Around the World: The Trump Insurgency

Donald Trump chose the Republican Elephant as the mount for his insurgent populist campaign that has ridden the divisive politics of the far-right deep into the American political system.

With the two main parties having settled - which might be an almost too painfully apt expression - on their respective candidates, it is now established who will stand, and for what they will stand, in the 2016 US Presidential Election.

Hillary Clinton will face Donald Trump - but only on the surface will it be a contest between Democrat and Republican. Beneath the party façade the Presidential race reflects a struggle that is a clear pattern emerging across the Western world, seen clearly in most of the recent elections in Europe, between the mistrusted mainstream and a Far Right insurgency.

Whether it was the Brexit referendum or the French regional elections, in this time of crisis progressives have found themselves having to wrestle with a difficult proposition: whether to oppose an imperfect mainstream at the risk of inviting in the Far Right, or to stand with the hated establishment, itself struggling for legitimacy against authoritarianism and sectarianism.

In the US, Bernie Sanders and his supporters tried to capture control of the mainstream Democrats so that the Left might lead from the front. Having failed, they're now left struggling with what to do in the face of Trump's mirrored insurgency succeeding in its capture of the rival Republicans. Despite Sanders' endorsement of Hillary, many of his supporters remain unconvinced.

Trump's insurgency has increased the sense of urgency, if not yet panic, across the Centre and Left. With no hint of irony, despite the hyperbole, even moderate commentators are expressing genuine fears for the future of American democracy (Finchelstein, 2016; Noah, 2016; Collier, 2016) - perhaps a part of which is an attempt to motivate the Left to fall in behind Hillary by stressing the seriousness of the fight ahead.

Political sensibility suggests that moderacy will ultimately win out - that Trump will eventually, whatever his rhetoric, have to bow to political realism. But that sensibility is cold comfort.

The most dangerous thing Trump has done is to force the coalescence of a constituency, previously scattered and with no common identity, that is persuaded by and supportive of authoritarian values (Taub, 2016). Trump himself, whatever his reactionary verbiage, is less of a concern than what this organised political movement, given common identity, might yet be used to accomplish.

The Republicans, the Grand Old Party (GOP), had already been through the long slow process, from Lincoln's time onwards, of coming under conservative control. But since the 1960s, conservatives have decisively consolidated their control over the party - including inviting the influx of Southern Democrats spurned by the embrace of the civil rights movement by the Democrats.

The consolidation definitively moved the GOP away from the Republicanism of Lincoln toward something more resembling the Republicanism of Jefferson - a parochial populist anti-establishment, or rather anti-elite, politics, with a strict and restrictive adherence to the constitution. Recent decades saw that combined with a sectarian Nativism and a politicised Evangelism.

What Trump has now rallied about the Republican Party is support for a popular authoritarianism able to cut across the distinctions, separating members of the coalition headed 'Republican', with a methodology: signified by a language that is brash, abrasive and often violent.

It is not surprising in the face of Trump's rhetoric that people have drawn connections between him and fascism. The theme of violence against others, against opponents, violence and conflict as decisive social positives, was a crucial tenet of fascism and has been inherited by its more 'democratic' successor populism (Finchelstein, 2016).

The Left and Centre getting behind the mainstream to oppose the rise of these violent ideologies is only the first step. Defeating it at one election is not the end of the matter. It does not address the reasons why people would seek out an abrasive, anti-establishment, anti-elite, strongman leader in the first place. The concerns of those voters must be understood, contextualised and addressed with positive solutions.

The angry, authoritarian-supporting, voters who would back a man like Donald Trump are not the enemies of progressives. For the most part they're victims of economic conditions, looking with misguided hope to strength and might for deliverance. The job of progressives is to extend a hand, show a better way to build a society and to expose the Far-Right programme for the fraud it is.

Spain shows us that to break old status quo and make proportional representation work, we need to outgrow adversarial politics

The Palacio de las Cortes in Madrid, home to the currently implacably divided Congress of Deputies. Photograph: Congress from Pixabay (License) (Cropped)

In twenty three days, Spain will go to the polls for its second election in just six months. Its first saw the seats in congress divided between Left and Right in such a way as to make forming a government unlikely (Tremlett, 2016).

Therein lies the challenge of proportional representation. While each political party may be able to make its ideas and its membership more homogeneous, there ultimately remains the need to be able to work amicably with those holding other such 'purified' stances.

Over the last five to ten years, Spain's has seen it political mainstream collapse. New parties of Citizen movements have sprung up, and through the proportional electoral system have found themselves to be collectively a third force, along with the regionalist parties, that must enthrone a new government.

Yet they have found an old social democratic Left, that might make the more tolerable ally, weakened and shrunken and the old conservatives the intolerable but only realistic option. The numbers did not add up and a new election awaits.

In the UK, voices on the Left and Right have considered how the break up of the present political alignment, itself an incoherent and inconsistent series of alliances, might be redrawn with more coherency.

Tim Montgomerie has envisioned Westminster's political parties rearranged into parties for Solidarity (essentially Democrats), Liberals, Nationals (Conservative Christian Democrats) and a party of the Far Right (Montgomerie, 2016). And Owen Jones has argued that Labour's internal strife may not be curable, with a split into more coherent groups inevitable and ultimately desirable (Jones, 2016).

Spain reveals that this is only the first step. In their incomplete breakdown of two party politics, the adversarial division remain. The old grievances are clung to as a marker of identity. The next step has to be maturity.

If the future of British politics splits the establishment in four parties then at least two will have to work together to form a government - and it may not always be the ideal two. That will require the parties to compromise and cooperate, and to find a way to do so without feeling their identity is threatened.

The attitude of the Labour supporters or Trade Unionists who hissed BBC Political Editor Laura Kuenssberg does not suggest a group of people ready to swap the UK's archaic adversarial politics for a system based on tolerances and compromise (Cowburn, 2016). Neither does the unbearable and vicious braying of the Tory parliamentarians every Wednesday at PMQs.

For the Left, finding a way beyond this confrontational, intolerant state is essential. Achieving progressive aims is only becoming less and less likely to be achievable through the medium of one, monolithic, party.

An alliance of progressives, of different strands, each on their own coherent - trade unionism, eco-socialism, democratic socialism, liberalism, social democracy and other various shades of centrism - requires those on the Left to find common aims, and to work amicably together with other progressives, while tolerating fundamental differences in ultimate priorities.

The introduction of proportional representation and seeing the old establishment parties split can only do so much to improve politics. Without the spirit of cooperation, without outgrowing adversarial divisions, we risk falling back into the same divisive patterns.

What kind of economy would Labour's new economic advisory council build?

Photograph: John McDonnell MP, with residents and supporters of Grow Heathrow outside Central London County Court in 2012, by Jonathan Goldberg/Transition Heathrow (License) (Cropped)

John McDonnell, Labour's new socialist shadow chancellor, has moved to rebuild the party's economic reputation by appointing an economic advisory council (BBC, 2015). The council is, by all estimations, a supergroup comprised of the rockstar economists of anti-austerity thinking: Thomas Piketty, Joseph Stiglitz, Mariana Mazzucato, Anastasia Nesvetailova, Ann Pettifor and David Blanchflower.

There are two clear aims to this move. The first is to show that, not only is austerity thinking flawed, but that there are clear alternatives. The second is win back for Labour the credibility on economic policy that they had lost, fairly or not, by 2010.

It has been argued, seemingly endlessly, that without both credibility and a clear alternative, Labour's reputation - and so its ability to win elections - will not recover (Elliott, 2012; Kendall, 2015; Reid, 2015). So it is important to know what kind of alternative Labour's new advisors would have them construct.

The resumes of Labour's new advisors

Thomas Piketty is a French economist who had a large impact, in political and economic circles, with his 2013 book Capital in Twenty-First Century. In that work, he puts forward a simple premise and explores it in depth.

Piketty's thesis is that the concentration of wealth, resulting from the rate of return on capital being in the long term in excess of economic growth, is as much a political problem as an economic one. In his assessment, the access to capital brought by inherited wealth and the 'rentier' power it gives, prevents the competition and distribution for which the free market is lauded.

That is an assessment agreed with by the OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. They argue that their findings show that income inequality in fact strangles growth, with countries that have a more even income spread actually performing better (OECD, 2014).

Piketty's proposed solution is for progressive taxes to be levied upon wealth and coordinated globally to suit the globalisation of capitalism. The failure to pursue this, in the French economist's eyes, means standing by as the rich consolidate control over society, crushing democracy in their wake by leaving the poor dispossessed and powerless (Naidu, 2014).

This concern with regards to inequality is shared by Joseph Stiglitz, former Clinton advisor and critic of the management of market globalization (Stiglitz, 2000). Stiglitz's work The Price of Inequality argued that inequality was as much the concern of the 1% as the 99%, as 'their fate is bound up' with how the other side live (Roberts, 2012).

To tackle inequality, Stiglitz argues that there needs to be a change in norms. He argues that free markets in fact need the protection of strong regulations and transparent accountability (Edsall, 2012), in order to break the monopolies on power that are used to influence selfish terms - to, in essence, reclaim capitalism.

For Mariana Mazzucato, reclaiming capitalism begins with reimagining the role of the state (Mazzucato, 2013). Mazzucato envisions the state as a risk-taking innovator, the creator and shaper of markets, and the natural agent to act in the 'common good' where privatisation is poorly suited and will not stop public subsidy (Mazzucato, 2013{2}).

She argues that this includes the provision of essential public services like education or health; investments in public infrastructure; investment and support for entrepreneurs, whether in business, for research, or for science and technology - all areas where steady, engaged, long-term investment commitments are needed.

Yet Mazzucato is not arguing for nationalisation or a growing of the state, but rather for a smarter state (Mazzucato, 2014) - bold and able to take risks. Quoting Keynes, she argues for a state that opens up new markets and regulates them:

"The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all."

As for the others on Labour's select list of economists?

Ann Pettifor predicted the severity of the economic crisis with her 2006 book The coming first world debt crisis and, in a very Keynes-esque manner, has worked hard to make clear the dangerous role that debt has played in events (Cooper, 2015). She has also argued that the debt crisis exposed dangerous collusion between governments and the finance sector that broke the 'link between risk and reward' and so chained 'free' markets (Pettifor, 2014).

David Blanchflower, a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, has spoken out against the idea that Labour 'caused' the 2008 financial crisis and against the economics of austerity (Blanchflower, 2015). Blanchflower was amongst the signatories of a letter during the Labour leadership campaign - along with Mazzucato - that argued Jeremy Corbyn's economic policy was in fact the moderate, mainstream response and it was instead George Osborne's austerity that was extreme (Blanchflower et al, 2015).

And finally there is Anastasia Nesvetailova, whose work Fragile Finance warned in 2007 of the fragility and instability of the finance-based economy, upon which the whole political and globalised economic house of cards was based (Nesvetailova, 2007).

The respectable face of economic opposition

So what kind of economy do these ideas combine to form?

In a definite stance of opposition to the dominant, and austere, conservative approach, the consensus running through Labour's new advisors is for the state to have a strong role - though not through nationalisation. The emphasis is placed upon the work the state does to create a framework for society - on infrastructure, on social security, on regulating market activity.

In fact, looking over the recommendations is almost like a review of German economics in the late twentieth century during the time of Germany's Wirtschaftswunder - its 'economic miracle'. The social market, so-called Rhine Capitalist, system that underwrote that economic boom was plush with public-private partnerships.

Inspired by German Ordoliberalism, the state was to act as regulator and facilitator in the Rhenist system (Guerot & Dullien, 2012). The aim was to ensure greater equality, and widely enjoyed prosperity, all while retaining an appreciation for free markets - so attempting to get the social aims and a vibrant market to go along hand in hand.

The ideas also bear some resemblance to those of Liberals and Liberal Democrats in the UK over the decades. Setting themselves apart from the Conservatives and Labour, their approach was to argue that it was not about a large or a small state, but about what the state is and what it does (Brack et al, 2007) - so Liberals might pursue the most efficient solution with the least interference with the individual.

In these similarities with liberal ideas, the approach of Labour's new advisors marks a kind of sharp change for the party, away from the centralised and overbearing managerialism it has pursued since the Second World War. But what stands out most is that, if we can accept that austerity represents a purely right-wing form of economics, the vision these economists are putting forward represent the mainstream - the democratic economics of the centre.

Building an alternative

With these very much mainstream, Keynesian-esque, ideas - based on broad analysis critical of austerity but friendly to markets - accomplishing the task of recovering Labour's credibility should not be such a long shot. Even reaching out to reintegrate the unhappy New Labour-ites should not be impossible.

For restoring their respectability, it is now a matter of building that model and presenting it to the public, which - if done right - could create the base from which the Conservative approach can be disassembled.

That would mean embracing Keir Hardie as Jeremy Corbyn did, in his first speech to the Labour Party conference as leader (Kennedy & Grierson, 2015). The existence of a credible alternative to the rigours of austerity allows the party to challenge the necessity of the suffering it has caused, and to try to 'stir up divine discontent with wrong'.

And yet, while the dry and balanced macroeconomic mainstream vision is the economist's dream ticket to government office, it is not hard to imagine these technical reforms falling short of progressive expectations.

There are radical ideas with not touched on here.

Citizen's income (Razavi, 2014), mutuals and co-ops (Webb, 2015), shorter working hours and the possibilities that automation are bringing (Mason, 2015) - these are all ideas tied closely to questions of equality, accountability and innovation.

However, there is likely more to come from the team of Corbyn & McDonnell - not least the pursuit of rail renationalisation (BBC, 2015{2}) and community owned energy companies (BBC, 2015{3}) - than is being accounted for here. Those extra measures are needed.

If we are to have more equality and accountability in the economy, there needs to be more co-operation. Which means more say for workers in the running of their workplaces and a greater mutuality of aims.

And if people are to enjoy full balanced lives, they also need enough time to embrace more than just their universal human rights to fair paid work and 'rest and leisure'. They need the resources and time to study, to raise families, to assemble, to debate and to act.

And if people are to have both of the above with freedom, from both want and coercion, they need the basic guarantee against poverty and homelessness afforded by a Citizen's Income.

As it says in the old Liberal Party's Yellow Book (1928), written under the deep influence of David Lloyd George and John Maynard Keynes:

'We believe with a passionate faith that the end of all political and economic action is not the perfecting or the perpetuation of this or that piece of mechanism or organisation, but that individual men and women may have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.'

A true progressive alternative to conservative economics needs to embrace big ideas. It needs to reform, it needs to challenge and it needs to spark hope of a new way forward.