Earlier this week, Marine Le Pen's Front National (FN) took a, sadly not entirely unexpected, lead in the first round of the
French regional elections (Chrisafis, 2015). While by no means emphatic, with 28% of the vote, to 27% for the Centre-Right Republicans and 23% for the Centre-Left Socialists, the Far-Right party nonetheless holds a lead that is no joke - thanks to the majority bonus awarded to the leading party in each region.
It will be a cold comfort to progressives that Front National's success has been largely laid at the feet of the parties of the Centre (Nougayrede, 2015). The rise of FN has been described seen as the product of the failures of the parties of the political centre. Those parties are struggling, discredited by their failure to address France's long term problem of unemployment and the impact, and narrow rewards, of globalisation.
The
transformist Centre parties, with their "conservative and social democratic modes of liberalism", have come to be seen as a 'complacent', 'insulated' and elite 'caste', and having laid the foundations for themselves to be supplanted by the Far-Right's more emotive and simplistic alternatives (Behr, 2015).
"No two countries have exactly analogous politics, but common threads run across Europe. The unifying dynamic appears to be the interaction of financial insecurity and the cultural detachment of governing elites from the governed... politicians of the technocratic centre are perceived as a caste apart, professionally complacent, insulated by hoarded privilege from the anxiety provoked in electorates by economic turbulence and abrupt demographic change..."
The fact that the Far-Right sit now on the doorstep of the establishment, so close to power in one of Europe's largest and most influential countries, has sparked fears of what the Centre's failure will entail for the broader European project (Betancour, 2015). The European system, a symbol of the time and effort required to build progressive institutions that break down borders and bring people together, was decades in the making - but appears now to be only years in the unravelling.
What is notable is that, as the Centre has collapsed, only the Right has really benefited. Meanwhile the Left has made few, if any, gains. In fact, in France, FN have largely made their initial inroads into the traditional heartlands of the Centre-Left Socialists (Nardelli, 2015). So the big questions for progressives are: Why? And, what can be done?
In France, the first steps taken in response by the scrambling Centre were to close ranks (Willsher, 2015). France returns to the polls for the second round today and in districts where Socialists trail in third place, the party has withdrawn candidates - falling back on tactical voting to ensure the victory of the least worst alternative (Chrisafis, 2015{2}). It also made the remarkable, though unrequited, suggestion of forming a Republican Front - uniting Centre-Left and Centre-Right - to hold back the rise of Front National.
From the perspective of those on the Left, it might be a lot easier to pour scorn on such a project than to become embroiled with discredited establishment's attempts to save their own necks. Yet becoming involved is precisely what some have proposed.
In an article based on a lecture he gave in 2013, before his adventure into political economics as Finance Minister of Greece, Yanis Varoufakis argued that only the Right ever benefits from breakdown and disorder (Varoufakis, 2015).
"If my prognosis is correct, and we are not facing just another
cyclical slump soon to be overcome, the question that arises for
radicals is this: should we welcome this crisis of European capitalism
as an opportunity to replace it with a better system? Or should we be so
worried about it as to embark upon a campaign for stabilising European
capitalism? To me, the answer is clear. Europe’s crisis is far less likely to
give birth to a better alternative to capitalism than it is to unleash
dangerously regressive forces that have the capacity to cause a
humanitarian bloodbath, while extinguishing the hope for any progressive
moves for generations to come."
What Varoufakis touches upon is that progressive politics depends upon building things - like a free and open civic space, or the infrastructure for broadly available healthcare and welfare. These things that cannot be easily made or remade, but are all too easy to tear down. In contrast, social or institutional breakdown benefits the Right because it drives itself with simpler, emotive, even instinctual, constructs. Traditionalism, moralism, nationalism: these have the advantage of being old and familiar, and already deeply rooted in the identity of the audience.
For Varoufakis, when the Centre fails, the Left needs to acknowledge its weakness and take up the task of responsible government - including propping up elements of the old establishment, in order to save past progress and to have something left to reform.
"Yet my aim here is to offer a window into my view of a repugnant
European capitalism whose implosion, despite its many ills, should be
avoided at all costs. It is a confession intended to convince radicals
that we have a contradictory mission: to arrest the freefall of European
capitalism in order to buy the time we need to formulate its
alternative."
Alexis Tsipras, Radical Left Prime Minister of Greece, has described any politician setting foot upon that road as needing to be pragmatic about what can be accomplished in government (from Horvat, 2013).
"I believe that today 'radical' is to try to be able to take responsibility for the people, to not be afraid of that, and at the same time to maintain in the democratic road, in the democratic way. To take the power for the people and to give it back to the people."
Yet Tsipras' approach, this
pragmatic radicalism, has its critics. On the one hand, it plays an exhausting game with democratic institutions that can be easily become fatigued (Patrikarakos, 2015). On the other, buying into the game in order to achieve practical things comes with a risk of succumbing to its pressures and ultimately conforming (Anthony, 2015). Another concern with Tsipras' pragmatic approach, is that the line of thinking can very easily lead to the temptations of Blairism.
Just this week, Tony Blair himself took to the pages of The Spectator to offer a defence of the 'Blairist' approach (Perraudin, 2015). He was quick to point out the 'flaw' in his critics' thinking.
"In particular, significant elements of the Party saw the process of governing with all its compromises, pragmatism and embrace of changing times as implicit betrayal of our principles."
Blair's defence of his direction focusses tightly, as his defenders and successors often do, on being willing to make 'hard choices' in order to be in power - placing value on "aspiring to govern" over being a "fringe protest" (Blair, 2015).
Yet that attitude also features a dangerous obsession with basing practical politics in "reality". On the face of it, this is a call for rational politics, taking the world as what it is rather than the utopia you might wish it to be - to base policy, and the political moves used to achieve them, on the 'reality' of the world as you find it. The trouble is that, beneath the surface of this approach, what it really means is engaging in a deceitful game of playing on, and to, often incomplete or outright wrong public perceptions (Jones, 2015).
For those who feel New Labour wandered too far to the political Right, a big part of the problem was that they had become anchored to 'reality', largely purveyed by a conservative media, and played to popular prejudice in search of an easy route to power. In the process simply turning the Centre and Left into a vehicle for the popular
conservatisms of the moment.
The danger of that course is, however, that if you keep playing to conservative perceptions you are only going to reinforce them. The result will be more citizens who interpret the world through conservative perceptions, and so make their decisions accordingly - ultimately making it more difficult to propose progressive policies in the future.
European politics, and in particular politics in France, have seen an expansion of this problem. Technocrats have spent decades quietly implementing the rules and regulations to bring about European unity - at least in the technical sense. Yet they have spent too little time on the engagement, debate and
education in the civic space that promotes and spreads the values behind them, and creates the 'values consciousness' amongst the public that parallels institutions and builds a bridge between them.
In the UK, the Liberal Democrats stand as a cautionary tale. The Lib Dems spent decades rebuilding, offering a progressive alternative but where brought low in just five years when they failed to meet the expectations of their supporters - decades in the recruiting - trying to meet the popular expectations of a 'party of government'.
In order to build a lasting progressive politics, there needs to
be a long term, concerted social project - for hearts and,
particularly, minds - that develops and promotes a form of compassionate, rational, government (Clark, 2015). Progressive parties have to be engaged with the political tasks of spreading ideas and changing minds required for the construction of a progressive social consciousness.
To that end, simply sneaking into power by pretending to be conservative isn't enough, and it never will be. That doesn't mean that the Left shouldn't seek to be practical, like Varoufakis suggests, and, as in France today, be willing to be practical in its compromises with the Centre and the establishment to prevent much worse outcomes.
But the Left has to be about more than just words. It needs to act as well, to actively live its values and promote their means and purposes. Progressives cannot be afraid to govern, but they cannot sacrifice the necessary work for easy access to power. There is no trade off to be made. Trying to do the former without the latter will only lead to failure, compounding more failures to come.
