinion polling that suggests the ruling, establishment conservative, Partido Popular will suffer a drastic loss of support (Penty, 2015) - or through further suppression. Neither of which is a recipe for long term peace and stability.

For the Catalonian Left, independence represents a new frontier on which the stubborn and intransigent old establishment might be contested. It is an opportunity to reconstruct the state and bring democratic power closer to the people, enhancing self-determination without closing off the provincial community from solidarity with the people of the wider continent (Sole i Ferrando, 2015).

The trouble is that the separatist struggle is not that simple. The Left has long struggled with the questions of identity embedded in nationalist struggles, which largely go against the internationalist and humanist themes inherent to democratic and liberal ideologies - that concern themselves instead with economic inequality and individual opportunities for people in a broader sense that crosses traditional social boundaries.

That makes the division in Catalonia uncomfortable for progressives. The contest between separatists in Catalonia and the establishment in Spain has been described as a struggle between two nationalisms (de Beer, 2014), with conservatism playing a leading role on both sides.

On the Catalonian Right, part of what Convergencia represents is a resentment, also felt in some other of Europe's richer provinces, at the unequal contributions they believe themselves to be making (Jackson, 2015). Like with prosperous industrial provinces such Bavaria, or Northern Italy where Lega Nord receive strong representation with its Far Right interpretation (Kirchgaessner, 2015), there is a belief that central government takes far more away from these regions that it gives back and is not serving their interests - not dissimilar from the sentiments of some regarding the UK's role in the European Union.

The separatists still have large hurdles to clear

After the last election, the two main pro-independence parties of Right and Left - Artur Mas' conservative Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC), leading the Convergence and Union coalition (CiU), and Oriol Junqueras' democratic socialist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) - between them held 71 of 135 seats (Nardelli, 2015).

At the European elections and in opinion polling since then, between them they have usually polled an overall plurality, and at times an outright majority, of support in the province. Individually, the ERC and CDC have polled as high as 24% and 26%, respectively. For this election they agreed to pool their support and stand together as a single pro-independence party, 'Junts pel Si' (Together for Yes, JxSi).

On Sunday that alliance resulted in the parties being just six seats short of a majority in the Catalan Parliament on 40% of the vote, but with pro-independence groups being, overall, in the majority (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). According to the pledge made by Artur Mas, that means the eighteen month countdown to independence has begun.

However, there are huge discussions to be had before the new form of Catalonia can be unveiled. The Left and the Right must still come to a settlement over their respective wishes for reconstruction. Then, together, they must manage their relationship with the establishment in Spain, which has no intention of allowing Catalonia to break away, and the European community - that will not look favourably upon a unilateral declaration of independence without the support of an outright popular majority.

That means, first, overcoming their stark political differences. The ERC and CDC each each represent a deep vein of separatist and reformist sentiment in Europe. For ERC, the pressure from the Left will be to embrace a radical democratic reform of the state. For the right, the CDC exemplifies a regionalist, pro-business, attitude that sees independence as a way of increasing economic efficiencies and integration into the European economic system.

They will both also need to find a way to work with the other pro-independence party, Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) - a far left, socialist and radical democratic party in the mould of its namesake in Greece. Overcoming their differences will not be easy.

The impact of the separatist movement will be felt across Europe

The separatist struggle, however it comes to an end, will have a deeply profound effect upon the rest of Europe. As with the Scottish referendum, moderates, separatists and nationalists of all stripes across Europe will await the outcome and ponder - likely with some anxiety - what it will mean for them.

After decades of trying to achieve reform within the establishment, often being thoroughly complicit in the decisions taken by the establishment, the Left is faced with - particularly social democrats - the possibility of the peaceful and progressive break up of the establishment institutions in various European nation-states.

As shown in Scotland, the mainstream Left has struggled to find a response to the fracturing of the power structures it has come to rely on. As the arguments within the UK Labour Party have shown, it is caught between propping up a crumbling edifice and embracing a new one that does not yet have firm foundations.

For progressives, as with Syriza in Greece, the hope lies in an outcome that shows an alternative to the old establishment positions is possible. An outcome that lays out a path that might be followed to a more civil libertarian and socially just society, able to marry self-determination with an open attitude to the world. For the more cynical, the hope is for clarity as to what the modern state should look like, from where its power should be derived and upon what basis it should claim legitimacy.

There are two pitches on the table for the future of the political left in the UK - a radical proposal from Caroline Lucas and a pragmatic one from Vince Cable

The September conference marked Tim Farron's first as leader of the Liberal Democrats. Photograph: Tim Farron at the Lib Dem conference rally on 19 September 2015 by Dave Radcliffe (License) (Cropped)

Tim Farron's first speech, as leader, at a Liberal Democrat party conference came at a crucial time for the UK's political Left (Kuenssberg, 2015). Farron used his speech to try and unite liberals and social democrats and relaunch the Lib Dems as an opposition party at a time when the opponents of David Cameron and George Osborne are scattered and divided.

Less than six months after a bad election night for Britain's progressives, the two main parties of the Left have just come out of the turmoil of leadership elections. The internal wrangling, squabbles surrounding their respective contests, and the distraction they caused - particularly Labour's (Bush, 2015) - have allowed the thin Conservative majority to roll on unchallenged.

The question that lingers behind the efforts of figures within individual parties, like Farron, is how progressives of all parties, with their new leaderships in place, should come together to present an opposition to the Conservatives.

With regards to that question, there have been two pitches, each representing a different approach to tackling Conservative dominance: one from Caroline Lucas and the other from Vince Cable.

Shortly after the election, Caroline Lucas, the Green Party MP, made the first pitch. She suggested that a progressive alliance be formed in time for the next election in order to avoid splitting the anti-Tory vote (Cowburn & Boffey, 2015). Lucas argued that parties on the Left - again, Labour in particular - needed to embrace multi-party politics and co-operation to counter the advantage that 'split' votes offers to the Conservatives under the present first-past-the-post electoral system (Lucas, 2015).

The second pitch was made by Vince Cable, former deputy leader of the liberal democrats and business secretary. Cable took advantage of the dissensions and threats of splits and defections amongst Labour MPs to resurrect the idea of a realignment of the left (Mason & Perraudin, 2015) - an idea favoured by Roy Jenkins and Tony Blair (d'Ancona, 2015). Cable argues that there is a strong support for a progressive, centrist, party and that moderates from Labour and the Liberal Democrats could unite to fill that space. 

The election of Jeremy Corbyn and Tim Farron, as leaders of Labour and Liberal Democrats respectively, clearly shows where the hearts of the party grassroots are - deep within the radical left. That certainly suggests that there is an openness to the pitch made by Caroline Lucas for a radical alliance, where co-operation replaces the previous status quo, in pursuit of common progressive aims.

However, the parliamentary Labour Party and the so-called 'liberal-left' media have been cold to those instincts (Blair, 2015; Cook, 2015). Since his election, Jeremy Corbyn has been faced with rumours of splits, breakaways and defections by the self-described 'moderate' elements of his party (Peston, 2015).

Tim Farron has so far seen little of this kind of response, despite coming from the more radical edge of the Liberal Democrats (White, 2015). Yet his speech yesterday still tacked to the centre, using language that would appeal to centrist and Right-leaning liberals on hard work and opportunities and making references - that will be familiar to followers of the Labour Party (Penny, 2015) - to the necessity of attaining power before a difference can be made (Farron, 2015).

Within both the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party, there are signs that the old patterns are hard to break. When one party makes a radical move, the other makes a centrist move - each trying to outmanoeuvre the other to be the one, dominant opposition to the Conservatives.

That certainly seems to make Cable's version of the Left coming together more likely. Historically, as Tony Blair has been at pains to tell the world (BBC, 2014), that has been the only choice that has ever been successful.

Yet that does not dampen the desirability of a radical alternative - nor lessen its necessity. Achieving long lasting and much needed change will require more than just an opposition. It needs a compelling alternative. Cable's proposal provides the first, but not the second. In Lucas' pitch, there is the possibility of both.

The austerity narrative, upon which Conservative domination rides, is part of a larger set of systems and presumptions that all need to be challenged - down to their roots. Only a radical alternative can do that - one that is willing to question accepted realities like the two-party monopoly over the electoral system.

So far, radical opposition, across Europe, has been stifled by its isolation (Fazi, 2015). In the UK, however, there are growing opportunities for progressives to work together - and they must if they are to challenge the establishment and the Conservatives who control it.

But before progressives can start down that road they must ask themselves a question, to which the answer matters: will they work together in the pragmatic centre, hoping to inherit control over the establishment, to soften its edges; or will they pursue a more radical course, seeking to challenge the establishment with an alternative vision?

Tsipras has his governing mandate, but weariness and disaffection dominate the mood and demand a positive response

Alexis Tsipras has been returned to power in Greece. Photograph: Alexis Tsipras - Caricature, by Donkey Hotey (License) (Cropped)

Once again, reality has made a fool of the polls. Against all of the indications pointing to a tight and inconclusive contest, Alexis Tsipras and Syriza have once again secured the position as the largest party at the elections in Greece (Smith & Wearden, 2015).

For Syriza though, it won't be all smiles and celebrations. The election also showed the clear limits of Tsipras' style of popular radical democracy. Voter turnout has waned drastically, with people worn thin by crisis after crisis and exhausted by Victory or Death stand-offs with creditors.

Alexis Tsipras resignation, back in August, was a gambit that triggered an election, with the purpose of shoring up his parliamentary support (Smith, 2015) - and possibly in acknowledgement of public weariness. His party's numbers in parliament had been irreparably dented by the rebellion of the Left Platform faction over the signing, by the Syriza leader, of the bailout terms negotiated with the European Union (Henley & Traynor, 2015).

In the run up to the election, the power of Tsipras' populist approach and personal appeal, for which Tsipras has been criticised (Patrikarakos, 2015), appeared to be on the wane (Smith, 2015{2}) - in line with the general disaffection. Yet on election day, Tsipras and Syriza proved resilient. In that sense, his gambit was successful.

Victory gives to Tsipras the task of building a majority coalition. At one stage, Syriza's falling popularity made it necessary to float the possibility of a coalition with Pasok and To Potami - the establishment social democratic and social liberal parties, respectively - in a centre-left and pro-European alliance (Ruparel, 2015).

In the end, though, the scale of the victory matched that of January and will allow Tsipras to rebuild his coalition with ANEL (BBC, 2015). But this time, he will be able do so without the most rebellious of the factions within his own party. That group, the Left Platform, had split away to form up under their own banner as Popular Unity. They stood against Syriza in the election, only to lose every single one of their seats, falling beneath the parliamentary representation threshold (Nardelli, 2015).

Few of Syriza's other opponents fared much better (Malkoutzis, 2015). New Democracy, under their acting leader Vangelis Meimarakis, could not, in the end, close the gap to Syriza and finished over seven points adrift. No other party managed to collect more than 7% of the vote. When it came down to it, it did not seem to be that Tsipras had triumphed, so much as he had found himself as the last man standing.

Being the only credible option left has given the Syriza leader a strong position that he will need, as the task facing the victor doesn't offer much in the way of joy (Elliott, 2015). The second term Prime Minister now has implement the austerian conditions of the bailout agreement and, importantly, negotiate for debt relief - without which the country will plunge back into chaos.

Tsipras will also need his strong parliamentary position because the biggest winner of the night was not Syriza. With voter turnout down to just 56%, the mood in Greece is now clearly dominated by disaffection and weariness. Despite his emphatic victory, Tsipras will have to lead his Syriza government without the kind of popular public mandate he had enjoyed for the first half of 2015.

Until now, Tsipras has tried to follow a radical democratic course in which he aimed, it seemed, to use the popular mobilisation of the people as a powerful political bargaining chip. Yet Syriza's victories with this strategy were limited and, in the case of the OXI referendum vote, became little more than a pyrrhic demonstration of dissent in the act of compliance.

With the people clearly tired from the strain of the crisis and weary and frustrated by pyrrhic acts of dissent and defiance, Tsipras and Syriza - at least for the moment -  have exhausted their popular political capital. That fatigue will limit the hands that Tsipras will be able to play in his game of political poker with the European austerian establishment.

Tsipras idea of radicalism has long been about popular power (from Horvat, 2013).

"I believe that today 'radical' is to try to be able to take responsibility for the people, to not be afraid of that, and at the same time to maintain in the democratic road, in the democratic way. To take the power for the people and to give it back to the people."

He and his party must now, because the people are tired, instead show that they can use parliamentary power - and they must use it to restore the people's belief. Their disaffection and weariness need to be healed with hope and opportunity, because, in the long run, a political crisis can be as dangerous to Greece as the economic crisis that currently engulfs it.

As the dissenting economist Yanis Varoufakis has made clear (Varoufakis, 2015; Luis Martin, 2015), the collapse of the mainstream systems into crisis does not, and has never, benefited a rational and progressive Left. Crisis breeds fear and fear feeds narrow and extreme responses.

Tsipras has his mandate, but the big challenge is still ahead. He must rebuild the economy and visibly tackle the old corrupt establishments, both in Greece and in Europe. And he must, above all, find a way to show people in Greece and Europe a positive and reforming way forward.